B. K. RATHI, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant, Vijay Singh has made a request for bail in appeal filed against his conviction for offence under Section 498-A, 304-B I. P. C. and D. P. Act in S. T. No. 1294 of 1996 decided on 5-3-1998 passed by Ist Additional Session Judge, Aligarh. ( 2 ) I have heard Sri G. P. Dixit, learned counsel for the appellant, Vijay Singh and the learned A. G. A. ( 3 ) IT is contended that the appellant is in jail since April, 1996 i. e. , since last four years. Learned Counsel has referred to decision of the Apex Court in the case of Takhat Singh v. State of M. P. , (1999) 10 JT 438 . In this case, the appeal against the conviction for offence under Sec. 302 I. P. C. was pending before High Court. The appellants applied for bail and it was rejected indicating that the appellants can renew their prayer for bail after one year. After one year second bail application was moved which was also rejected. Therefore, the convicts filed appeal before the Honble Supreme Court. It was observed by the Apex Court that the appellants were already in jail for over three years and three months. That there is no possibility of early hearing of the appeal in the High Court. The bail was therefore, granted by the Apex Court. It is contended that in the present case the appellant, Vijay Singh is in jail for over four years and there is no possibility of the appeal being heard early, therefore he is entitled to bail. ( 4 ) THE question therefore, for consideration is whether the above decision of the Apex Court is intended for universal application and whether it should be considered that the Apex Court has laid down that all the accused who are in jail for more than three years and three months should be enlarged on bail divorced from the facts. I therefore, consider whether any such law has been declared by the Apex Court by the aforesaid judgment. ( 5 ) THE law declared by the Honble Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution of India which is as follows :"the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. ( 5 ) THE law declared by the Honble Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution of India which is as follows :"the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. " ( 6 ) THE question therefore is whether any law has been declared in the above case of Thakat Singh by the Apex Court. Unless it is a law declared by the Honble Supreme Court the same is not binding on this Court. The Honble Supreme Court itself has pointed as to where its decision shall not be deemed to be the precedents. ( 7 ) IN this connection, I may refer to para 22 of the decision of Honble three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab (1979)3 SCC 745 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1384 ). The para 22 of the Judgment is as follows :"with greatest respect, the majority decision in Rajendra Prasad case (supra) does not lay down any legal principle of general applicability. A decision on a question of sentence depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, can never be regarded as a binding precedent, much less law declared within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution so as to bind all Courts within the territory of India. According to the well settled theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients: (I) findings of material facts and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts ; (II) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (III) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above. FOR the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. It is not everything said by a judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. It is not everything said by a judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judges decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it isimportant to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. In the leading case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes, LR 1959 AC 743 (1959)2 All ER 38 it was laid down that the ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problem raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents. The judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties themselves), nor are the findings of facts. This means that even where the direct facts of an earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case before the Court, the judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier case. " ( 8 ) THE observations of constitutional Bench of the Apex Court reported in A. D. M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207 made in para 546 of the judgment are also material which is as follows:"moreover, it must be remembered that when we are considering the observations of a high judicial authority like this Court, the greatest possible care must be taken to relate the observations of a judge to the precise issues before him and to confine such observations, even though expressed in broad terms, in the general compass of the question before him, unless he makes it clear that he intended his remarks to have a wider ambit. It is not possible for judges always to express their judgments so as to exclude entirely the risk that in some subsequent case their language may be misapplied and any attempt at such perfection of expression can only lead to the opposite result of uncertainty and even obscurity as regards, the case in hand. " ( 9 ) CERTAIN important observations were also made by Kerala High Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Vasudevan reported in 1975 Cr. " ( 9 ) CERTAIN important observations were also made by Kerala High Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Vasudevan reported in 1975 Cr. LJ, 97. (FB ). The following observation is relevant for the purpose:"judicial propriety, dignity and decorum demand that being the highest judicial tribunal in the country even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court should be accepted as standing Declaration of law by that Court even if it be only by the way, has to be respected. But all that does not mean that every statement contained in a judgment of that Court would be attracted by Art. 141. Statements on matters other than law have no binding force. Several decisions of the Supreme Court are on facts and that Court itself has pointed out in Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab (1972 FAC 549) and Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1960 SC 195 ) that as on facts no two cases could be similar, its own decisions which were essentially on question of fact could not be relied upon as precedents for decision of other cases. " ( 10 ) I find that the case of Takat Singh (1999 (10) JT (SC) 438) (supra) does not lay down any legal principle of general and universal applicability. It is the ratio decidendi of the decision which is material and every thing said in the judgment does not constitute a precedent. There is no statement of principle of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts. By means of the above judgment directions given are not of a wider ambit and not intended to be issued to other Courts. The Honble Supreme Court from time to time had issued directions regarding the trial and disposal of the criminal cases which are to be followed universally. However, no direction has been issued in this case that the accused who is in custody for more than three years three months should be granted the facility of bail. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, divorced from the facts of the case the accused appellant can not be released on bail for the reason of his detention of over three years three months because the Apex Court had extended the facility in the case cited above. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, divorced from the facts of the case the accused appellant can not be released on bail for the reason of his detention of over three years three months because the Apex Court had extended the facility in the case cited above. ( 12 ) IN the present case the appellant, Vijay Singh is the husband of the vicitm. He was married with the victim five years before the incident. After the incident the dead body was consigned to flames in hot haste without any information to the parents of the victim or to authorities. There is no cogent explanation by the appellant as to how his wife died. The appellant was refused bail during trial. ( 13 ) CONSIDERING the circumstances, I do not find any ground to release the appellant on bail. The request for bail is refused. Petition dismissed. .