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2000 DIGILAW 956 (MP)

Uco Bank, Guna v. Smt. Laxmi Ojha

2000-09-04

S.P.SRIVASTAVA

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ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the defendant-applicant. 2. The learned counsel for the applicant has produced the copy of application filed under Section 23Aof the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 3. The defendant-tenant-applicant is aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Guna, rejecting its application seeking amendment in the written statement filed by it opposing the application of the non-applicant-respondent seeking an order for the eviction of the defendant from the premises in dispute which was claimed to be bonafide required by the landlady for meeting out the urgent necessity disclosed in the application. 4. The application under Section 23-A of the Act had been filed by the plaintiff-respondent asserting that her husband had died and in order to meet the expenses for maintaining the family and the expenses for getting her minor son educated she wanted to establish her own cloth business in the premises in dispute which has been let out to the defendant-Bank at the rental of Rs. 2,900/- per month. In the application it was also indicated that the landlady had a capital of Rs. 4,00,000/- which she intended to invest in establishing the cloth business dealing in the sale of sarees etc. and opening a show-room for the purpose. 5. After the closure of the plaintiff's evidence and subsequent to the defendant's having examined one of its witnesses on the next dated fixed for completing of the evidence an application was filed by the defendant-applicant seeking amendments in the written statement. Under the proposed amendment the Bank wanted to bring on record the fact that the landlady had asked the Bank to increase the rent by 30% and when this request was refused the application seeking ejectment of the defendant- Bank from the premises in dispute was filed, even though the defendant-Bank was prepared to increase the rent at the rate of 10%. 6. The landlady objected to the proposed amendment asserting that no such demand had ever been raised by her as alleged. 7. The Rent Controlling Authority has rejected the aforesaid application vide the impugned order not only on the ground that it had been filed belatedly but observing that the purpose of filing the proposed amendment application was to delay the proceedings which is of a very special nature and intended to give relief to the deserving landlord at the earliest. 7. The Rent Controlling Authority has rejected the aforesaid application vide the impugned order not only on the ground that it had been filed belatedly but observing that the purpose of filing the proposed amendment application was to delay the proceedings which is of a very special nature and intended to give relief to the deserving landlord at the earliest. It was also indicated that in view of the fact that the plaintiff had closed her evidence, with the introduction of such facts the proceedings will not only be delayed but even the defence already put in will stand altered. 8. The observations made in the impugned order indicate that the application had been rejected on the view firstly that it was belated and secondly that taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record evidence would be required to be led after exchange of pleadings resulting in unnecessary delay. The accommodation was required in essence for being utilised to establish and start a business for independent source of adequate income in order to meet the expenses relating to family. The requirements which were to be met included the expenses for education of the minor son of the landlady. The landlady proposed to invest about Rs. 4,00,000/- in the new business which was intended to be set up in the premises in dispute. 9. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance in support of his submission on the observations made in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B.K. Narayana Pillai Vs. Parameswaran Pillai and another, reported in (2000) I SCC 712. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has observed that no amendment should be allowed which amounts to or results in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. But the delay of its own could not be a ground for rejecting the application for amendment when the opposite party could be compensated by costs. 10. It may be noticed that in the aforesaid case the amendment which had been proposed was to bring on record an alternative plea seeking protection of the provisions of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easement Act, 1882. 10. It may be noticed that in the aforesaid case the amendment which had been proposed was to bring on record an alternative plea seeking protection of the provisions of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easement Act, 1882. The Trial Court had rejected the application but that was allowed finding that the plea sought to be raised was neither inconsistent nor repugnant to the pleas already raised in defence, and in fact the alternative plea sought to be incorporated in the written statement was extension of the initial plea of the respondent- plaintiff and rebuttal to the issue framed regarding the liability of the defendant of being dispossessed on proof of the fact that he was a licensee liable to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of law. It was in the aforesaid circumstances that the Apex Court observed that the mere fact that the appellant had filed the application after a prolonged delay could not be made a ground for rejecting his prayer particularly when the respondent-plaintiff could be compensated by costs. 11. The aforesaid decision, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances as brought on record of this Court, is clearly distinguishable. It may be noticed at this stage that the proceedings under Section 23-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act which is a summary proceeding is meant for only specified category of persons detailed in Section 23-J of the Act. A widow falls within the category of specified landlords who can maintain such an application. 12. The provisions contained in Section 23-C of the Act provide that the tenant on whom the summons is served shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the accommodation unless he files within fifteen days from the date of service of the summons, an application supported by an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Rent Controlling Authority. It is, therefore, obvious that the written statement has to be filed on the grounds available in respect whereof the leave is sought as contemplated under Section 23-C of the Act. There is nothing on record to indicate that any such plea as is now proposed to be raised was sought to be raised at the stage of Section 23-C of the Act. 13. There is nothing on record to indicate that any such plea as is now proposed to be raised was sought to be raised at the stage of Section 23-C of the Act. 13. It should also be not lost sight of that the provisions contemplated in Section 23-D of the Act to secure speedy disposal of the case mandates that the Rent Controlling Authority to commence hearing on the application as early as possible and decide the same as far as may be within six months of the order of granting leave to the tenant to contest application. Time obviously has been made a very important factor and any attempt to delay the proceedings on grounds which were not raised at the earliest has to be prevented. 14. In the present case, the application had been filed by the widow in the year 1998. The landlady has already led her evidence and even the defendant-tenant had examined one of its witnesses and the proceedings are virtually at the close. 15. Taking into consideration the legislative scheme underlying the provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act and the effect of the various provisions as noticed hereinabove the observations made by the Apex Court sought to be relied upon cannot come to the rescue of the applicant-defendant. 16. It is not at all fit case for any interference while exercising the revisional jurisdiction envisaged under Section 23-E of the Act. 17. Taking into consideration the family circumstances and the purpose of setting up a business for having an independent source of adequate income after the death of the husband of the landlady and the nature of the proposed amendment as well as the stage of the proceedings no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for any interference in the impugned order by this Court, in the present proceeding. 18. The revision is accordingly dismissed. 19. Civil Revision dismissed.