JUDGMENT 1. - Heard the learned counsels for the parties. 2. Shri Vinond Kumar Bhardwaj, the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with the prayer that the departmental enquiry initiated against him under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules, 1958 (in short the Rules of 1958), the memo dated 22nd December. 1993 (Annex. 1) whereby the petitioner has been informed about the commencement of a departmental enquiry against him and has been asked to submit his reply as well as the letter dated 5-1-95 (Annex. 5) with which an order dated 5-1-95 purporting to be an order passed under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 be quashed and the respondents be restrained from holding any departmental enquiry against the petitioner. It is also prayed by the petitioner that any other appropriate relief, which the Court deems just and proper may also be given to the petitioner. 3. The facts relevant for the disposal of this petition may be summarised as below:- The petitioner is presently holding the post of Superintending Engineer in I.G.N.P. CAD, Jalsalmer and is under suspension. He joined his service on 15-7-61 as a Junior Engineer after his selection. In the year 1962 he was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer and in 1975 he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer. His promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer took place in the year 1991 and he was assigned the quota of the year 1991-92. he was served with a charge-sheet and statement of allegations along with the memo (Annex. 1) dated 22nd December, 93 informing him that an enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 had been initiated. By Annex. 1 the petitioner was asked to submit his reply. The statement of allegations against the petitioner shows that the alleged misconduct, for which inquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 has been commenced, was committed during the period from November, 1983 to July, 1985 when the petitioner was posted as Executive Engineer. Survey and Research Division. In-charge Canal Colony, Ramgarh. The allegation against him is to the effect that in spite of the knowledge that the residential houses constructed in Canal Colony. Survey and Research Division. In-charge Canal Colony, Ramgarh. The allegation against him is to the effect that in spite of the knowledge that the residential houses constructed in Canal Colony. Ramgarh were of inferior quality, the petitioner did not take steps towards their proper maintenance and allowed them to remain in the same state in which they were. It is also alleged that the petitioner failed to get the defect removed by the The kedars and did not take any action for completing the work of sprouts coming from the roof, which work had be left incomplete by the The kedars. It is also alleged that when the residential houses were damaged, the petitioner did not inform the senior officers and took no steps to save the residential houses from damage and thereby, neglected and showed indifference towards his official duty and as a consequence the State Government had to incur loss to the extent of Rs. 1.68 lacs. The charge-sheet contains four charges, which are based on the statement of allegations summarised above. It is stated in the charge-sheet that the petitioner was posted as Executive Engineer, Survey and Research Div. Canal Colony, Ramgarh during the period from November, 1983 to July, 1985. During this period he committed negligence in the construction as well as the maintenance of the residential houses constructed in Canal Colony, Ramgarh and as a consequence 20 residential houses, the construction of which was inferior quality suffered damage on account of rains which poured on 16 and 17th July, 1985 and the State Government had to incur expenditure to the extent of Rs. 1.68 lacs for the repair of the above mentioned residential houses. Charge No. 1 states that the, Thekedars, who were entrusted the work of construction, did not complete the construction of the residential houses constructed in Canal Colony, Ramgarh. The Additional Chief Engineer, Jaisalmer by his order dated 20-2-84 constituted a committee headed by Shri Vinod Kumar Bhardwaj (the petitioner) for the purpose of ascertaining the draw backs in the construction of the houses and the committee after conducting enquiry, came to the conclusion that the construction of the residential houses was of inferior quality. The Additional Chief Engineer, Jaisalmer by his order dated 20-2-84 constituted a committee headed by Shri Vinod Kumar Bhardwaj (the petitioner) for the purpose of ascertaining the draw backs in the construction of the houses and the committee after conducting enquiry, came to the conclusion that the construction of the residential houses was of inferior quality. Charge No. 1 further states that Shri Vinod Kumar Bhardwaj (the petitioner) knew well that the construction of the houses was defective and any accident might occur on account of damage to the building and therefore, it was his duty to get the houses repaired by the The kedars and to take suitable steps for the maintenance of the buildings, but he did not take any action in this regard and in July, 85, the houses were damaged on account of rains and the State Government had to incur financial loss. The second charge states that the Additional Chief Engineer, Jaisalmer by his order dated 19th July, 85 appointed an Enquiry Committee headed by Shri H. G. Acharya, the then Superintending Engineer, Jaisalmer and the above mentioned committee gave the report that the cause of damage to the houses was the water, which had collected on the roof on account of the level of the sprout being higher than the roof and this defect was not got cured before rains. It was further reported by the above mentioned Committee that if the defect pointed out by it were removed before the rains, the houses would not have been damaged. The charge No. 3 states that almost all the residential houses constructed in Canal Colony. Ramgarh had been left incomplete by the The kedars, who were entrusted the work of construction, but Shri Vinod Kumar Bhardwaj did not take any concrete step to get the construction work completed by the The kedars, in accordance with clauses (2) and (3) of the Contract and as a consequence 20 residential houses were damaged on account of rains, which poured on 16 and 17th July, 85 and in consequence thereof, the State Government incurred a loss to the tune of Rs. 1.68 lacs. The charge No. 4 states that information about the damage. 1.68 lacs. The charge No. 4 states that information about the damage. which had been caused to the residential houses, constructed in Canal Colony, Ramgarh on account of rains, which poured on 16th and 17th July, 85 had been given to Shri Vinod Kumar Bhardwaj on 7-7-85 by Shri K. L. Verma a Junior Engineer, but no action was taken on that report and the petitioner left the headquarters without sending any information to the senior officers about the damage which had been caused to the residential houses and he thereby neglected his duties and in consequence of the neglect and indifference on the part of the petitioner, the State Government had to incur a loss to the tune of Rs. 1.68 lacs. 4. The petitioner submitted his reply in response to Annex. 1. He denied all the charges levelled against him. In his reply, the petitioner stated that during the period from 10-12-83 to 31-7-84, he was posted at 29 Division of the IGNP and the charge of residential houses constructed in Canal Colony, Ramgarh was with him. It was also stated by him that alter 31-7-84, he was posted as Executive Engineer, Survey and Research Division, where he remained during the period from 1st August, 84 to July, 1991 and during this period also he was in-charge of Canal Colony, Ramgarh and the residential houses constructed therein. The petitioner further stated that in his reply that the residential houses in Canal Colony, Ramgarh had been constructed before he took charge of the Division and, therefore, he was not responsible for the inferior quality of the construction. He cited as many as 10 decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court in reply to charge No. 1 and on their basis pleaded that the alleged misconduct being more than 10 years old. could not be the subject matter of the Departmental enquiry. It was also alleged by the petitioner in his reply that the record which he wanted to inspect had not been shown to him. could not be the subject matter of the Departmental enquiry. It was also alleged by the petitioner in his reply that the record which he wanted to inspect had not been shown to him. Regarding the cause of damage to the houses by rains which poured on 16th and 17th July, 85, the petitioner stated in his reply that he did not commit any neglect after 10-12-83 and the main cause of damage to the house was that the soil, on which the foundations were laid was not suitable for construction of houses and the material used for the construction of houses was of inferior quality, and therefore, he was not responsible for damage caused to the houses by rains. Regarding the steps taken by him for maintenance and removal of defects of construction, the petitioner stated in his reply that after assuming the charge on 10-12-83 he issued notices to the Thekedars, but the Thekedars did not remove the defect, and therefore, penal action was taken against the Thekedars in accordance with clauses (2) and (3) of the agreement and tenders were also invited with a view to remove the defect of construction. The notices were issued by him action was taken by him in terms of clauses (2) and (3) of the agreement. It was also stated by the petitioner in his reply that according to the report of the Committee constituted by the Additional Chief Engineer, Jaisalmer by order dated 20-2-84, the quality of construction of the residential houses was inferior. Regarding the report of the committee headed by Shri H. G. Acharya, the petitioner replied that the findings of the Committee were based on inference and no member of the Committee had climbed over the roofs of the damaged houses in order to inspect them. It was admitted by the petitioner that he received information from Mr. K. L. Verma, a Junior Engineer that the house had been damaged on account of rains. which poured on 16th and 17th July, 85 and on receiving this Information, he directed Shri K. L. Verma to take proper action and also directed him to inform the Assistant Engineer. It was admitted by the petitioner that he received information from Mr. K. L. Verma, a Junior Engineer that the house had been damaged on account of rains. which poured on 16th and 17th July, 85 and on receiving this Information, he directed Shri K. L. Verma to take proper action and also directed him to inform the Assistant Engineer. Regarding his own conduct, the petitioner stated that on 16th and 17th July, 85 he was in Jaisalmer, but he had to submit some record in connection with the star red question dated 18-7-85 and in order to collect the relevant record, he went to Ramgarh, where the information about the damage of the houses was given to him by Shri K. L. Verma and after giving directions to Shri Verma, he went to Jaisalmer and from Jaisalmer he proceeded to Jodhpur and while he was going to Jodhpur he met Shri O. P. Vyas, the then Assistant Engineer, whom he gave direction to make an assessment of the damage caused to the houses by rains and to take suitable action to avoid further damage. In short, the petitioner in his reply denied all the four charges framed against him by the Disciplinary Authority. 5. On 5-1-95, the Government of Rajasthan issued an order under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 and thereby directed that a Joint Enquiry under Rules 16 and 18 of the Rules be held against 14 persons including the petitioner named in the order. A copy of this order was served on the petitioner with the letter dated 18-3-95 (Annex. 6). 6. The petitioner has challenged the Departmental Enquiry initiated against him under Rule 16 read with 18 of the Rules of 1958, on three gounds, namely, (1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by the petitioner ten years before the commencement of the enquiry, and therefore, the Departmental Enquiry was not maintainable: (2) that the petitioner did not commit any negligence nor displayed any indifference in discharge of his official duties and took proper action and (3) a Joint Enquiry against the petitioner and 13 other persons cannot be conducted for want of a proper order under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958. 7. The respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed their reply. 7. The respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed their reply. In their reply, the respondents No. 1 and 2 reiterated that the petitioner had committed misconduct by neglecting his duties as Executive Engineer and that commencement of the Disciplinary Enquiry against the petitioner was proper and the petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed by him. 8. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a joint enquiry against the petitioner and 13 other officers cannot be held because no order under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 has been passed by the respondents. Rule 18 may be reproduced below for ready reference:- "18. Joint Enquiry. - (1) Whether two or more Government servants are concerned in any case, the Government or any other authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such Government servants may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding. (2) Any such order shall specify.- (i) The authority which may function as the Disciplinary Authority for the purpose of such common proceedings. (ii) The penalties specified in rule 14 which such Disciplinary Authority shall be competent to impose: and (iii) Whether the procedure prescribed in rule 16 or 17 may be followed in the proceedings." 9. A bare reading of Rule 18 shows that an order for joint enquiry under Rule 18 may be passed either by the Government or any authority competent to impose penalty of dismissal from service on all such Government servants. The order No. 8-1 (124) Ka/Kar-3 (93) dated 5-1-95, a copy of which is annexed with this writ petition purports to have been issued by the Rajasthan Government and it is signed by the Dy. Secretary to the Government. The order clearly states that it has been issued under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958. In para No. 17 of the writ petition, the grounds on which the writ petition is founded are stated in sub-pars (f) of para No. 17, the petitioner has stated that a joint enquiry is totally uncalled for and is impermissible as there is no common act of the delinquent officers for which a joint enquiry can be held and so far as the petitioner is concerned, he was not posted at the said place when the work was commenced. Therefore, a joint enquiry against him and 13 other persons is impermissible. In para No. 17(k), it is stated that the order Annex. 6 dated 5-1-95 is improper because it was passed after the issue of the charge sheet to the petitioner. 10. I have carefully considered the grounds on which the order dated 5-1-95 has been challenged. A bare reading of this order shows that it has been passed under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 and therefore. the contention that there is no order under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 is not correct. The impugned order has been passed by the Government of Rajasthan and therefore, it must be held that it has been passed by the authority competent to pass it under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958. It is true that this order has been passed on 5-1-95, whereas the charge sheet was issued to the petitioner before 5-1-95. There is nothing in Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 to indicate that the order of joint enquiry must be passed before the service of charge sheet on the delinquent officer. I, therefore, do not find any force in the submission that the impugned order dated 5-1-95 is improper on the ground that it was passed after the issue of the charge sheet to the petitioner. 11. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the joint enquiry could not have been ordered under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958, because the period of posting of the petitioner and other 13 delinquent officers was not identical and it cannot be said that the petitioner and 13 other persons named in the order were concerned with the same case for the purpose of Ruls 18 of the Rules of 1958. 12. On a careful consideration, I do not find any force in it. The expression "any case" in Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 is not synonymous with any period of posting. The organisation consisting of engineers belonging to various ranks, is a three dimensional organisation. At the base, which is obviously larger. there are Junior Engineers. Just above, the Junior Engineers, there are Assistant Engineers. Above the Assistant Engineers, there are Executive Engineers. Superintending Engineers occupy the position above the Executive Engineers. The organisation consisting of engineers belonging to various ranks, is a three dimensional organisation. At the base, which is obviously larger. there are Junior Engineers. Just above, the Junior Engineers, there are Assistant Engineers. Above the Assistant Engineers, there are Executive Engineers. Superintending Engineers occupy the position above the Executive Engineers. The Additional Chief Engineer and Chief Engineer are in the apex of the pyramidical structure of the organisation of engineers to which the petitioner belongs. The number of personnel at the base level is larger, at the apex there is the Chief Engineer, who is entrusted with the functions of the Head of the organisation. 13. Whenever any work is entrusted to this organisation of Engineers all of ranks become responsible according to the duties assigned to them for the accomplishment of the work. Junior Engineer being at the base, is closely associated with the work, which is to be accomplished, but it does not mean that the Executive Engineers. Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineer have no responsibility for accomplishment of the work. In fact, right from Junior Engineer to the Chief Engineer, all ranks of engineers belonging to the organisation are responsible for accomplishing that work. The nature of duties of the Junior Engineer. Assistant Engineer, Executive Engineer. Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineer are, however, according to the rank which they hold. The Assistant Engineer being higher in rank to the Junior Engineers is required to supervise the work of the Junior Engineer and other officers below him in such a manner that the work may be accomplished properly. The Executive Engineer being senior to Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers is required to supervise the work in such a manner as may ensure that the work is accomplished according to the norms laid down in accomplishing it and the Assistant Engineers, Junior Engineers and other subordinate staff under the Executive Engineers works property. Similar duties are assigned to the Superintending Engineers in respect of the Executive Engineers, Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers and other subordinate staff under them and the Chief Engineer being placed at the apex has to perform similar duties in relation to the officers inferior to him. Similar duties are assigned to the Superintending Engineers in respect of the Executive Engineers, Assistant Engineers and Junior Engineers and other subordinate staff under them and the Chief Engineer being placed at the apex has to perform similar duties in relation to the officers inferior to him. In this pyramidical structure of the organisation of the Engineers in which the Chief Engineer is placed at the apex and Junior Engineers are placed at the bottom, the Engineers of all the ranks are responsible for the work, which has been assigned to them. The responsibility of the senior officers as compared to the junior officers is in no way lesser than that of the junior officers; rather it is more than than their responsibility, because the senior officers are not only required to perform the work, which has been assigned to them individually, they are further required to exercise the supervision so effectively over the staff below them so as to ensure that the officers subordinate to them perform the functions properly. Because of this reason in any 3 dimensional pyramidical structure of the organisation, the officers placed at the higher rank cannot disclaim the responsibility for the acts of junior officers placed below them. Whenever any work is assigned to such an organisation, which has a three dimensional pyramidical structure prescribed above, right from the Chief Engineer to the Junior Engineer, engineers of all the ranks are responsible for the execution of the work in proper manner. The Chief Engineer cannot say that it is none of his job to look after the work, which is required to be performed by his Department and it is sufficient for him to sit in his office and be contended with the ministerial job, which may be performed at the table. It is his duty to see that the work assigned to the organisation headed by him is accomplished within proper time in proper manner and according to norms laid down for its accomplishment. 14. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the opinion that in most of the cases, more than one officers are involved, and therefore, all the officers, who were in any manner responsible for the proper execution of the work assigned to them, at any, stage, in any form, in any manner, may be responsible for the execution of the work. It is possible that their involvement may not be for the same period and the duties or the work to be performed by them may not be identical, but if the work is the same and they are individually as well as collectively responsible for accomplishing the work, all the acts and omissions committed by them and amounting to misconduct would be reletable to one single case for the purpose of Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958. 15. In the instant case, the alleged misconduct was committed in respect of the construction and maintenance of 20 residential houses constructed in Canal Colony, Ramgarh. Right from the moment, work was started to the point of time when the residential houses were handed over to some other person or Department to which the petitioner belongs, remains responsible for the construction or maintenance or both as may be necessary. 16. I, therefore, hold that the impugned order passed under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1958 cannot be challenged on the ground that the misconduct of the petitioner and the other officers does not, relate to the "case" contemplated by Rule 18. Apart from the reasons mentioned above, it is also important to note that an order passed by a competent authority under Rule 18 of the Rules cannot be quashed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. unless it is shown that any prejudice of it grave nature has been caused to the petitioner. In the instant case, no prejudice whatsoever appears to have been caused to the petitioner by the impugned order passed under Rule 18, and therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to be violative of any provisions of the Constitution of India or of the Rules of 1958. 17. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is unexplained delay in commencement of the enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. The submission is that if the disciplinary enquiry is not commenced soon after the commital of misconduct, the initiation of a departmental enquiry at a later stage would not be permissible. as it would amount to harassment of the public servant. The submission is that if the disciplinary enquiry is not commenced soon after the commital of misconduct, the initiation of a departmental enquiry at a later stage would not be permissible. as it would amount to harassment of the public servant. The first decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given by a learned single Judge of this Court in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1977/95 Narendra Pal Singh v. State of Rajasthan (decided on 5th May, 98) : (Reported in 1998 Lab IC 2641) . In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Engineer subordinate in Irrigation Department on 27-7-1966, which post was redesignated as Junior Engineer (Civil). The petitioner was due for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer in view of his seniority in the cadre of Junior Engineers but departmental enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. 1958 was initiated against him, and therefore, his chances of promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer were eclipsed. The petitioner's case was that in the charge sheet dated 27-8-94, which was served on him on 31-12-94. first charge was of excess payment made to one Puran Chand. Contractor in 1978 for the construction of a ramp and second charge was of payment made to the Contractor on the basis of the measurements recorded by him. Regarding the first charge, the petitioner's contention was that the ramp had been constructed for the use of the department and was entered in the measurement book and the same was verified by the competent authorities and even the amount was subsequently recovered from the contractor on 16-6-85 vide voucher No. 35. Regarding the second charge, the petitioner contended that the measurements were verified by the Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer and nobody raised objection and in the final bill the excess amount was adjusted and the audit objection was also dropped. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the enquiry initiated against the petitioner was highly belated and there was no substance in both the charges. and therefore, the charge sheet should be quahsed. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Bani Singh. AIR 1990 SC 1308 : (1990 Lab IC 1488). and therefore, the charge sheet should be quahsed. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Bani Singh. AIR 1990 SC 1308 : (1990 Lab IC 1488). The learned counsel for the respondent contested the writ petition and relying on the decision given by a Division Bench of this High Court in State of Rajasthan v. Gulab Chand (D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 23 of 1995) decided on 17-7-95 , it was contended that mere delay was not sufficient to quash the charge sheet. The learned single Judge considered the nature of the charges made against the petitioner and found that the charges do not pertain to misappropriation of amount by the petitioner and it has been stated in the charges that the petitioner was Band in glove with the contractors and he had recorded wrong measurements with ulterior motive. It was in view of the nature of the charges framed against the petitioner and other facts and circumstances of the case that the learned single Judge allowed the petitioner. The decision given by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Gulab Chand (supra) was distinguished on the ground that the charges made in that case against the delinquent officer were of a serious nature. The learned single Judge also referred to the decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme court in Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Faizabad v. Sachindra Nath Pandey, (1995) 3 SCC 134 : (1995 AIR SCW 3028) , wherein their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not think It proper to quash the departmental proceedings as the charges were very serious involving misappropriation and absconding along with official record. The learned single Judge in para No. 11 of the judgment observed:- "The legal position which emerges out of the Court decisions is that where the charges are of very serious nature like misappropriation and illegal allotment of land, it is not proper to quash the departmental proceedings on the ground of delay. As already pointed out, the charges against the petitioner are not of serious nature and he has been charge for the irregularities committed by him. It is also obvious that no financial loss was caused to the respondents because of those irregularities." 18. As already pointed out, the charges against the petitioner are not of serious nature and he has been charge for the irregularities committed by him. It is also obvious that no financial loss was caused to the respondents because of those irregularities." 18. Above observations clearly shows that the facts of that case were different and the charges levelled against the petitioner in the enquiry initiated under Rule 16 were of not a serious nature and therefore, the enquiry was dropped. 19. The next decision was reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given in Vaidhya Dav Shanker Sharma v. The State of Rajasthan, (1991) 2 WLC (Raj.) 632. In that case the petitioner joined his services as Vaidhya in Ayurved Department of the Government of Rajasthan on 14-9-1964. He was promoted as Senior Physician in the year 1975 and, then as District Ayurved Officer in 1980. He was further promoted as Deputy Director. Ayurved and was holding that post, he was eligible to be considered for promotion on the post of Director but on account of disciplinary enquiry which had been initiated against him by memorandum dated 16-4-93, whereby the disciplinary enquiry was initiated, was challenged by the petitioner. The charge against the petitioner was that during this tenure as District Ayurved Officer, Dungarpur. four candidates, namely, Surendra Singh, Pooranmal, Arjunlal and Jayesh Kumar were appointed as Class IV employee against the quota of Physically Handicapped persons. In the charge sheet, it was alleged that the Social Welfare Department had issued circular dated 23-2-87 for filling the vacant posts of Physically Handicapped persons. On the basis of that circular of the Social Welfare Department, the Collector, Dungarpur had, by him order dated 11-3-97, instructed the the Employment Exchange, but the petitioner did not take any steps. The sanction given by the Collector for making recruitment of Physically Handicapped persons was limited for a period of 2 months but the petitioner ignored this sanction and in collusion with Shri R. N. Joshi appointed four persons by his order dated 28-3-88. Three of those persons were not residents of Dungarpur and they managed their transfer outside District of Dungarpur. Three of those persons were not residents of Dungarpur and they managed their transfer outside District of Dungarpur. It had been alleged that three persons were present at the time of meeting of the Committee and this shows that without following the procedure prescribed in various Government circulars, the petitioner had appointed four persons. The Government had treated this action of the petitioner to be an act of grave misconduct. The charge-sheet was assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground of abnormal delay in the issue of charge-sheet. Regarding the charges framed against the petitioner, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no necessity of getting NOC/NAC from the Collector in view of different circulars issued by the State Government and what the petitioner had done was to consider the claims of those persons who were physically handicapped and who had submitted applications for being appointed against the quota reserved for Physically Handicapped persons and this action of the petitioner cannot be treated as violative of any provisions of law or instructions issued by the Government, and therefore, there was no justification in charging the petitioner with the allegation of having violated the instructions issued by the Collector. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the allegation of collusion with the Regional Deputy Director was wholly unfounded because there was no material whatsoever to show that the petitioner had entered into a conspiracy with the respondent No. 4 for the purpose of making appointment against the quota of Physically Handicapped persons with an oblique motive. The parameters within which the Court dealing with the petition for quashing the disciplinary proceedings were indicated by the learned single Judge in para No. 10 in the following words : "Coming to merits of the case. I would first indicate the parameters within which the Court will ordinarily interfere and quash disciplinary proceedings before their conclusion at the level of the department. This Court will quash a charge-sheet where it finds that the authority issuing the chargesheet is not competent authority to issue the charge-sheet. It will also interfere where it is found that there has been abnormal delay in service of charge-sheet and such delay has caused prejudiced to the delinquent employees. This Court will quash a charge-sheet where it finds that the authority issuing the chargesheet is not competent authority to issue the charge-sheet. It will also interfere where it is found that there has been abnormal delay in service of charge-sheet and such delay has caused prejudiced to the delinquent employees. Yet another ground for interference at a stage prior to conclusion departmental enquiry will be where it is found that charges levelled against the delinquent employee are wholly baseless or where the action is actuated by malice in fact." 20. Regarding the charge of committing irregularity in appointment of four persons against the quota of Physically Handicapped. the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioner cannot with any element of justification be charged with allegation of having committed violation of the instructions issued by the Government much less the instructions issued by the District Magistrate, Dungarpur by his letter dated 11-3-87 and the allegation of collusion between the petitioner and Shri R. N. Joshi, the then Regional Director was without whatsoever. In para No. 15, the learned single Judge pointed out his conclusions in the following words:- "Thus, I have no hesitation in concluding that the charge-sheet is totally baseless and warrants interference by this Court at this stage. Failure of this Court to interfere and give proper relief to the petitioner would definitely result in irreparable injury to him." 21. There can be no dispute with the proposition that if the initiation of the disciplinary enquiry against a public servant is without any basis whatsoever, then this Court may quash the departmental proceedings in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the exercise of powers conferred on the Disciplinary Authority to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the public servant subject to its control amounts to abuse of the process of the law, and therefore, it deserves to be quashed. 22. The next decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given by a learned single Judge of this Court in Hukum Singh v. State of Rajasthan. (1986) 1 Judicial Surveyor 460. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on this decision for the purpose of supporting his contention that the disciplinary enquiry must be initiated within a reasonable time. (1986) 1 Judicial Surveyor 460. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on this decision for the purpose of supporting his contention that the disciplinary enquiry must be initiated within a reasonable time. The decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Nath, AIR 1969 SC 1297 were cited before the learned single Judge. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed (at p. 1301 of AIR):- "The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211. but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised." After taking into consideration several decisions, the learned single Judge observed at page 463 of the reports:- "These cases laid down a rule regarding delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. It has been observed that no lair and effective enquiry can be conducted unless it commences within a reasonable time after the incident. It has been held that the delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings must be held to constitute a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself as calling the employee at the distance of time, is probably to put him at considerable disadvantage. These authorities have no application so far as the present matter is concerned." 23. In the case before the learned single Judge, the petitioner had been punished in a disciplinary enquiry after a lapse of 9 years, the punishment was sought to be enhanced. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned single Judge allowed the petition and held that the power to enhance the punishment has not been exercised within a reasonable time, and therefore, the order dated 23-10-1978 enhancing the punishment deserves to be quashed. 24. The next decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given by a Division Bench of this Court in Sukhraj Singh (Bajwa) v. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, (1983) 1 Rajasthan LR 613 : (1998 Lab IC NOC 74). 24. The next decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given by a Division Bench of this Court in Sukhraj Singh (Bajwa) v. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, (1983) 1 Rajasthan LR 613 : (1998 Lab IC NOC 74). In that case, it was held that where the charges are found groundless or void ab initio or baseless or when there is no iota of evidence to frame them or when there is non-application of mind by disciplinary authority to admitted facts, the High Court can pass suitable orders under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case, the High Court found it fit to quash the charge-sheet (Annex. 1) and the statement of allegations (Annex. 2) along with the memorandum (Ex. 2) dated 27-1-87. 25. The next decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Prafulla Chandra Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (1993 SCC (L&S) 284: (1992 Lab IC 2478). In that case the appellant was working as Mizarat Officer in the Collectorate of Baripada in the State of Orissa. While working on that post the Additional District Magistrate on May 24, 1973 lodged a report about cash amounting to Rs. 30.877.53 missing from the Collectorate's funds. The appellant was found to be involved in the said matter and he was placed under suspension by order dated 9-4-1974. The disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the appellant for the charges of misappropriation of cash and negligence in performance of duty. A criminal case under Section 409 Indian Penal Code was also instituted against the appellant and one Anil Chandra Patnaik. who was working as Nazir at the relevant time. Both of them were convicted in the criminal case by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 28-9-1977. The appellant was dismissed from service on the basis of the aforesaid judgment by order dated 12-1-1978. The appellant flied an appeal against his conviction and sentence and was acquitted in appeal by the learned Sessions Judge by an order dated May 11, 1979. 26. According to the appellant he was acquitted both on merits as well as on the ground of want of proper sanction. Leave to appeal filed by the State Government against the acquittal of the appellant was dismissed by the High Court on October 9, 1979. 26. According to the appellant he was acquitted both on merits as well as on the ground of want of proper sanction. Leave to appeal filed by the State Government against the acquittal of the appellant was dismissed by the High Court on October 9, 1979. The appellant was reinstated in service by order of April 18, 1980 and the period during which he remained under suspension and dismissal was ordered to be treated as the period spent on duty. The appellant retired from service having attained the age of superannuation on January 31, 1981. The Government by order dated April 20, 1981 restarted the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The representations made by the appellant to the State Government against the revival of the disciplinary proceedings were rejected and the Collector by letter dated July 16, 1981 informed the appellant that the disciplinary proceedings would continue. The appellant in these circumstances filed a writ petition in the High Court. The writ petition was transferred to the State Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the order of Administrative Tribunal, the appellant approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court in appeal. Shri Anil Chandra, who was co-accused with the appellant was convicted along with the appellant by the Chief Judicial Magistrate by a common judgment. The appeal filed him against his conviction was dismissed by the Sessions Court by order dated May 11, 1979. The conviction was challenged by a revision in the High Court. The High Court not only acquitted Anil Chandra but also made some observations which were made the basis for restarting the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant by the Government. Anil Chandra after his acquittal from the High Court challenging the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. filed a writ petition in the High Court. The said writ petition was also transferred to the Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal allowed the petition and quashed the disciplinary proceedings pending against Anil Chandra. It was contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the acquittal of the appellant by the Court of Sessions was on a technical ground. and therefore. restarting a disciplinary proceeding was proper. This contention did not find favour with the Supreme Court. It was contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the acquittal of the appellant by the Court of Sessions was on a technical ground. and therefore. restarting a disciplinary proceeding was proper. This contention did not find favour with the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held (1992 Lab IC 2478 at p. 2480):- "In our view It was not proper for the Government to restart the disciplinary proceedings being influenced by any observations recorded by the High Court in the case relating to the co-accused Anil Chand Patnaik. It may be noted that so far as the present appellant is concerned he was acquitted by the Sessions Court and the special leave application was also dismissed by the High Court. We are also not convinced with the stand taken on behalf of the State Government that the acquittal of the appellant by the Sessions Court was merely on a technical ground of want of proper sanction. A perusal of the judgment of the Sessions Court shows that the acquittal of the appellant was based both on merits as well as on the want of sanction. The Sessions Judge clearly recorded a finding that there was no evidence to hold that the amount was transferred to the iron chest under double lock and, therefore, it should be held that there was no evidence to prove that the appellant Nizarat Officer Shri P. C. Mohapatra (appellant before us) was either entrusted with the aforesaid amount or had dominion over it." 27. From the above observations, it is obvious that charge levelled against the appellant in that case. in the disciplinary enquiry, which was initiated against him after his acquittal by the Court of Sessions, was totally baseless. 28. The next decision on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance is the decision given in Chief Secretary to Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. R. Veerabhadram. 1992 SCC (L & S) 985. In that case, the State of Andhra Pradesh filed an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order dated 21-3-1989 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, whereby the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent were quashed. The charges against the respondent were that while working as Additional Revenue Divisional Officer. 1992 SCC (L & S) 985. In that case, the State of Andhra Pradesh filed an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order dated 21-3-1989 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, whereby the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent were quashed. The charges against the respondent were that while working as Additional Revenue Divisional Officer. Land Reforms Tribunal II, Amalapuram passed orders in 30-12-1978 in two cases in which he determined the extent of the holdings by treating the minor sons of the declarants as majors as on the notified date in order that the declarants be benefited and that respondent did so for corrupt considerations by overlooking certain glaring discrepancies and tell-tale suspicious freatures in the socalled birth certificate and other documents presented by the declarants. The Tribunal rested the conclusion it reached, as to the infirmities which, according to it, vitiated the proceedings, principally on two grounds. The first was that though the disciplinary proceedings were initiated at a time when respondent was still in service. however. their continuation after the attainment by him of the age of superannuation was subject to and attracted the condition envisaged in Rule 9(2)(b) and (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980 and that such continuation of the disciplinary proceedings which did not satisfy the requirements of those sub-rules would be invalid. The second ground was that the proceedings were so long drawn out that the inference becomes inescapable that the disciplinary authority was not diligent in pursuing the matter and that in the circumstances of the case, it would be wholly Unreasonable to have permitted the charges arising out of certain acts and omissions alleged against respondent in the year 1978 to pursue after the lapse of over a decade. 29. Regarding the second ground on which the decision of the Administrative Tribunal rested, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered whether the view taken by the Administrative Tribunal was correct. At page 989 (of 1992 SCC (L & S) 985) of the Report. the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:- "So far as the second point is concerned, the Tribunal has, on the material before it, persuaded itself to the view that it would be unreasonable to permit the continuation of the enquiry after the lapse of a decade after the alleged misconduct. the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:- "So far as the second point is concerned, the Tribunal has, on the material before it, persuaded itself to the view that it would be unreasonable to permit the continuation of the enquiry after the lapse of a decade after the alleged misconduct. The Tribunal noticed that while the charge against the respondent that while functioning as a statutory authority to deal with the cases under the land ceiling laws had accepted a birth certificate in order to cone to the conclusion that the person referred to therein had attained the age of majority and entitled to the benefit of an additional ceiling area and that the respondent had instead of rejecting the claim, deliberately, overlooked the tell-tale interpolations in the documents that, respondent, even while the appeal against his determination was pending before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, had himself proposed to correct the order on the ground that he had since come to suspect that the declarant had practised fraud on him and that the mistake should not be left uncorrected. The Tribunal also noticed the inaction on the part of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the enquiry with reasonable diligence. The question is whether this view of the Tribunal should be interfered with under Article 136. On a consideration of the matter, we are of the view that it is not an appropriate case where we should interfere with the view taken by the Tribunal." 30. It appears from the observations made in the judgment that after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to interfere with the orders of Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution. No declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution appears to have been made in this judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 31. The next decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given in R. C. Sood v. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan, (1998) 4 JT (SC) 4: (1999 Lab IC 453). In this case. the disciplinary enquiry, commenced against the petitioner by the High Court. was quashed on the ground that the charges made against him were without any basis. 32. In this case. the disciplinary enquiry, commenced against the petitioner by the High Court. was quashed on the ground that the charges made against him were without any basis. 32. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakrishan, (1998) 3 JT (SC) 123 : ( AIR 1998 SC 1833 ). In that case the respondent was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning In the year 1976. He worked in the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad in 1979. He was posted as City Planner, Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam in 1981. A report dated 7-11-1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad to the Secretary to The Government, Housing, Municipal Administration & Urban Development Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorised constructions in multi-storied complexes in twin cities of Hyderbad and Secundrabad in collusion with Municipal Authorities. On the basis of the report the State issued two memos, both dated December 12, 1987 (1) In respect of three officials, viz., Radha Krishna, the then Asstt. City Planner, the respondent, (2) P. V. Janki Raman, the then City Planner and (3) A. Ram Reddy, the then Asstt. City Planner. In the second memo seven other officers of the rank of Sections Officers and one Assistant City Planner were named. The memo respecting the respondent and two others said that under Rule 19(2) of 1963 Rules, one Sri N. Venugopal Reddy, Director of Town and Country Planning, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. was appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct a detailed inquiry against them, who were allegedly involved and found responsible for the irregularities. The Inquiry Officer was directed to complete his inquiry within a period of two months and to submit his report to the Government with specific findings. In one of the letter dated 7-1-1988 of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, it was mentioned that during the course of the checking of the buildings witnesses were neither examined nor their statements were recorded and as such there was no part-B file. It was suggested that action be taken on the basis of the report already sent to the Government. It was suggested that action be taken on the basis of the report already sent to the Government. Rule 19(2) of the 1963 Rules requires that when It is proposed to impose on a member of a service any of the penalties specified therein the authority competent to impose the penalty shall appoint an inquiry officer or itself hold an Inquiry. In every such case the ground on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of definite charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any of other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders in the case. The charged employee, shall be required within a reasonable time to file written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires an oral inquiry or to be heard in person or both. Rule 45 of 1991 Rules provided that repeal shall not affect the previous operation of 1963 Rules, or any notification or order made, or anything done, or any action taken thereunder, in any proceeding under those Rules pending at the commencement of 1991 Rules and shall be continued and disposed of as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of 1991 Rules. In 1991 Rules procedure for imposing penalties had been changed by Rules 20 and 21. The Inquiry Officer is to be appointed after written statement of the defence of the charged employee has been received. When it is proposed to old inquiry against a Government servant, the disciplinary authority is required to draw up the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct article of charge, a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavious in support of each article of charge containing (a) a statement of all relevant facts (b) list of documents and (c) list of witnesses. These shall be served upon the Government servant, who shall be required to submit written statement in defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If on receipt of the written statement of the defence the disciplinary authority finds that it is necessary to inquire into the charges, it shall appoint an Inquiry Officer for the purpose. If on receipt of the written statement of the defence the disciplinary authority finds that it is necessary to inquire into the charges, it shall appoint an Inquiry Officer for the purpose. Of course, the disciplinary authority can itself inquiry into the article of charges, if it so choses or thinks to do so. ?Again, it was not necessary to consider as to how the Inquiry Officer is to proceed further in the matter as per 1991 Rules as after the article of charge was served upon the respondent and his statement of defence was received there was no progress and he moved the Tribunal. 33. The Tribunal did not go into the culpability of the respondent with respect to the charges as contained in memo dated July 31, 1995 and did not record any finding of guilt or otherwise on those charges. The Tribunal, however, said that the memo dated July 31, 1995 related to the incidents that happened ten years or more prior to the date of the memo and that there was absolutely no explanation by the Government for this inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting the inquiry against the respondent. The explanation given by the State that for some reason or the other the Inquiry Officer was being changed from time to time and on that account inquiry could not be conducted, did not find favour by the Tribunal. It said that there was no justification on the part of the State conducting the inquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents at this late stage. The Tribunal noticed that in the meanwhile respondent had been promoted as Senior Joint Director of Town and Country Planning notwithstanding the appointment of Inquiry Officer one after the other after memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987 and plea of the State that when respondent was promoted as Senior Joint Director of Town and Country Planning his file relating to inquiry against him was not brought to the notice of the administrative section in the year 1991 at the time of convening the D.P.C. and which resulted in promoting the respondent, also did not find favour with the Tribunal. The Tribunal said that both the sections were within the Municipal Administration and this explanation, now offered, was without any merit. The Tribunal said that both the sections were within the Municipal Administration and this explanation, now offered, was without any merit. The Tribunal while quashing memo dated July 31, 1995 did not quash the memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996 and said that the State, if so advised, might proceed against the respondent according to law for taking action against him. What the Tribunal said about the later two memos was that they should not be taken into consideration while promoting the respondent in pursuance to the recommendations of D.P.C. which was held on August 16, 1995. 34. One of the grounds on which the Tribunal quashed memo dated July 31, 1995, issued under 1991 Rules, was that without cancelling the earlier memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987, issued under 1963 Rules, the latter memo could not be issued. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that Rule 45 of 1991 Rules the inquiry proceedings initiated under 1963 Rules could be continued even after coming into force of 1991 Rules, and it was correct that inquiry proceedings did progress after issuance of memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987 to the extent that ail Inquiry officer was appointed and inquiryshould have been concluded under 1963 Rules. 35. So far as the delay in conducting the departmental inquiry was concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the decisions given in State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 JT (SC) 18 and A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, (1991) 6 JT (SC) 431 : ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 ) observed:- "It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously an he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations." 36. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal. 37. The next decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given in the case of State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 . In that case. the High Court had quashed the memo of charges on three grounds. namely. 37. The next decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the decision given in the case of State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 . In that case. the High Court had quashed the memo of charges on three grounds. namely. (i) that there was a delay of five and half years in serving the memo of charges, for which there was not acceptable explanation (ii) that the S.D.M. had exonerated the respondent of any responsibility for or culpabability in the alleged incident in his report dated 26-1-87 and the Government kept quiet for a number of years. In view of the said report and only much later, when the respondent's case was to come up for promotion to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Prisions than the matter was raked up and charges served and the Government had practically decided not to proceed against the respondent and it was raked up after several years only with a view to deny promotion to the respondent, and therefore, the action of the appellants was vitiated by mala fides; and (iii) that the respondent was not the Superintendent of the Jail at the time the incident took place and the other officers who were said to be responsible along with the respondent have been exonerated. 38. Regarding the principles, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at page 576 (of (1995) 2 SCC 570 ) observed:- "The principle to be borne in mind in this behalf have been set out by Constitution Bench of this Court in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 ) . Though the said case pertained to criminal prosecution, the principles enunciated therein are broadly applicable to a plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. In paragraph 86 of the judgment this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that "ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-balancing test or balancing process and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case". It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the Court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case. Applying the balancing process. we are of the opinion that the quashing of charges and of the order appointing enquiry officer was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is more appropriate and in the interest of justice as well as in the interest of administration that the enquiry which had proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be completed. At the same time, it is directed that the respondent should be considered forthwith for promotion without reference to and without taking into consideration the charges of the pendency of the said enquiry and if he is found fit for promotion, he should be promoted immediately. This direction is made in the particulars facts and circumstances of the case though we are aware that the rules and practice normally followed in such cases may, be different. The promotion so made, if any, pending the enquiry shall, however, be subject to review after the conclusion of the enquiry and in the light of the findings in the enquiry. It is also directed that the enquiry against the respondent shall be concluded within eight months from today. The respondent shall co-operate in concluding the enquiry. It is obvious that if the respondent does not so co-operate, it shall be open to the enquiry officer to proceed ex parte. If the enquiry is not concluded and final orders are not passed within the aforesaid period, the enquiry shall be deemed to have been dropped." 39. The respondent shall co-operate in concluding the enquiry. It is obvious that if the respondent does not so co-operate, it shall be open to the enquiry officer to proceed ex parte. If the enquiry is not concluded and final orders are not passed within the aforesaid period, the enquiry shall be deemed to have been dropped." 39. The last case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is State of M. P. v. Dani Singh, AIR 1990 SC 1308 : (1990 Lab IC 1488) . In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed (Para 6) : "Normally. pendency or contemplated initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a candidate must be considered to have absolutely no impact upon, to his right to be considered. If the departmental enquiry had reached the stage of framing of charges after a prima face case has been made out, the normal procedure followed as mentioned by the Tribunal was "sealed cover" procedure but if the disciplinary proceedings had not reached that stage of framing of the charge after prima facie case is established the consideration for the promotion to a higher or selection grade cannot be withheld merely on the ground of pendency of such disciplinary proceedings. Deferring the consideration in the Secreening Committee meeting held on 26-11-80 on this ground was therefore unsupportable." 40. The charge sheet Issued to the petitioner by the respondents has been challenged on two grounds. The first is delay in initiation of disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner. the other is that the charges are baseless. 41. I will first of all consider the first ground on which the charge sheet has been sought to be quashed.DELAY IN COMMENCING/COMPLETING THE DISCIPLINARY ENQUIRY : 42. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the charge sheet submitted by the respondents to the petitioner is liable to be quashed on the ground of delay in commencement and completion of the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner is not based on any provision of the Rules of 1958 or of the Rajasthan Service Rules or the Rules governing the conditions of the petitioner. The submission is based on the law developed by judicial precedents and therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on several decisions, which have been cited by him at the bar. 43. The submission is based on the law developed by judicial precedents and therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on several decisions, which have been cited by him at the bar. 43. In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with delay held that the principles to be borne in this behalf have been set out by a Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 ). Their Lordships held that though the said case pertained to criminal prosecution, the principles enunciated therein are broadly applicable to a plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. In A. R. Antulay's case ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 ) (supra), the Constitution Bench observed at page 267 (of SCC) : (at p. 1729 of AIR) of the report:- "Article 21 declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The main procedural law in this country is the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Several other enactments too contain many a procedural provision. After Maneka Gandhi ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ), it can hardly be disputed that the "law" (which has to be understood in the sense the expression has been defined in clause (3)(a) of Article 13 defined in clause (3)(a) of Article 13 of the Constitution) in Article 21 has to answer the test of reasonableness and fairness inherent in Articles 19 and 14. In other words, such law should provide a procedure which is fair, reasonable and just. Then alone, would it be in consonance with the command of Article 21. Indeed, wherever necessary, such fairness must be read into such law. Now, can it be said that a law which does not provide for a reasonably prompt Investigation, trial and conclusion of a criminal case is fair, just and reasonable? It is both in the interest of the accused as well as the society that a criminal case is concluded soon. If the accused is guilty, he ought to be declared so. Social interest lies in punishing the guilty and exoneration of the innocent but this determination (of guilt or innocence) must be arrived at with reasonable despatch reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. If the accused is guilty, he ought to be declared so. Social interest lies in punishing the guilty and exoneration of the innocent but this determination (of guilt or innocence) must be arrived at with reasonable despatch reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. Since it is the accused who is charged with the offence and is also the person whose life and/or liberty is at peril, it is but fair to say that he has a right to be tried speedily. Correspondingly, It is the obligation of the State to respect and ensure this right. It needs no emphasis to say. the very fact of being accused of a crime is cause for concern. It affects the reputation and the standing of the person among his colleagues and in the society." At page 268 (of SCC) : (at pp. 1729-1730 of AIR) their Lordships further observed:- "But then speedy trial or other expressions conveying the said concept are necessarily relative in nature. One may ask speedy means how speedy? How long a delay is too long? We do not think It is possible to lay down any time schedules for conclusion of criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the workload in the particular Court. means of communication and in mind. For example, take the very case in which Ranjan Dwlvedi (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 268 of 1987) is the accused. 151 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution over a period of five years. Examination of some of the witnesses run into more than 100 typed pages each. The oral evidence adduced by the prosecution so far runs into, we are told, 4000 pages. Even though, it was proposed to go on with the case five days of a week and week after week, it was not possible for various reasons viz., non-availability of the counsel, non-availability of accused, interlocutory proceedings and other, systematic delays. A murder case may be a simple one involving say a dozen witnesses which can be concluded in a week while another case may involve a large number of witnesses, and may take several weeks. A murder case may be a simple one involving say a dozen witnesses which can be concluded in a week while another case may involve a large number of witnesses, and may take several weeks. Some offences by their very nature e.g., conspiracy cases, cases of misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, sedition, acquisition of disaproportionate assets by public servants, cases of corruption against high public servants and high public officials take longer time for investigation and trial. Then again, the workload in each course, district, region and state varies. This fact is too well known to merit illustration at our hands. In may places. requisite number of Courts are not available. In some places, frequent strikes by members of the bar interferes with the work schedules. In short, it is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time-limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. Even in the U.S.A. , the Supreme Court has refused to draw such a line. Except for the Patna Full Bench decision under appeal, no other decision of any High Court in this country taking such a view has been brought to our notice. Nor, to our knowledge, in United Kingdom. Wherever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case including those mentioned above and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceedings have been pending for an unjustifiably long period. In many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases, delays may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed but the system itself. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable-broadly speaking. Of course, if it is a minor offence-not being an economic offence and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise. Each case must be left to be decided on its own facts having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speedy trial. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speedy trial. We are also not satisfied that without such an outer limit, the right becomes illusory." 44. Since the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the charge sheet against the petitioner is liable to be quashed on the ground of delay is based on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal ( 1995 (2) SCC 570 ) (supra) and in that case, the provisions laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A. R. Antuley v. R. S. Nayak ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 ) (supra) were held to be applicable to delays in commencement and completion of disciplinary enquires against the public servants, the legal ground on which delay in commencing/completion of the disciplinary enquiry may be pleaded as a ground for quashing the disciplinary enquiry, appears to be none other than the right to speedy justice under Article 21 of the Constitution. which confers one of the most valuable fundamental rights on every person to India. In other words, the right to speedy justice includes the right to speedy initiation and completion of disciplinary enquiry and this right is under Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence, the observations made by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antuley v. R. S. Nayak (supra), must necessary govern the decision on the plea of delay in commencing/completion of the disciplinary enquiry. 45. The other side of the picture is that the petitioner is a public servant employed as a civil engineer. He does not have and much less a fundamental right to commit any mistake in the performance of his official duties. On the other hand, being an engineer, belonging to higher status, it was his official duty to devote himself to the duties of this office in which he was posted. In other words, it was his duty to ensure that the buildings placed in his charge were constructed properly and that they were properly maintained so that loss may not be caused to the buildings by rains or otherwise. In other words, it was his duty to ensure that the buildings placed in his charge were constructed properly and that they were properly maintained so that loss may not be caused to the buildings by rains or otherwise. If any loss is caused by any act or omission on the part of a public servant. the ultimate sufferers are the people of State in particular and the citizens of India in general. The petitioner being a public servant had no right whatsoever to cause any harm by any act of commission or omission to the people of India or to the people of Rajasthan. In other words, being a public servant. the petitioner owed a duty to the people of Rajasthan, because the acts and omissions committed by him are bound to adversely effect in the ultimate analysis, the fate and fortune of the people of Rajasthan. The question is what remedy the people of Rajasthan have to save their interest when such interest is likely to be affected by the acts and omissions of public servants, whose duty is to protect and promote their interest by performing the duties with devotion and dedication. The whole system of Government is so voluminous and sophsticated that the victims of illegal acts and omissions committed by public servant often have no remedy against the wrongs done to them by the public servants, except wait till the Department of Vigilance detects the wrong and decides to take some effective steps against the delinquent public servant. The people. who are in the ultimate analysis the victims of the acts and omissions committed by the public servants. have a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India that they shall be governed in accordance with the procedure established by law and that the State in its functionaries, who exercise so many controls on their personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, shall also act in accordance with the procedure established by law as mandated by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 46. 46. Viewed from this angle, it will have to be said that if the delinquent public servant against whom a disciplinary action is prosed or is commenced has a fundamental right to speedy justice by virtue of the provisions contained in Article 21 of the Constitution, every person has a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution to demand action against the wrongdoer for the purpose of protecting his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right to the victims of wrongs committed by a public servants, to enforce their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution is not restricted to the filing of petitions under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution. They further have a right to invoke any other provisions, which is designed to prevent the commission of the wrong against them. Thus, if the wrong committed by the delinquent public servant, amounts to an offence made punishable by law, unless the contrary is provided, the victim's right to prosecute the wrongdoer shall have to be read as a right under Article 21 of the Constitution. If the civil wrong is committed against any person, cognizance can be taken by the civil Court under Section 9, the right to move the civil Court for proper decree or order shall have to be read as part of the right to enforce the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Similarly. if the rules governing the conditions of service of the delinquent public servant, permit the disciplinary action against the delinquent public servant, the right of the victim to enforce his fundamental right snider Article 21 of the Constitution of India shall extend to disciplinary proceedings, which may be commenced against the delinquent public servant. It is, true that in such cases, the responsibility of prosecuting the disciplinary proceedings is placed on the shoulders of the Department and the victim of the wrong committed by the delinquent public servant, has no role to play in the prosecution or the delinquent public servant, but he has a right to legitimate expectation that the enquiry against the public servant shall be commenced and the guilty person shall be punished in accordance with law, because. on the punishment of the delinquent public servant depends the protection and enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. 47. on the punishment of the delinquent public servant depends the protection and enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. 47. The distinction between the actions which are preventive and the action which are curative is well known. The actions which prevent the commission of a wrong are far superior in quality and cheaper in terms of cost so far as the task of eradicating the wrongs are concerned. The actions which are curative in character, are very costly in terms of time, energy, money and quality wise they are very poor, because they often fail in undoing the evil consequences arising from the wrongs committed by the public servants. The award of compensation is hardly an adequate remedy so far as the object of preventing a harm or curing the harm is concerned. Some times advices and even injunctions issued against the wrongdoer are effective in a small number, and therefore, the legislature has to provide penalties to punish the wrongdoers, because the imposition of penalty for the wrong committed by them is. in the ultimate analysis the only effective action which can act as a deterrent and which can prevent the commission of the wrong. The deterrent effect of the penalty does not always depend on the quantum of punishment, often it depends on the detection of the wrong and prosecution of the wrongdoer for the wrong committed by him. 48. For the reasons mentioned above, detection of a wrong made punishable by law, followed by investigation and prosecution of the wrongdoer and the verdict of guilty by the authority completent to deliver such verdict, appears to be the only effective remedy for preventing the commission of wrong act when advice and the issue of injunctions do not serve the purpose. 49. The above line of reasoning. Is not contrary to the reformative theory, which insists on reforming the wrongdoer rather than causing a harm by imposing heavy punishment on him. It is the detection of the wrong and the prosecution of the wrongdoer followed by a verdict of guilty. after a proper enquiry or trial, which serves the object as a deterent not only to that particular wrongdoer, but to other prospective wrongdoers. It is the detection of the wrong and the prosecution of the wrongdoer followed by a verdict of guilty. after a proper enquiry or trial, which serves the object as a deterent not only to that particular wrongdoer, but to other prospective wrongdoers. In short, the people, who are the ultimate victims of the wrongs committed by a public servant have no other effective remedy against the wrong committed by the public servants except, their prosecution with a view to impose on them punishment in accordance with law. The commencement of the prosecution of a public servant on charges of misconduct and the continuation of such prosecution till the prosecution reaches the stage when the public servant may be acquitted or be found guilty of the misconduct against him, being the most effective remedy against the wrongs committed by the public servants, must be regarded as necessary in the interest of the general public and it would not be unreasonable to say that the people, who are the ultimate victims of such wrongs have an expectation that those officials, whose duty is to exercise effective supervision on their subordinates shall leave no stone unturned to detect the wrongs committed by public servants as soon as may be possible and to commence disciplinary proceedings against them and prosecute the same till the disciplinary proceedings reached their logical end. 50. It would thus appear that if there be sufficient ground to believe that a public servant has committed a misconduct, which should not be ignored or forgiven, the commencement of disciplinary enquiry against the delinquent public servant and the continuation thereof till the enquiry reaches its logical end would be necessary in the public interest. If in such cases, the wrong committed by the public servant is ignored and no disciplinary enquiry is initiated against him or if an enquiry is initiated against him, but it is given up before it reaches its logical end, the public interest would be defeated as these acts would amount to conferring a license on the public servant to commit the wrongs, amounting to misconduct. 51. 51. For the reasons mentioned above, it is necessary that before the proceedings of a criminal case or the disciplinary proceedings are quashed on the ground of delay in commencement of the proceedings or completing the proceedings, the gravity of the charges and the necessity of initiating the disciplinary proceedings and continuing them till they reach their logical end so that the delinquent public servant, who is found guilty may be punished, must be kept in view. It is not as if delay in commencement of the disciplinary proceedings or in completion thereof. It is not as if mere delay in commencement of or in completion of the departmental enquiry would by itself, as a proposition of law be sufficient to quash the disciplinary proceedings irrespective of the gravity, harm caused by the misconduct, the necessity of conducting the disciplinary enquiry with a view to eradicate grave misconducts and other relevant factors. 52. In the instant case, after considering the facts, I am of the opinion that it is not a fit case in which the departmental enquiry should be quashed against the petitioner. 53. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is going to retire soon and he was entitled to be considered for promotion. but he has not been considered for promotion, because the departmental enquiry is pending against him. 54. When a public servant, after his slection to a public service assumes his duties, he accepts the appointment with all the consequences that may arise from the acceptance. His acceptance in fact means that he undertakes to perform the duties of his office with utmost devotion, dedication and diligence, no matter how much physical or mental suffering he has to undergo. The hazards of the functions, which he has to perform, cannot be avoided by him and sometimes he has to risk his own life for the purpose of performing his duties efficiently. Thus, viewed, the public service is not a bed of roses. Simultaneously, the acceptance of the post by the public servant, by implication, promises, certain status, dignity, emoluments and future chances of promotion. Thus, viewed, the public service, offers to the person, who is selected, a certain dignity, a promise of fraternity and chances of promotion in future, subject of course to the good conduct, devotion and dedication with due observance of integrity. Thus, viewed, the public service, offers to the person, who is selected, a certain dignity, a promise of fraternity and chances of promotion in future, subject of course to the good conduct, devotion and dedication with due observance of integrity. The public servants may, therefore, reasonably expect that they would be considered for promotion as and when they become eligible for the same and an opportunity for promotion arises. They have to wait not only for becoming eligible for the superior post, they have to further wait till a superior post falls vacant. Thus, viewed, if a public servant is not considered for promotion or is denied the promotion after he has become eligible for the same and the post and superior post on which he may be promoted has fallen vacant, the expectation of the public servant that he would be promoted in due course subject to his becoming eligible and the availability of a post, is frustrated. It is true that nobody has a fundamental right to promotion but it is equally true that every person has a right to certain other fundamental rights including the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution entitles every public servant to be considered for promotion as and when he has become eligible and the cases of other similarly placed persons are being considered. The fact that there is no fundamental right to promotion, does not mean that there is no fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of Constitution. In my considered view. Article 14 entitles all public servants who are similarly placed to be treated alike and to be considered for promotion as and when their cases are considered for filling a seniormost. The right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution is available to only those persons who are similarly placed. It is also true that the legislature has a right to bring about a discrimination among the persons, who are similarly placed, provided such a discrimination is based on an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus, with the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. It is also true that the legislature has a right to bring about a discrimination among the persons, who are similarly placed, provided such a discrimination is based on an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus, with the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. Viewed in this light, the crucial question is whether a public servant can be denied consideration for promotion, or after being considered and found suitable for promotion be denied promotion on the ground that a departmental enquiry is contemplated or is pending against him. 55. In order to answer the above question, it would be necessary to find out if there is anything in the Constitution and the Laws made thereunder to indicate whether such a course is permissible. Whenever any person, who on account of being a member of a particular class, is sought to be discriminated with a view to deny him the benefits which are made available to others. Article 14 of the Constitution comes into play. As soon as it is shown that the person complaining of discrimination. belongs to a particular class of persons, it must be held that his membership of that class entitles him to be treated in the same manner in which other members of a class. to which he belongs are to be treated. This right to be treated in the same manner in which the others are being treated is however subject to the condition that if the discrimination, complained of is based on an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object to be achieved, then he cannot complain against the discrimination. In other words, a discrimination even among those, who belong to the same class is permissible, if there is an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object to be achieved. What do we mean by the expression "intelligible differentia". Does it mean, a differentia, which is capable of being perceived?. The expression "intelligible" gives an indication that the differentia by which discrimination is made, must be capable of being conceptulised and it must be real, because, it is the intelligible faculty of mind, which helps mankind in conceptulising various things, objects and functions, but the faculty of mind, which is responsible for conceptulising, is capable of both, conceptulising that which is real and conceptulising that which is unreal. As a result of this. As a result of this. what a man may conceive of, may be real as well imaginary. The crucial question is whether the expression "intelligible differentia" means a real differentia capable of being conceptulised or it means and includes real as well as fanciful differentia, which is capable of being conceptulised. While answering this question. one cannot ignore the necessity of adhering to the principle of truth, which is responsible for preservation of life and liberty, equality and fraternity. To hold that the intelligible differentia necessary for a lawful discrimination includes a fanciful or imaginary differentia, which is untrue, would undoubtedly open gates for falsehood and untruth to prevail over truth. Reasonableness, which appears to be one of the basic aspiration of the people cannot be allowed to be based on falsehood. It is truth, which alone can be said to be the foundation of reasonableness. In order, the intelligible differentia necessary for making a discrimination lawful may be called "reasonable". It must not only be capable of being conceptulised, it must be true. I am, therefore, of the opinion that unless a differentia, on the basis of which a person is sought to be discriminated is true, the discrimination would not satisfy the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. 56. The allegation of misconduct against a public servant may or may not be true. It is possible that the complaint, on the basis of which such misconduct is alleged. may be motivated by personal interest or his own perception of the conduct complainted of, may be faulty. Merely because someone has made a complaint against a public servant. does not mean that the complaint made by him must be true. It is possible that the complaint may be totally Case, as was the case in R. C. Sood v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, (1998) 4 Jr. (SC) 4: (1999 Lab IC 453) and in the case of Sukhraj Singh Bajwa v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, (1988) 1 Rajasthan LR 613 : (1988 Lab IC NOC 74). If the allegations of misconduct are false, such allegations cannot be used as an intelligible differentia for discriminating the public servant against whom the allegations have been made. This explains why the preliminary enquiry is often considered necessary when the allegations of misconduct are made against a public servant. If the allegations of misconduct are false, such allegations cannot be used as an intelligible differentia for discriminating the public servant against whom the allegations have been made. This explains why the preliminary enquiry is often considered necessary when the allegations of misconduct are made against a public servant. The preliminary enquiry is intended to ascertain the truth about the allegations so as to find out whether there is ground for proceeding against the concerned public servant. If the preliminary enquiry discloses that the allegations made against the public servant are false or they are not proved to be correct, no further action against the public servant would be justified. So far as the rights of the masters are concerned, these rights are either contractual or they are statutory. In case of contractual rights, there is rarely any clause in the contract, empowering the masters to unilaterally decide questions relating to alleged misconduct. All that the master can complain of, is a breach of a condition of a contract and if he denies any benefit, to which the servant is entitled on account of alleged breach of contract, he has to prove the breach of contract before a Court of law. In the case of statutory rights, the doctrine of pleasure, which gave to the master the absolute right to keep the servant in the service or to dispense with the services, did not by itself confer any right on the master to discriminate on the ground of alleged misconduct, though, it permitted the master to discriminate on the ground of his own arbitrary discretion, which was indicated by the expression "his pleasure". Since, the doctrine of pleasure in its ultimate analysis is the doctrine conferring arbitrary powers on the master to discriminate one servant from others on the ground of his pleasure is not in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution, the doctrine of pleasure has not been followed in our country. Arbitrariness whether it, is bonafide or mala fide, whether it is accompanied by malice or it is independent of malice, is opposed to what is known as reasonableness, and it is liable to be struck down as void on the ground that it violates the mandate of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. Arbitrariness whether it, is bonafide or mala fide, whether it is accompanied by malice or it is independent of malice, is opposed to what is known as reasonableness, and it is liable to be struck down as void on the ground that it violates the mandate of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, even in those cases, where the master has been conferred powers under a Statute, the powers vested in the master must not be exercised in an arbitrary manner. They must be exercised in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. In other words, if the master intends to discriminate a public servant by denying him a treatment to which he is entitled, by virtue of Article 14 of the Constitution, then he must show that there was a real intelligible differentia for discriminating such public servant. I therefore, have no doubt in it that if a public servant is sought to be discriminated on the ground of alleged misconduct, the allegation about the misconduct must be true and not fanciful. A false allegation of misconduct cannot on any reasonable ground, entitle the master to practice any discrimination against any public servant. In the case of Sukhraj Singh Bajwa v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, (1988 Lab IC NOC 74) (Raj.) (supra) and R. C. Sood v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, (1999 Lab IC 453) (SC) (supra). the disciplinary proceedings against the concerned public servants were quashed on the ground that the allegations were not true. 57. For the reasons mentioned above, it must be held that the right to discriminate a public servant on the ground of alleged misconduct. may be available to the master only after the misconduct has been proved against him. Such right to discriminate the public servant is not available to the master unless the allegations of misconduct are proved to be true. 58. I, therefore, find force in this sub-mission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if a public servant, who is innocent, is denied the right to be considered for promotion or is denied promotion on the ground of an allegation, which is not true, then grave injustice would occur. 58. I, therefore, find force in this sub-mission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if a public servant, who is innocent, is denied the right to be considered for promotion or is denied promotion on the ground of an allegation, which is not true, then grave injustice would occur. The practice however shows that in many cases, grave injustice is caused to the public servants when discrimination is practised against them on the basis of allegations, which are false and which are not proved to be true. The reason for this is not difficult) to ascertain. The rules prescribe that a departmental enquiry should be conducted against a public servant in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Rules. The rules regulating the conduct of departmental enquiry invariably insist on the observance of the principles of natural justice, and therefore, the departmental enquiry is required to be conducted in such a manner as to give the full opportunity to the public servant to defend himself. It takes a long time to conclude the departmental enquiry and the master faces the question: "what is to be done during the period the departmental enquiry remains pending?". If it is held that so long the departmental enquiry has not been completed, the public servant must not be discriminated and should be promoted to the higher post, the result would be that unworthy public servants would be promoted even if the allegation of misconduct are true. On the other hand, if it is held that as soon as a departmental enquiry is contemplated or has been commenced against a public servant, he should not be considered for promotion or he should not be given promotion, it is most likely to lead to causing of grave injustice to the concerned public servant, if the allegations of misconduct are false. Thus, in both the cases mentioned above, there is a likelihood of causing of a grave injustice; in one case to the people and the department, who suffer from the misconduct committed by the public servant; in the second case to the public servant concerned. The only way in which injustice may be avoided and justice may be done to both the parties, it is necessary to require strict proof of alleged misconduct, before the departmental enquiry is commenced against a public servant. The only way in which injustice may be avoided and justice may be done to both the parties, it is necessary to require strict proof of alleged misconduct, before the departmental enquiry is commenced against a public servant. In fact, the view that a preliminary enquiry should be conducted by the department to find out the truth of allegations made against a public servant, supports the view that before the departmental enquiry is commenced, the truth of allegations must be ascertained. The purpose of the preliminary enquiry is, thus to find out if the allegations made against the public servant are true. So long, this purpose is fulfilled, no injustice is likely to be caused to either party. If the allegations of misconduct are true, the final result of the disciplinary enquiry would positively be a verdict of guilty against the concerned public servant. On the other hand, if the preliminary enquiry shows that the allegations are not true, there would be no occasion for commencing a disciplinary enquiry against the concerned public servant. However, it appears that the very purpose of conducting a preliminary enquiry into the alleged misconduct is defeated by not insisting upon the same degree of proof, as is required for giving the finding of guilt against the public servant and by not conducting the preliminary enquiry with that amount of care and caution with which the disciplinary enquiry is required to be conducted. As a result, most of the preliminary enquiries are without collecting the whole of the evidence relating to the allegations and in place of strict proof of the allegations, the findings of the preliminary enquiry are given, in terms of "prima facie proof of allegations". Consequently. the object of the preliminary enquiry is defeated by substituting "prima facie proof"in place of "proof of the allegations of misconduct" and the enquiring officer at the stage of preliminary enquiry avoids collecting all relevant evidence on the ground that his object is only to find out whether the allegations are prima facie proved and for such prima facie proof, it is not necessary for him to collect all relevant evidence. Not only this, the test for appreciating the evidence is also compromised. Not only this, the test for appreciating the evidence is also compromised. At the stage of preliminary enquiry, sometimes even the most ?unreliable evidence is accepted as reliable as was the case in R. C. Sood v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, (1999 Lab IC 453) (SC) (supra) and all the lacunas were ignored on the expectation that these lacunas may be fulfilled by the prosecution when the disciplinary enquiry is commenced. In short, in some cases neither the preliminary enquiry is conducted to ascertain the truth of the allegations nor It is conducted with due care and caution. Not only this, the rules of appreciation of evidence, which ought to be applied for separating the truth from falsehood are also not applied at the stage of preliminary enquiry. As a consequence, the findings given by the enquiry officer, after he has concluded the preliminary enquiry, is far from being reliable. The finding given by him that the allegations of misconduct is true means that the allegations or misconduct is only prima facie true and in fact it may or may not be true. Simultaneously. his finding carries with it the message that the finding of prima facie proof of allegations is not based on the whole of the evidence, but on a part of the evidence and that this finding is arrived at without applying those tests, which are necessary for separating truth from falsehood. The results of such preliminary enquiries, are therefore, not sufficient to arrive at the inference that the allegation of misconduct must be true. All that can be said is that the allegations of misconduct are only prima faice true and they are based on insufficient evidence and without applying the tests, which are necessary for separating the truth from falsehood. Many innocent public servants on account of these drawbacks of the departmental enquiry, are made to face the disciplinary enquiry and to undergo mental torture, humiliation, and loss of chances of promotion when the departmental enquiries are started against them on the basis of "prima facie proof of the allegations of misconduct", by the enquiring officer. 59. What is the remedy? In my humble opinion, the remedy does not lie in taking the view that the public servant should not be denied promotion, unless the departmental enquiry has been concluded and he has been found guilty. 59. What is the remedy? In my humble opinion, the remedy does not lie in taking the view that the public servant should not be denied promotion, unless the departmental enquiry has been concluded and he has been found guilty. Because, if this view is taken, then all those public servants, who are guilty of misconduct would be getting promotion in place of punishment and they would delay the commencement as well as the completion of the disciplinary enquiry against them, on one pretext or the other and as a consequence, the public at large and the concerned department in particular would have to suffer irreparable harm. If the other view that the public servant against whom the disciplinary enquiry is contemplated or has been commenced should not be considered for promotion or should not be given promotion till he is acquitted of the charges made against him is accepted, grave injustice is likely to be caused to the concerned public servant if the commencement or completion of the disciplinary enquiry takes unnecessary long time. It is true that in such cases, the Court may sometimes give a relief to the concerned public servant by quashing the disciplinary proceedings started against him, either on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or on the ground of delay, the hard reality is that this view leads to Injustice to the innocent public servants. It would be noticed that by adoption of the first view, the guilty public servants are benefited and the public as well as the department is harmed. The innocent public servants do not suffer by the first view. On the other hand, by adoption of the second view, the guilty persons do not suffer because a promotion is denied to them, no injustice is caused to them, but innocent public servants do suffer, because if the denial of consideration or promotion, as the case may be on account of the pendency of the disciplinary enquiry pending against them. The remedy of quashing the proceedings on the ground of delay in commencement or completion of disciplinary enquiry cannot be made available in all cases, and therefore, where the allegations are grave and consequences of misconduct are serious, the Courts have declined to quash the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay alone. The remedy of quashing the proceedings on the ground of delay in commencement or completion of disciplinary enquiry cannot be made available in all cases, and therefore, where the allegations are grave and consequences of misconduct are serious, the Courts have declined to quash the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay alone. On the other hand, if the allegations are not proved or there is no reliable evidence, worth the name to prove the allegations of misconduct, the Courts have quashed the disciplinary proceedings. This necessitates the Court to substitute its opinion about the sufficiency or the credibility of evidence in place of the opinion made by the enquiry officer. In such cases, if the rule that Court should not substitute its opinion in place of the opinion formed by the enquiry officer is followed, then this remedy would not be possible. 60. In view of above discussion. I am of the considered opinion that the only remedy for avoidance of injustice either to the department or to the public servant concerned, lies in correcting errors which are committed in conducting the preliminary enquiry. The object of preliminary enquiry must be find out if the allegations made against the public servant are true. There should be no compromise so far as this object is concerned. So long truth and law are regarded as the two pillers, on which justice is founded, no compromise can be made with the object of ascertainment of a truth. no matter what is the stage of the proceedings. The practice of conducting the preliminary enquiry with a view to ascertain anything but truth, must be deprecated. The officer conducting preliminary enquiry must take care to collect all relevant evidence relating to alleged misconduct, whether it is oral, documentary or circumstantial and the golden rule of evidence that best evidence must be collected ought to be strictly followed by the officer conducting the preliminary enquiry. After the collection of evidence, the probative value of the evidence must be determined by application of all those rules of prudence, which are necessary for separating the truth from falsehood so that the ultimate finding, which may be arrived at by the officer conducting the preliminary enquiry must relate to a truth, whether it is guilt or innocence. After the collection of evidence, the probative value of the evidence must be determined by application of all those rules of prudence, which are necessary for separating the truth from falsehood so that the ultimate finding, which may be arrived at by the officer conducting the preliminary enquiry must relate to a truth, whether it is guilt or innocence. If these three principles are followed by at the time of conducting preliminary enquiry in all probability, the finding of the enquiry officer conducting the enquiry would be correct. If this finding is subjected to trial during the disciplinary enquiry in which the delinquent public servant will have the right to test the veracity of the evidence and produce his own evidence, there is every possibility that the finding arrived at by the officer, who conducted the preliminary enquiry would not be shaken. The very object of conducting the disciplinary enquiry commenced by serving a charge sheet to the delinquent public servant is to observe the principles of natural justice so that the delinquent public servant may exercise his right to defend himself. The necessity of observing the principles of natural justice during the disciplinary enquiry is rooted not in the assumption that in his absence truth cannot be ascertained, but in social duty to inform the person against whom an adverse action is intended to be taken and, to give an opportunity to save himself from the intended action by adopting lawful means. So far as the ascertainment of truth of allegations of misconduct is concerned, if the enquiry officer is capable and he takes pains to collect all relevant evidence and the case is one in which sufficient evidence can be discovered and he is capable of applying the proper principles for separating the truth from falsehood, he can ascertain the truth even without observing the principles of natural justice. Therefore, so far as the ascertainment of truth is concerned, observance of principles of natural justice does not appear to be necessary, though in cases where the officer incharge in exercise of the power conferred on him acts in arbitrary manner, the observance of principles of natural justice would enable the effected person to unvail the arbitrariness and thereby take steps for eradication of the same. The basic foundation of the principles of natural justice lies in fraternity among the human beings, which fraternity is based on two principles. The basic foundation of the principles of natural justice lies in fraternity among the human beings, which fraternity is based on two principles. The first principle is the non-violence. The second is that a violence cannot be avoided and the prospective victim of violence should be given an opportunity to defend himself so that he may escape the consequences. If this is the correct approach and non-violence is the foundation of fraternity, the ideal state of society would be where no one causes any harm to another by any act or omission. If such an ideal state cannot be secured at any particular time or place or in respect of certain persons, the next best rule is to appraise the other person of the danger of harm to him and to enable him to save himself from the harm, by escape or otherwise as may be permissible. It is necessary to observe the principles of natural justice for preserving fraternity. For the reasons mentioned above. I hold that the duty to ascertain ?truth is mandated by Article 14 of the Constitution, which insists on the presence of a real intelligible differentia necessary for the lawful discrimination, if a person, who is otherwise entitled to parity vis-a-vis others similarly placed persons is discriminated with adverse consequences occurring to him. This duty to ascertain the truth, can be performed by the officer conducting preliminary enquiry, without observing any principles of natural justice, except in those cases where the public servant concerned is likely to give relevant information to the enquiring officer. This duty should not be shirked by the officer conducting the preliminary enquiry on the pretext that at that stage he cannot observe the principles of natural justice. The enquiry officer making the preliminary enquiry must aim at ascertaining the truth of the allegation and he should collect all relevant evidence and apply the same principles to such evidence as is necessary for ascertainment of truths by separating the truth from falsehood so that he may give a finding, which is close to the truth. Stage of con ducting the disciplinary enquiry would come next and the object of the disciplinary enquiry would be to give an opportunity to the delinquent public servant to defend himself after he has been apprised of all the charges made against him. Stage of con ducting the disciplinary enquiry would come next and the object of the disciplinary enquiry would be to give an opportunity to the delinquent public servant to defend himself after he has been apprised of all the charges made against him. If during the preliminary enquiry all relevant evidence has been collected, there would be no chance of production of any additional evidence during the disciplinary enquiry. If the officer conducting the preliminary enquiry has applied correct principles for appreciating the evidence/separating the truth from falsehood, there is no chance of the reversal of his finding, because the principles necessary for separating truth from falsehood are well established and they cannot be changed by the public servant during the conduct of the enquiry. Thus viewed, the disciplinary enquiry would by itself not be sufficient to reverse the findings given by the officer, who conducted the preliminary enquiry but it would satisfy the rules resulting from fraternity, namely that if an action is proposed to be taken against another person, such person must be apprised of the action and be given opportunity to defend himself. I am therefore, strongly in favour of conducting preliminary enquiries with a view to as certain the truth of allegations of misconduct and on collection of all relevant evidence and the appreciation of evidence by the enquiring officer by application of the same principles, which are applied for separating truth from falsehood. This would substantially reduce the number of cases in which injustice may be caused either to the public servant or to the department and the cases in which injustice may still be caused in spite of the efforts taken by the department, would positively be very few. 61. Since, the duty to ascertain the truth of allegations of misconduct and the duty to give an opportunity to the delinquent public servant to defend himself against the charge made against him have different objects, it would be proper to divide the whole of the proceeding of enquiry into two parts. The first part commencing from the receipt of a complaint against a public servant to the conclusion of the preliminary enquiry and the second part commencing from the service of charge sheet and the statement of accusation to the public servant to the conclusion of the departmental enquiry. The first part commencing from the receipt of a complaint against a public servant to the conclusion of the preliminary enquiry and the second part commencing from the service of charge sheet and the statement of accusation to the public servant to the conclusion of the departmental enquiry. The dominant object of the first part should be to ascertain the truth of allegations of misconduct by collecting all relevant evidence and subjecting it to tests necessary for separating truth from falsehood. The dominant object of the second part should be to give an opportunity to the public servant concerned to admit or deny the charges made against him and in case he denies the charges, to enable him to test the probative value of the evidence collected by the disciplinary authority and to give a finding after the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. However, in many cases, the first part of the enquiry is not conducted in the manner indicated above, Consequently, there is possibility that relevant and material evidence may not be collected during the preliminary enquiry. In addition to this, the process by with the probative value of the evidence is to be ascertained is also not the same as is applied at the final stage of the disciplinary enquiry conducted under the Rules. Both these things render the findings given in the preliminary enquiry open to challenge and in any case render them not sufficient for the purpose of forming any opinion about the allegations. In these circumstances, if a public servant is denied consideration for promotion or his promotion is withheld on the ground that a prima facie case was found against him after conclusion of the preliminary enquiry, it is possible that grave injustice may occur to the public servant concerned. As pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Bani Singh (1990 Lab IC 1488) (supra) that normally, pendency or contemplated initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a candidate must be considered to have absolutely no impact upon, his right to be considered, and therefore, his case must be considered for promotion if he is otherwise eligible for promotion and vacancy has arisen. It is true that if the departmental enquiry had reached the stage of framing of charges after a prima facie case has been made out against the delinquent public servant, the "scaled cover procedure" is followed. It is true that if the departmental enquiry had reached the stage of framing of charges after a prima facie case has been made out against the delinquent public servant, the "scaled cover procedure" is followed. But, this procedure does not totally prevent the likelihood of grave injustice to the delinquent public servant if the enquiry takes unnecessary long time. In my humble opinion, the "sealed cover procedure" should be restricted to those cases where the preliminary enquiry was conducted with a view to collect all relevant evidence and a very strong prima facie case has been made out against a delinquent public servant and the disciplinary enquiry is conducted without unnecessary delay. Otherwise, the sealed cover procedure is likely to be abused for the purpose of denying the benefit of promotion to otherwise deserving public servants. 62. For the reasons mentioned above, the prayer to quash the charge-sheet served to the petitioner deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. However, applying the balancing process as indicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal ( 1995 (2) SCC 570 ) (supra) and keeping in view all relevant facts and circumstances of this case, it appears to be just and proper to give a direction to consider the petitioner for promotion, if he is otherwise eligible and the occasion for considering his case for promotion has arisen and in case he is found fit for promotion, he should be promoted without reference and without taking into consideration the charges and the pendency of the said enquiry. In case, he Is promoted to a higher post in compliance with this direction, the promotion shall be subject to review after the conclusion of the enquiry and in light of the findings in the enquiry. 63. This petition is disposed of accordingly.Order accordingly. *******