VAMAN RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the constitution of India seeks to challenge the order of the 2nd respondent dated 23-5-1998 namely, Director (Technical) ecil, Kushaiguda, Hyderabad under which being the disciplinary authority, he accepted the report of the enquiry in respect of certain charges against the petitioner and imposed the punishment of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this petition may be stated briefly as follows: the petitioner has been working as the personnel Manager, Main Frame Computer unit, ECIL. During the period in 1995-96, the petitioner is said to have committed certain irregularities in respect of his unauthorized absence without leave. The disciplinary authority decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings and accordingly an Enquiry Officer has been appointed. Five allegations have been made in the charge- sheet framed against the petitioner. The first one is related to his absence from duty for 9 days on 27-8-1995, 5-9-1995, 23-9-1995, 15-10-1995,5-11 1995,13-2-1996,14-2-1996, 1-3-1996 and 2-3-1996. ( 3 ) THE further allegation in this regard is that without getting his absence regularized, the petitioner drew the salary fraudulently for the said period. The second charge against the petitioner was while the petitioner had 56 days sick leave to his credit on 31-5-1998, he has shown six days of sick leave as opening balance as on 1-1-1996 in his sick leave account and thus showed increase of balance of 8 days and the third charge was that the petitioner was absent from duties between 16-6-1996 to 23-8-1996. He had got this absence regularized by applying 10 days of sick leave without submitting any medical certificate. The charge is that while he was required to apply for sick leave for 13 days, he applied only 10 days and thus debited less quantum of sick leave to his leave account. ( 4 ) THE fourth allegation is that the petitioner had availed earned leave for four days from 14-5-1995 to 17-5-1995 and debited the same to his Earned Leave account and subsequently he had converted the above Earned Leave into casual leave at the year end which was contrary to the rules of the company. ( 4 ) THE fourth allegation is that the petitioner had availed earned leave for four days from 14-5-1995 to 17-5-1995 and debited the same to his Earned Leave account and subsequently he had converted the above Earned Leave into casual leave at the year end which was contrary to the rules of the company. The fifth charge against the petitioner is that he has drawn the salary for certain days namely, 23-3-1995, 13-10-1995, 28-12-1995 and 29-8-1996 to 31-8-1996 without attending the office and by showing as if he was on other duty (OD) which was not authorized. Thus, the allegation against the petitioner was that he was guilty of fraud and dishonesty in conducting the affairs of the company. He was negligent in performance of his duties and that his actions were subversive of discipline and behaviour and finally that he acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the evidence adduced before him, the Enquiry Officer recorded his conclusion that the charges framed against the delinquent Officer have not much of significance except for negligence in his supervision over the procedures and practices, The disciplinary authority, however, held that on the basis of the available record, there is material to show that the delinquent officer drew salary for five days in 1995 and four days in 19% without regularizing the absence and accordingly held him guilty for the above said charges mentioned in the charge-sheet. On this basis, the disciplinary authority viz. , the Director (Technical), ECIL has imposed the penalty of reduction of basic pay by one increment with cumulative effect. The appeal preferred against this order of the disciplinary authority imposing the above said punishment has been dismissed. This order imposing punishment on the petitioner-delinquent officer is challenged on various grounds. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner referred to a general observation made by the disciplinary authority that apart from the charge of negligence held to have been proved by the Enquiry Officer, other charges also have been proved. However, what has specifically been held by the disciplinary authority is that the delinquent officer being over all in-charge, drew the salary for five days in 1995 and four days in 1996 without regularizing his absence and accordingly held him guilty of misconduct. However, what has specifically been held by the disciplinary authority is that the delinquent officer being over all in-charge, drew the salary for five days in 1995 and four days in 1996 without regularizing his absence and accordingly held him guilty of misconduct. The fact that the petitioner drew salary for five days in 1995 and four days in 1996 without regularizing his absence is factually not disputed. The Enquiry Officer also mentioned about this, but left it by referring to the contention of the petitioner that punishing him on that ground would amount to subjecting him to double jeopardy. ( 7 ) SRI P. R. Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner challenges the impugned order on two grounds. Firstly, it is contended that the Officer who acted as a disciplinary authority was promoted as chairman and Managing Director by the time the petitioner preferred his appeal and heard the appeal in his new capacity as chairman and Managing Director against the order passed by himself. Learned counsel for the respondent does not dispute this and in fact, concedes that it is a grave irregularity and that if the matter is remitted back, the lapse in this behalf shall be corrected and the Board of Directors will hear the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein. But, Mr. P. R. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner has specifically pleaded and I record this fact emphatically that he does not press for remitting the matter back on that ground and he does not press the petition on that ground. ( 8 ) THE only other ground urged before me is that for the same lapse viz. , of claiming salary for the period of unauthorised absence before it was regularized, the petitioner was already subjected to punishment and the present punishment imposed under the orders of the disciplinary authority is violative of art. 20 (2) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it amounts to subjecting the petitioner to double jeopardy. The facts on which this plea is based may be stated as follows. ( 9 ) IT is stated that for the relevant days viz. , five days for which he is said to be unauthorisedly absent, his salary was drawn. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner being a busy executive, cannot be expected to verify each salary bill. ( 9 ) IT is stated that for the relevant days viz. , five days for which he is said to be unauthorisedly absent, his salary was drawn. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner being a busy executive, cannot be expected to verify each salary bill. However, when this was brought to his notice, he himself hers submitted a note to his superior officer that such a lapse has occurred and has himself suggested for deduction of salary for those days for which his absence was not regularized. On this, the competent officer passed an order that the petitioner s salary paid for those days may be recovered from the petitioner from his pay bill of the subsequent period. The disciplinary authority also passed an order on the note submitted by the petitioner that he is censured for this act of claiming salary for the period of absence which was not regularized. This, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, amounts to punishing the petitioner for the alleged misconduct of claiming salary for the period of absence, which was not regularized. The punishment of withholding of one increment which has been imposed in the regular enquiry subsequently amounts to subjecting the petitioner to double jeopardy for the same acts for which he was already punished and as such, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that the so called censure said to have endorsed on the representation made by the petitioner does not amount to imposition of any penalty by the disciplinary authority. It is not disputed that the said endorsement was made, but it is contended that this endorsement dated 25-9-1996 to the effect that the petitioner is censured and that such action shall not be repeated in future was never communicated to the petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner being a personnel Manager appears to have procured a copy of the said endorsement unlawfully without any authority. The present action, therefore, does not amount to double jeopardy. ( 11 ) IT is pertinent to mention that the earlier order dated 25-9-1996 mentioning censure of the petitioner was passed on a representation given by the petitioner himself suggesting deduction from his salary for the days of his unauthorized absence. The present action, therefore, does not amount to double jeopardy. ( 11 ) IT is pertinent to mention that the earlier order dated 25-9-1996 mentioning censure of the petitioner was passed on a representation given by the petitioner himself suggesting deduction from his salary for the days of his unauthorized absence. Thus, the action was not initiated at the instance of the disciplinary authority. The main purpose of the order passed by the disciplinary authority was to act on the representation made by the petitioner himself in regard to deduction from his salary for the period of his unauthorized absence. The principal object of the order was to direct the office to deduct the pay from the salary bill of the petitioner for the month of October, 1996. The disciplinary action, as is commonly understood, appears to have been far from the mind of the authority who passed the said order. There seems to be some substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the order was never communicated to the petitioner. In fact, what has been filed in this Court is a photostat copy of the order said to have been passed. No formal order communicating the same to the petitioner has been filed. The petitioner has not suggested that there is any such formal order passed that such formal order communicating the same to the petitioner is in existence. ( 12 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent, relying on a judgment of the Supreme court in State of Punjab vs. Amar Singh harika contends that mere passing an order of dismissal is not effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. It is contended that in this case, even assuming that the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishing the petitioner with censure, the said order has not been communicated to the petitioner and as such is not effective and does not bar disciplinary action against the petitioner. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the very fact that the salary was deducted from the pay bill of the petitioner after the said order was passed by the disciplinary authority would itself show that the order was communicated and acted upon. I am unable tp agree with this contention. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the very fact that the salary was deducted from the pay bill of the petitioner after the said order was passed by the disciplinary authority would itself show that the order was communicated and acted upon. I am unable tp agree with this contention. When the matter was brought to the notice of the officer in an official note, he directed the salary for the period of absence to be deducted from the pay bill of the petitioner. In the absence of any material placed on behalf of the petitioner that the said order was in fact communicated to him, mere deduction of salary as per the endorsement made by the officer, does not constitute communication of the order to the petitioner. If it is looked from a proper perspective, it appears obvious that the main thrust of the order was that certain amount may be deducted from the salary of the petitioner for the period of his unauthorised absence. When the fact of claiming of such salary by the petitioner without regularization of the leave was brought to the notice of the disciplinary authority while directing deduction of salary, he has also mentioned that the petitioner be censured. Any disciplinary action against the petitioner and punishing him for the lapse does not appear to have been present in the mind of the authority at that time. The main purpose was directing deduction of salary. If cursorily he has also mentioned that the petitioner be censured, that cannot constitute an action in consequence of any disciplinary action proposed against the petitioner. There is no material to show that the petitioner was present before the disciplinary authority personally when this order was passed. By its very nature, the punishment of censure can be implemented either censuring the officer in person or making a record of it in the personal service records of the employee concerned. In this case there is no material that the endorsement of censure has been carried out into the personal records of the petitioner. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent sought to contend that the petitioner gave a representation for deduction of certain amount from his pay only after this irregularity was noticed by some other third party like audit. There is no need to go into the truth or otherwise of this contention. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent sought to contend that the petitioner gave a representation for deduction of certain amount from his pay only after this irregularity was noticed by some other third party like audit. There is no need to go into the truth or otherwise of this contention. The circumstances narrated above would show that the so called censure endorsed by the disciplinary authority was certainly not conceived as a disciplinary action for imposing penalty on the petitioner. Such an order appears to have been passed mainly for directing deduction of salary from the pay bill of the petitioner. Taking into account these circumstances and the further fact that the said order was never communicated to the petitioner, the order of censure recorded by the disciplinary authority while ordering deduction of salary from the pay bill of the petitioner cannot be construed as a bar for instituting regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Thus, the impugned order cannot be set aside on this ground. ( 14 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner made an attempt to contend that the disciplinary authority has differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer, but has not given any reasons and as such, his order cannot be sustained. I see no substance in this contention inasmuch as the fact that the delinquent officer claimed salary for certain days for which he was absent and that his absence was not regularized has never been disputed. In fact, according to the petitioner, he himself brought this fact to the notice of the disciplinary authority and suggested for deduction of the amount from his salary. The question of the order of the disciplinary authority being bad on the ground of non-mentioning of reasons for differing from the Enquiry Officer s report, therefore, does not arise in this case. The various authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner on this question do not appear to have any bearing on the question. ( 15 ) IN the result, there are no grounds for allowing this petition. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.