JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Heard the Learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellants. 2. Perused the record including the record of the trial Court. 3. The Plaintiff-Respondent had filed the suit giving rise to this second appeal on 8-12-1989 asserting that Bhagga, the father of the present Appellants, who found impleaded as Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 Parma, the father of the Plaintiff-Respondent, were real brothers. Parma was the younger brother of Bhagga. Parma and Bhagga were the tenants of the land in dispute and formed a Joint Hindu family. The father of the Plaintiff had died during the infancy of the Plaintiff. The land in dispute continued to be recorded in the revenue records in the names of Parma and Bhagga upto Samvat 1975. Bhagga had died while the Plaintiff was only aged 6-7 years. After the death of his father instead of getting the name of the Plaintiff recorded no mutation was done and even the name of Parma was deleted from the revenue records. The Plaintiff had prayed for a decree claiming half share in the land in dispute and the partition of the agricultural holdings and for his being put in separate possession thereof. A decree for permanent prohibitory injunction was also claimed against the Defendants restraining them from interfering in the ownership and possession of the Plaintiffs in the land in dispute. 4. The trial Court vide its order dated 9-12-1989 directed for issuing the summons fixing 14-2-1990 for framing of issues indicating that one week before the said date written statement be filed. Although 14-2-1990 had been fixed by the trial Court, on 3-1-1990 the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the present Appellants, moved an application under Order 23 Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure wherein the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 admitted the claim of the Plaintiff. It was also stated that the suit had been adjusted and the parties have arrived at compromise and effected a partition of the agricultural holdings separating the share of the Plaintiff since there was no contest between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant No. 3, the State, so far as the title of the Plaintiff on the land in dispute was concerned, the suit of the Plaintiff against the Defendant No. 3 may be dismissed. 5. 5. The aforesaid application purporting to be under Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure was presented by both the parties. An endorsement to this effect was made by the trial Court on the application itself. The Plaintiff was identified by his counsel. The Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were identified by Chatra son of Mangalia. The trial Court recorded the statement of the Plaintiff on 3-1-1990. In his deposition the Plaintiff admitted the execution of the compromise in question accepting the terms and conditions indicated therein and prayed for a decree being passed in terms thereof. The trial Court also examined Fosa, the Defendant No. 1. Fosa disclosed his age to be 75 years and stated that he had compromised the matter with the Plaintiff. He admitted that the Plaintiff was the son of his 'Kaka' and the land in dispute was ancestral. He also stated that they have partitioned the land. He reiterated the terms and conditions contained in the compromise application. He admitted that he had entered into compromise of his free will. He also stated that he had got the compromise read over and had understood the same and the terms and conditions contained in the compromise were explained to him. He admitted that he had put his thumb impression on the compromise application and now there is no dispute. He also prayed that a decree be passed in terms thereof. 6. The trial Court read over the statement recorded by it to Fosa who accepted the same to be correctly recorded and an endorsement in this connection has been made by the trial Court. 7. The trial Court further examined Soma, the Defendant No. 2, who disclosed his age to be 60 years. He also admitted that the matter had been compromised. He further stated that he had got the compromise was read over and explained to him and he had compromised the matter after due deliberation. He admitted the execution of the compromise by him and his signatures thereon. He also prayed that a decree be passed in terms of the compromise. 8. On 14-2-1990, which was the date fixed in the suit when the case was taken up it was found that summons had not been issued to the said Defendant fixing 18-4-1990. He admitted the execution of the compromise by him and his signatures thereon. He also prayed that a decree be passed in terms of the compromise. 8. On 14-2-1990, which was the date fixed in the suit when the case was taken up it was found that summons had not been issued to the said Defendant fixing 18-4-1990. The order sheet dated 14-2-1990 shows that Fosa and Soma were present as their thumb impressions are there on the order-sheet. It may be noticed that on 3-1-1990 when the compromise application has been presented, the Plaintiff had moved an application praying that although 14-2-1990 has been fixed in the case and since a compromise has been arrived at between the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and both the parties were present in court and are filing the compromise the file may be summoned and be disposed of. It may further be noticed that along with the plaint certified copy of the revenue entries relating to the agricultural holdings for Samvat 1975 had been filed showing that Parma and Bhagga had been recorded as co-tenure holder of the land in dispute. 9. On 18-4-90 the trial Court 7-5-1990 for its hearing. On 7-5-1990 the trial Court decreed the suit as against Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in terms of compromise as against the State directing that the Plaintiff will be entitled to get mutation in the Government records done accordingly. The suit as against the Defendant No. 3, the State, was however, dismissed. 10. The direction as against the Defendant No. 3, referred to hereinabove, attained finality as no appeal was filed by the said Defendant challenging the decree of the trial Court. However, the Defendants No. 1 and 2 filed an appeal challenging the decree passed by the trial Court. In the memo of appeal the parentage of the Plaintiff was challenged and his claim that he was the son of Parma was denied. His title and possession over the land in dispute was also disputed. However, the Defendants No. 1 and 2 filed an appeal challenging the decree passed by the trial Court. In the memo of appeal the parentage of the Plaintiff was challenged and his claim that he was the son of Parma was denied. His title and possession over the land in dispute was also disputed. So far as the execution of the compromise was concerned although it was admitted that he had come to the Court premises on 3-1-1990 yet it was asserted that the Plaintiff had told him that he had to give security in a criminal case and had taken him to a wine-shop and served him liquor and it was thereafter that he had been brought to the Court premises and was made to sit at one place and after getting the writing work done his thumb impressions were obtained. It was specifically alleged that the compromise was not read over and explained to him by the Appellants. 11. In paragraph 7 of the memo of appeal, the Appellants had asserted that on 3-1-1990 the Appellants had not put their thumb impressions on the compromise application treating the same to be a compromise and had not agreed to give share in the land in dispute to the Appellants. It was further asserted that the Plaintiff had fraudulently and misrepresentation had obtained the signatures and thumb impressions of the Appellants on the compromise application without getting the same read over and explained to them. 12. In paragraph 10 of the memo of appeal it was asserted that at the time of accepting the compromise the trial Court made no inquiry from the Appellants and the signatures were obtained showing that the compromise has been accepted. 13. It may be noticed that a perusal of the memo of appeal indicates that the Appellants had not disputed the correctness of the recording of their statements by the trial Court. The compromise had been accepted not on 3rd of January, 1990 but on 7th of May, 1990. No such case as disclosed in the memo of appeal had been taken by the Appellants before the trial Court during the period 3-1-1990 to 7-5-1990. Although the Appellants had tried to raise factual controversy in the appeal no effort was made even to seek permission of the first Appellate Court to lead additional evidence. No such case as disclosed in the memo of appeal had been taken by the Appellants before the trial Court during the period 3-1-1990 to 7-5-1990. Although the Appellants had tried to raise factual controversy in the appeal no effort was made even to seek permission of the first Appellate Court to lead additional evidence. Further, in case there had been a fraud or misrepresentation whether it be a fraud on court or fraud on party no effort was made to move any application before the trial Court seeking setting aside of the decree in which proceedings it could have been open to the Appellants to lead evidence in support of the allegations made in the memo of appeal raising factual controversy. 14. Feeling aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial Court, the present Appellants challenged the same in a first appeal which was heard and disposed of by the first Appellate Court vide the impugned judgment and decree whereunder their appeal was dismissed. 15. The first Appellate Court has observed that there was no evidence on the record which could lead to an inference that the compromise in question was got filed defrauding. It was also observed that there was no evidence on the record to indicate that on 3-1-1990, the Plaintiff had offered drinks and after he was in a drunken state got the signature on certain papers disclosing them to be papers relating to filing of security. It was also noticed by the first Appellate Court that the case had been taken up by the trial Court on an application being moved for preponing the date and the compromise application had been jointly presented by the Plaintiff and the Appellants. It was also observed by it that though the summons had not been served on the Defendants yet the trial Court had recorded the statements of the Defendants as well as the Plaintiff but no such feature could be noticed by the trial Court which could indicate that the Defendants were in a drunken state. It was specifically noticed by the first Appellate Court that the Appellants had nowhere stated that their statements had not been recorded by the trial Court and further it was not their case that in their place some impostor had been produced before the trial Court. It was specifically noticed by the first Appellate Court that the Appellants had nowhere stated that their statements had not been recorded by the trial Court and further it was not their case that in their place some impostor had been produced before the trial Court. The case of the Appellants taking into consideration the evidence and the materials already on the record was disbelieved. 16. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants has tried to assail the findings returned against the Appellants by the first Appellate Court. However, the correctness of the observations made by the first Appellate Court in the impugned judgment has not been challenged. What has been urged is that taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record, it was the bounden duty of the first Appellate Court to hold an enquiry into the facts suo motu and afford an opportunity to the Appellants to lead evidence in support of their claim as set out in the memo of appeal. 17. I am of the considered opinion that the contention urged by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants is totally misconceived and baseless. As has already been noticed hereinabove, no effort had been made by the Appellants to avail the opportunity to lead evidence in support of their claim by moving an appropriate application for setting aside the compromise decree before the trial Court itself. 18. At this stage, it may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1249 had observed as follows: ........... Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation." (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramanian. AIR 1926 PC 136). We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in Court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error (Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhusudan v. Chandrabati. AIR 1917 PC 30). That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there....... 19. It is, therefore, obvious that unless on the materials already on the record, a compromise ex facie is demonstrated to be unlawful or otherwise vitiated in law, it would not have been permissible for the first Appellate Court to interfere in the decree passed by the trial Court taking notice of the facts, the proving or establishing whereof required leading of evidence especially when the scope of admitting the additional evidence in an appeal is circumscribed by various statutory limitations as envisaged under the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code, but there is no such limitation for the trial Court. 20. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L. Rs. 20. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L. Rs. ) and another, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 , while interpreting the scope of the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure Code, had observed that where it is alleged by one party and denied by other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, "the Court shall decide the question", the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise "which is void or voidableunder the Indian Contract Act............" shall not be deemed to be lawful ithin the meaning of the said Rule. The Apex Court had indicated that in view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, Code of Civil Procedure Code, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can question the validity of compromise in view of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code. 21. The Apex Court in its aforesaid decision had noticed that different High Courts had taken the view even after a compromise has been recorded, the Court concerned can entertain an application under Section 151 of the Code, questioning the legality or validity of the compromise. The view to that effect was not disapproved by the Apex Court. 22. It may be noticed that the scope of the application filed before the trial Court and the scope of an appeal against the compromise decree filed under Order 43, Code of Civil Procedure Code, is quite different. The trial Court while dealing with an application seeking setting aside of the compromise decree is not prohibited from permitting the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective cases in case the compromise is void or shown to be unlawful. The trial Court while dealing with an application seeking setting aside of the compromise decree is not prohibited from permitting the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective cases in case the compromise is void or shown to be unlawful. The jurisdiction of the first Appellate Court to bring on record the additional evidence is circumscribed by the limitations envisaged under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code. The matter will be entirely different where ex facie from the materials already on the record it could be demonstrated to the first Appellate Court that the compromise in question was unlawful or void or stood vitiated from any error going to the root of the matter. 23. In the present case, the Appellants had not taken recourse to the remedy with a wider scope where they could lead evidence in support of the facts which were sought to be relied upon by them. Further, no effort was made by them to move an application making out a case for the grant of a permission to bring on record the additional evidence in appeal. The observations made by the first Appellate Court in regard to the correctness of the facts noticed by it which are borne out from the perusal of the record have not been disputed. 24. In the facts and circumstances noticed hereinabove, I am clearly of the opinion that no substantial question of law can be said to be involved in this appeal. 25. This appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.