Honble BALIA, J.–This appeal is by an unsuccessful petitioner of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5129 of 1998 challenging the enquiry report Annex. 33, Annex. 36 order dated 29.5.91 by which the petitioner was dismissed from service. Annex.37 dated 3.6.91 by which the petitioner was relieved from his post and Annx. 39 by which the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed. (2). Appellant was appointed as Store Munshi in November 1978 in Mahi Bajaj Sagar Project, Banswara. On 19.9.84 while the petitioner was working as Store Munshi in Central Stores Sub Division, Mahi Project, Banswara, he reported to the Asstt. Engineer as his immediate superior Jr. Engineer was out of station, that 24 Injector Assemblies were missing. The immediate person superior to the petitioner in charge of the Store on that day was Mr. Govind Ram Leelani, a Junior Engineer. The petitioner-appellant reported that while in the Stores he was taking out the rack containing Stores that has were be issued, he noticed that parts were scattered all around and the packing boxes were empty. On physical verification, he found that Injector Assemblies were missing. He reported that these injectors might have been stolen between 3.4.1984 to 19.4.84. It appears that the said Govind Ram Leelani, Junior Engineer, incharge of the Stores also lodged a complaint on 29.9.84 at the Police Station about missing of 21 Injectors on 19.9.84 and three injectors missing on 20.9.94 valued at Rs. 30,646. The Superintendent of Police reported after the investigation concluded vide his letter dt. 7.10.85 (Ex.34) that the report submitted by Mr. Leelani was false and according to him said Leelani himself is likely to be involved in reported theft of stores. The petitioner was issued memorandum of charge dated 24.9.86 in the first instance by the Executive Engineer alleging that the petitioner was guilty of making deliberate false report and either himself committing theft of 24 Injectors which are missing or connived in commission of theft and because of that the Govt. has suffered loss of Rs. 30,646/- and secondly that he has cheated the Govt. by falsely reporting to the superior officer about theft of the said articles. After this charge, the petitioner was suspended. The Executive Engineer was appointed an enquiry officer. Statements of C.B. Singh and Govind Ram Leelani were also recorded by the said Executive Engineer on 11.12.86. has suffered loss of Rs. 30,646/- and secondly that he has cheated the Govt. by falsely reporting to the superior officer about theft of the said articles. After this charge, the petitioner was suspended. The Executive Engineer was appointed an enquiry officer. Statements of C.B. Singh and Govind Ram Leelani were also recorded by the said Executive Engineer on 11.12.86. The petitioner has at that stage raised grievance about the manner in which the enquiry was conducted against him by written report dated 30.1.87 alleging that he was required to give statement as suggested by the enquiry officer and that he was conducting enquiry in a manner prejudicial to the delinquent officer. It appears that thereafter Shri R.B. Goyal was appointed as Enquiry Officer on 27.4.87 and he required the petitioner to submit the documents vide communication dated 28.4.87. The petitioner by his letter dated 8.5.87 demanded the copies of all statements recorded in the proceedings concerning the theft of Injector assemblies but the same were not supplied. By another order dated 11.6.87, the order appointing Shri R.B. Goyal as enquiry officer was cancelled. Thereafter, a fresh chargesheet was served by the Superintending Engineer on 16.9.87 in connection with the same subject matter. The allegation of charges in the memorandum of charges dated 16.9.87 (Annex.20) vitally differed from the allegations of charges levelled against the petitioner in the earlier Memorandum of charges. This is apparent from the comparative reading of the two charges under the two Memorandum of charges. Charges under Memo dt. 24.9.86 Charges under Memo dt. The allegation of charges in the memorandum of charges dated 16.9.87 (Annex.20) vitally differed from the allegations of charges levelled against the petitioner in the earlier Memorandum of charges. This is apparent from the comparative reading of the two charges under the two Memorandum of charges. Charges under Memo dt. 24.9.86 Charges under Memo dt. 16.9.87 vkjksi izFke %&;g fd Jh ckcwyky ukxj tks fd LVksj eqakh ds in ij lgk vfHk;Urk dsUnzh; Hk.Mkj tkod mi[k.M ds vf/kuLFk ,p bZ ,e & 11 esa dk;Z dj jgs FksA tku cq>dj ,p bZ ,e & 11 esa pksjh djokbZ ,oa 24 bUtsDVj xk;c fd;sA jkT; ljdkj dks 24 bUtsDVj xk;c gks tkus ds QyLo:i 30]646@& :i;s dh gkfu gqbZA vkjksi f}rh; &;g fd Jh ckcwyky ukxj us LVksj eqakh dk dk;Z djrs gq, vius vf/kdkjh dh >wBh pksjh fn[kk dj jkT; ljdkj dks /kks[kk fn;k ,oa jkT; ljdkj dh lEifRr dks xk;c djokus esa /kks[kk/kM+h dh] ;g dk;Z /kks[kk?kM+h ,oa pksjh dk gSA vkjksi izFke %&;g fd Jh ckcwyky ukxj tks fd LVksj eqakh ds in ij lgk vfHk;Urk dsUnzh; Hk.Mkj tkod mi[k.M ds vf/kuLFk ,p bZ ,e & 11 vuqHkkx esa dk;Z dj jgs FksA bu nkSjku bUgksaus ,p bZ ,e & 11 vuqHkkx esa fnukad 4-9-84 ls 18-9-84 ds chp vlg;ksx nsdj 24 bUtsDVj xk;c fd;s@djok;sA jkT; ljdkj dks 24 bUtsDVj xk;c gks tkus ds QyLo:i 30646@& :i;s dh gkfu gqbZA vr% mudk ;g dk;Z ekgh LVsUMhx vkMZj ds fu;e 55¼6½ ds nq"d`R; gksdj n.Muh; gSA vkjksi f}rh; &;g fd Jh ckcwyky ukxj us LVksj eqakh dk dk;Z djrs gq, vius vf/kdkjh dks xyr lwpuk nh ,oa lgh rF;ksa dks fNik;kA vr% mudk ;g dk;Z ekgh LVsUMhx vkMZj ds fu;e 55¼22½ ds nq"d`R; gksdj n.Muh; gSA (3). It may be noticed that while in the memorandum of charges dated 24th Sept. 1986 the petitioner has been directly accused of committing theft and making deliberate false report of theft to the Govt. and was charged with cheating the Govt. of such conduct, the charges under the new memo were substantially toned down. The charge of committing theft is missing in the second chargesheet. It only refers that by causing non-cooperation in the discharge of duties during 4.9.84 to 18.9.84 he has helped in loss of 24 Injector assemblies. Thus charge was confined to negligent discharge of duties. of such conduct, the charges under the new memo were substantially toned down. The charge of committing theft is missing in the second chargesheet. It only refers that by causing non-cooperation in the discharge of duties during 4.9.84 to 18.9.84 he has helped in loss of 24 Injector assemblies. Thus charge was confined to negligent discharge of duties. The second charge of cheating was not levelled at all but the same was restricted only to making a wrong report. Be that as it may, thereafter the petitioner as well as said Leelani were issued memorandum of charges in respect of similar charges. Mr. Leelani, Junior Engineer was charged with making a false report to the Police about theft. He was also alleged accused for causing loss to the Govt. to the tune of Rs. 30,646/- by committing forgery and being a party to commission of theft of the Injector assemblies. He was thus accused of not maintaining the dignity of his office. Likewise, the appellant was also served with the charge that he assisted in commission of theft of 24 Injectors and therefore he is responsible for causing loss of Rs. 30,646/- to the Govt. In the details of charges it was said that he has submitted written report on 19.4.84 about the theft of 24 Injectors but this has been wrongly made to absolve himself from, sharing the responsibility for the supervision of the Stores because in the absence of concerned Junior Engineer keys remains with the Store Keeper. Since both the employees were subject to the similar nature of charge in respect of same subject matter, a joint enquiry was conducted. On the conclusion of enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report that Govind Ram Leelani, Junior Engineer is responsible for supervisory negligence because he has left the supervisory duty to other persons viz. Chandra Bhushan Singh the Assistant Engineer, and Praveen Kumar Sharma Jr. Engineer and therefore cannot be absolved from the responsibility of lack of supervision which has resulted in loss to the Govt. The said two officers who were discharging supervisory duty in the absence of Leelani were also found guilty of the same offence and Shri Babulal, the present petitioner was also found guilty of the supervisory negligence that because of his negligence, the stores were found in shortage and were stolen. The said two officers who were discharging supervisory duty in the absence of Leelani were also found guilty of the same offence and Shri Babulal, the present petitioner was also found guilty of the supervisory negligence that because of his negligence, the stores were found in shortage and were stolen. With these findings, Babulal Store Munshi was reported to be fully responsible for the shortage in the stores. The Disciplinary Authority vide his order dt. 25.9.91 Ex.36 accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer. He held G.R. Leelani and Babulal Nagar, the petitioner as jointly delinquent for causing loss to Govt. The finding was recorded as under in Ex.36. ^^tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr tkap izfrosnu esa fn;s x;s fu"d"kksZa ,oa nks"kh deZpkfj;ksa }kjk izLrqr dkj.k crkvksa uksfVl ds izr;qRrj dk foosiwoZd v/;;u djus ds ipkr~ Jh xksfoUnjke fyykuh ,oa Jh ckcwyky ukxj LVksj eqakh jktdh; lkeku dh pksjh ds izdj.k esa nks"kh ik;s x;s ,oa jkT; ljdkj o foHkkx dks : 30646@& dk uqdlku igqapkus esa nks"kh ik;s x;sA** (4). In the case of G.R. Leelani he imposed punishment of stoppage of one grade increment without cumulative effect. It was also ordered that the recovery of Rs. 30,646/- be made from said Shri Govind Ram Leelani. However, the punishment of dismissal was imposed on the petitioner Babulal. No recovery was ordered to be effected from Babulal. In pursuance of Ex. 36 the petitioner was relieved on 3.6.91 vide Ex. 37. The appeal against the said order was also rejected by the appellate authority on 17.5.94 vide Annx. 39. The petitioner has challenged the impugned orders inter alia on the ground firstly that there was no fair and just enquiry inasmuch as principles of natural justice have been violated. He has not been served with the report of the preliminary enquiry and documents. He also alleged that he has not been allowed to cross examine the witnesses, their statements have been recorded in his absence, that he has not been supplied with the copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry even though demand was made and secondly that at any rate when the petitioner as well as Leelani were subjected to joint enquiry and were both found guilty of supervisory negligence which caused the loss to the Govt. while the superior officer has been let off with mild punishment of stoppage of one grade increment without cumulative effect, the petitioner has been subjected to extreme punishment of dismissal which is apparently discriminatory. These pleas did not find favour with the learned Single Judge and the petition was dismissed. (5). Aggrieved with that order, the petitioner is in appeal and has raised the same contentions before us. (6). We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. On perusal of the record and the pleadings, we find force in both the contentions. The petitioner has specifically averred that in the first instance vide Annx. 18 he demanded copies of the statements recorded so far recorded in the enquiry vide Annx. 18 dated 6.5.87 which had not been supplied to him. The petitioner demanded again specifically the copies of three statements earlier recorded by the disciplinary authorities vide Annx.21 which were not given to him. These assertions made in Para 21 & 22 of the writ petition have been admitted by the respondents in their reply stating that since the petitioner had been supplied with the copies on which the departmental representative relied on for substantiating charge he was not supplied with copies of other statements which were not relied on by the enquiry officer. About Annx. 18 it was said that because the petitioner had not asked for any specific copies of the documents the same were not supplied and that the respondents were in no obligation to submit report of preliminary enquiry. The petitioner has alleged in Para 25 that petitioner again moved an application for supply of copies of statements of witnesses vide letter dated 23.9.87 (Annex.21) it has not been supplied to him. Annex.21 reveals that the petitioner had been supplied copies only of statements of one C.P. Singh and Assistant Engineer, Mr. Leelani and he has demanded the copies of the statements of Santosh Kumar Gate Keeper, Ratan Lal Chowkidar and his own statement. The respondents in their reply admitted the receipt of the request of and non-supply of the copies on the ground that since the respondents did not rely on those documents it was not necessary for them to have supplied the copies. The respondents in their reply admitted the receipt of the request of and non-supply of the copies on the ground that since the respondents did not rely on those documents it was not necessary for them to have supplied the copies. The learned Single Judge has accepted the contention of the respondents in this behalf inter alia on the ground that it is not necessary for the respondents to have supplied the copies of the documents and statements which were not relied on by them in the enquiry. (7). We regret out inability to agree with that view. It is true that only obligation of the disciplinary authority is to supply without askance all relevant materials which is relied by the prosecuting authority for establishing the charges against the delinquent officer where such copies are not supplied, the disciplinary authority is bound to supply such copies when demanded. It is also true that though the disciplinary authority is not bound to supply copies of other documents of statements on their own which are not relied on by them whether such statements were earlier recorded during the course of preliminary enquiry or preceding enquiry but, is duty bound to supply the same when demanded by the delinquent officer for his defence. (8). The delinquent officer apart from being entitled to receive the copies of the statements and documents relied on by the prosecuting authority is also entitled to demand copies of such documents and statements which he considers relevant for preparing his defence and which are in possession of the prosecuting authority. Simply because the authority is not bound to disclose and give those documents on its own, it cannot be inferred that even when such documents are demanded by the delinquent officer to prepare his defence, the same can be denied on the ground that because the prosecution has not relied on them, they are not bound to supply them. Non supply of such documents would be denying the delinquent officer fair opportunity to prepare and raise his defence against the allegations levelled against him. In such event, the supply of the copies of documents in the possession of the prosecution agency can only be refused if any privilege is claimed in respect thereof in the public interest. Non supply of such documents would be denying the delinquent officer fair opportunity to prepare and raise his defence against the allegations levelled against him. In such event, the supply of the copies of documents in the possession of the prosecution agency can only be refused if any privilege is claimed in respect thereof in the public interest. It may be relevant to mention here that the delinquent officer in his defence is entitled to produce the evidence relied on by him and if necessary to secure the assistance of the enquiry of officer to summon the witnesses for their oral testimony or for production of relevant documents in their possession. If that can be done, we see no reason why the prosecuting authority is absolved from that responsibility from supplying the documents which are in its possession and are demanded by the delinquent officer for the purpose of preparation of his defence against the allegations levelled against him. The admitted facts of the case are that the petitioner has been consistently demanding the copies of the statements recorded by the authorities in the proceedings concerning the same event namely the loss/theft of 24 of Injector assemblies between the fateful period. Such statements may not be relevant for substantiating charges, but may be relevant for the purpose of substantiating defence of the delinquent or for cross examining such witnesses if and when examined during the course of enquiry. Non supply of such documents, in possession of prosecuting agency, results in denial of fair opportunity to defend the delinquent officer by withholding the relevant material evidence with them even after the same is demanded. In such event, the enquiry is vitiated. (9). The contours of reasonable opportunity in the context of departmental enquiry that may lead to imposing punishment on a public servant are well settled. In such event, the enquiry is vitiated. (9). The contours of reasonable opportunity in the context of departmental enquiry that may lead to imposing punishment on a public servant are well settled. In Khem Chand vs. U.O.I. (1), S.R. Das, CJ speaking for the Court said: ``The reasonable opportunity envisaged to the Government servant by the provision contained in Art. 311 (2) includes (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him. (10). The importance of statement recorded during the preliminary enquiry or at the earlier stage in the earlier enquiry which was not concluded but fresh enquiry by serving fresh memo of charge was conducted can be adjudged from the following observations made by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Bhagat Ram (2): ``The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Govt. servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against charges on which inquiry is held. The Govt. servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the Government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Govt. servant. Unless the statements are given to the Govt. servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. (11). This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of India (3). The Court held denying the copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded during preliminary enquiry before the commencement of enquiry amounts to breach of natural justice. (12). servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. (11). This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of India (3). The Court held denying the copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded during preliminary enquiry before the commencement of enquiry amounts to breach of natural justice. (12). It will be apposite to invite attention to following observations made by the Apex Court in Tirlok Nath vs. U.O.I. (4): ``We shall assume for the present that R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules applies to this case. But this rule requires that the public servant concerned must be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. It is for this reason that it is obligatory upon the Inquiry Officer not only to furnish the public servant concerned with a copy of the charges levelled against him, the grounds on which those charges are based and the circumstances on which it is proposed to take action against him. Further, if the public servant so requires for his Officer, he has to be furnished with copies of all the relevant documents, that is, documents sought to relied on by the Inquiry Officer or required by the public servant for his defence. (13). From the above both the obligations are distinctly discernible viz. (1) to supply such documents and statements without askance on which prosecution rests to substantiate the charges and (ii) document and statement which delinquent requires for the purpose of his defence and require the prosecuting agency to furnish copies of the same to him for his defence. The latter five of document may or may not be one on which prosecution relies. Such documents can only be withheld if any privilege is claimed in respect thereof and so found to exist. (14). The facts of present case noticed above clearly reveal that the petitioner has made request for supply of the copies of statement of witness recorded earlier by the prosecuting agency twice over but the same was denied only on the ground that prosecution is not relying on them. The delinquents defence merely does not rest on explaining the evidence provided by the prosecution, it extends to lead his own evidence also. (15). The delinquents defence merely does not rest on explaining the evidence provided by the prosecution, it extends to lead his own evidence also. (15). For the same reason non furnishing copies of statements recorded during preliminary enquiry was held to be violative of principles of natural justice in State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Sarif (6). (16). We are, therefore, of the opinion that on the admitted facts the petitioner has been able to make out a case that the enquiry conducted in this behalf against him was not fair and has been conducted in breach of principles of natural justice. In this connection, it may also be noticed that statement of C.B. Singh and Leelani has been recorded by an earlier officer during the course of proceedings that was being conducted in pursuance of Memorandum of charges dated 24.09.1986. The enquiry into those charges has not at all been continued. Present enquiry was conducted in furtherance of Memo of Charges dated 16.9.87, which as noticed were vitally different, and was conducted by another enquiry officer. The previous statements, as stated, have been used in this enquiry. In these circumstances, we are further of the opinion that the use of such statements of witnesses, who were not subjected to cross examination and recorded in previous enquiry which remained unconcluded, without examining those witnesses in the enquiry conducted in pursuance of chargesheet dated 16.9.1987 also cannot be said to be a part of the fair procedure. It is not disputed that there has been some incident during the course of examination of the recording of the statements about which the petitioner has levelled his grievance about the conduct of the Presiding Officer in recording statements and not permitting his representative to conduct the enquiry. The fact remains that thereafter the said enquiry officer has been changed, the new chargesheet has been served and enquiry has been conducted by an altogether a new enquiry officer appointed in pursuance of Memorandum of charge dated 16.9.87. It may also be noticed that present enquiry was not in continuation of previous enquiry. The statement of C.B. Singh and co- delinquent Leelani had been supplied in pursuance of his request dated 16.1.87. Obviously petitioner was not a party to preliminary enquiry that led to framing of charges against him. Such witnesses could not have been subjected to cross examination during the preliminary enquiry. The statement of C.B. Singh and co- delinquent Leelani had been supplied in pursuance of his request dated 16.1.87. Obviously petitioner was not a party to preliminary enquiry that led to framing of charges against him. Such witnesses could not have been subjected to cross examination during the preliminary enquiry. Those witnesses were examined by the reporting officer during the enquiry in pursuance of chargesheet dt. 24.9.86. Such statements could not be read in present enquiry, which was not in continuation of enquiry in pursuance of memorandum of charge dated 24.9.86. Any material collected during that enquiry automatically does not become part of the enquiry in question. (17). So also even, assuming that the petitioner did not cross examine those witnesses during the earlier enquiry into charges dt. 24.9.86 such statements were neither the material which led to framing of charges under enquiry against the petitioner, nor the same has been disclosed to be relied on during the enquiry in charges dt. 16.9.87 cannot be used against him, when those witnesses were not produced in the current enquiry for examination. The fact remains that statement recorded in preliminary enquiry was without cross examination and statement recorded during the enquiry in pursuance of memo of charges dated 24.9.86 could not have been read in this enquiry unless same were made part of the current enquiry which was not in continuation of earlier enquiry and which were not disclosed as the material to be relied on by the prosecuting authority during the current enquiring agency. Thus the principle about use of such statement without cross examination, when the delinquent officer does not avail of such opportunity is not applicable in the very peculiar facts and circumstances of present case. (18). There is yet another peculiar feature apparent from the record. Both Leelani and petitioner were charged with lodging false report of theft and themselves being involved in theft of 24 Injector assemblies. In the case of Leelani the police after investigating first information lodged by him, reported it to be false and suspected involvement of complainant. In the case of petitioner his charge included making of wrong report about missing of same material from the Stores to the A.En. Report of petitioner was much earlier in time. In the case of Leelani the police after investigating first information lodged by him, reported it to be false and suspected involvement of complainant. In the case of petitioner his charge included making of wrong report about missing of same material from the Stores to the A.En. Report of petitioner was much earlier in time. Strangely no mention has been made in the enquiry report or the order of Disciplinary Authority about report submitted by Superintendent of Police about the falsity of report submitted by Leelani and its veracity. No oral evidence has been produced in the enquiry conducted in pursuance of memo dated 16.9.87. It is not disputed that petitioner demanded all statements recorded during preliminary enquiry and also the statements of specific persons named and the same were not supplied to him. The inference against petitioner has been drawn only on the basis of observation that there is no evidence of any house breaking and that locks on stores were not found broken. However in drawing such inference very vital circumstance has been ignored that it was nobodys case, nor it was so reported either by Leelani or the petitioner that any house breaking has taken place of that locks were found broken. In those circumstances when loss or missing of injector assemblies was not in dispute and no evidence was led by the prosecuting agency to prove involvement of delinquent in the commission of theft directly or by connivance, one fails to understand on what material inference about falsity of report submitted by the petitioner could at all be drawn. It also ignores another vital factor about the two reportings that while petitioner has already reported about loss of 24 injector assemblies on 19.4.84, the other co delinquent Mr. Leelani had reported about loss of these stores only 10 days later on 29.4.84 in which he gives two dates after the report of 19.4.84 as to his knowledge about loss of stores that he came to know loss of 21 assemblies on one date and remaining 3 assemblies three days later, as if he did not know about the report made by the petitioner and had come to know on his own on two different dates about loss of stores in question. Thus neither there is any evidence about falsehood of report, nor any evidence of either of delinquent officers of their involvement in theft except their responsibility as supervisors. The only other factor which led to finding against the petitioner is that statement of co-accused Leelani that in his absence keys used to be kept with the petitioner. But that too does not make case of the petitioner any more different from the said Leelani inasmuch it is also not part of anybodys case that loss occurred on any particular day when the keys were with the petitioner. The only source of knowing about missing assemblies is report made by the petitioner reporting loss of assemblies over a period of time during which entire period the Jr. Engineer was not away from the station. (19). This takes us to consider the second limb of contention of the appellant-petitioner. We are satisfied that apart from procedure unfairness, the discrimination in inflicting punishment is also apparent. We have noticed that as per the findings of the enquiry report as accepted by the disciplinary authority, the Junior Engineer Mr. Leelani as well as the present petitioner, the store clerk were both at best were found guilty of supervisory negligence and not of theft directly. The very fact that the disciplinary authority directed the recovery of the amount from Junior Engineer for his supervisory lapse further indicates that the responsibility of the loss caused on account of supervisory negligence of Junior Engineer was considered to be greater. Yet for no ostensible reasons the petitioner who was merely a store clerk and was found guilty of the negligence in discharge of duties while he was Store Munshi has been visited with an extreme penalty of dismissal from service. In regard to this, the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the State was that since the Junior Engineer was a Member of regular establishment and was found guilty of supervisory negligence, he has been given lesser punishment but the petitioner who was merely on the workcharge establishment and not a confirmed employee having been found negligent was though fit not to be continued in the job. We see not rationale behind this reasoning in meeting out different punishments arising out of the same incident for which both the employees have been subjected to similar charges and found guilty of supervisory negligence and not guilty of direct involvement in the commission of theft. In these circumstances, this distinction in the punishment by the very same authority in respect of the findings recorded in the very same proceedings imposing two different punishments vitally varying as noticed by us, cannot be sustained. (20). When the charge against two persons are substantially the same, a joint enquiry is held and both of them are found guilty but one was given lessor punishment and the other was dismissed. It must be held to be a case of patent discrimination, in the absence of any aggravating factor appearing from the record of proceedings against such employee visited with more harsh penalty. That was the view expressed by Allahabad High Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corp. vs. State of U.P. (6). (21). Article 14 which ensures for a fair and just treatment at the hands of State or any instrumentality of State to all the citizens and is a guarantee against arbitrariness, unreasonableness and irrational discrimination, provides the bedrock for equality before law. It forbids any invidious discrimination between similarly situated persons. Two persons facing the same charge or charges of similar nature and found guilty of the same are persons similarly situated. In such case it can be stated with conviction that when two or more employees are guilty of the same or similar misconduct, but inspite of that one employee is visited with more serious punishment and the other employee is given lesser punishment, and the discriminatory treatment cannot be explained on any rational ground then it must be held that employer is guilty of invidious discrimination. The fact that one is on workcharge establishment and another on regular does not entitle the disciplinary authority to impose a higher punishment on employee on workcharge establishment as compared to other employee on regular establishment. Classification of two delinquent officers on such basis in the matter of choosing punishment to be imposed cannot be justified. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents, justifying the different punishments on the basis of nature of establishment on which the petitioner was employed, cannot be accepted. (22). Classification of two delinquent officers on such basis in the matter of choosing punishment to be imposed cannot be justified. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for the respondents, justifying the different punishments on the basis of nature of establishment on which the petitioner was employed, cannot be accepted. (22). In this connection, reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sengara Singh vs. State of Punjab (7). This was a case wherein large number of personnel of the members of the police force in the State of Punjab who were participating in agitation were dismissed from service. While some of them were reinstated, the others were not reinstated and remained under dismissal orders. The Supreme Court deprecated the discrimination in penalising some of the persons with the dismissal orders while others have been reinstated for the very same conduct. Thus, finding that this discrimination is violative of Article 14, the dismissal orders were set aside. (23). Ordinarily, in these circumstances, we would have quashed the proceedings and remanded the case back for continuance of the disciplinary proceedings afresh against the petitioner. However, looking to the age of the incident and ultimate nature of the findings recorded against the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that in totality of the circumstances when he has been found guilty of supervisory negligence, he shall be satisfied if relief to him is confined to the second contention and lesser punishment is imposed for supervisory negligence than termination of service and if reinstated in service, he would also be prepared to forgo 50% of his back wages to which he would be otherwise entitled to on quashing of entire proceedings. (24). In the totality of the circumstances and in the interest of justice and to bring this matter to a close in the light of finding reached by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority, we deem it proper that ends of justice would be met if the order of punishment is set aside and a penalty of three grade increments without cumulative effect is imposed on the appellant-petitioner keeping in view that recovery of loss caused to Government has been directed only against Junior Engineer while the petitioner as well as the Junior Engineer both were held responsible for supervisory negligence. The appellant shall be reinstated in service with continuity of service and other consequential benefits subject to that on reinstatement he shall be entitled to only 50% of the consequential financial benefits flowing to him as arrears of back wages. (25). Accordingly, the appeal as well as writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned orders Annx.36 & 39 imposing punishment of dismissal on the petitioner are set aside. Instead, the punishment of three grade increments without cumulative effect is imposed on the petitioner appellant. The petitioner is entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service and all consequential benefits except that he shall be entitled to only 50% of back wages. (26). There shall be no orders as to costs.