Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The State Government had made a reference to the Industrial Court, Bench at Gwalior, in exercise of its jurisdiction envisaged under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. The perusal of the copy of the aforesaid reference order indicates that the dispute which had been referred for arbitration was between Madhya Pradesh Rajya Badak Parivahan Nigam and the workers in Madhya pradesh Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam Gwalior, who were represented by Prantiya Rajya Parivahan Karmachari Sangh Congress, Morar. Gwalior and the Prabandh Nideshak, Madhya Pradesh Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam Bhopal as well as Sambhagiya Prabandhak, Madhya Pradesh Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lashkar, Gwalior. An application was filed by the employer at a belated stage of the proceedings challenging the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, Bench at Gwalior, to proceed with the case. The objection to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, Bench at Gwalior, was raised on the ground that the reference contemplated under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 could be made only either to a Labour Court or the Industrial Court or a Board and as the expression "Industrial Court" has been defined under section 9 of the said Act, the reference could be made only before the Industrial Court at Indore and not directly to its Bench situate at Gwalior. In the aforesaid connection it may be noticed that the provision contained in section 9 (6) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 specifically provides that the Industrial Court may make rules for the exercise of powers and functions of the Court, by Benches constituted of one-more members thereof, and all decisions or awards given by such benches in exercise of such powers or functions shall be deemed to be the decisions or awards of the Industrial Court. The provisions contained in Rule 3 of the Industrial Court (Formation of Benches) Rules, 1964 framed under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, provides that the President may constitute a Bench of one or more members to decide any of the matters filed in or referred to the Court and the Bench so constituted shall exercise the jurisdiction and the powers vested in the Court. It is not in dispute that the Gwalior Bench of the Industrial Court has been constituted in exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under the aforesaid Rule 3 and this Bench exercises full jurisdiction and powers vested in the Industrial Court. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that inspite of the fact that the Bench of the Industrial Court functioning at Gwalior is fully competent to exercise the jurisdiction and give the award as an Arbitrator but it cannot exercise that jurisdiction unless the Industrial Court transmits the record for disposal to this Bench. The contention is that the State Government could only make a reference to the Industrial Court at Indore and after receipt of the reference the Industrial Court could send the reference for disposal to the Gwalior Bench or any other Bench. The grievance, therefore, is in regard to the presentation of the reference. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners it ought to have been presented before the Industrial Court at Indore and after presentation it could be transmitted for disposal to the Gwalior Bench. A perusal of the reference, however, indicates that the dispute was confined to the employees working at Gwalior. It is also not in dispute that the employer has its own office at Gwalior. The cause of action for dispute had arisen at Gwalior. Since the jurisdiction of the Gwalior Bench of the Industrial Court is not disputed and the decision of the Gwalior Bench will have to be treated as the final decision given by the competent Industrial Court. I am not inclined to interfere in the impugned order while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India entertaining this hyper-technical objection which in the facts and circumstances of the present case is only of academic nature as nothing has been brought on record to indicate distribution of jurisdiction territory-wise as water tight compartments indicating usurpation of a jurisdiction vesting in any other Bench. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since taking into the consideration the nature of the reference various questions of fact had to be decided and, therefore, issues ought to have been framed but the Arbitrator has not framed any issue and has directed the parties to lead evidence. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since taking into the consideration the nature of the reference various questions of fact had to be decided and, therefore, issues ought to have been framed but the Arbitrator has not framed any issue and has directed the parties to lead evidence. The Industrial Court, however, has clarified vide its order dated 26.7.2000 that the evidence shall be confined to the issue which has been referred to for the arbitration/decision. This clarification is more than sufficient and restricts the evidence on the question which has to be decided as indicated in the order of reference, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P-5 to the writ petition. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is not at all acceptable especially when the petitioner is not going to be prejudiced in any manner. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.