JUDGMENT ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Except for the appeal filed by the West Bengal Housing Board, being M.A.T. No. 2964 of 1997, in respect of a writ petition filed on the Appellate Side, all the other appeals arise out of a common judgment dated 3rd October, 1994, passed by the learned Single Judge in respect of 35 writ petitions of which 30 were moved on the Original Side and 5 were moved on the Appellate Side, since common questions of law and fact were involved in all the matters. Out of the 35 writ petitions, in 6 writ petitions directions were given for restoration of possession of the requisitioned lands on the ground of non-service of the orders of requisition. In the remaining matters, the orders of requisition were held to be legal and valid. Out of the said 29 writ petitioners whose writ petitions were dismissed, 26 have come up in appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 2. On 13th March, 1993, an order of requisition was made under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act II of 1948) in respect of 17.332 acres of land in Kasba Mouza. Possession of the said land was taken over by the State Government on 14th March, 1993. 3. On 16th March, 1993, various writ petitions were filed challenging the order of requisition under section 3(1) of Act II of 1948. The very next day several writ petitions were moved and an order of status quo was passed in respect of the aforesaid land. As indicated hereinabove, the writ petitions were heard by the learned Single Judge and dismissed by a common judgment dated 3rd October, 1994. 4. These appeals were preferred on 25th November, 1994, against the order of the learned Single Judge and an interim order was passed by the Division Bench to the effect that the State of West Bengal would not make any construction on the requisitioned land during the pendency of the appeal, but, it would be entitled to proceed in accordance with law to acquire the said lands, and the same would abide by the result of the appeal. 5. While the writ petitions were pending, certain amendments were introduced by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, which came into force on 31st March, 1994. 5. While the writ petitions were pending, certain amendments were introduced by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, which came into force on 31st March, 1994. By the said Act, section 3 of the principal Act was omitted with effect from 1st April, 1994. In other words, the power to requisition which was vested in the State Government under section 3 of Act II of 1948, was taken away with effect from 1st April, 1994. Section 3 of the Amendment Act of 1994 reads as follows:- "3. Section 3 of the principal Act (hereinafter referred to as the said section) shall be omitted with effect from the 1st day of April, 1994:- Provided that such omission shall not:- (a) Affect the previous operation of the said section so omitted or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. (b) Affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the said section so omitted. (c) Affect any inquiry, investigation, legal proceeding or remedy, in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation or liability as aforesaid, and any such inquiry, investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the said section had not been so omitted. Provided further that any reference to the said section in any other provision of the principal Act shall be construed as a reference to the said section as if the said section had not been so omitted." 6. Apart from the above, the life of Act II of 1948 was also extended till 31st March, 1997. 7. Subsequently, Act II of 1948 was further amended on 8th October, 1996, and by virtue of section 3 of the Amending Act, Section 7A was inserted after section 7 of the principal Act to the following effect:- "Award by 7A – The Collector shall make an award under Collector. Sub-section (2) of section 7 within a period of three years from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1) of section 4 (hereinafter referred to as the said notice) and if such award is not made within the period as aforesaid, the said notice shall lapse. Sub-section (2) of section 7 within a period of three years from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette under sub-section (1) of section 4 (hereinafter referred to as the said notice) and if such award is not made within the period as aforesaid, the said notice shall lapse. Provided that in the case where the said notice has been published more than two years before the commencement of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994 the award shall be made within a period of one year from the date of commencement of that Act. Explanation – In computing the period of three years or one year, as the case may be, under this section the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said notice is stayed by an order or a Court having jurisdiction, shall be excluded." 8. Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1996, provided that the Act would be deemed to have come into force on 1st April, 1994. 9. On 31st March, 1997, the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, lapsed, and on 2nd May, 1997, the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, received the assent of the President of India. On 4th June, 1997, a Notification dated 22nd May, 1997, issued by the Government of West Bengal, Land and Land Reforms Department, was published in the Calcutta Gazette whereby it was notified that the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, would be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April, 1997. 10. By the said amendment, section 9 of the present Act, namely, Act I of 1894, was amended as follows:- "3. 10. By the said amendment, section 9 of the present Act, namely, Act I of 1894, was amended as follows:- "3. Amendment of section 9 of Act I of 1894 – In section 9 of the principal Act, after sub-section (3), the following sub-sections shall be inserted:- (3A) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act II of 1948) (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said Act), as reenacted by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Reenacting Act, 1977 (West Bengal Act 15 of 1977), and, in every case, the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4, section 5, section 5A, section 6, section 7 and section 8 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with:- Provided that the date of notice under this sub-section shall be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this Act. Provided further that when the Collector has made an award under section 11 in respect of any such land, such land shall, upon such award, vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Provided further that when the Collector has made an award under section 11 in respect of any such land, such land shall, upon such award, vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (3B) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same affect on all such persons known or believed to be interested in any land, or to be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the said Act, and notice for acquisition of such land has also been published under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the said Act, and, in every such case, the provisions of section 4, section 5, section 5A, section 6, section 7, section 8 and section 16 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with:- Provided that the date of publication of notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4 of the said Act shall be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this Act:- Provided further that in every such case, the Collector shall make an award under section 11 in respect of such land only for the purpose of payment of due compensation to the persons interested in such land which has, upon the Collector taking possession thereof, already vested absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances." 11. Section 11A of the principal Act was also amended in the manner following:- "4. Amendment of section 11A – In section 11A of the principal Act, after the proviso, the following proviso shall be added:- Provided further that in respect of the acquisition of the land referred to in sub-section (3A) and sub-section (3B) of section 9, the award shall be made wherein a period of two years from the date of the issue of the public notice under section 9." 12. In keeping with the aforesaid amendment, special notice under section 9(3A) of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, was issued by the Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, to some of the writ petitioners on 16th July, 1999. Soon thereafter on 10th August, 1999, all the writ petitioners filed their respective objections to the said notice dated 16th July, 1999. 13. Soon thereafter on 10th August, 1999, all the writ petitioners filed their respective objections to the said notice dated 16th July, 1999. 13. On separate applications being made in the pending appeals, the Appeal Court passed an interim order to the effect that even if the appellants participated in the proceedings before the Collector on the basis of the notice under section 9, the same would not in any way prejudice the appellants in the pending appeals and no payments were to be made till the appeals were disposed of. Leave was also given to the appellants to challenge the vires of subsections (3A) and (3B) of section 9 of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997. 14. Pursuant to the leave given, supplementary affidavits were filed by the appellants on 14th January, 2000, challenging the validity of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997. 15. Initially when the appeals were taken up for hearing, Mr. Pijush Dutta, Senior Advocate, had appeared for the appellants in the appeal filed by Niharendu Majumdar Samajpati & other, A.P.O. No. 675 of 1994, but subsequently, he submitted that he had retired from the case and was no longer appearing in the matter. Although, thereafter the other appeals were heard on a number of days, no one appeared for the appellants in the said appeal. 16. Appearing for the appellants in the other appeals, except for the appeal filed by the West Bengal Housing Board, Mr. Pradip Ghosh, Senior Advocate, submitted that on 8th October, 1996, the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1996, received the assent of the President. This was followed by a Circular issued by the State Government on 16th October, 1996, with regard to all pending cases of requisition under Act II of 1948. Mr. Ghosh submitted that despite the said Circular and the leave earlier granted by the Appeal Court, no action was taken by the respondents to initiate and/or to complete the acquisition proceedings in respect of the requisitioned lands of the appellants/writ petitioners and the respondents allowed the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, to expire on 31st March, 1997. 17. Mr. 17. Mr. Ghosh urged that from 1st April, 1997, in the absence of any statutory sanction, the possession of the respondents in the requisitioned land became unlawful and instead of restoring possession thereof to the respective appellants the respondents continued to occupy the same illegally in violation of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Mr. Ghosh urged that in the absence of any valid protection of the law, it became incumbent on the part of the State Government to restore the lands to their lawful owners. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the authority of law referred to in Article 300A of the Constitution had been derived by the State Government under section 3 of Act II of 1948, but with the expiry of the Act such authority of law also ceased and the continued occupation of the requisitioned lands was in violation of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution. 18. Mr. Ghosh urged that under section 3(1) of Act II of 1948, possession of the land in question was lawfully taken but before title could be acquired, the said Act, including section 4(1a), lapsed on 31st March, 1997 consequently, the action taken by the respondents for taking away ownership of the lands in question under section 9(3A) of Act I of 1894, was without valid sanction of law and hence violative of Article 300A of the Constitution. 19. It was next urged by Mr. Ghosh that the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, received the assent of the President on 2nd May, 1997, and sub-section (2) of section 1 thereof provided that the said Act would come into force on such date as the State Government might by Notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. Mr. Ghosh submitted that significantly the legislature did not intend to give retrospective effect to the said Act, and in view of the said provision, the State Government could have appointed a day subsequent to 2nd May, 1997. The State Government, however, by a Notification published in the Calcutta Gazette on 4th June, 1997, directed that the said Act would be deemed to have come into effect on 1st April, 1997. 20. Mr. The State Government, however, by a Notification published in the Calcutta Gazette on 4th June, 1997, directed that the said Act would be deemed to have come into effect on 1st April, 1997. 20. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the aforesaid Notification was unconstitutional and arbitrary as the executive authority could not give retrospective effect to a statutory enactment unless the same was provided for by the legislature in the body of the statute or the legislature had itself given retrospective operation to the enactment in clear and unambiguous terms. 21. In support of his submission Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta & another vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893 , wherein reference was made to an observation made by the House of Lords in Wicks vs. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1947 All England Law Reports (1) 206, inter alia, to the effect that a regulation validly made under an Act should be regarded as though it were itself an enactment. Reference was also made to the case of Emperor vs. Abdul Hamid, AIR 1923 Patna 1, where it was observed that when a notification is issued by an executive authority in exercise of a power conferred by statute that notification is as much a part of the law as if it had been incorporated within the body of the statute at the date of its enactment. In other words, according to Mr. Ghosh, an executive authority by a statute could act on the basis of such power, but not so as to overreach the provisions of the statute itself. 22. Mr. Ghosh urged that it is a settled principle of law that a repository of power could not by taking recourse to a legal fiction, transcend the limits of its domain of legislation. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerly & Co. (Madras) Limited, AIR 1953 SC 560 and in New Manik Chawk Mills vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 1801 , Mr. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerly & Co. (Madras) Limited, AIR 1953 SC 560 and in New Manik Chawk Mills vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 1801 , Mr. Ghosh urged that if the possession of the State Government in respect of the requisitioned lands had become unauthorised and unlawful as on 1st April, 1997, such possession could not be made lawful with retrospective effect by enacting a legal fiction which was contrary to Article 300A of the Constitution and it was incumbent on the State Government to restore the lands to their lawful owners. 23. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the default on the part of the State Government could not be a justification for subsequent regulation with retrospective effect. According to Mr. Ghosh, neither the State Legislature nor the State Government could render lawful something which had already become unlawful and unconstitutional and the attempt to give retrospective effect to the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, by the executive notification dated 4th June, 1997, was illegal and void in law as the same was not permitted by the Act itself. 24. Mr. Ghosh urged that when the legislature provides that a statute instead of coming into force on its enactment will come into force on a date to be subsequently notified, it indicates that the statute will take effect prospectively at a later date. Mr. Ghosh submitted that when the legislature intends that a statute should have retrospective operation the same is expressly stated in the statute itself and when the legislature has not given retrospective effect to a statute, the executive authority cannot in exercise of the power to specify a date for the Act to come into force, fix a date with retrospective operation. It was submitted that such a notification would be ultra vires the Act and beyond the scope of the power to bring the Act into operation. 25. In this regard, Mr. It was submitted that such a notification would be ultra vires the Act and beyond the scope of the power to bring the Act into operation. 25. In this regard, Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar vs. M. Venkatachalam Potti, AIR 1956 SC 246 , wherein while considering a notification issued under section 1(3) of the Travancore Act 14 of 1124, passed by the Travancore legislature on 7th March, 1949, empowering the Travancore Government to appoint a date on which it would come into force, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the power conferred under the said section, the Government had the power to issue the notification bringing the Act into force on any date subsequent to the passing of the Act. 26. Mr. Ghosh submitted that it was well established that the provisions of the General Clauses Act would not apply to a temporary statute and that in the absence of a saving clause in such statute, all action taken thereunder would lapse along with the statute on its expiry owing to efflux of time. It was urged that the said question had fallen for the consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as far back as in 1961 in the case of S. Krishnan vs. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 301 , wherein while considering the validity of certain provisions of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expired. 27. Mr. Ghosh also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Seth Jagamander Das & other, AIR 1954 SC 683 , where the legality of proceedings for offence taken after the expiry of the Defence of India Act in view of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, was under consideration. Ghosh also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Seth Jagamander Das & other, AIR 1954 SC 683 , where the legality of proceedings for offence taken after the expiry of the Defence of India Act in view of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, was under consideration. In the said context the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- "When a statute is repealed or comes to an automatic end by efflux of time, no prosecution for acts done during the continuance of the repealed or expired Act can be commenced after the date of its repeal or expiry because that would amount to the enforcement of a repealed or a dead Act. In cases of repeal of statutes this rule stands modified by section 6 of the General Clauses Act. An expiring Act, however, is not governed by the rule enunciated in that section." 28. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the intention of the legislature that the life of Act II of 1948 should not be extended beyond 31st March, 1997, was quite evident from the fact that while by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, the life of Act II of 1948 was extended till 31st March, 1997, it was also provided that section 3 of the principal Act would be omitted with effect from 1st April, 1994. In other words, the State Government's power to requisition land under Act II of 1948 stood abrogated with effect from 1st April, 1994. 29. Mr. Ghosh reiterated that once the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, lapsed on 31st March, 1997, on account of it being a temporary statute, the orders of requisition passed under section 3(1) of the said Act, where no further order had been passed under section 4(1a) thereof, also lapsed in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, and the continued possession of the State Government in the requisitioned lands was rendered unlawful and unconstitutional being contrary to the constitutional mandate contained in Article 300A of the Constitution. 30. In this regard, Mr. 30. In this regard, Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose & other, AIR 1962 SC 945 , where the effect of the lapse of an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor seeking to validate the elections of the Cuttack Municipality was under consideration. One of the points urged on behalf of the respondent was that the appeals pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court had become infructuous having regard to the fact that the impugned Ordinance lapsed on 1st April, 1959. It was contended that since the Ordinance was temporary it was bound to lapse after the expiration of the prescribed period and so, as soon as it lapsed, the invalidity in the Cuttack Municipal elections which had been cured by it, revived. 31. Dealing with the said question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of S. Krishnan vs. State of Madras (supra) and observed that the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act do not apply to a temporary Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed further that it is because of such situations that the legislature can and often does avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is somewhat similar to that of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. 32. In this connection, reference was made to a decision of the House of Lords in Wicks vs. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1947 All England Law Reports (1) 206, wherein some of the provisions of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, were being considered. Sub-section (3) of section 11 of the said Act provided that the expiry of the Act would not effect the operation of things previously done or omitted to be done thereunder. The appellant, Wicks was convicted in May 1946 of offences committed in 1943 and 1944 contrary to Regulation 2A of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 made pursuant to the above Act. Both the Act and the Regulation expired on 24th February, 1946. The appellant, Wicks was convicted in May 1946 of offences committed in 1943 and 1944 contrary to Regulation 2A of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 made pursuant to the above Act. Both the Act and the Regulation expired on 24th February, 1946. It was, as a result of the specific provision contained in section 11(3) of the Act that the House of Lords held that although Regulation 2A had expired before the trial of the appellant, he was properly convicted after the expiration of the Act since section 11(3) did not expire with the rest of the Act, being designed to preserve the right to prosecute after the date of expiry. 33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to observe that it would not be reasonable to hold that the general rule about the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act is inflexible and admits of no exception and that if a penalty had been imposed upon a person the same would survive the expiration of the statute. 34. Mr. Ghosh next contended that the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, was ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution in view of the hostile discrimination created by such amendment against persons whose lands had been the subject matter of requisition under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, and was now being sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by virtue of the amended provisions. 35. Mr. Ghosh urged that the provisions of sections 9(3A) and 9(3B) and the proviso to section 11A as incorporated by the West Bengal Amendment Act of 1997 in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were unconstitutional as on the date when the Act came into force the possession of the State Government in the requisitioned lands was no longer lawful and no further action could lawfully be taken on the basis of such requisition under section 9(3A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the lawful nexus between the State Government and those lands stood snapped on and from 1st April, 1997. Mr. Ghosh submitted that no subsequent enactment could restore the said nexus and on such score also the provisions of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, were ultra vires and were liable to be struck down. Mr. Ghosh submitted that no subsequent enactment could restore the said nexus and on such score also the provisions of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, were ultra vires and were liable to be struck down. It was also submitted that merely by saying that the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4, sections 5, 5A, 6, 7 and 8 shall be deemed to have been complied with the West Bengal Legislature could not validate something which had become non est in the eye of law. 36. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the scheme of Act I of 1894 provided for publication of a preliminary notification by the State Government under section 4(1) indicating that the lands covered by the notification were likely to be required for a public purpose and provision was also made under section 5A for objections to be filed against such notification. Mr. Ghosh urged that such objection was intended to be meaningful since the State intended to take away a valuable right of a citizen. Only thereafter could a declaration be made under section 6 that the lands were required for a public purpose. 37. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the introduction of sub-section (3A) in section 9 of Act I of 1894 has given rise to an anomalous situation and has resulted in hostile discrimination and unequal treatment between persons whose lands were being sought to be acquired. It was urged that those whose lands were sought to be acquired under Act I of 1894 were treated more favourably than those whose lands were initially requisitioned under Act II of 1948 when the said Act was in force. 38. Mr. Ghosh submitted that while West Bengal Act II of 1948 provided for requisition and speedy acquisition of lands, section 17 of Act I of 1894 also provided for speedy acquisition of land. Sub-section (4) of section 17 provides that in appropriate cases, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A would have no application. However, sub-section (3A) of section 17 provides that before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), tender payment of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for such land to the persons interested and entitled thereto. 39. Mr. However, sub-section (3A) of section 17 provides that before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), tender payment of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for such land to the persons interested and entitled thereto. 39. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the instant cases although the provisions of section 5A of the Act I of 1894 were not really complied with, the persons whose lands were being sought to be subjected to the amended provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 9 were denied the benefit of sub-section (3A) of section 17 of Act I of 1894. 40. It was also urged that the classification being made by the State Government by the introduction of sub-section (3A) in section 9 of Act I of 1894 was unreasonable, having no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the said Act. Mr. Ghosh contended that persons whose lands were subjected to the provisions of section 17 of the said Act and persons whose lands were subjected to section 9(3A) were similarly circumstanced as both are denied a hearing under section 5A, which is a valuable right available to others. In both cases, some of the provisions of Act I of 1894 are obviated for taking possession of land specially for a public purpose. But inspite of the similarities, one group would get 80 per cent compensation, while the other group would be deprived of such benefit. According to Mr. Ghosh, the classification being without any rational basis, the amendments were hit by Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of hostile discrimination. 41. Mr. Ghosh urged that the real plight of the appellants, who were originally subjected to orders of requisition under Act II of 1948, is that if the said Act was still in force they would have got the benefit of section 8B which provided for on account of payment of compensation in advance in a manner similar to the provisions of section 17(3A) of Act I of 1894. With the lapse of Act II of 1948, such benefit was no longer available to the appellants and at the same time they were also denied the benefit of section 17(3A) of Act I of 1894. With the lapse of Act II of 1948, such benefit was no longer available to the appellants and at the same time they were also denied the benefit of section 17(3A) of Act I of 1894. Again, because of the expiry of Act II of 1948, the appellants have been deprived of the benefit of section 4(1a) thereof and the time frame for making of the award under the amended provisions of Act II of 1948. 42. Mr. Ghosh then referred to the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Santosh Kumar Chakrobarty & other vs. State of West Bengal, 1996 (1) CHN 83 , wherein it was held that even if the emergency power under sections 17(1) and 17(4) of Act I of 1894 are to be resorted to, then even no land could be acquired without publication of a declaration under section 6 thereof. 43. Mr. Ghosh submitted that what could not be done under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act even in an emergency situation, would not be justified in the case of those who had suffered an order of requisition under West Bengal Act II of 1948, so as to treat them as a distinct class and to deprive them of a valuable right. Mr. Ghosh urged that the State Government's laches or inability to comply with the provisions of law could not be a justification for discriminatory treatment against the appellants. Mr. Ghosh submitted that even such discrimination was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He also rugged that the amendment of section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was made only to bypass the declaration required to be made under section 6 of the said Act. It was urged that the same also suffered from the vice of arbitrariness and unreasonableness and was liable to be struck down on such score as well. 44. Mr. Ghosh contended that having regard to the provisions of section 11A of Act I of 1894, the total absence of any time frame with regard to the initiation of proceedings under section 9(3A) and the time limit within which the same was required to be completed is discriminatory in view of the incongruity between the two schemes and the impugned amendment is a clear instance of colourable exercise of legislative power. 45. 45. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gopi Chand vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 609 , Mr. Ghosh submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution did not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation, but such classification had to be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together in one class from others left out of it, and the differentia must have a reasonable or rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned provision. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the said two tests had been held to be essential for determining the vires of an impugned statute in relation to Article 14 of the Constitution. 46. Mr. Ghosh contended that it was well settled that where one is the repository of two powers, the one more advantageous to the citizen is to be invoked. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in relation to the powers of acquisition under Act I of 1894 a difference was being made between two groups of persons who were similarly circumstanced and the power which was more onerous was being sought to be applied to the appellants in complete disregard of earlier judicial pronouncements. 47. In this regard reliance was placed on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Snehalata Bhowmik & other vs. Land Acquisition Collector, West Dinajpur, wherein it was observed that if the same land could be acquired either under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, the State cannot take recourse to the latter only to deprive the owner of the statutory compensation that would otherwise be payable if the land had been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Reference was also made to another Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bijoli Prova Nandy Chowdhury vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1977 Cal 64 , where it was held that sections 8(2)(b) and 17(2)(a) of West Bengal Act II of 1948, so far as they provided for non-payment of statutory solatium could not be upheld, and the provisions of section 23 of Act I of 1894 would have to be followed. 48. The said principle was more lucidly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jiwani Kumari Paraki vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, AIR 1984 SC 1707 . 48. The said principle was more lucidly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jiwani Kumari Paraki vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, AIR 1984 SC 1707 . It was observed that where one is the repository of two powers, that is power of requisition as well as power of acquisition in respect of the same property, and if the purpose can equally be served by one which causes lesser inconvenience and damage to the citizen concerned, unless the repository of both the power suffers from any insurmountable disability, user of one which is disadvantageous to the citizen without exploring the use of the other, would be had not on the ground that the Government has no power but on the ground that it will be a misuse of the power in law. 49. Mr. Ghosh submitted that although the provisions of Act II of 1948 were more advantageous to the appellants they had been wrongly subjected to the less advantageous provisions of Act I of 1894. 50. It was lastly contended that the impugned Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, would lead to deprivation of property in violation of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution, as there was no valid law in the field ever since the expiry of Act II of 1948. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the subsequent enactment being unconstitutional and void, there is no lawful basis for depriving the appellants of their property and the same was liable to be returned to the appellants upon payment of adequate compensation for continuing in wrongful possession thereof. 51. Appearing for the respondents in all the appeals filed on the Original Side and for the West Bengal Housing Board in the appeal filed by the said Board on the Appellate Side, the learn9d Advocate General firstly pointed out that while the orders of requisition were made on 13th March, 1993, and possession of the requisitioned lands had been taken on 14th March, 1993, the said orders of requisition were challenged in writ petitions filed by the appellants on 16th March, 1993. The said writ petitions were moved on 17th March, 1993, where orders of status quo were made. The said writ petitions were moved on 17th March, 1993, where orders of status quo were made. Ultimately, the writ petitions of the appellants were dismissed on 3rd October, 1994, and these appeals, save for the appeal of the West Bengal Housing Board, were filed on 23rd November, 1994, whom the State was injuncted from making constructions, but were given leave to continue with the acquisition proceedings. 52. The learned Advocate General submitted that in order to meet the acute housing problem of different sections of society in the State need was felt to build a large number of dwelling units in urban areas. Towards that end, after negotiations and discussions with different Private Sector Companies, the State Government selected two companies, namely (1) Bengal Peerless Housing Development Co. Ltd. and (2) Bengal Shrachi Housing Development Co. Ltd., who were willing to form Joint Sector Companies in collaboration with the West Bengal Housing Board to build such dwelling units. The relevant provisions of the West Bengal Housing Board Act, 1972, were amended with effect from 3rd September, 1993, and under section 27A of the amending Act power was conferred on the West Bengal Housing Board to entrust existing or new Joint Sector Companies with any Housing Scheme for execution on such terms as the State Government thought it fit and proper. Memoranda of Understanding were drawn up between the West Bengal Housing Board and the two private companies to promote Joint Sector Companies for the above-mentioned purpose and in pursuance thereof orders of requisition were made on 13th March, 1993 in respect of 17.332 acres of land in Kasba Mouza, P.S. Jadavpur, in the city of Calcutta. 53. The learned Advocate General submitted that during the pendency of the appeals no notice was issued to the owners of the requisitioned lands under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948 and ultimately the said Act lapsed before these appeals could be taken up for hearing. 54. Opposing the submissions of Mr. Ghosh that with the lapse of the above Act, the orders of requisition made thereunder automatically came to an end in the absence of any saving clause, the learned Advocate General urged that the actual position was quite different. He submitted that Act II of 1948 was a temporary Act and by the Amending Act of 1994 its life was extended till 31st March, 1997. He submitted that Act II of 1948 was a temporary Act and by the Amending Act of 1994 its life was extended till 31st March, 1997. The Amending Act of 1994 also provided for omission of the State Government's power to pass orders of requisition under section 3 of the principal Act with effect from 1st April, 1997, with a saving provision which, inter alia, provided that such omission would not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, occurred or incurred under the section omitted or affect any inquiry, investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation or liability. It was provided further that any such inquiry, investigation, legal proceeding or remedy could be instituted, continued or enforced as if the said section had not been so omitted. 55. The learned Advocate General also pointed out that Act II of 1948 was further amended by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1996, and such amendment provided that notice for acquisition under section 4(1a) would lapse if the Collector failed to make an award within a period of three years from the date of publication of such notice in the Official Gazette or within one year if such notice was published more than two years before the commencement of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, subject to any order of a competent Court staying any action or proceeding taken pursuant to such notice. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, came into force with effect from 1st April, 1997, whereby section 9, section 11(a), section 23(1A) and section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in their application to West Bengal, were amended. 56. The learned Advocate General submitted that the amended provisions of section 9 provided for service of notice to all persons known or believed to be interested in any land possession whereof had already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, and in every such case the provisions of sections 4, 5, 5A, 6, 7 and 8 of Act I of 1894 would be deemed to have been complied with and after award was made under section 11, such land would vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. Under section 11A, such award was required to be made within two years from the date of issuance of notice under section 9. 57. The learned Advocate General urged that after the expiry of Act II of 1948 on 31st March, 1997, rights which had accrued to the State after initiation of proceedings under section 3 of the said Act could not be said to have ipso facto terminated or been taken away. The learned Advocate General also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (supra) which had been referred to and relied upon by Mr. Ghosh. It was submitted that in the said decision it had been clearly observed that in considering the effect of the expiration of a temporary statute it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. If the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and certain rights were vested thereby, the same could not be taken away because the statute by which it was created had expired. 58. With reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of F. and V. Merchant's Union vs. Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 , it was submitted that the expression vest did not have a fixed connotation. Vesting could mean vesting of title or possession as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. 59. In the said context it was submitted that in exercise of the powers vested in the State Government under section 3 of Act II of 1948, it could requisition any land for any of the purposes mentioned in the said section even if such purpose was permanent in nature. It was submitted that as had been held by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grahak Sanstha Mancha vs. State of Maharastra, AIR 1994 SC 2319 , there was no statutory bar for any such requisition if the policy formulated by the State was not against the mandate of the Constitution or any statutory provision. 60. The learned Advocate General urged that the lands in question had been requisitioned under section 3 of Act II of 1948 for a permanent purpose, namely, the construction of a Housing Complex. 60. The learned Advocate General urged that the lands in question had been requisitioned under section 3 of Act II of 1948 for a permanent purpose, namely, the construction of a Housing Complex. It was urged that after requisition of any land, as soon as the possession thereof was taken over, such possessory right became a distinct which vested absolutely to the State Government and remained with the State Government unless the State Government decided to release the property under section 6 of the said Act. 61. It was submitted that apart from the above, the Saving Clause which had been incorporated in section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, whereby the operation of section 3 of the principal Act was omitted, made it very clear that such omission would not affect the previous operation of the said section or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or accrued under the said section. The learned Advocate General contended that by virtue of such saving clause the State Government was entitled to retain its distinctive possessory right in the requisitioned lands till steps were taken to acquire the property under the amended provisions of sections 9 and 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, whereupon the title thereof would vest absolutely to the State. The learned Advocate General submitted that there was no vacuum with regard to the orders of requisition passed under Act II of 1948 and the issuance of notice under section 9(3A) of Act I of 1894, as the said orders of requisition were saved by virtue of the Saving Clause and the publication of the Notification dated 22nd May, 1997, seeking to give retrospective operation to the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, with effect from 1st April, 1997, was by way of abundant caution only. 62. In the alternative it was submitted that if the omission of section 3 of Act II of 1948 had not been saved after 31st March, 1997, the right which was acquired by the State by taking possession of the land was a right which had vested to the State and could not be taken away even after the expiry of the principal Act on 31st March, 1997. 63. 63. The next point urged by the learned Advocate General was that the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, published after the assent of the President of India on 2nd May, 1997, was necessarily given effect retrospectively. It was submitted that from the Amending Act of 1997 itself it would be clear that the same was being given effect to in respect of lands the possession whereof had already been taken on requisition under section 3 of Act II of 1948. It was submitted that the legislature had made express provision for acts previously done and by necessary implication the Amending Act of 1997 would have to be given retrospective and not prospective operation. It was re-emphasised that the Notification dated 2nd May, 1997, notifying that the Amending Act of 1997 should be deemed to have come into force on and from 1st April, 1997, was published in order to remove any doubt or ambiguity regarding the retrospective operation of the Amending Act. It was submitted that even if the Notification had not been published, the effect of the Amendment Act would remain the same and the State Government would be legitimately entitled to give effect to the Amending Act of 1997 in respect of such lands where possession had already been taken under section 3 of Act II of 1948, inasmuch as, the possessory right of the State Government and the requisitioned land would remain vested in the State forever, even after the expiry of Act II of 1948. 64. It was submitted that a statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. A statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure has to be construed as retrospective unless a contrary intention was expressed by the legislature. The learned Advocate General referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012 , where the above principles were explained. 65. A statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure has to be construed as retrospective unless a contrary intention was expressed by the legislature. The learned Advocate General referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012 , where the above principles were explained. 65. The learned Advocate General urged that in the present case one was concerned with matters of procedure relating to utilisation of the requisitioned lands where possession had already been taken, which constituted a separate and distinct class of persons from those who had been served with orders of requisition, but whose lands remained in their possession after 31st March, 1997, when Act II of 1948 expired. 66. Regarding the deeming provision contained in the amended provision of sub-section (3A) of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it was submitted that such amendment was related only to those lands where possession had already been taken over under section 3 or Act II of 1948 and such right was enduring in nature. It was urged that the provisions of sections 4 to 8 of Act I 1894 had been substantially covered in the proceedings under section 3 of Act II of 1948. On a comparison of the provisions of the two Acts, the learned Advocate General contended that the provision relating to service of notice was common to both the enactments. While section 5A of Act I of 1894 provides for objections to be filed in respect of the Notification under section 4, under section 3 of Act II of 1948 persons served with notice were entitled to file objection in respect of the proposed requisition. While section 6 of Act I of 1894 requires a declaration to be made that the lands in question were required for a public purpose, a similar declaration was also required to be made under section 3(1) of Act II of 1948. Similarly, while section 8 of Act I of 1894 provides for measurement and demarcation of the land to be acquired, in respect of orders of requisition passed under section 3 of Act II of 1948, the measurement and marking of the land is indicated in the notification itself. 67. Similarly, while section 8 of Act I of 1894 provides for measurement and demarcation of the land to be acquired, in respect of orders of requisition passed under section 3 of Act II of 1948, the measurement and marking of the land is indicated in the notification itself. 67. It was submitted that there was, therefore, no necessity of repeating the entire process when a lateral entry was made from Act II of 1948 to Act I of 1894. 68. The learned Advocate General submitted that the appellants were not being denied any of their rights by virtue of the deeming clause in relation to compliance of sections 4 to 8 of Act I of 1894. On the contrary, the appellants would be more benefited by way of compensation under the amended provisions of section 9 of the said Act since the date of notice under sub-section (3A) of section 9 would be the date of reference for the purpose of determining the value of the land concerned. 69. In support of his aforesaid submission, the learned Advocate General firstly referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bombay vs. Panduram, AIR 1953 SC 244 , wherein it was observed that when a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the court is entitled to ascertain the purpose for which such legal fiction was to be resorted to, and full effect was required to be given to the statutory fiction which should be carried to its logical conclusion. 70. Reference was also made to two other decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Venugopal vs. The Divisional Manager, LIC of India, Machilipattnam, AIR 1994 SC 1343 and G. Viswanathan vs. Speaker, Tamilnadu, AIR 1996 SC 1060 , wherein it was held that the legislature could introduce a statutory fiction and the Court would have to proceed on the assumption that such a state of affairs existed on the relevant date. It was also observed that the legislature was competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of examining the existence of a fact which does not even exist. 71. It was also observed that the legislature was competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of examining the existence of a fact which does not even exist. 71. The learned Advocate General then urged that there was no hostile discrimination or arbitrariness in making a classification in respect of persons to whom orders under section 3 of Act II of 1948 had been issued and possession of the lands forming the subject matter of such orders had been taken over. The action of the State Government could not be said to have violated the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution could be invoked only if the classification was made on grounds which were totally irrelevant and had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute. If, however, there was some nexus between such classification and the object sought to be achieved, the legislature must be presumed to have acted in proper exercise of its constitutional powers. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.C. Bhatia vs. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 104 , the learned Advocate General submitted that statutory discrimination could not be set aside, if there are facts on the basis of which such statutory discrimination could be justified. 72. The learned Advocate General reiterated that the amendment effected by the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, was not for all lands, but for a particular class of land where possession had been taken over by the State Government pursuant to orders passed under section 3 of Act II of 1948. It was submitted that the lands sought to be requisitioned were for the purpose of raising a Housing Complex, and the object sought to be achieved under the amended provisions of section 9(3A) of Act I of 1894 was also the same. The amendments introduced by the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, the construction of a Housing Complex, which was in the public interest. 73. The amendments introduced by the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, the construction of a Housing Complex, which was in the public interest. 73. The learned Advocate General submitted that the constitutional validity of Act II of 1948 had been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Nandy vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 961 , and as had been held therein, although there was no provision for making of representations, if such a representation was made the appropriate Government would be expected to consider the matter on its merits. 74. It was also urged that in West Bengal Housing Board vs. B.L. Mundhra, AIR 1997 SC 2989 , and in West Bengal Housing Board vs. B.P. Gupta, AIR 1997 SC 2745 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Housing Project was also a public purpose since it provided services which were essential to the life of the community at large. The learned Advocate General pointed out that in B.P. Gupta's case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed that the legal compulsion of the State and the Housing Board to get the Housing Project executed through a Joint Sector Company was quite understandable and it could not be said that the power exercised by the State authorities were vested in the State. 75. The learned Advocate General submitted that since no one had appeared for the appellants in A.P.O. No. 675 of 1994 the same was required to be dismissed with costs. 76. The learned Advocate General concluded his submissions by urging that the general rule of construction was always in favour of the validity of an enactment of the legislature and the same rule was required to be applied to the facts of this case as well. 77. Mr. Soumen Bose, learned Senior Advocate, who appeared for the writ petitioner/ respondents in M.A.T. No. 2964 of 1997, filed by the West Bengal Housing Board, adopted Mr. Ghosh's submissions and added that the appeal was not maintainable as it had not been filed by the State Government, which was not aggrieved by the order appealed against. Mr. Bose submitted that the West Bengal Housing Board may be the requiring authority but it had not requisitioned the lands. 78. Regarding lapse of a temporary statute, Mr. Ghosh's submissions and added that the appeal was not maintainable as it had not been filed by the State Government, which was not aggrieved by the order appealed against. Mr. Bose submitted that the West Bengal Housing Board may be the requiring authority but it had not requisitioned the lands. 78. Regarding lapse of a temporary statute, Mr. Bose referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Tarak Chandra Mukherjee vs. Ratan Lal Ghosal, AIR 1997 Cal 257, wherein it was explained that in the absence of a saving clause or any validating Act, all proceedings taken thereunder would terminate automatically. Mr. Bose contended that when Act II of 1948 terminated by efflux of time on 1st April, 1997, there was nothing to keep the requisitions made under section 3(1) of Act II of 1948, alive. 79. Reference was also made to the decision of the Federal Court in J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing vs. Emperor, AIR 1947 FC 38, wherein, in view of saving provisions in Ordinance I of 1946, it was held that the Tribunal constituted thereunder did not cease to exist. 80. Mr. Bose submitted that in Wicks vs. Director of Public Prosecutions (supra) relied upon by Mr. Ghosh, the same sentiments have been expressed. 81. Mr. Bose urged that no notice had been issued to the writ petitioners under section 9 of Act I of 1894 and, in any event, in the absence of any saving provision, the order of requisition passed under Act II of 1948, which was a temporary statute, lapsed along with the statute. Mr. Bose submitted that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhupendra Kumar Bose's case, relied upon by the learned Advocate General had no application to the writ petitioners' case, since no restraint had been imposed on the State for issuance of notice under section 9 of Act I of 1894. 82. Mr. Bose submitted that, in any event, there was a vacuum after 31st March, 1997, which could not be filled, for the purpose of giving effect to the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997. 83. Mr. Bose submitted that the appeal filed by the West Bengal Housing Board was not competent and was liable to be dismissed with appropriate costs. 84. Replying to the submissions made by the learned Advocate General, Mr. 83. Mr. Bose submitted that the appeal filed by the West Bengal Housing Board was not competent and was liable to be dismissed with appropriate costs. 84. Replying to the submissions made by the learned Advocate General, Mr. Ghosh reiterated his earlier submission that Act II of 1948, being a temporary statute, orders of requisition made thereunder lapsed along with the statute itself. 85. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the saving provision contained in section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, had to be construed in the light of the omission of section 3 of Act II of 1948 by the Amending Act and not in the manner suggested by the learned Advocate General. Mr. Ghosh submitted that with the omission of section 3 from the principal Act, it became necessary to have a saving provision since the other provisions of the principal Act continued to remain operative by virtue of the extension of the life of the principal Act till 31st March, 1997, by the Amending Act. 86. Mr. Ghosh contended that the saving of action taken under section 3 of the principal Act was to enable further action to be taken under section 4(1a) for speedy acquisition of the lands which had been requisitioned and to take consequential action before the principal Act lapsed on 31st March, 1997. It was urged that to give such saving provision any other meaning would be to extend the life of the principal Act indefinitely even after its lapse on 31st March, 1997. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the contention of the learned Advocate General that once an order of requisition was made and possession of the requisitioned land was taken by the State, such requisition could and/or would continue indefinitely, went against the very character of the statute and was liable to be discarded. 87. Mr. Ghosh submitted further that in the decision of the House of Lords in Wicks vs. The Director of Public Prosecutions (supra) it was observed that unless a temporary Act contains some special provision to the contrary, after the temporary Act expires no proceedings can be taken upon and it ceased to have any further effect. Mr. 87. Mr. Ghosh submitted further that in the decision of the House of Lords in Wicks vs. The Director of Public Prosecutions (supra) it was observed that unless a temporary Act contains some special provision to the contrary, after the temporary Act expires no proceedings can be taken upon and it ceased to have any further effect. Mr. Ghosh submitted that there was no such special provision in the instant case which would have the effect of saving the orders of requisition made under section 3 of Act II of 1948 where no further steps had been taken to acquire the lands under section 4(1a) thereof before the Act expired on 31st March, 1997. 88. Mr. Ghosh urged that the interpretation of the proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act of 1994 has to be made without taking into consideration the subsequent West Bengal Amendment to Act I of 1894. According to Mr. Ghosh, one would have to go back to the stage of 31st March, 1994, when the said amendment was made, in order to understand the legislative intent behind the said provision containing the saving clause. Mr. Ghosh submitted that at the point of time when section 3 of Act II of 1948 stood omitted, one could foresee that the West Bengal Amendment to Act I of 1894 would be enacted. It was urged that the saving provision contained in the proviso to section 3 of the 1994 Amending Act could not be co-related to the 1997 West Bengal Amendment to Act I of 1894 or interpreted in the context thereof. Mr. Ghosh urged that having regard to the object of Act II of 1948 to provide for requisition and speedy acquisition, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that the lands under requisition should remain in the possession of the State Government in perpetuity without any order of acquisition. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act of 1994 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would go against the very object of the statute as intended by the legislature in the absence of specific provisions to that effect. 89. Mr. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act of 1994 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would go against the very object of the statute as intended by the legislature in the absence of specific provisions to that effect. 89. Mr. Ghosh urged that had it been intention of the legislature that both the orders of requisition and possession taken pursuant thereto, were to be saved, it would have used specific words to that effect as had been done in the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Re-enacting Act, 1977. It was also pointed out that in order to continue to use or deal with land under requisition it was necessary that section 4(1) of Act II of 1948 should continue to be in force as the said provision confers legislative sanction to the continuation of lawful use of the land. To say that even without section 4(1) the possession of the land could be lawfully retained would render section 4(1) otiose. It was, therefore, wrong to contend that any right of an enduring character would come into effect because of an order of requisition made under section 3 of the said Act. 90. Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.D. Vora vs. State of Maharastra, AIR 1984 SC 860, where it was observed that an order of requisition is by its very nature temporary in character and it cannot endure for an indefinite period of time. Reference was also made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jiwani Kumari Paraki to which reference had earlier been made, where similar views had been expressed. 91. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the intention of the legislature could also be ascertained from the provisions of section 3 of the Amending Act of 1996 whereby section 7A was incorporated in Act II of 1948 fixing an outer limit for making an award on the expiry whereof the acquisition itself would lapse. 92. Mr. Ghosh contended that the submissions made by the learned Advocate General regarding the continuance of the requisition even after the lapse of the Act whereunder such requisition had been made, were misconceived, since possession taken under an order of requisition would require a continuous legal mandate for retention of such possession. Such a mandate was there under section 4(1) of Act II of 1948. Such a mandate was there under section 4(1) of Act II of 1948. Once such mandate was lost, the sanction of law to remain in possession of the lands under requisition also came to an end and continued possession thereafter became unlawful and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution. 93. As to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhupendra Kumar Bose's case (supra), Mr. Ghosh submitted that the portion of the judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate General was made in the context of a penalty imposed under a temporary statute and the question involved was whether on expiry of the statute, the penalty already imposed would also lapse. It was urged that the penalty already imposed was of an enduring nature, brought about by a judicial order, and the expiry of the statute could not effect such judicial order. 94. Regarding the submission of the learned Advocate General, regarding the retrospective operation of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, Mr. Ghosh submitted that such submission had no legs to stand upon. Mr. Ghosh rugged that if the legislature really intended the said Act to have retrospective operation it would have said so in specific terms. According to Mr. Ghosh, the very fact that the legislature itself postponed the coming into operation of the Act by providing for the State Government to specify a date for such purpose, is a clear indication that the said Act was intended by the legislature to be prospective. 95. Mr. Ghosh urged that the decision in K.S. Paripoornan's case, relied upon by the learned Advocate General, really supported the case of the appellants, since the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997 was not in itself retrospective and unless the gap between the lapse of Act II of 1948 and the enactment of the 1997 Amendment Act was bridged, such retrospective effect could not be given. In such a situation the docutrine of Doubtful Penalisation came into play. 96. Mr. Ghosh concluded on the note that in cases of lateral movement, once outsiders enter into the mainstream and are absorbed therein, all discrimination must cease. Mr. In such a situation the docutrine of Doubtful Penalisation came into play. 96. Mr. Ghosh concluded on the note that in cases of lateral movement, once outsiders enter into the mainstream and are absorbed therein, all discrimination must cease. Mr. Ghosh reiterated his earlier submissions that the provisions of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, were ultra vires, and the continuance of possession of the requisitioned lands by the State was unlawful and the State was liable to return the same to their owners. 97. Initially, in the several writ petitions out of which three appeals have arisen, orders of requisition made under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, were under challenge. While these appeals were pending, the said Act, which was a temporary statute, lapsed on 31st March, 1997, by efflux of time and the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, was enacted. In the changed circumstances leave was given to the appellants to challenge the vires of the Amendment Act of 1997. The question which is central to all these appeals is whether the said orders of requisition, which were not followed up by proceedings for acquisition under section 4(1a) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, survived the expiry of the said Act. 98. There is no dispute that Act II of 1948 was a temporary statute which lapsed by efflux of time on 31st March, 1997, and there was no saving provision therein. There is also no dispute that the life of the said Act was extended from 1st April, 1994, till 31st March, 1997, by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1994, section 3 whereof provided that section 3 of the principal Act would be omitted with effect from 1st April, 1994, but that such omission would not affect the previous operation of the section so omitted or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the section so omitted. It was also provided that such omission would not also affect any inquiry, investigation, legal proceeding or remedy, in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation or liability and the same could be instituted, continued or enforced as if the said section had not been so omitted and any reference to the said section in any other provision of the principal Act was to be construed as a reference to the said section as if the said section had not been so omitted. 99. Can it be said, as contended by the learned Advocate General, that by virtue of the said proviso to section 3 of the 1994 Amendment Act orders of requisition which had already been made survived the lapse of the principal Act so as to continue such orders of requisition indefinitely. In our view, the answer to such question must be in the negative. 100. As submitted by Mr. Ghosh, while section 3, which vested the power to requisition in the State Government, was omitted by the Amending Act of 1994 with effect from 1st April, 1994, by the same Act, the life of the principal Act was also extended from 1st April, 1994, till 31st March, 1997. As pointed out by the learned Advocate General, by virtue of the amending Act of 1994, the State Government continued to retain the power under section 4(1a) to acquire the lands which had been requisitioned. The saving provision incorporated in section 3 of the Amending Act of 1994 appears to have been made to enable the State Government to continue to exercise its powers under section 4(1) and section 4(1a) and other sections of Act II of 1948 which continued to be operative after omission of section 3 of the principal Act. The omission of section 3 and the extension of the life of Act II of 1948 for a further period of three years indicate that an opportunity was being given by the legislature to the State Government to complete the process of acquisition begun by issuing orders under section 3 of the said Act. 101. The omission of section 3 and the extension of the life of Act II of 1948 for a further period of three years indicate that an opportunity was being given by the legislature to the State Government to complete the process of acquisition begun by issuing orders under section 3 of the said Act. 101. We are unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of the respondents that by virtue of the proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act of 1994 all orders of requisition, where possession of the land had been taken over, were saved and would continue indefinitely, notwithstanding the lapse of the principal Act. Such submissions are also contrary to the well-settled legal principle that with the lapse of a temporary statute, all action taken thereunder, which were not of an endurable nature, would lapse with the statute and could not be continued. 102. While interpreting statutes, the Courts have uniformly made a distinction between statutes which are temporary in nature and have lapsed and statutes which have been repealed. While in the former case, it has been the view that in most cases all action or proceedings taken under a temporary statute ceases with the lapse of the statute, in the latter case it has been held that the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable and all actions and proceedings taken prior to repeal of the statute would be saved. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Seth Jagamander Das (supra), referred to by Mr. Ghosh, makes the position clear that continuance of proceedings under an expired Act would amount to enforcement of a dead Act, whereas in cases of repeal of statutes such rule stands modified by section 6 of the General Clauses Act. While it is true, as expressed in Bhupendra Kumar Bose's case, that there can be no inflexible rule regarding the effect of expiration of a temporary statute where an enduring right has been created, in the present case no such enduring right has been created by the order of requisition which may have survived the expiration of Act II of 1948. 103. We are inclined to agree with Mr. 103. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Ghosh that the savings provision incorporated in section 3 of the Amending Act of 1994 must be related to the life of the principal Act which was a temporary statute. Had it been the intention of the legislature to perpetuate the orders of requisition passed prior to 1st April, 1994, it would have incorporated a saving clause in the principal Act itself. With the expiry of the principal Act the right to use and occupy the requisitioned land also came to an end with effect from 1st April, 1997, and the continued possession in the said land thereafter became unlawful. With the lapse of the principal Act the authority to use the land under section 4(1) thereof also come to an end. We are unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the respondents that once possession of the requisitioned land had been taken over by the State Government a possessory right in respect of the said lands was created in favour of the State Government which would continue indefinitely. 104. In our view, that was not the object of the Act which provided for requisition and speedy acquisition of land for a public purpose. The State Government had only it self to balme for not having taken steps under section 4(1a) of Act II of 1948, even after section 3 was omitted therefrom, particularly when the purpose for which the lands had been requisitioned was undoubtedly public in nature. 105. The subsequent enactment of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, and the notification published by the State Government on 22nd May, 1997, could not, in our view, either revive the orders which had lapsed or bridge the gap between the expiry of Act II of 1948 on 31st March, 1997 and the commencement of the former Act. In fact, the State Government was not competent to give retrospective effect to the Amending Act of 1997. 106. Although, Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.D. Vora's case, the said decision was over-ruled in the Grahak Sanstha Mancha's case. 107. In fact, the State Government was not competent to give retrospective effect to the Amending Act of 1997. 106. Although, Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.D. Vora's case, the said decision was over-ruled in the Grahak Sanstha Mancha's case. 107. We are also unable to agree with the learned Advocate General that there was no vacuum between the lapse of Act II of 1948 and the enactment of the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, since the latter Act was necessarily retrospective in character. In our view, had the legislature intended the 1997 Act to have retrospective operation, it would have incorporated such intention in the Act itself in clear and unambiguous terms, instead of leaving it to the State Government to appoint a date for the Act to come into force, which necessarily meant that the Act was to be given prospective effect although, by the official notification dated 22nd May, 1997, an attempt was made to give it retrospective effect. 108. Since in our view the orders of requisition passed under section 3 of the Act II of 1948 did not survive the lapse of the said Act and the Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1997, was prospective and not retrospective in operation, sub-section (3A) incorporated in section 9 of Act I of 1894 by the said Amending Act of 1997, must be held to be of no effect. 109. The submission regarding the creation of a class of persons who had been served with orders of requisition under section 3(1) of Act II of 1948 and possession of whose lands had been taken over by the State Government, also fails on such score. In our view, the amended provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 9 gives rise to discrimination between persons whose lands had been requisitioned under Act II of 1948 and those whose lands had been acquired under Act I of 1894, in that the former group of persons were deprived of the benefit of section 17(3A) of Act I of 1894, despite being deprived of the right to file an objection against the proposed acquisition under section 5A of the said Act. The amended provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 9 of Act I of 1894 must be held to be of no effect on such score as well as there is no rational basis for such discrimination with the object sought to be achieved. 110. The appeals, except the one filed by the West Bengal Housing Board, being M.A.T. No. 2964 of 1997, therefore, succeed and are allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellants therein is set aside and the orders of requisition impugned in the writ petitions are also set aside on the ground that they had lapsed along with Act II of 1948 after 31st March, 1997. The appeal filed by the West Bengal Housing Board is dismissed. The respondents concerned are directed to return possession of the requisitioned lands to the appellants concerned within two months from date and to pay compensation for continuing in possession of the lands even after the lapse of Act II of 1948 at the rate of recurring compensation paid during the period of requisition till return of possession in terms of this order. 111. This order will not, however, prevent the respondents concerned from proceeding afresh to acquire the lands under the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, other than the provisions of sub-section (3A) of section 9 and the connected amended provisions thereof. 112. There will be no order as to costs. 113. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment on the usual undertakings. Urgent xerox copy of this judgment, if applied for, is to be supplied expeditiously. Appeals are allowed with directions except M.A.T. No. 2964 of 1997. I agree.