ORDER: In W.P. No.13423 of 1995, the petitioner an educational trust which had already established and running a Polytechnic prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the first respondent in G.O.Ms. No.14 (Industries MH-I) Department, dated 19.5.1994 issued under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and Sec.6 declaration in G.O. Ms.(20) No.154, dated 3.8.1995 issued under the Land Acquisition Act and quash the same. 2. The first respondent is the State Government while the second respondent is the Land Acquisition Officer. The third respondent namely M/s. Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited/ Requisitioning Body has been impleaded at its instance. 3. W.P. No.16164 of 1995 has been filed by M/s.Yasodhran Chamber Bricks represented by its Partner praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent- State of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms. No.148 (Industries MIE.1) Department, dated 19.5.1994 issued under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and Sec.6 declaration in G.O.Ms.(20) No.154, dated 3.8.1995 and quash the same. 4. The first respondent is the State Government. The second respondent is the Land Acquisition Officer and the third respondent is the beneficiary at whose instance the petitioner’s land was sought to be acquired among other land. 5. As the two writ petitions relate to one and the same acquisition, at the joint request of the counsel for the petitioners, the writ petitions are taken up together and common arguments were advanced. The learned counsel for the petitioner in both the writ petitions raised the following contentions: “(i) Sec.4(1) Notification had not been published in the locality in two dailies having circulation in the locality and the two tamil dailies in which the notification has been published have no circulation in the locality, where the land is located. (ii) The Rule 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act has not been followed, in that after communicating the remarks of the requisitioning body, no further enquiry has been conducted by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer has failed to take into consideration the objections raised without reference to the objections and a declaration had been forwarded to the State Government. (iii) In any event the purpose of Sec.4(1) Notification as was notified under Sec.4(1) Notification as well as Sec.6 declaration has been aborted as seen from the affidavit filed by the third respondent who required the land for an industrial park as against the original requirement, namely to establish an automobile tyre project by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited, in the Joint Sector and therefore the acquisition cannot be proceeded further and consequently the impugned Notification as well as the Declaration are liable to be quashed”. 6. In support of the first contention the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of P.Sathasivam, J. in Chelladurai, N. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000)3 C.T.C. 215 , where the learned Judge sustained the contention that publication made in “Kumari Murasu” and “Kinnas” are not in compliance withe the requirement of Sec.4(1) of the Act. In my considered view, it would be sufficient to take up the next two points for consideration while leaving the first point to be considered at the appropriate stage, if so warranted. 7. Let me take up the contention regarding change of purpose and the consequential invalidity of the notification on the ground that public purpose ceased. 8. Under Sec.4(1) Notification, the public purpose set out being for the establishment of an Automobile Tyre Project by Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation in the joint sector. The exact public purpose noticed in Sec.4(1) Notification reads thus: “for a public purpose to wit for the establishment of an Automobile Tyre Project by Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (TIDCO - a State owned company) in the joint sector.” 9. Under Sec.6 Declaration, the purpose stated being that the land is needed for a “public purpose, to wit, for construction of a rubber tyre and tube factory”. 10. Under Sec.4(1) Notification as well as Sec.6 Declaration, the public purpose stated being the location of a tyre and tube factory. In the 4(1) Notification it was notified that it will be in the Joint Sector by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation. But at that stage of Sec.6 Declaration, it is seen that it is being implemented by the State not by a Government company. 11. The writ petitions have been admitted during the year 1995 long prior to the passing of the award and interim stay had also been granted by this Court. But at that stage of Sec.6 Declaration, it is seen that it is being implemented by the State not by a Government company. 11. The writ petitions have been admitted during the year 1995 long prior to the passing of the award and interim stay had also been granted by this Court. In the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2, the same public purpose has been reiterated. The beneficiary or the requisitioning body for whose benefit the land is sought to the acquired took out an application to implead itself as one of the respondents. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation had taken out the said application and its Executive Director had sworn to the affidavit in support of his application. After referring to Sec.6 Declaration and while admitting that possession had not been taken, the said requisitioning body has stated that the purposes for which the land was originally sought to be acquired could not be materialised as the promoter had lost interest in the implementation of the tyre project and had withdrawn from the tyre project. The exact portion of the affidavit, which is material reads thus: “7. It may seem from the above that the completion of land acquisition formalities viz., passing the awards from the receipt of Government approvals for the land acquisition took more than 3 years and moreover, even after three years are over, the possibilities of getting the above land for the said project was totally uncertain and, therefore, the promoter had lost interest in the implementation of this tyre project and had withdrawn from the tyre project of Rs.400 crores.” 12. From this it is clear that the purpose of acquisition, namely, locating a tube and tyre factory either by the Government or by the Government company in joint sector no longer exists. Normally the purpose for which the land was required for a particular purpose should continue till vesting and land which vested with the State could be diverted for other user. But in this case, the land has not vested so far. Admittedly possession has not been taken. In terms of Sec.16, when the Collector has made an award under Sec.11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from encumbrance. But in this case, the land has not vested so far. Admittedly possession has not been taken. In terms of Sec.16, when the Collector has made an award under Sec.11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from encumbrance. Therefore, factually in the present case the land has not vested with the Government, only after vesting the State Government if at all could divert the usage of the land after the completion of acquisition and not at any time earlier to vesting. The public purpose for which the land was notified and declared ceased to exist even according to the 3rd respondent long prior to vesting and passing of award itself. Before completion of acquisition and vesting, the proposed tyre and tube project had been abandoned by the Government or the State undertaking as the promoter from U.S.A. had lost interest. Therefore, the public purpose ceased to exist. Hence, there could be no further proceedings or acquisition of the land. On this short ground as well, the declaration deserves to be quashed and there could be no continuation of further acquisition proceedings in this respect. 13. Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975)4 S.C.C. 285 , as well as Bagat Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 436 are all cases where the land has vested and, thereafter, there was a change of purpose or alteration of purpose. That is not the case here. When the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired, ceased and, therefore, even before vesting of the land there could be no change or alteration of public purpose at the whims and fancies of the respondents. It is well settled that: "(i) The Government has no right to change the public purpose in mid-stream. (ii) The State has no authority to change the original public purpose till the acquisition is complete. (iii) After the land has vested into it, the Government has a right to change the usage to which it may be utilised. (iv) It is essential that the State must adhere to the original purpose. (ii) The State has no authority to change the original public purpose till the acquisition is complete. (iii) After the land has vested into it, the Government has a right to change the usage to which it may be utilised. (iv) It is essential that the State must adhere to the original purpose. (v) It for any reason the State desires to deviate from the original purpose, it is incumbent upon the state to start the acquisition proceedings afresh." Factually in the present case when the acquisition proceedings were pending and even before the land vested in the state at the time of issuing a notice under Sec.9 or 10 or 11 or passing of the award, it had changed the public purpose. Such a change is illegal and not authorised by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. 14. A review of consideration of all the decided cases in this respect, the principle laid down being the Government must adhere to the original purpose and it cannot change the original purpose midstream and till the acquisition is completed and till the land vest with the State. Only after the land had vested in it, the Government has a right to change the user of the acquired land. As seen from the affidavit filed by the requisitioning body, namely, the beneficiary, the purpose ceased even before vesting, passing of an award and taking possession of the land. Once a Notification under Sec.4 has been issued and followed it with a Declaration issued under Sec.6, subsequent, change of public purpose is impermissible till vesting and, the land has to be acquired only for the notified purpose and the State must stick to the original purpose only. The State cannot change the public purpose from one to another at its sweet will or fancy as has been done in this case. The public purpose for which acquisition was started has been set out above in detail and the public purpose for which the 3rd respondent now seeks to take the land or proposed to utilise as disclosed by its counter affidavit is entirely different. The difference in purpose is admitted. 15. In this respect, the 3rd respondent in its counter affidavit has stated thus: "9. The difference in purpose is admitted. 15. In this respect, the 3rd respondent in its counter affidavit has stated thus: "9. In this context, TIDCO is planning to set up a rubber industrial park in Kanyakumari District enabling prospective entrepreneurs to set up rubber based industries in that park. The Rubber Park is an infrastructure development project for the growth of rubber and rubber wood based industrial sector in India. The project aims at developing infrastructure facilities for the setting up of 120 numbers of rubber and rubber wood based products manufacturing units with emphasis on export of the products. 10. The park is proposed to be set up at Shenbagaramanpudur village, Thovalai Taluk, Kanyakumari District, 200 acres of suitable land for establishing the park has been identified. After developing the land and establishing common infrastructure facilities in about 40 acres, about 160 acres will be allotted to entrepreneurs for setting up the units and common infrastructure facilities are to be developed. 11. I submit that the original outlay for creating infrastructure and facilities at the proposed industrial part is estimated at Rs.18 crores and the particulars of the different category of units envisaged to be set up in the park are as given under: Type of Units No. of Units (a) Extruded Products 24 (b) Calendered Products 6 (c) Moulded Products 60 (d) Beltings 6 (e) Tyres and Tubes 6 (f) Latex Products 12 (g) Rubber wood units 6 - Total 120- The investment by setting up the above industries is estimated at Rs.600 crores and the new industries to be set up in the industrial park will provide employment to about 10.000 persons. 12. I submit that the above project is proposed to be completed during the period of 2 years i.e., 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 and the park will be ready by April, 2001. TIDCO has also made an application to the District Collector on 5.7.1999 for acquiring additional land required for the Rubber Industrial park in the adjoining area of the land acquired for the tyre project. The above time schedule is possible, if the 25.04 hectares of land already acquired for the tyre project are made available to the rubber industrial project by September, 1999. The above time schedule is possible, if the 25.04 hectares of land already acquired for the tyre project are made available to the rubber industrial project by September, 1999. In view of the above, there is an element of urgency in seeking possession of the lands, the acquisition of which has been impugned in W.P. No.13423 of 1995 and W.P. No.16164 of 1995, as otherwise the State of Tamil Nadu may lose the investment opportunities to the extent of about Rs.600 crores by new projects to be set up in the above park and besides employment opportunities to about 10,000 persons. Hence, the above project is considered as strategically an important project for the State of Tamil Nadu." 16. Therefore as seen from the admitted statement made by the 3rd respondent, the purpose is changed even before completion of acquisition and vesting, which is impermissible in law. The purpose may be public, but the respondent has to start afresh and objections, if any, that could be raised depending upon the public purpose, which is notified under Sec.4(1) of the Act requires to be considered under Sec.5-A and at the stage of Sec.6 Declaration. Having issued a notification for a different purpose, the land cannot be acquired for a different purpose as admitted by the 3rd respondent. Hence, the acquisition in the present case cannot be continued and it deserves to be quashed. However, it is made clear that if the respondents require the land, it is open to them to proceed afresh by issuing a fresh notification under Sec.4(1) and thereafter proceed according to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of locating a Rubber Park. 17. The petitioner in W.P. No.13423 of 1995 contends that it is already using the land for a public purpose, namely, running a polytechnic. There is no dispute that the Polytechnic has been located and it is running for quite sometime. It is admitted that the Polytechnic requires the particular extent of land for getting permission, approval and recognition and the extent of land required is a continuing interest for the Polytechnic, which is a public purpose. That being so, it is not known as to how the respondents seek to acquire the land, which is being used for a different public purpose. That being so, it is not known as to how the respondents seek to acquire the land, which is being used for a different public purpose. If the land is acquired, the extent of the holding of the petitioner herein will get reduced, which may result in closure of the Polytechnic as the recognition or approval will be withdrawn. 18. In this respect, the decision of the Apex Court in Dharam Paul Goel (Decd.) represented by L.Rs. v. State of Haryana and others, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1800 was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the said case, the purpose for which the owner intended to sell is a public purpose, namely, to establish a school for the children of the locality. When the matter came up before the Apex Court, their Lordships directed the officer to be named by the respondents to make an inspection and submit a detailed report as to the actual land needed for the school building and for playground and to ascertain as to what is the reasonable extent of land is required to be released for the purpose of school and playground without causing any disturbance to the scheme already evolved, for which the acquisition was undertaken. In furtherance thereof, an inspection was made and a report had been submitted. Based upon the report, the Apex Court, while sustaining the requirement of a school to a limited extent, and as already limited extent has been detailed, disposed of the matter. 19. It is on the basis of this decision, it is sought to be contended that when the entire land is needed by the petitioner in W.P. No.13423 of 1995 as being used for a public purpose, namely, running of a Polytechnic, and the reduction of its holding pursuant to the impugned notification will in the result lead to closure of the Polytechnic and, therefore, the counsel for the petitioner is well founded in contending that already when the land is used for a public purpose, it shall not be acquired for a different public purpose, and more so when there are other adjacent lands, besides Government lands lying very near to the block of lands proposed to be acquired. There is no controversy in this respect. 20. A reply affidavit has been filed in this respect, which would show that other lands are available immediately in the locality. There is no controversy in this respect. 20. A reply affidavit has been filed in this respect, which would show that other lands are available immediately in the locality. The statement of the respondents that the Polytechnic could be shifted and located in other locality, is rather extraordinary as it is an existing institution, which requires to hold the minimum extent of the land, but for which the polytechnic has to be closed down as its recognition will be withdrawn and it is no longer possible for the Polytechnic to carry out the public purpose. 21. Nextly, it is contended that old Rule 3(b) and Rule 4 of the new rules has been violated. In this respect certain material as set out in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents 1 and 2 have to be referred. Sec.4(1) Notification was made by the Government on 19.5.1994. Sec.4(1) Notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 15.6.1994 and in two local dailies “(1) Kinnas Evening and (2) Kumari Murasu”, dated 29.7.1994. The said Notification was also published in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer, Collector’s Office, Nagercoil, Taluk Office, Thovalai and Sub-Registrars Office, Thovalai on 8.8.1994. Substance of Sec.4(1) Notification was published in the locality on 8.8.1994 by beat of “TOM-TOM” and also published in the field. A notice under Sec.5-A of the Act were served on the land owners on 19.9.1994 and 20.9.1994. 22. Sec.5-A enquiry was conducted on 6.10.1994, 7.10.1994 and 8.10.1994 as scheduled in the village office, Shenbagaraman-puthoor. On those dates, objections were filed on behalf of the petitioners. The objections were referred to the Executive Director, Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation, Madras, for remarks on 24.10.1994. On 19.1.1995, the Executive Director, TIDCO, the requisitioning body, offered his remarks and the same was communicated to the land owners on 19.1.1995. The petitioner was required to attend the enquiry on 20.2.1995. In the enquiry, the petitioner submitted objections. The objections and remarks of the requisitioning body were examined in detail and the site was again inspected by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer submitted proposals to the State Government and forwarded the entire file for issuance of Declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. 23. In the enquiry, the petitioner submitted objections. The objections and remarks of the requisitioning body were examined in detail and the site was again inspected by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer submitted proposals to the State Government and forwarded the entire file for issuance of Declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. 23. Sec.6 Declaration was issued on 3.8.1995 and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 4.8.1995, besides in the said above two dailies, namely, “Kinnas Evening” and “Kumari Murasu” dated 6.8.1995. The substance of the Notification has been published in the locality on 7.8.1995. These are the facts that could be culled out from the counter affidavit filed in W.P. No.16164 of 1995. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the proceedings of the Land Acquisition Officer under Sec.5-A of the Act. It is seen from the counter affidavit as well as from the Sec.5-A enquiry proceedings, Rule 4 had been complied with and the contention raised in this respect cannot be sustained. 25. Nextly, it was contended that the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification as well as Sec.6 Declaration in the said two dailies, namely, "Kumari Murasu" and Kinnas Evening" vitiates the acquisition proceedings and the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of P.Sathasivam, J., in Chelladurai, N. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000)3 C.T.C. 215 . It is true that the learned Judge had taken the view on the facts of the said case that the publication made in Kinnas and Kumari Murasu dailies is not in compliance with requirements of Sec.4(1) as they are not widely circulated. In the said decision, the learned Judge had taken such a view based upon certain supporting affidavits filed by the President of Kanyakumari District Newspaper Agents Sangam who had deposed that the two newspapers have no wide circulation in the locality where the land is situated. 26. This decision is sought to be distinguished by the learned counsel for the respondents on the facts of the case. The earlier acquisition, which was the subject matter of challenge in Chelladurai, N. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000)3 C.T.C. 215 relates to the 4(1) Notification of the year 1881 and declaration of the year 1992. The publication effected in that case was in "Kumari Murasu" and "Kinnas" and in the present case it is "Kinnas Evening" and "Kumari Murasu". The earlier acquisition, which was the subject matter of challenge in Chelladurai, N. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000)3 C.T.C. 215 relates to the 4(1) Notification of the year 1881 and declaration of the year 1992. The publication effected in that case was in "Kumari Murasu" and "Kinnas" and in the present case it is "Kinnas Evening" and "Kumari Murasu". It is pointed out that both the dailies are registered newspapers. They are published from Nagercoil, which is the District Head Quarters and Thovalai is very nearby Nagercoil. Being registered newspapers and they are local dailies, it is contended that the publication of notification in the two dailies will satisfy the requirement of Sec.4(1) of the Act. In this respect what Sec.4(1) requires is a Notification shall be published in the official gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which daily. One shall be in the regional language. 27. It is admitted that the two dailies are registered newspapers and they are published from Nagercoil, the Head Quarters of the District. Thovalai is within a short distance The district of Nagercoil, namely, Kanyakumari District is adjacent to Kerala, where the percentage of literacy is high when compared to neighbouring districts. What is required is publication in the daily newspapers circulating in that locality and it is not necessary that they should have wide circulation as is sought to be contended or suggested. 28. That apart, in this case, there is passage of time, which would show that the dailies are being published for a number of years. But for a reasonable circulation, the dailies could not have survived. The passage of time is sufficient to indicate that the two dailies are having sufficient circulation in the locality. Further, one of the newspaper is a different newspaper, namely, "Kinnas Evening". No material has been placed before the Court that during the material point of time, the two dailies have no circulation at all in the locality, namely, the place, village or town or Taluk where the land is located. Hence, on facts, this Court holds that the contention advanced cannot be sustained and factually the present case is distinguishable from the case Chelladurai, N. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000)3 C.T.C. 215 . 29. It is not necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench as on facts this Court is distinguishing this case. Hence, on facts, this Court holds that the contention advanced cannot be sustained and factually the present case is distinguishable from the case Chelladurai, N. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000)3 C.T.C. 215 . 29. It is not necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench as on facts this Court is distinguishing this case. It would be sufficient if the Notifications are published in dailies, which have a circulation in the locality and there should be a positive material before the Court to hold that those dailies have no circulation at all in the locality. This is lacking in the present case. Hence, the contention cannot be sustained. 30. One of the writ petitioner contends that it has located a brick industry at a heavy cost and that land shall not be acquired. It is not necessary to go into this contention as the acquisition is being quashed on other grounds. 31. Though other contentions have been advanced, it is not necessary to go into these contentions and it would be sufficient to allow the writ petition on one or more grounds. On the first contention, which this Court has already sustained, the impugned acquisition is liable to be quashed. 32. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned proceedings are quashed. Parties shall bear their respective costs. Consequently, connected W.M.Ps. are closed.