JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against the judge­ment of learned Single Judge in AA No. 2077 91 dated 27th of August, 1992, Whereby ob­jections under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbi­tration Act, (vide CMP NO. 417/91) have been rejected and consequently, the award of the arbitrator dated 26.01.1991 had been made rule of the court. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this case need to be noted. Respondent was allotted work of sanitary installation at centaur Lake view Ho­tel, at Srinagar to be completed by 15th of April, 1982. According to respondent, this could not be done as other agencies failed to perform their functions. At the time of hearing of the case, learned counsel for the parties were not at variances that the work instead of being completed in terms of the agreement was ex­tended by a further period of four years and was thus completed some where in the year 1986. 3. This resulted in a petition by the respond­ent for making a reference of dispute in terms of the arbitration Clause, existence whereof is also not in dispute between the parties; and this court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties on 11th of April, 1986, appointed two arbitrators namely R.D. Desai, Chartered Engineers and Sh. T.K. Saran, retired Advisor (Construction), Bureau of Public Enterprises Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, New Delhi, form amongst the list of arbitrators furnished by both the sides. They were directed to enter upon the reference and submit their award. 4. After entering upon reference, the Arbi­trators adjudicated the matter and on 12th of November, 1996, made an award in the sum of Rs. 3415383/- till full and final settlement of the claim of the repentant alongwith 15 % per annum interest with effect from January 25, 1984 till date of payment or decree, which ever was earlier. This award when filed in the Court was questioned on a variety of grounds and was questioned on a variety of grounds and was finally set aside on 09th of November, 1989. At the same time, Sh. Swami Dial, Re­tired Chief Engineer, CPWD was appointed as new arbitrator to submit his award. He after proceeding in the matter, on 26th of August, 1991 gave his award and thus held respondent entitled to Rs. 3628570.49 payable by the cor­poration appellant. At the same time, Sh. Swami Dial, Re­tired Chief Engineer, CPWD was appointed as new arbitrator to submit his award. He after proceeding in the matter, on 26th of August, 1991 gave his award and thus held respondent entitled to Rs. 3628570.49 payable by the cor­poration appellant. For paying this amount, two months time was allowed failing which it was held that interest will be payable at the rate of 18 % P.A. from the date of award (i.e. 26.08.91) till the date of payment or decree whichever is earlier. When this award was questioned un­der sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, by dismissing the objections, it has been or­dered to be made rule of the court. Hence this appeal. 5. With a view to appreciate me submissions properly, it is felt that the award of the arbitrator which is subject matter of controversy in this appeal needs to be extracted which is as under: "Award In the matter of Arbitration between M/S Northern Sanitation .... claimant And M/s Hotel Corporation of India Ltd. Name of work: Sanitary Installation of Centaur Lakeview Hotel at Srinagar. Whereas, the disputes between parties were referred to me vide order dated 09.11.1989 passed by Honble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in A.A. No. 403 titled M/s Northern Sanitation Vs Hotel Corporation of India. And whereas in pursuance to the order of the court. I entered upon the ref­erence and summoned the parties for appearance before me. During the course of arbitration proceedings, the parties filed their claims, counter claims, pro­duced documentary evidence as well as oral evidence, first hearing was held on 09.12.1989. Thirty five days hearings were conducted and the last was held on 14.08.1991. The high court of Jammu and Kashmir extended the time for making the award upto 31.08.1991 vide order dated 08.05.1991. And whereas after hearing the par­ties at length and considering their re­spective contentions raised before me as also their pleadings, documents placed on record and the evidence produced. The work of the claimant being of plumbing installation and the same was depend­ent upon the execution and completion of civil work, Marble work etc. I am of the opinion that the delay in execution and completion of the work is caused by the respondent. The work of the claimant being of plumbing installation and the same was depend­ent upon the execution and completion of civil work, Marble work etc. I am of the opinion that the delay in execution and completion of the work is caused by the respondent. The respondent has failed to fulfill their obligation under the contract and committed various breaches of the contract which are basic and go the root of it. AND NOW THEREFORE 1. Claim No. The claimant has claimed that amount in two parts i.e. under part (i) a sum of Rs.1989039.87 being expendi­ture incurred on labour upto 25.01.85, under part (ii) of the claim a sum of Rs.338650.00 is claimed. I award a sum of Rs. 2175000.00 under this claim to the claimant. 2. Claim No. 2. Under this claim the claimant has claimed a sum of Rs. 432134.00 on ac­count of expenditure on travelling (air,train/road), local conveyance, tel­ephones, expenses etc. from 16.04.82 to 25.01.85. I award a sum of Rs. 375000.00 to the claimant. 3. Claim No. 3. Under this claim a sum of Rs.29967.12 is claimed on account of insur­ance charges incurred by the claimant in obtaining the insurance Polices be­yond 16.04.1992.1 award a sum of Rs.29967.12 to the claimant. 4. Claim No. 4. Under this claim a sum of Rs. 18624.00 is claimed on account of Bank Guarantee charges incurred by the claim­ant in keeping Bank Guarantee alive be­yond 16.04.82. So I award a sum of Rs. 18624.00 to the claimant. 5. Claim No. 5 The claimant claimed a sum of Rs. 487243.00 towards refund of the amount of rebate recovered by the respondent upto21st R.A, Bill. I disallow this claim. 6. Claim No. 6 A sum of Rs. 495344.15 is claimed being the interest of Rs, 532579.75 from 16.04.72 and also the interest on the blocked amount of Rs. 150000/- being the margin money of Rs. 6 lacs bank Guarantee and Rs. 25000.00 being the margin money of Rs. 1 lac of the Bank Guarantee. I disallow the claim for Rs. 451258.40 but allow the amount of Rs. 44093.75 to the claimant. 7. Claim No. 7 A sum of Rs. 895939.62 is claimed by the claimant being the increase on all types of accessories and materials used in the work. I hold that the claimant is entitled to the claimed amount and I award Rs. 895939.62 to the claimant. 8. 451258.40 but allow the amount of Rs. 44093.75 to the claimant. 7. Claim No. 7 A sum of Rs. 895939.62 is claimed by the claimant being the increase on all types of accessories and materials used in the work. I hold that the claimant is entitled to the claimed amount and I award Rs. 895939.62 to the claimant. 8. Claim No. 8 Under this claim the claimant has claimed a sum of Rs. 532579.75 being the amount of the profit which according to the claimant would have been earned but because of prolongation of contrac­tual period, the same has been reduced to zero. I disallow this claim. 9. Claim No. 9 This claim was withdrawn by the claimant in arbitration proceedings with liberty to take it up at the final bill stage. 10. Claim No. 10 Under this claim a sum of Rs. 89946.00 being the certified payment of 23rd R/A bill is claimed. I hold there was no justification for not making payment of the certified 23rd R.A. Bill and I award the sum of Rs. 89946.00 to the claim­ant. 11. Claim No. 11 Under this claim interest is claimed by the claimant with effect from 16.04.82 @ 21 % per annum being commercial transaction. I award 18 % P.A. interest to the claimant from 01.02.85 to 19.12.89. COUNTER CLAIMS The respondent claimed a sum of Rs. 11845000.00 in three parts i.e. the revenue loss Rs. 91.75 lacs, profit loss Rs. 18.40 lacs and loss of interest Rs. 8.30 lacs. After considering the respective contentions of the parties, their plead­ing, documents placed on record and there evidence produce, I hold that the counter claims cannot be granted in as much as they are attributable to the de­lays caused by the respondent them­selves and disallow the counter claims of the respondent. Now therefore in consideration of the claim of the claimant and counter­claims of the respondents. I do Hereby made the publish my award that the re­spondents do pay to the claimant Rs. 3628570.49 (Rupees thirty six lacs twenty eight thousand five hundred sev­enty and paise forty nine only), in addi­tion to the interest awarded and the claimant do pay to the respondent ru­pees nil. I do Hereby made the publish my award that the re­spondents do pay to the claimant Rs. 3628570.49 (Rupees thirty six lacs twenty eight thousand five hundred sev­enty and paise forty nine only), in addi­tion to the interest awarded and the claimant do pay to the respondent ru­pees nil. Thus respondent is allowed two months time to make the payment fail­ing which interest will be payable at the rate of 18 % from the date of award till the date of payment or decree whichever is earlier. The parties will bear their respec­tive costs. Sd/- In witness whereof, I have signed this award at New Delhi this 26th day of August, 1991. Sd/- SWAMI DIAL, SOLE ARBITRATOR AND CHIEF ENGINEER (RETD.) CPWD PLACE: NEW DELHI, DATED 26TH AUGUST, 1991" 6. A perusal of the award clear shows that it is a case of non speaking award. As such, error has to be found out on its reading appar­ently or on the basis of the record that was before the Arbitrator. In this context, it may be appropriately observed that when objections against the award were filed under sections 30 and 33, those were duly replied to on behalf of the respondents and following issues were framed on 20th December, 1991:- 1. Whether the arbitrator has mis conducted himself and the proceed­ings? OP objector corporation. 2. Whether the award is invalid by person of its being non speaking one? 0 Objector corporation. 3. Whether the award is otherwise invalid on any other ground? OP objector corporation; 4. To what relief parties are entitled O.P. Parties. 7. Record of CMP 417/91 and A.A. 207/91 clearly suggests that no evidence was exam­ined by the appellant/objector before the learned single Judge in support of its objec­tions, with a view to show that the award suf­fers from error apparent on the face of the record and thus liable to be set aside. On a further reference to the record of proceedings before the learned single Judge it is also found that at the instance of the appellant a prayer was made to impound the award. Respondent paid the necessary penalty as well as cost of the req­uisite stamp and thus the matter did not pro­ceed further in that behalf. 8. On a further reference to the record of proceedings before the learned single Judge it is also found that at the instance of the appellant a prayer was made to impound the award. Respondent paid the necessary penalty as well as cost of the req­uisite stamp and thus the matter did not pro­ceed further in that behalf. 8. At the time of hearing of this appeal, clause 18 of the agreement entered into be­tween the parties was referred to which is in the following terms: "18-Time of completion: a. All time limits stated in the con­tract documents shall be the essence of the contract. The contractor obligates himself to complete the work in the re­spects within the time schedule stipu­lated in the special conditions subject to any adjustment that may be granted by the owner on the recommendation of the Architect in writing under the conditions of the contract. He shall submit to the Architect and owner detailed verified progress reports on the first and fifteenth of each and every month, b. A bar chart showing the programme o proposed construction within the scheduled time of completion is attached as appendix IV to this docu­ment. The contractor shall carefully study the bar chart and obligate himself to carry out the work in conformity with the vari­ous stages of completion as shown in the bar chart. c. Should the contractor be delayed or impeded in the execution of works by reason of: i. Force maje ro (See clause 48). ii. By the works or delays of other contractors or tradesmen engaged or nominated by the owner and not referred to in the contract documents. iii. The non delivery or delay in the de­livery to the contractor, of any materials or equipment or drawings which under the contract, the owner or the Architect is to supply; or iv. Any cause whatever, arising out of the acts or defaults of the owner or the Architect. v. Any accident happening to the works during their progress not arising from the neglect, default of the contrac­tor or his workmen or subcontractors; or vi. Extras or variations being ordered by the Project Engineer on recommen­dations of the Architect; or vii. Any cause whatever, arising out of the acts or defaults of the owner or the Architect. v. Any accident happening to the works during their progress not arising from the neglect, default of the contrac­tor or his workmen or subcontractors; or vi. Extras or variations being ordered by the Project Engineer on recommen­dations of the Architect; or vii. Any other cause which in the opin­ion of the Architect has caused delay, the contractor may from time to time, within 14 working days of the happening of any of aforesaid, apply in writing to the Architect for an extension of time on ac­count thereof, setting forth the cause of such application, d. The architect, shall, if he thinks the cause sufficient but not otherwise, write to the Owner for extension of time, the owner may extend the time for comple­tion of the works and the time for com­pletion of the works and the time for com­pletion of the works so extended, shall for all purposes of the contract be deemed the time specified for completion of the works. e. Unless the contractor shall apply for an extension of time within the period and the manner aforesaid, and unless and until the owner on recommendation of the Architect shall extend the time as afore­said, the contractor shall not by reason of any delay arising from cause afore­said, be relieved in anyway to any ex­tent from his obligations to proceed with, execute and complete the works within the time specified in the contract for the completion of the work, f. In granting extensions of time un­der this clause as aforesaid, it is an ex­press condition that there shall be no. claims whatsoever by the contractor." 9. As per this clause, owner i.e. the appel­lant had an agency of Architect who was to look into the work and time could be extended in terms of the said clause; however, it is an express condition that for delay there shall be no claim whatsoever by the contractor. 10. Sh D.S. Thakur, learned counsel appear­ing for the appellant, to be precise raised fol­lowing questions in this appeal; a. that despite direction of the court. Arbitrator has not given a speaking award and has thus mis conducted himself and the proceedings, therefore, the award in question is liable to be set aside. 10. Sh D.S. Thakur, learned counsel appear­ing for the appellant, to be precise raised fol­lowing questions in this appeal; a. that despite direction of the court. Arbitrator has not given a speaking award and has thus mis conducted himself and the proceedings, therefore, the award in question is liable to be set aside. By up holding the same, learned single Judge according to him has gravely erred; b. Despite being non speaking award, this court can still look into it and thus, set aside the same; & c. Award is contrary to as well as be­yond the terms of the agreement, there­fore, in no case it can be upheld. 11. Accordingly, he prayed for allowing this appeal and consequently, setting aside the award in question and remitting the matter for adjudication of the dispute between the par­ties to the Arbrator. 12. All these pleas have been controverted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing of the respondents who submitted that the judge­ment of the learned Single Judge calls for no interference as it is based on sound reason­ing. Besides this, he stated that the award is strictly as per terms and conditions of the agree­ment subject to which the work was allotted to his client; and further that neither the award nor the judgement off the learned Single Judge suffers from anything so as to warrant interfer­ence in these proceedings, it has further been stated by him that this being the case of non speaking award, and on its perusal no ground much less circumstances is made out calling for any interference, as such, he has prayed for dismissal of the appeal with costs and thereby upholding the judgement of the learned single Judge. 13. When a reference is made to the terms of agreement, no doubt clauses 18 (c) (iv) and 18 (e) clearly suggest that petitioner shall not be entitled to claim any compensation for any ground including delay. Fact remains that this is not only clause which is material for deter­mination of this case. 13. When a reference is made to the terms of agreement, no doubt clauses 18 (c) (iv) and 18 (e) clearly suggest that petitioner shall not be entitled to claim any compensation for any ground including delay. Fact remains that this is not only clause which is material for deter­mination of this case. In this behalf, the Arbi­tration clause under the heading of settlement of Disputes at page 46 of the General Condi­tions of the Agreement reads as under: "All disputes and differences of any kind whatever arising out of or in connec­tion with the contract of the carrying out of the works (whether during the progress of the works or after their completion, and whether before or after the determination, abandonment or breach of the contract) shall be referred to and settled by the Architect who shall state his decision in writing. Such decisions may be in the form of a final certificate or otherwise. The decisions of the Architect with respect to any or all of the following matters shall be final and without appeal: a. The variation or modifications of the design. b. The quality of quantity of works or the addition or omission or substitution of any work. c. Any discrepancy in the drawings or between the drawings and / or specifi­cations and scheduled of quantities, d. The removal and / or re-execution of any works executed by the contractor. e. The dismissal from works of any person employed thereupon, f. The opening up for inspection of any work covered up. g. The amending and making good of any defects under defects liability period, h. Acceptability of material, equipment and workmanship. g. The amending and making good of any defects under defects liability period, h. Acceptability of materials, equip­ment and workmanship, i. Materials, labour, tools, equipment and appurtenance necessary for the proper execution of work, j. Assignment and Sub-letting, k. Delay and extension of work. I. Termination of contract by the owner. g. The amending and making good of any defects under defects liability period, h. Acceptability of materials, equip­ment and workmanship, i. Materials, labour, tools, equipment and appurtenance necessary for the proper execution of work, j. Assignment and Sub-letting, k. Delay and extension of work. I. Termination of contract by the owner. But if either the owner or the contractor be dissatisfied with the decision of the Architect on any matter, question or dispute of any kind except the mat­ters listed above, then and in any such case, either party (the owner or the con­tractor) may within twenty eight days, after receiving notice to such decisions give a written notice to other party trough the architect requiring that such matters which are in dispute or difference of which such written notice has been given and no other shall be and is hereby referred to the arbitration and final decision of a single Arbitrator being a person who is a professional Engineer/Chartered Archi­tect Chartered Surveyor (Building and quantities / land surveying) to be agreed upon and appointed by both the parties or in the case of disagreement as to the appointment of a single arbitrator to the arbitration of two Arbitrators both being persons who are professional engineers /Chartered Architects/Chartered Survey­ors (building and quantities/Land Surrveying), one to be appointed by each party, which arbitrators shall, before tak­ing upon themselves the burden of refer­ence appoint an Umpire, who must also be a professional engineer/chartered Ar­chitect/Chartered Surveyor as described earlier. The Arbitrator, the Arbitrators or the Umpire shall have power to open up, re­view and revise any certificate, opinion, decision requisition or notice pertaining to the matter referred to them and to de­termine the same by his/their award. Upon every or any such references the cost of and incidental to the reference and award respectively shall be at the discretion of the Arbitrator or Arbitrators or umpire who may determine the amount thereof or direct the same to be taxed as between Attorney and client or as be­tween party and party, and shall direct by whom and to whom and in what man­ner the same shall be borne and paid. This submission shall be deemed to be submission to Arbitration within the meaning of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modifications thereof. The award of the Arbitrator or Ar­bitrators or the Umpire shall be final and binding on the parties. This submission shall be deemed to be submission to Arbitration within the meaning of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modifications thereof. The award of the Arbitrator or Ar­bitrators or the Umpire shall be final and binding on the parties. The owner and the contractor hereby also agree that ar­bitration under this clause shall be a con­dition precedent to any right of action under the contract. 14. Thus, a perusal of this clause clearly suggests that the decision of the Architect with respect to or any or the matters mentioned in this clause were to be final and without ap­peal. Matter relating to delay and extension of work is one of the factors. Further, this aspect of the case will be taken up while dealing with the points at b and c referred to in the pre­ceding paras. 15. So far the first point regarding miscon­duct of the arbitrator on account of not giving a speaking award is concerned, this is being taken first of all. With a view to advance this argument, Sh. Thakur placed reliance on the following observation of the court while refer­ring the dispute between the parties fro adjudi­cation by the Arbitrator namely Sh. Swami Dial, Retired Chief Engineer, CPWD, "It will be ap­preciated that the new Arbitrator give the award item wise of the claims and counterclaims pre­ferred by the parties and reasons for the same, if he deems proper". This, according to learned counsel would mean that the Arbitrator was bound to give reasons while giving his award in terms of the reference made to him on 09th of November, 1989 when objections against the earlier award dated 12th of November, 1986 were allowed. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly stated that the Arbitrator in law is required to give his award in case it is a condition of the Arbitration Agreement, or he was specifically and expressly called upon either by the par­ties, or by the reference order to do so, or the statute governing the same enjoined a duty by law upon the Arbitrator to give a speaking rea­soned award. Faced with the situation, he fur­ther stated that the observation of the court underlined here in above is to be treated as a mandate to the Arbitrator who was bound to give a reasoned award. With a view to advance his case, Sh. Faced with the situation, he fur­ther stated that the observation of the court underlined here in above is to be treated as a mandate to the Arbitrator who was bound to give a reasoned award. With a view to advance his case, Sh. Thakur placed reliance on a de­cision on the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Limited v/s In­dian Carbon Limited, AIR 1988 S.C. 1340. However, this matter need not detain in view of the subsequent decision of the constitution bench in the case of Raipur Development Au­thority etc. etc., V/S M/S Cholhamal Contrac­tors etc. etc., AIR 1990 S.C., 1426. What was held by the constitution Bench was in the fol­lowing: "Having given our careful and anx­ious consideration to the contention urged by the parties we feel that law should be allowed to remain as it is until the com­petent legislature amends the law. In the result we hold that an award passed un­der the Arbitration Act is not liable to be remitted or set aside merely on the ground that no reasons have been given in its support except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission or an order made by the Court such as the one under Section 20 or section 21 or section 34 of the Act or the statute gov­erning the arbitration requires that the arbitrator or the umpire should give reason for the award. These cases will now go back to the division bench for disposal in accordance with law and the view ex­pressed by us in this decision, order accordingly." 17. Thus, the plea that the award needs to be reasoned was not accepted. In the face of this position, the submission of Sh. Thakur cannot be accepted. 18. Another reason to take this view is that when reference was made to the above named Arbitrator namely Sh. Swami Dial, learned Judge had left it all to the discretion of the Arbitrator to give reasons if he deemed proper. In case it was felt that there had to be a mandate requiring the arbitrator to give reasons, there was nothing that prevent the Court to have is­sued positive directions in terms. Purposely no such direction was given. On the other hand, it was left for the arbitrator to decide whether he deems it proper to give reasons. In case it was felt that there had to be a mandate requiring the arbitrator to give reasons, there was nothing that prevent the Court to have is­sued positive directions in terms. Purposely no such direction was given. On the other hand, it was left for the arbitrator to decide whether he deems it proper to give reasons. That hav­ing not been done, by no stretch of imagina­tion, on examination of the aforesaid order or by reading down the same of any other princi­ple of interpretation it can be said that a duty was enjoined on the arbitrator to have given a reasoned/speaking award. In this view of the matter, point (a) is decided against the appel­lant. Reference in this behalf can also be made to the decision of M/s Kundale and Associ­ates V/S M/s. Konkan Hotels (P) Ltd. J.T. 1999 (2) S.C.55. 19. Now coming to the points b and c. Both these points are being taken up together since they are interrelated and the materials which age going to be referred to are common, as such, it will also avoid repetition. As noted immediately herein-above, after extracting the Arbitration clause that there was another au­thority namely Architect who could extend the time, he was to state his decisions writing. Such a decision of the Architect was final and it included as well as extinction of work under clause (k), Supra. 20. A reference to some communications on record clearly shows that architect did not give any opinion in the matter though respondent had referred its claims to the arbitrator (see letter dated 28th of March, 1985 at page c-83 in vol. II (i). Contents of this letter from Archi­tect addresses to the Director Development of the appellant corporation are in the following terms: "The Director Development Hotel Corporation of India, Ltd. The centaur Hotel Palam Airport Gurgaon Road, New Delhi 110037. Dear Sir, Centaur Lakeview Hotel, Srinagar Sanitary and Plumbing Installation. Please refer to Hotel Corpn. of Indias let­ter No. CDP/P PE-4914/1436 dated Feb­ruary 20,1985 and the earlier correspond­ence exchanged between Hotel Corp. of India, M/s Northern Sanitation. It is gen­erally understood that the work of sani­tary and plumbing Contractor would by and large depend upon the progress made by the Civil contractor. Please refer to Hotel Corpn. of Indias let­ter No. CDP/P PE-4914/1436 dated Feb­ruary 20,1985 and the earlier correspond­ence exchanged between Hotel Corp. of India, M/s Northern Sanitation. It is gen­erally understood that the work of sani­tary and plumbing Contractor would by and large depend upon the progress made by the Civil contractor. The work of the civil contractor has been delayed and extension of item for completion of work has been given to the civil contractor on our recommendation in consultation with HCI. The time of completion of the sani­tary and plumbing contractor had to be extended accordingly. The contractor has listed several rea­sons for the delay in the completion of their part of the work in the several let­ters addressed to HCI and ourselves. One of the reason advanced in the delay in handing over the site and the contractor as such has claimed idling of labour, additional expenditure on travel, over heads, increase in the price of ma­terials, increases in the price of materi­als, extra expenses for extending insur­ance cover and Bank Guarantees, etc. The contractor has quantified their claims in their letter Nos.NS:3852:85 dated 25th of January 1985 and NS: 2349 84 dated 29th February 1984 addressed to us copy to HCI/A5/510 Dated 6th March 1984. We reiterate that as in our opinion legal in­terpolation in the overall context of the provisions of the contract is necessary, we forward the matters raised by North­ern sanitation for consideration and nec­essary action at your end. 21. Similarly, some relevant correspondence which has bearing on the merits of this case is being reproduced herein below which in our opinion goes a long way to show that delay in question was abnormal and on the showing of the appellant, it was attributable to all other agencies except the appellant. Letter dated 22.04.85 from appellant to the Architect is the first communication. Relevant portions of this letter are asunder: "...We agree with your remarks that the responsibility for completion of work cannot be put squarely on the con­tractor, M/s Northern Sanitation. But, it would have been proper if you had clari­fied the position item wise based on our agreement dated 24.04.84 with the con­tractor, a copy of which was forwarded to you vide our letter No. HCI/CLVH/DD dated 26.04.1984 and then expressed your opinion as to what extent the delay is on the part of M/s Northern Sanitation vis-a-vis other agencies. ... ... in view of the above, we would request you to please review the case again and forward us your opinion indicating clearly the delay on the part of M/s Northern Sanitation and other agencies for each item of work mentioned in the agreement, immediately. Any delay on this account would affect our case in the arbitration and as such we would request you to accord highest priority to this letter." 22. Letters dated 15th of April, 1985 and 2nd of May, 1985 from the Architect are as under: "Please refer to your letter No. DD/ PF-4014 dated 25th February 1985 15th April. 1985 You have called our attention to your let­ter No. HCI/CLVH/DD dated 26th April 1984 and the agreement dated 25th April 1984 entered into between Hotel Corpo­ration of India and M/s Northern Sanita­tion. As per the above referred agree­ment to contractor was to complete work progressively in various areas and the entire work within 60 days of the date of the agreement i.e. by 24th June 1984. We have gone through the Minutes of various meetings held at site including those held on 26th May 1984:16th June 1984:18th June 1984/joint site inspec­tion report dated 26th June 1984 and meeting held at site on 5th September 1984 and subsequent site meetings. We have also taken note of contractors let­ters dated 3rd June 1984 and 24th June 1984 addressed to our office and 16th June 1984 addressed to the Managing director, HCI besides the correspondence between the project Manager and M/s Northern Sanitation. According to the above records the re­sponsibility for delay in completion of work cannot, in our opinion, be put squarely on the contractor. It is pertinent to note that spaces were not made available to the contractor so that he could finish entire work within 60 days of April 25, 1984. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would not be correct to say that M/s Northern Sanitation have com­mitted breach of agreement entered into between HCI and Northern Sanitation on 25th April 1984. 2nd May. 1985 Please refer to your letter No. DD/ PF-4014/1529 dated 22nd April, 1985. We have given careful considera­tion to your letter under reply including the various letters referred therein. Letter No. HCI/AS/842 dated 15th April 1985 was written by us after reviewing the whole situation and correspondence exchange between the parties. 2nd May. 1985 Please refer to your letter No. DD/ PF-4014/1529 dated 22nd April, 1985. We have given careful considera­tion to your letter under reply including the various letters referred therein. Letter No. HCI/AS/842 dated 15th April 1985 was written by us after reviewing the whole situation and correspondence exchange between the parties. As already communicated to you and also in view of the points and coun­ter points made by the concerned par­ties, it is our considered opinion that no breach of Agreement has been commit­ted by Northerner Sanitation with regard to the agreement dated 25th April 1984 entered into between HCI and M/s North­ern Sanitation. No further review as such on our part is necessary." 23. Other communications which further go to demolish and case of the appellant are also extracted herein below: "Hotel Corporation of India Ltd. Ref: HCI/CLVH/111/4760 dated 221 03/83 To M/s Amar Nath Charanji Lal Civil Engineers and Builders. Dear Sir, Subject: Civil Work at CLVH-Srinagar The following works may please be taken up on top most priority as it has hindering works of other agencies: Ad/-13.K. mattu Project Manager. Letter Dated 31.03.83 from project Manager HCIL to M/s Amar Nath Charanji Lal, Civil Engineer and Builders. You are once again requested to complete these works immediately as it is hindering the progress of other agen­cies. In addition your attention is invited to minutes of meeting held at site on 16.03.83 and 17.03.83. The progress on corridor flooring of wing 4 which you have started five days back is very slow. Simi­larly the progress on external develop­ment, title fixing and water proofing in toilets is very slow and has to be expe­dited.’ Letter dated 20.08.83 from project Man­ager HCIA to M/s Amar nath Charanji Lal Civil Engineers and Builders. We regret to notice that irrespec­tive of our repeated verbal request, your labour is not taking any care for the bath tubes while fixing the tiles around these tubes. This has resulted in spillage of cement mortar which has hardened in­side the tube inspite of protective layer given by the bath tub contractor. You are requested to advise your labour to pro­tect the tubs while working. It protect the tubs while working. It has been noticed that bags of cement and T & P are stored in tubs. This has resulted in spillage of cement mortar which has hardened in­side the tube inspite of protective layer given by the bath tub contractor. You are requested to advise your labour to pro­tect the tubs while working. It protect the tubs while working. It has been noticed that bags of cement and T & P are stored in tubs. Kindly note that any damage to the bath tubs will be your responsibility and in case the tubs are beyond repair the same will have to be got replaced at your cost. This is for your information and necessary action. Telegram dated 03.05.1983 from project Manager, B.K. Mattu to M/s Parry Ltd. Madras. "Please despatch your remaining Materials immediately" Telegram dated 04.10.83 from DPI. HCI to M/s Rajnagar Marble and Minerals In­dustries (P) Ltd. R-33 Ambe Niketan Chiya Marg Banipari-Jaipur. Refour Tel Dated 8th September and dis­cussions in Del on 16 Sept(.) Despite your assurances progress of work very slow (.) Other agencies work held up (.) Telegram dated 16.10.83 from project manager HCI-Sgr. to M/s Gemico (Gem Sanitary Co.) Attn Mr. Chander Shekhar (.) Despatch balance fittings immediately (.) All work held up on this account. Letter dated 10.01.84 from Project Man­ager HCI to M/s Amar nath Charanji lal Civil Engineers and Builders. This has reference to your site office let­ter No. AC: HP : 83-84/1458 dated 06.01.84. We do not agree with the contention of your letter... from the above it can be noticed that the delay in completion of the work is entirely due to non availabil­ity of adequate men and materials at site and can not be attributed to any other agency. You are once again requested to mobilise your resources i.e men and materials to avail of the unusual good spell of weather existing in the valley at present. We find that except for a few local carpenters and one painter, there is practically no lobour at site. Also no responsible site representative is avail­able to take day today instructions, look after the work. Letter dated 14.01.1984 from project Manager HCI to M/s Rajnagar Marble and Minerals Industries. "Tell date the marble has not reached site with the result that except for polishing work, your labour is idling. This is seri­ously hindering the inter connected work of all agenesis. Letter dated 01.02.1984 from project en­gineer, HCI to M/s Amarnath Charanji Lal Civil Engineers and Builders. "Tell date the marble has not reached site with the result that except for polishing work, your labour is idling. This is seri­ously hindering the inter connected work of all agenesis. Letter dated 01.02.1984 from project en­gineer, HCI to M/s Amarnath Charanji Lal Civil Engineers and Builders. Please be informed that the tilling of F block main floor toilet needs rectification and repair. Also you are requested to complete your work in requested to complete your work in toilets of F Block FF level attic floor level and service floor levels. Letter dated 09.02.84 from project man­ager HCI to M/s Amrnath Charanji Lal Building Engineers and Builders. We regret that there is hardly any action at your end to expedite the balance work rectification of defects mentioned in above quoted letters. The interconnected work of any agencies is getting hampered. Letter dated 21.02.84 from Project Man­ager, HCI to M/s Ranjnagar marble and Minerals industries. Wherein we have informed you that your labour has stopped working since 17.01.1984 and this is seriously hamper­ing the work f all interconnected agen­cies. Your labour contractor Mr. Mishra has also written to us on 17.01.84 that due to shortage of material and break down in cutting machine, he is topping work w.e.f. 17.1.84. Due to non availabil­ity of marble counters, the work of all agencies in wing 6, 7 10 and 11 and pub­lic areas toilets has come to a stand still. Letter dated 15.05.84 from B.K. Mattu Project Manager H.C.I to M/s Rannagar Marble and Mineral Industries. We regret to note that you are lagging behind in every activity as per the pro­gramme given by you. Materials for flooring and skirting and counters are not avail­able at site. This is hampering the work of every connected agency and ultimately delay the completion schedule of the project. Letter dated 01.06.84 from Project man­ager HCI to M/s Amarnath Charanji lal Civil Engineers and Builders. Your contention is not correct. All suites of wing 10 were lying vacant. In wing? only one suite was occupied by your men only. In wing 6, two suites were occu­pied by M/s Ahuja Furnishers and one by Orient Carpets and same have been got vacated since then days. It is incorrect to say that all the suites were occupied. Your contention is not correct. All suites of wing 10 were lying vacant. In wing? only one suite was occupied by your men only. In wing 6, two suites were occu­pied by M/s Ahuja Furnishers and one by Orient Carpets and same have been got vacated since then days. It is incorrect to say that all the suites were occupied. Please complete your work without further loss of time." Letter dated 04.09.84 from D.D..H.C.T. to M/s Stein Doshi and Balla, 5 Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. Please refer to various telegrams sent by our project Manager to M/s Rannagar Marble (Last such telegram being sent on 16th August 1984) with copies marked to you. We regret to state that so far there has been no improvement in the procurement as well as mobilization of additional man power and equipment on the part of the contractor to complete the job. This has resulted in not only delay in completion of M/s Rajnagar Marble Industries work, but is also coming in way of completion of activities of other contractors. We would-be thankful if you would look into the matter and ensure that M/s Rajnagar marble take up the matter seriously and complete the job on top prior­ity. In case the contractor fails to do this necessary recommendation should be sent from your off ice to us regarding cancellation of this contract and awarding the work to another suitable agency. An early action in this regard will be appreci­ated.’ Letter from Project Manager, HCI to M/s Amarnath Chirnji Lal Civil Engineers and Builders Dated 29.09.84 Dear Sirs, Please complete the water proofing work in remaining suites i.e. of wings 6,7,10 and 11 immediately as bath tubs in these areas are to be fitted. Telegram dated 5 November. 1984 to IW s Rajnagar Marble and Minerals Indus­tries from Project manager, B.K. Mattu. No work going on site (.) Labor fortiling suite does not working since last one week Hindering work of every connected agency (.) Rush additional labour to site and be present at site personally to com­pete your work (.) Your labour has no money and we have advanced five hun­dred rupees to your Mr. Ball for their daily expenses (.). Telegram dated 12-November 1984 to M/s Rajnagar Marble & Mineral Industries from Project Manger B.K. Mattu. Refer telegram dated 16 Nov. (.) No im­provement in labour position till date. Ball for their daily expenses (.). Telegram dated 12-November 1984 to M/s Rajnagar Marble & Mineral Industries from Project Manger B.K. Mattu. Refer telegram dated 16 Nov. (.) No im­provement in labour position till date. Rush labour immediately and be present personally (.) Have conveyed this mes­sage at your residence telephonically today (.) work of all agencies held up on your account (.) Letter dated 03.01.85 to M/s Stein Doshi and Bhalla, 5 Sunder Nagar, New Delhi from B.B. Bagga Director Development, HCI. Dear Sir, 1. Please refer your letter No. HCI/A3. 3/2567 dated 27.11.84 on the above sub­ject. 2. In this connection, you have rec­ommended that in view of the progress of work at site and assuraces offered by the contractor, the revised date of com­pletion of the above work be fixed as December 31, 1984, you have also men­tioned that the contractor has assured that the work could be further expedited if heating arrangement is provided in the working areas of HCI. In the context please clarify the follow­ing: a. Whether your letter under reference is for grant of extension of the contractor without imposing liquidated damages, if so, it may be clarified as to how it can be agreed to, since the entire project got delayed because of this activity, b. the assurances now offered by the contractor vis-vis his earlier assurances/ commitments. c. The status of work on December 31.12.1984. 24. Matter does not rest here only. Even the project Manager of the applicant has on 7th/ 8th of May, 1985 informed M/s Rajnagar Mar­ble and Minerals Industries that how could sanitary contactor fix the bath tubs in balance suites. The contents of this letter as an under: "Dear Sir, This has reference to your letter No. Nil dated 27.04.1985. It may please be noted that the balance work pointed out by you have since been completed by other agencies and you have started fixing marble tiles on both tub facing. It is not correct to say that these works were pointed out by you in December, 1984. How could the sanitary contractor fix the bath tubs in 6 Nos. balance suites (wings 7 & 10) or civil contract complete the brick work in front of bath tubs unless you had fixed marble tiles upto tub level last year. This work has executed by you only this year and hence the de­lay. How could the sanitary contractor fix the bath tubs in 6 Nos. balance suites (wings 7 & 10) or civil contract complete the brick work in front of bath tubs unless you had fixed marble tiles upto tub level last year. This work has executed by you only this year and hence the de­lay. Hope this clarifies the issue. Please com­plete your balance work in suites and public toilets immediately." 25. There are few instances to show that what could the respondent do when other agencies appointed by the appellant failed to make the site available. (These documents are in Vol. II (ii) and start form pages 27 onwards to page 50 marked in blue ink and as C-110 to C-131 of this volume. 26. In addition to this, respondent contractor had taken specific stand in its reply to these objections under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, filed by the appellant, explain­ing therein date wise as to how it was not a blame and delay was on the part of appellant and other agencies who were much behind the schedule. Documentary evidence extracted here in above clearly supports the plea of the respondents. 27. Despite all these factors, Sh. Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner persisted with vehemence that even if it is accepted that de­lay was on the part of the owner, i.e. the appel­lant as well as on the part of the other agen­cies who were engaged by his client for the completion of the project, still, appellant is not entitled to any relief whatsoever on account of work getting delayed. 28. In this behalf, it may be appropriate to observe that while tendering, contractor had furnished rates to the appellant keeping in view reasonable and normal delay depending upon so many factors. But then the question that needs consideration of the court is whether the delay when stretched beyond reasonable limits can be taken to the length and extent as was urged by Sh. Thakur? Answer be, No. Otherwise, it will result in absurdity. This is one reason not to uphold the plea of Sh. But then the question that needs consideration of the court is whether the delay when stretched beyond reasonable limits can be taken to the length and extent as was urged by Sh. Thakur? Answer be, No. Otherwise, it will result in absurdity. This is one reason not to uphold the plea of Sh. Thakur and thereby hold that for whatever reason the delay may occur as also for how so long it may be there, respondent was not entitled to any compensation for the same, particularly, when form the contemporaneous officials record, i.e. the communications exchanged between the appellant-owner and its Architect clearly establish that the delay was on the part of other agencies and not of the respondent and his opinion in that behalf was conclusive and did not call for any review in reply of appel­lants wanting that way. 29. Besides this, all disputes were referred to the Arbitrator who has after going into those has thereafter pronounced his award. Its those has thereafter pronounced his award. Its pe­rusal clearly shows that he has given item wise award, and has further taken into account pleadings of the parties, documents placed on the record and the evidence produced and has thus given the award. Under these circum­stances, it cannot be said that the award is either the result of non-consideration of the documents or evidence that was before the Arbitrator. 30. While considering An Arbitrators award, courts generally view it with an object to up­hold the same; unless of course it falls within the four corners of sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. Reason being that it is an ad­judication by a person of the choice of the par­ties outside the court in whom both of them repose confidence. It may also be observed that an Arbitrator is the master of quality and quantity of evidence and while examining the award, it is not for this court to go into the process of reasoning that weighed with the Arbitrator. It may also be observed that an Arbitrator is the master of quality and quantity of evidence and while examining the award, it is not for this court to go into the process of reasoning that weighed with the Arbitrator. Simply because the court would take another view of the matter can in no case be made a ground for setting aside the award given by an Arbitrator Thus, what follows from this is that with a view to set aside the award, fault, has to be found either in the award or it is to be based on the material which is there on the record so as to show that award is liable to be set aside. In the instant case, all the disputes were referred for adjudication to the Arbitrator. This included the question relating to the inter­pretation of the agreement which was within his power. Thus, we are of the view that this court would not examine the terms of agree­ment and thus, come to a different view. It is also by now well settled that where two views are possible, the court would not up-set the award? (See JT 1999 (7) S.C. 122 & 2001 (3) SCC 397). 31. The plea that the court can always look into a non speaking award and set aside the same, is a plea which cannot be accepted in the circumstance of this case. Arbitrator was required to give item wise award, that he has given after consideration of all the materials that was before him. In this behalf when a ref­erence is made to the documents before the Arbitrator, it cannot be said that the same suf­fers any error which may call for any interfer­ence in this appeal. 32. Similarly, the plea that award is contrary to the beyond the terms of agreement also cannot be accepted. In this behalf, it may be observed that admittedly, the architect ap­pointed by the appellant who was to give an opinion in the matter never decided such ques­tion including one relating to the extension of time. Secondly, there is enough documentary evidence to suggest that delay was abnormal on the part of the owner, i.e. the preset appel­lant as well as other agencies who were un-^ble to complete the work so as enable re­spondent to complete the part of the work al­lotted to it of the sanitary installations. 33. Secondly, there is enough documentary evidence to suggest that delay was abnormal on the part of the owner, i.e. the preset appel­lant as well as other agencies who were un-^ble to complete the work so as enable re­spondent to complete the part of the work al­lotted to it of the sanitary installations. 33. Admittedly, it was dependent on the com­pletion of the works allotted to other agencies who had filed to do the needful within the time allowed as well as within the extended period. Correspondence exchanged between the ap­pellant and its architect clearly suggests that the former wanted the architect to fix the re­sponsibility of delay on the respondent, but he (architect) declined in toe in line with the ap­pellant and refused to review its earlier opin­ion, relevant portion of the communication has been extracted herein above. No claim being _________ available to the respondents on account of delay cannot be stretched to the extent of infinity otherwise it will lead to a situ­ation for which there will be no end. Therefore, this contention urged on behalf of the appel­lant is hereby rejected. 34. Arbitrator has already interpreted the terms of the agreement in a particular manner. As already observed, simply because this court would take another view is no ground to substitute the same and prefer it over view of the arbitrator. In this context, it may also be noted that the reasoning given by the learned single Judge at page 12 of his judgement is reasonable and we find no reason to take a different view in this appeal. As such, in the face of this position we are in respectful agree­ment with the same. In addition to this, on examination of the record of this case, we find no reason to take a different view. 35. In Jivarajbhai Ujamashi seth and others V/s Chintamanrao Balaji and others, AIR 1965 S.C. 214, it was held that where the arbitrator assumed jurisdiction not possessed by him, the award was invalid and was thus, set aside. So far this proposition of law is concerned, learned counsel for this proposition of law is concerned, learned counsel for the respond­ent even did not dispute it. So far this proposition of law is concerned, learned counsel for this proposition of law is concerned, learned counsel for the respond­ent even did not dispute it. However, he pointed out that in the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act where on initial reference was made, claim set up on account of com­pensation for abnormal delay also stood re­ferred, and therefore, arbitrator after interpret­ing the clause of agreement has given its award. It cannot be said that he assumed ju­risdiction not possessed by him. As such, the award was not liable to be set aside. This is the conclusion that have also been arrived by us on examination of the whole case. As such, this decision has no applicability to the present case. 36. M/s Sudarshan Trading Co. V/s The Govt. of Kerala and another, Air 1989 S.C. 890 is a decision relied upon on behalf of both the sides. It deals with two aspects; one is that court cannot interfere with the award when reasons for the same are not given by the Arbitrator. A view that has been taken in the present appeal on examination of the whole matter including claim-set up under Section 20 of the Arbitra­tion Act on the basis whereof reference was made and which order admittedly has attained finality, following observation from the decision of the Supreme Court has material bearing on the present appeal: "31)... But, in the instant, case the court had examined the different claims not to find out whether these claims were within the disputes referable to the arbi­trator, but to find out whether in arriving at the decision, the arbitrator had acted correctly or incorrectly. This, in our opin­ion, the court had no jurisdiction do, namely, substitution of its own evolution of the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties, whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be paid or damages liable to be sus­tained was a decision within the compe­tency of the arbitrator in this case. By purporting to construe the contract the court could not take upon itself the bur­den of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond juris­diction. By purporting to construe the contract the court could not take upon itself the bur­den of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond juris­diction. It has to be determined that there is a distinction between dispute as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the dis­putes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. See com­mercial Arbitration by Sir M.J. Mustil and stewart C. Boyd page 84. 32)... It may be mentioned that in so far as the decision given that it was possi­ble for the court to construe the terms of the contract to come to a conclusion whether an award made by the arbitrator was possible to be made or not, in our opinion, this is not a correct proposition in law an the several decisions relied by the learned Judge in support of that propo­sition do not support this proposition. Once there is no dispute as to the con­tract, what is the in the interpretation of that contract is a matter for the arbitrator and no which matter for the arbitrator and on which court cannot substitute its own decision." 37. This decision squarely covers the case of the respondent and in no way advances case of the appellant. 38. In New India Civil Erectors (P) Ltd. V/s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, AIR 1997 S.C. 980, it was held that where there was express stipulations between the parties as to price being firm and not subject to any escalation till completion of work, a contractor was held not entitled to any escalation and award grant­ing such amount was held to be beyond the authority of the arbitrator. Again, there is no dispute with this legal proposition. It may also be incidental noted that in the absence of for­mal contract ______, arbitrator having construed relevant stipulations as contained in schedule to tender notice and correspondence between the parties and then award having been made, it was held that it calls for no interfer­ence. This is precisely the situation in the present case. State of J&K and another V/s Dev Dutta Pandit, AIR 1999 S.C. 3196 is another deci­sion relied on behalf of the appellant. This is precisely the situation in the present case. State of J&K and another V/s Dev Dutta Pandit, AIR 1999 S.C. 3196 is another deci­sion relied on behalf of the appellant. But, after having examined the same, we are of the view that it is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 39. In case M/s Krishan Kumar Madhok V/s Union of India, AIR 1982, Delhi 332, Division Bench while dealing with the power of the arbi­trator to grant interest held as under: "An arbitrator has power to award interest penden lite. Though S. 34 does not in terms apply, the arbitrator has the same power as the court has. The court can award pendentllite interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable. So can the arbitrator. Though no statue gives him that power the judicial decisions rec­ognize as of necessity that power in him as an implied term of reference. If the arbitrators award of interest is reason­able the law forbids the court to interfere with it". 40. To similar effect is a three judge decision of the Supreme Court in case of Hindustan constructed Co. Ltd. V/s State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1992 (4) S.C.C. 217. In this very de­cision, while allowing the appeal of he con­tractor and dealing with the question of mis­conduct under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, it was held, that in case of non speaking award, court cannot deduce reasons from the claims accompanying the award and examine whether those reasons were erroneous or not by placing its own interpretation on the relevant clauses of the contract. Reliance was also placed on a number of decisions of the Su­preme Court including that of M/s Sudarshan Trading Co. V/s The Govt. of Kerala and an­other (Supra). 41. In case Municipal corporation of Delhi V/ s M/s Jagan nath Ashok Kumar and another, Air 1987 S.C. 2316 it was held as under: "The reasonableness of the rea­sons given by an arbitrator in making this award cannot be challenged in a special leave petition. In the instant case, there was no evidence of violation of any prin­ciple of natural justice. In the instant case, there was no evidence of violation of any prin­ciple of natural justice. The arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as quantity of evidence and it will not be for the Supreme Court to take upon itself the task of being a judge of the evidence before the arbitrator it may be possible that on the same evidence the court might have arrived at a different conclu­sion that the one arrived at by the arbi­trator but that by itself is no ground for setting aside the award of the arbitrator". 42. This is what exactly the appellant wants this court to do by substituting its view for that of the arbitrator. 43. In case Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. V/s Union of India, 1969 (1) Arbitration law Reporter 306, Supreme Court took a view that the court cannot reexamine the merits of the award with regard to the materials produced before the Arbitrator. It cannot sit in appeal over the views of the Arbitrator. Its jurisdiction is limited to the grounds available under the Arbitration Act. The appeal was allowed with costs in this case after holding so. 44. In case B. V. Radha Krishana V/s Sponge Iron India Ltd., (1997) 4 SCC 693 it was held that High Court has no jurisdiction se aside an award by substituting its own view in place of Arbitrator. 45. In a case before the Bombay High Court, Union of India V/s M/s Shyam Charan Agarwala and Sons, Arbitration petition No. 86 of 1995 in Award No. 233 of 1994, Arbitrator gave his award against certain items. Condition No. 11 (C) in this agreement was like the one for com­pensation being not claimable in this case which is extracted herein below: "Clause 11 (C) was under: No claim in respect of compensa­tion of or otherwise howsoever arising as a result of extensions granted under con­ditions A and B above shall be admitted, 46. While upholding the objections of the Union of India liability of the petitioners to pay the amount in respect of claim No. 8 and inter­est pendent lite and future thereon was set aside and the rest of the award was upheld. This matter was taken up in appeal by the con­tractor, being Appeal No. 1249 of 1996. The appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the court. 47. This matter was taken up in appeal by the con­tractor, being Appeal No. 1249 of 1996. The appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the court. 47. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision, contractor filed petition for Special leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 5757/98, which was allowed on 7th of September, 1998 in the following terms: "... In view of the decision of this court in K.R, Ravindran V/s State of Kerala (1996(10) SCC 36, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgement and order of the High Court is set aide. There will be, therefore, a decree also in respect of claim No. 8 of the award." 48. Review petition was filed against this Judgement by the Union of India vide review petition No. Civil 2243 of 1998 which was dis­missed on 12th March, 1999. Only correction made was regarding citation of the case of K.R. Ravinderan V/s State of Karala as 1998 (9) S.C.C. 410. Net result of this all was that the award made by the arbitrator was upheld in­cluding that of interest by the Supreme Court while setting aside the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High court. This is a decision nearer to the facts of the present case where almost identical clause existed in the agreement before the Bombay High Court as in the present case extracted herein a above. 49. In case P.V. Subba Naidu V/s Govt. of A.P. And ors., (1998) (9) Supreme Court Cases 407 While examining the arbitration clause like the present one, it was held as under: "3. In the judgements which are under appeal in these appeals, the approach of the High Court has been similar. The High Court has examined the terms of the contract and has been similar. The High Court has examined the terms of the contract and has come to conclusion that on the interpretation of the contract, the claims which were raised before the ar­bitrators would not arise under the con­tract itself and hence they were beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 5. In the present case all the claims in question were expressly refereed to arbitrator and were raised before the ar­bitrator. The High Court was, therefore, not right in examining the terms of the contract or interpreting them form the purpose of deciding whether these claims were covered by the terms of the con­tract. 7. 5. In the present case all the claims in question were expressly refereed to arbitrator and were raised before the ar­bitrator. The High Court was, therefore, not right in examining the terms of the contract or interpreting them form the purpose of deciding whether these claims were covered by the terms of the con­tract. 7. Learned counsel for the state of Andhra Pradesh placed strong reliance on the judgement of this court in the case of Ch. Ramalinga Reddy vs. Superin­tending Engineer 4. In that case the ar­bitrator was required to decide the claims referred to him, having regard to the con­tract. His jurisdiction was expressly lim­ited to decide claims under the terms of the contract. The court, therefore, exam­ined various items of the contract. The court therefore, examined various terms of the contract to see whether the appel­lant was barred form considering any part of the claim on account of any express prohibition in the terms of the contract to that effect. In the present case we have not been shown any clause of the con­tract which prevents the arbitrator form examining the claims which were put up before the arbitrator." 50. While dealing with a matter relating to the construction of contract matter in the case of K.R. Raveendranathan V/s State of Kerala, (1998) 9 supreme court cases 410, it was held asunder: "The Learned counsel for the appellant points out that the question in issue in the present appeal is squarely covered by the decision of this court Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. V/s State of J&K. In particular, it draws our attention to para 10 of the judgement and the portion extracted from the decision in Sudarsan Trading Co. case 2 wherein it was said that by purporting the con­strue the contract the court could not take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. That is exactly what the court has done in the instant case, therefore, the issue stands covered by this decision and the learned counsel for the respondents court not in the face of this decision argue otherwise." 51. In HP. That is exactly what the court has done in the instant case, therefore, the issue stands covered by this decision and the learned counsel for the respondents court not in the face of this decision argue otherwise." 51. In HP. State electricity board V/s R.J. Shah and company, (1999) 4 S.C.C. 214, it was held that in case of the non reasoned award, if it is made in excess of the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, then it is liable to be set aside; but if it is within his jurisdiction on the basis of construction of contract which the arbitrator was required to do, so then the court cannot set it aside merely because another view was possible. And test to determine whether the arbitrator acted in excess of his jurisdiction was that court has to examine certain docu­ments including the contract and reference of the dispute to the arbitrator for the limited pur­pose of determining whether the arbitrator had the jurisdiction or not. After applying these tests to the facts of that case, it was held that the award was not in excess jurisdiction of the ar­bitrators. 52. In M/s Kundel and associates V/s M/s Konkan Hotels (P) Ltd. JT 1999 (2) S.C. 556, while finding a legal misconduct in case of non-speaking award, when here was no condition to give reasoned award, Arbitrator having con­sidered evidence both oral and documentary and having visited the site himself, to these facts on application of mind by him (Arbitra­tor), it was held by S.C., that there was no misconduct or non-application of mind. 53. In M/s Arson Enterprises Ltd. V/s Union of India and anr., JT 1999 (7) S.C. 122, while dealing with the objections, it was reiterated that in the event of two view being possible on the question of law, court would not be justi­fied in interfering with the award. Similarly er­ror apparent on the face of award does not give any right to examine reasoning of view of the arbitrator. It was held that reappraisal of the evidence by court was not permissible where the award was based on the appreciation of material on record. Relevant portions of this judgement are as under: "35. Similarly er­ror apparent on the face of award does not give any right to examine reasoning of view of the arbitrator. It was held that reappraisal of the evidence by court was not permissible where the award was based on the appreciation of material on record. Relevant portions of this judgement are as under: "35. Be it noted that by reason of a long catena of cases, it is now a well settled principle of law that reappraisal of evidence by the court is not permissi­ble and as a matter of fact exercise of power by a court to reappraise the evidence is unknown to a proceeding under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. In the event of there being no reason in the award, question of interference of the court would not arise at all. In the event, how­ever there are reasons, the interference would still be not available within the ju­risdiction of the court unless of course, there exist a total perversity in the award or the judgement is based on a wrong proposition of law: In the event however two views are possible on a question of law as well, the court would not be justi­fied in interfering with the award. 36. The common phraseology error ap­parent on the face of the record does not itself, however, mean and imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record: The Court as a mat­ter of fact, cannot substitute its evalua­tion and come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bar­gain between the parties. If the view of the arbitrator is a possible view the award or the reasoning contained therein can­not be examined. In this context, refer­ence maybe made to one of the recent decision of this court in the case of State of Rajasthan V/s Pur Construction Co. Ltd. JT 1994 (6) SC 412 whether in this court relying upon the decision of Sudarshan Trading Co.s case (Sudarshan Trading Co. V/s Govt, of Kerala and Anr. JT 1989 (1) Sc 339 ob­served in paragraph 31 of the report as below: Account of competent jurisdiction has both right and duty to decide the lis pre­sented before it for adjudication accord­ing to the beset understanding of law and facts involving in the lis by the judge pre­siding over the court. V/s Govt, of Kerala and Anr. JT 1989 (1) Sc 339 ob­served in paragraph 31 of the report as below: Account of competent jurisdiction has both right and duty to decide the lis pre­sented before it for adjudication accord­ing to the beset understanding of law and facts involving in the lis by the judge pre­siding over the court. Such decision even if erroneous either in factual determina­tion application of law correctly, is a valid one and binding inter parts. It does not, therefore, stand to reason that the arbi­trators award will be per se invalid and inoperative for the simple reason that the arbitrator has failed to appreciate the facts and has committed error in appreciating correct legal principle in basing the award. An erroneous decision of the court of law is open to judicial review by way of ap­peal or revision/in accordance with the provisions of law. Similarly, an award ren­dered by an arbitrator is open to chal­lenge within the parameters of several provisions of the arbitration Act. Since the arbitrator is a judge by choice of the parties and more often than not a person with little or no legal background, the adjudication of disputes by an arbitration by way of an award can be challenged only within the limited scope of several provisions of the Arbitration Act and the legislature in its wisdom has limited the scope and ambit of challenge to an award in the arbitration Act. Over the decades, judicial decisions have indicated the pa­rameters of such challenge consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. By and large the court have dis-favoured interference with arbitration award on account of error of law and facts on the score of misappropriation and misread­ing of the materials on record and have shown definite inclination to preserve the award as far as possible. As reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substan­tial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award does not get undesirable immunity. As reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substan­tial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award does not get undesirable immunity. In recent times, error in law and fact in basing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of "legal misconduct” of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpe­trate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. It is nec­essary, however, to put a note of caution that in the nicety to render justice to the party to arbitration, the court should not reappraise the evidence intrinsically with a close scrutiny for finding out. That the conclusion drawn from some fact, by the arbitrator is, according to the understand­ing of the court, erroneous. Such exer­cise of power which can be exercised by an appellate court with power to reverse the finding of fact, is a line to the scope and ambit of challenge of an award un­der the Arbitration Act. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstra­ble without the necessity of carefully . weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with award based on er­roneous finding of fact is permissible. Similarly, if an award is based by apply­ing a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle. The award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. Similarly, if an award is based by apply­ing a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle. The award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In ultimate analy­sis it is a question of delicate balancing between the permissible limit of error of law and fact and patently erroneous find­ing easily demonstrable from the materi­als on record and application of principle of law forming the basis of the award which is patently erroneous it may be indicated here that however objectively the problem may be viewed, the subjec­tive element inherent in the judged de­ciding the problem, is bound to creep in and influence the decision by long train­ing in the art of dispassionate analysis, such subjective element is, however, re­duced to minimum keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, the challenge to the validity of the impugned award is to be considered with reference to judicial de­cisions on the subject. 37. It is on the basis of this well settled proposition that the learned single Judge came to a conclusion that the findings of the Arbitrators in regard to the extension of delivery period and failure to fix the fresh date has resulted in breach of the contract on the part of the government and the same being purely based on ap­preciation of material on record by no stretch it can be termed to be a error apparent on the face of the records enti­tling the court to interfere. The Arbitra­tors have in fact, came to a conclusion on a closer scrutiny of the evidence in the matter and reappraisal of the evidence by the court is unknown to a proceeding under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. Re appreciation of evidence is not per­missible and as such we are not inclined to appraise the evidence ourselves save and except what is noticed hereinbefore pertaining to the issue as the time being the essence of the contract. In this con­text, reference may be made to a deci­sion of this court in the case of M. Chellapan V/s Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and another (1975 (1) SCC 289). Methew, J. Speaking for the three Judge Bench in paragraph 12 and 13 observed as below: 12. In this con­text, reference may be made to a deci­sion of this court in the case of M. Chellapan V/s Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and another (1975 (1) SCC 289). Methew, J. Speaking for the three Judge Bench in paragraph 12 and 13 observed as below: 12. The High court did not make any pronouncement upon this question in view of the fact that ti remitted the whole case of the arbitrators for passing fresh award by its order. We do not think that there is any substance in the contention of the board. In the award, the umpire has re­ferred to the claims under this head and the arguments of the Board for disallow­ing the claims under this head and the arguments of the board for dis-allowing the claim and then awarded the amount without expressly adverting to or decid­ing the question of limitation. From the findings of umpire under this head it is not seen that these claims were barred by limitation. No mistake of law appears on the fact, that is no ground for chal­lenging the validity of the award. It is only when a prosecution of is stated in the award and which is the basis of the award, and that is erroneous, can the ground of error of law apparent on the face of the record: Where an arbitrator makes a mis­take either in law or in fact in determin­ing the matters referred, but such mis­take does not appear on the face of the award, the award is good not withstand­ing the mistake, and will not be remitted or set aside. The general rule is that, as the parties choose their own arbitrator to be the judge in the disputes between them, they cannot, when the award is good on its face, object to his decision, either upon the law or the facts. (See russell on Arbi­tration, 17th Ed. P.322). 13. An error of law on the face of the award means that you can find in the award or a document actually incorpo­rated thereto, as for instance, a note ap­pended by the arbitrator stating the rea­sons for his judgement, some legal propo­sition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous (See Lord Dunedin in Champsey Ehara & Co. Vs Jivraj Baloo Co.). Vs Jivraj Baloo Co.). In Union of India V/ s Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. This Court adopted the proposition laid down by the privy council and applied it. The court has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to exam­ine the documentary and oral evidence on the record for the purpose of finding out, whether or not he arbitrator has com­mitted an error of law." 54. In case Paradip Fort Trust and others V/ s Unique Builders, (2001) 2SCC 680, What was held and is relevant for the present case was in the following terms: "11. From several decisions of this court and the previsions contained in the act, it is clear that generally on award passed by the arbitrator is considered binding between the parties for the rea­son that the parties selected the arbitra­tor and powers of the court to set aside the award are restricted to cases set out in section 30 of the Act. It is not open to the courts to guess or speculate reasons for the award, when it is non reasoned. Courts cannot attempt to investigate the mental process by which the arbitrator arrived at conclusion where it is not vis­ible from the award. The jurisdiction of courts including High Courts is not inde­pendents of the statue. The arbitrator’s award is final both on facts as well as law. There is no appeal from his verdict. However, an award can be set aside only in situations specified in sections 30 and 33 of the Act. In the light of law already settled by this court, we consider it un­necessary to cite loneliest of decisions in this regard. We will refer to few of them including those relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions, hereinafter. 12. In the light of law already settled by this court, we consider it un­necessary to cite loneliest of decisions in this regard. We will refer to few of them including those relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions, hereinafter. 12. In Javarajbji Ujamshi Sheth V. Chintamanrao Balaji 1 this court in AIR para 18, has stated that: An award made by an arbitrator is conclusive as a judgement between the parties and the court is entitled to set aside an award if the arbitrator has mis conducted himself in the proceedings or when the award has been made after the issue of an order by the court super­seding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Sec. 35 of the arbitration Act or where an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid (section 30 of the Arbitration Act). An award may be set aside by the court on the court on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely be­cause by a process of inference and agreement it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mis­take in arriving at his conclusion." 13. This Court in puri Construction (P) Ltd. V/s Union of India 2 has taken the view that: (SCC p.415, para?) "Even on accepting the suggestion and interpreting the objection petition of the respondent liberally, the decision of the High Court cannot be maintained. When a court is called upon to decide the objections raised by a party against an arbitration award, the jurisdiction of the court is limited, as expressly indi­cated in the Arbitration Act, and it has no jurisdiction to sit on appeal and ex­amine the correctness of the award on merits. 14. This court in State of Orissa V/s Lail Bros. 3 had held that the fact that there is a non-reasoned award, is no ground to set it aside and that lump sum award is not had per se, as such. 18. The learned counsel for the com­pany pointed out that the High Court, placing reliance on the judgement of this court in Executive Engineer (irrigation). Abhaduta Jena denied interest pendente lite. But in a subsequent decision by the constitution bench of this court in secy., Irrigation Deptt. 18. The learned counsel for the com­pany pointed out that the High Court, placing reliance on the judgement of this court in Executive Engineer (irrigation). Abhaduta Jena denied interest pendente lite. But in a subsequent decision by the constitution bench of this court in secy., Irrigation Deptt. Govt, of Orissa V.G.C. Roy it is held that the decision in Abhaduta Jena case 7 did not lay down good law on this aspect. The constitu­tion bench decided the case on 12.12.1991. The impugned order of the High Court was passed on 25.08.1992. We agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the company as to the power of the arbitrator to award inter­est pendente lite. However, the High Court having denied the interest on ground that there was no claim for interest pendente lite before it nor any argument was ad­vanced in that behalf was are not inclined to upset that part of the order of the High Court in relation to denial of interest to the company. However, we do not find good ground or valid reason to deny further interest from the date of the decree to the company. Hence, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we consider it just and appropriate to award future interest at the rate of 12 % per annum from the date of decree till payment. The award of interest from 28.09.82 to 10.01.1985 was justified by the High Court in the impugned judge­ment. The contention that there was no basis for choosing the date 28.09.1982 is answered in the judgement of the High Court itself stating that it was on 28.09.82 that the trust repudiated the contract and forfeited the deposit made by the com­pany and that the arbitrator entered into reference on 10.01.1985. We agree with the reasons recorded by the High Court in this regard. Further as already noticed above, the award is made in lump sum. As rightly observed by the High Court, unless there appears to be a mistaken on the face of the award and the docu­ments appended or incorporated thereto which form past of he award, it cannot be set aside even with respect to interest part of it. Further as already noticed above, the award is made in lump sum. As rightly observed by the High Court, unless there appears to be a mistaken on the face of the award and the docu­ments appended or incorporated thereto which form past of he award, it cannot be set aside even with respect to interest part of it. In this view of the matter, we hold that the company is entitled for interest @ 18 % per annum from 28.09.82 to 10.0185 and further interest @ 12 % per annum from the date of decree till payment." 55. One of us, Goel (J), while dealing with the objections under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act in case M/s U.K. Plastic Udyog V/s New India Assurance Co. Ltd., A.A. No. 156/96, while dismissing the objections on 30.12.1999, made the award rule of the court together with interest at the rate of 18 % per annum. 56. On the overall examination of the whole case, are satisfied that the appellant cannot be permitted to say that where the delay was abnormal as in the present case, still respond­ent was not entitled to claim any compensa­tion. The decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Shyama Charana Agarwala V/s Union of India (Supra); is a complete an­swer to this. In addition to this, that situation was only to come when the Architect had given his decision on the question of extension. There was nothing brought to our notice on behalf of the appellants in that behalf. Still such a deci­sion could be questioned again in the manner in terms of the clauses extracted here in above. Therefore, in this court also the grievance of the appellant cannot be accepted. 57. No other point is urged. 58. From whatever angle the case of the ap­pellant may be perused, it has not merit and thus the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is ordered accordingly. Costs on the parties. 59. We are told that in terms of the order of the court, awarded amount after it was depos­ited in the registry, has been released in favour of the respondent on furnishing a bank guaran­tee. Since the appeal has been dismissed, as such, Bank guarantee shall stand discharged if it is still in force.