Judgment :- K.Narayana Kurup, J.: These Letters Patent Appeals are directed against the common judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in A.S.Nos.446 of 1986 and 923 of 1988, confirming the judgment of the trial Court with a slight modification towards interest. 2. Thebrief facts necessary for disposal of these appeals are as follows: The appellant herein figured as plaintiff in O.S.No.38 of 1984, in which the respondent- Panchayat herein figured as defendant. That suit was one for declaration that Ex.A-3 agreement, entered into between the appellant and the respondent for enjoyment of the usufructs of trees, has become unenforceable on account of unprecedented drought of a sweeping nature and for an injunction, restraining the respondent from claiming any amount due from the appellant under Ex.A-3 and further for the recovery of a sum of Rs.21,610 said to have been paid by the appellant to the respondent in excess of what could be actually due under Ex.A-3 agreement. In O.S.No.18 of 1984, the respondent-Panchayat figured as plaintiff. That was a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.1,06,000 from the appellant with principal and interest, being the arrears of instalments due from the appellant under Ex.A-3. Both the suits were clubbed together and a common judgment was passed, dismissing the appellants suit (O.S.No.38 of 1984) and decreeing the respondents suit (O.S.No.18 of 1984). 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments, as confirmed by this Court, the defendant has preferred these two appeals before this Court as L.P.A.Nos.50 of 2001 and 51 of 2001. L.P.A.No.50 of 2001 is directed against A.S.No.446 of 1986 and L.P.A.No.51 of 2001 is directed against A.S.No.923 of 1988. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant in extenso, we are not persuaded to interfere with this judgment impugned in these appeals. It is on record that the appellant has entered into Ex.A-3 agreement with eyes wide open regarding the climatic and weather conditions prevailing in the area. The crux of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that since he was prevented from collecting the usufructs from the property in question covered by Ex.A-3 on account of adverse seasonal conditions, the trial Court went wrong in dismissing his suit and decreeing the suit preferred by the respondent. The crux of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that since he was prevented from collecting the usufructs from the property in question covered by Ex.A-3 on account of adverse seasonal conditions, the trial Court went wrong in dismissing his suit and decreeing the suit preferred by the respondent. In support of this contention, the learned counsel brought to our notice Ex.B-17, report of the Tahsildar; Ex.B-19, report of the Revenue Inspector and Ex.C-1, report prepared by the Advocate Commissioner. Adverting to the above, learned single Judge has observed that these reports do not mention anything about the effect of drought on other trees namely, Mango trees, Jack trees, Guava trees etc. According to the learned single Judge, the evidence adduced on the side of the appellant only shows that there was some adverse seasonal condition for a limited period of about six months from October, 1982, till March, 1983. The specific finding rendered by the learned single Judge is that the evidence and the reports of the Tahsildar nd the Revenue Inspector are not sufficient enough to come to a conclusion that there was total failure of yield from the trees in question. In that view, the learned single Judge negatived the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that he was prevented from deriving any income at all from the property in question for the relevant period in 1983. Even assuming for a moment that there was drought, it was only for a limited period namely from October, 1982, till March, 1983. In that case, we expect the appellant to bring the factum of drought to the notice of the respondent at the earliest point of time and to get himself relieved for the obligations arising out of Ex.A-3. Admittedly, that has not been done. On the other hand, we find that the appellant has chosen to remain in possession of the property covered by Ex.A-3 for the entire period from 1.4.1982 to 31.3.1985. Having taken the usufruct for the entire period, it is too late in the day for the appellant to contend that he may be exonerated from payment of the amount due under Ex.A-1 on the pretext of the alleged adverse seasonal condition. Having taken the usufruct for the entire period, it is too late in the day for the appellant to contend that he may be exonerated from payment of the amount due under Ex.A-1 on the pretext of the alleged adverse seasonal condition. That apart, we take note that Ex.A-3 is an unconditional lease and in the case of unconditional lease, where the undertaking to pay rent is absolute, the destruction of crops by an act of God like tempest or cyclone would not frustrate the contract, vide: Sri Parimala Ranganathaswami Devasthanam, Tiruvilandur v. S.Muthuswami Iyer vide: Sri Parimala Ranganathaswami Devasthanam, Tiruvilandur v. S.Muthuswami Iyer vide: Sri Parimala Ranganathaswami Devasthanam, Tiruvilandur v. S.Muthuswami Iyer (1962)2 MLJ. 203 . In a decision reported in Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Harmohinder Singh and another Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Harmohinder Singh and another Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Harmohinder Singh and another (1968)3 S.C.R. 339 it has been held by the Apex Court that where the property leased is not destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit, the lessee cannot avoid the lease even if he does not or is unable to use the land for purposes for which it is let to him. In a decision reported in H.V.Rajan v. C.N.Gopal and others H.V.Rajan v. C.N.Gopal and others H.V.Rajan v. C.N.Gopal and others 1975 S.C.R. 261 the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of frustration can only be applied if the contract is an executory contract and not one which has created a demise in praesenti. 5. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are not persuaded to interfere with the judgment impugned in these appeals. Accordingly, we confirm the same and dismiss the appeals. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.Ps. are also dismissed.