P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE revision is filed under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by the unsuccessful defendant as against the judgment and decree in SC No. 30/96 dated 12-2-1999 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur. ( 2 ) FOR the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to as arrayed in the suit. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff filed the above suit against defendant for recovery of an amount on the ground that he had borrowed a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the plaintiff on 10-8-1993 promising to repay the same with interest at 12% per annum and executed the suit promissory note Ex. A1. The plaintiff also had issued a legal notice dated 28-2-1996, the office copy of which was marked as Ex. A-2 and the acknowledgment was marked as Ex. A3. The defendant had acknowledged the notice but had failed to reply. The defendant had denied the borrowing of amount on 10-8-1993 and also execution of promissory note in favour of the plaintiff. The case of the defendant is that he had executed a pronote on 6-6-1988 in presence of the Sarpanch by name Komati Krishnam Raju, Uppe Someswara Rao, Veeramalla Pullayya and Rankireddi Gurrayya. It was also pleaded in the written statement that there was a money dispute between the plaintiff and defendant s family in the year 1988 and the wife of the defendant had given a police report and at the instance of the Sarpanch the promissory note was executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. It was also stated that the date and the amount were kept blank at that time and the promissory note was handed over to the said Krishnam Raju and the dispute was not settled and the plaintiff got the said promissory note and had filled the amounts and the dates and had filed the same. After receiving the legal notice the defendant approached Komati Krishnam Raju, who promised to settle the dispute and after receiving Court notice again he approached the said Krishnam Raju, who told him that the plaintiff had taken away the promissory note from him and thus the claim of the plaintiff is not enforceable. On behalf of the plaintiff PW1 to PW4 were examined and Exs. A1 to A3 were marked and on behalf of the defendant he had examined himself as DW1. On behalf of the plaintiff PW1 to PW4 were examined and Exs. A1 to A3 were marked and on behalf of the defendant he had examined himself as DW1. The Court below had framed a point for consideration i. e. , "whether the plaintiff is entitled to suit claim as prayed for ?" and had ultimately arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the suit claim. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant filed the present civil revision petition. ( 4 ) SRI N. Subba Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner-defendant had contended that he approach the Court below is totally erroneous and the Court below had totally ignored the important admissions made by PW1 in the course of cross-examination and the Court below had given a wrong finding that the said admission relates to a different transaction. The learned Counsel also had contended that the Court below also had erred in appreciating the aspect of burden of proof. The learned Counsel also had relied on G. Vasu v. Syed Yaseen Sifuddin Quadri, AIR 1987 AP 139 , Putta Lakshmi Narayana Reddy v. Putta Mysura Reddy, 1996 (2) ALD 1242 . The learned Counsel also had submitted that the Court below had totally erred in giving much importance to the non-giving of reply by the defendant and also non-examination of Krishnam Raju. In the light of clear admissions of PW1 there is no necessity on the part of the defendant to establish anything more and even otherwise it is for the plaintiff to explain such admissions made by him. ( 5 ) SRI Vijay Kiran representing Sri J. Venugopal Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff vehemently contended that the exercise of power and jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, hereinafter in short called as "act" is very limited and inasmuch as the Court below on a detailed appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence from paragraphs 5 to 10 had arrived at a conclusion that the suit claim is proved and the plaintiff is entitled to the suit amount, these are findings of fact need not be disturbed in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The teamed counsel also had placed strong reliance on Mayyam Janaka Lakshmi v. Mctyyam Madhava Rao and others, 1972 (2) ALT 85. The learned Counsel also had further contended that the evidence of PWs. The teamed counsel also had placed strong reliance on Mayyam Janaka Lakshmi v. Mctyyam Madhava Rao and others, 1972 (2) ALT 85. The learned Counsel also had further contended that the evidence of PWs. 2 to 4 clearly goes to show that Ex. A1 is supported by consideration and a stray sentence in the cross-examination of PW1 need not be given serious consideration. The very fact that except DW1 none others were examined and there was no reply to the notice issued by the plaintiff and none of the persons including Krishnam Raju had been examined by the defendant to substantiate his contention, the defendant miserably failed to discharge the burden and the Court below had arrived at the correct conclusion in the light of the presumption available under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act also. ( 6 ) HEARD both sides. Now, the question that has to be decided is whether the judgment and decree in SC No. 30/96 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur are sustainable or they are liable to be set aside? It may be relevant to look into the cross-examination of PW1, which is as follows: "i know the defendant s wife. It is true the wife of defendant was running Chit business in the village. It is true about 10 years age I joined in one of the chits run by the wife of defendant. It is true the wife of defendant did not pay the chit amount to me. It is true I disputed about non-payment of money before the Sarpanch of our village. It is true in the presence of elders the defendant executed a pronote for the said amount. Rankireddy Gurraiah scribed the said pron ote. It is true the date and amount were not mentioned in the said pronote. The defendant signed in the said pronote and the same was kept with one Komati Krishnam Raju. Ex. Al is also scribed by R. Guraiah. The scribe became old and is not able to see. I have no dispute with Komati Krishnam Raju. It is true I filed the pronote which was kept with krishnam Raju. It is true I filed the pronote which was kept with Krishnam Raju in the Court. I cannot say who had mentioned the date in the pronote Ex. A1. The scribe became old and is not able to see. I have no dispute with Komati Krishnam Raju. It is true I filed the pronote which was kept with krishnam Raju. It is true I filed the pronote which was kept with Krishnam Raju in the Court. I cannot say who had mentioned the date in the pronote Ex. A1. The witnesses signed in the pronote when disputes arose between me and the wife of defendant. It is true I did not consider to the defendant under Ex. A1. Krishnam Raju did not call me when issued notice to defendant. It is not true to suggest I am not entitled for the suit claim". Hence, the admission made by PW1 is to the following effect: "it is true I did not pass consideration to the defendant under Ex. A1. In the light of these clear admissions, the finding of the Court below that this admission was made by PW1 in reference to some other transaction cannot be sustained. Sections 17 and 18 of the Indian Evidence Act dealing with admissions read as follows: "17. An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned. " "18. Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by any agent to any such party, whom the Court by regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorized by him to make them, are admissions. Statements made by parties to suits suing or sued in a representative character, are not admissions, unless they were made while the party making them held that character. Statements made by (1) persons who have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the proceeding, and who make the statement in their character of persons so interested or, (2) persons from the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject-matter of the suit, are admissions if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statements". In Ramji Dayawala and Sons (Petitioner) Ltd. v. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 , the Apex Court while dealing with value of admissions it was held that admission unless explained furnishes the best evidence. In Ramji Dayawala and Sons (Petitioner) Ltd. v. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 , the Apex Court while dealing with value of admissions it was held that admission unless explained furnishes the best evidence. In Avadh Kishore v. Ram Gopal, AIR 1979 SC 861 , the Apex Court was pleased to observe that it is true that evidentiary admissions are not conclusive proof of the facts admitted and may be explained or shown to be wrong, but they do raise an estoppel and shift the burden of proof on to the person making them or his representative in interest and unless shown or explained to be wrong they are an efficacious proof of facts admitted. In the present case, in the light of the clear admission made by PW1 relating to the fact that Ex. Al is not supported by consideration, I do not think that the other evidence let in by the plaintiff will come to his aid in any way. In the light of the peculiar facts, it cannot be said that the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can ensue to the benefit of the plaintiff. Unfortunately, this important aspect was lost sight of by the Court below while appreciating the matter. In Gunmathappa v. Dharwar Municipality, AIR 1945 Bom. 197, while dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 25 of the Act, it was held that the power and jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act is wider when compared to the revisional powers under Section 115 of CPC. In the light of the above facts, I have no hesitation to say that the findings of the Court below in this regard are unsustainable and against law. Since admitted facts need not be proved, the defendant had not let in any further evidence and by that itself it cannot be said that the defence taken by the defendant is not true. It may be that depending upon the facts and circumstances the non-issuance of reply notice also can be taken into consideration. But it is not as though merely because the reply notice was not given, it can be taken that the plaintiff was able to prove his claim. The issuance or non-issuance of reply notice may have to be appreciated depending upon the facts and circumstances of the cases. But it is not as though merely because the reply notice was not given, it can be taken that the plaintiff was able to prove his claim. The issuance or non-issuance of reply notice may have to be appreciated depending upon the facts and circumstances of the cases. In the pleading itself, the defendant had taken a stand that he had been approaching Krishnam Raju with the fond hope that there may be some settlement in this regard. After both the parties had let in evidence usually, the question of burden of proof loses its importance. But however, even otherwise, in the light of the ratio in G. Vasu v. Syed Yaseen, AIR 1987 AP 139 and Putta Lakshminarayana Reddy v. Putta Mysura Reddy, 1996 (2) ALD 1242 , in the present facts and circumstances it can be definitely said that the burden is shifted on to the plaintiff in the light of the specific admission of PW1 on the aspect of non-passing of consideration and since the effect of such clear and unequivocal admission on the part of the plaintiff is that Ex. A1 is not supported by consideration. In Maayam Janakalakshmi v. Manyam Madhava Rao and others, 1972 (2) ALT 85, on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent, it is a case dealing with the burden of proof and shifting of burden of proof and where the consideration recited in the promissory note has been found to be not true and the effect of consideration other than recited in the promissory note. This decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the decision referred (supra), the Full Bench had observed at paragraph-24 as follows: "in our view, the above decision of the Supreme Court is clear authority for the proposition that once the defendant shows either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or by use of other presumptions of law or fact that the promissory note is not supported by consideration, in the manner stated in the promissory note or in the manner stated in the suit notice or in the pleading, the evidential burden shifts to the plaintiff and the legal burden of the plaintiff is revived, i. e. , to prove that the promissory note is supported by consideration and at that stage, the presumption of law covered by Section 118 disappears and no longer subsists. This is because the presumption under Section 118 raised by the statute initially in favour of the plaintiff steps, as it were, into the witness box and acts as a substitute for the plaintiffs evidence. Once such rebuttal evidence is given by the defendant to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court acting on a preponderance of probabilities and not requiring an absolute proof of a negative i. e. , absence of all conceivable forms of consideration, the effect of the presumption shifting the initial evidential burden to the defendant disappears . " in the decision referred (supra), where a promissory note was executed in favour of the plaintiff by his younger brother and the promissory note recites cash consideration which was denied by the defendant and the plaintiff instead of cash consideration pleading past consideration of adjustment at the time of partition, the plaintiff was not able to prove the partition, the value of difference in partition and how it was adjusted, it was held that the suit is liable to be dismissed. In the present case, I am of the considered opinion that no further proof may be necessary in this regard as far as the defendant is concerned and the other evidence let in by the plaintiff in this regard will fall into insignificance in view of the admission of PW1. ( 7 ) HENCE, for the foregoing reasons, the Judgment and decree of the Court below are not in accordance with law and it is a fit matter to exercise the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act and accordingly the impugned Judgment and decree dated 12-2-1999 in SC No30/96 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur are hereby set aside and the CRP is allowed, with costs.