JUDGMENT - CHITRE J.G., J.:---The petitioner is hereby assailing the correctness, propriety and legality of the judgment and order passed by Member of the M.R.T. in the matter of Revision Application No. M.R.T.P. XII-7/84 (TEN.B. 298/84) Pune dated 9-3-1988 whereby the learned Member of M.R.T. set aside the judgment and order passed by S.D.O. Haveli, Sub-Division, Pune bearing No. TNC. 81/82. 2. The present petitioner Kashinath Datar had filed a suit against the respondents ancestors in the Civil Court for an injunction. The Civil Court made a reference to Tahsildar and A.L.T., Haveli requesting the said Court to hold the enquiry and record the finding whether Khandu Bagade and other heirs were in possession of the suit lands as tenants. The Tahsildar and A.L.T. made the enquiry for the purposes of deciding the said issue which was quoted by him as :- "Whether the defendants prove that they are the tenants of the suit properties?" The Tahsildar and A.L.T. recorded the said finding in favour of the said Khandu Bagade and against the present petitioner by passing a judgment in that context. The same was challenged by the present petitioner Kashinath Datar by submitting the appeal bearing Tenancy Appeal No. 81/81. The S.D.O. Haveli, Sub-Division, Pune set aside the judgment and order passed by Tahsildar and A.L.T., Haveli by passing the judgment and order. The said judgment and order was challenged by the present heirs of Khandu Bagade by filing the revision application. The learned Member of the M.R.T. set aside the judgment and order passed by the S.D.O. Haveli, Division Pune. 3. The land in question is Survey No. 163-A of Village Urali Kanchan, District Pune which was belonging to Datar family. One Shriniwas Datar had sold Survey No. 163-B on 5.5.52 to the opponents Bagades for Rs. 10,000/-. Survey No. 163/A remained in the name of Kashinath Bhaskar Datar as the judgment passed by the S.D.O. Haveli, Division Pune shows. 4. The land in question is Survey No. 163-A of Village Urali Kanchan, District Pune which was belonging to Datar family. One Shriniwas Datar had sold Survey No. 163-B on 5.5.52 to the opponents Bagades for Rs. 10,000/-. Survey No. 163/A remained in the name of Kashinath Bhaskar Datar as the judgment passed by the S.D.O. Haveli, Division Pune shows. 4. The learned Member of M.R.T. by dislodging the judgment and order passed by S.D.O., Haveli, Sub-Division, Pune mentioned above, pointed out by paragraph 7 of his judgment that after minutely going through the entire record and the proceedings of the dispute he came to the conclusion that the said land was continuously in possession of Bagades from the year 1943 till the year 1956 till the mutation entry No. 2083 was effected in respect of the said land. He also pointed out that for a period of two years, the names of respondents were got mentioned in the record of rights in respect of the said land. He held that the possession of the suit land was with Bagades. He further pointed out in the same paragraph by observing :- "It is amusing to note that the lower Appellate Court has not at all taken into consideration the record and VII/XII extracts which are at pages 47 and 49 of the trial Court's record file. These two VII/XII extracts clearly reveal that the present applicants are the tenants in respect of the suit lands as their names are shown in the tenancy column. In addition to these VII/XII extracts although it may not be a conclusive proof, the statement recorded before the trial Court of the opponent No. 1, who had filed a civil suit, whose deposition is recorded at page 249 of the trial Court's file which clearly shows that he admitted the tenancy of the present applicants. He says ^^Qs- uks- ua- 2084 rk- 12 4 49 eyk nk[kfoyh ;k uksanh izek.ks izfroknhaph dwG Eg.kwu uksan vkgs ^^ The learned Member further points out :- "This clearly shows that opponent No. 1 admits the tenancy of the present applicants. He says ^^Qs- uks- ua- 2084 rk- 12 4 49 eyk nk[kfoyh ;k uksanh izek.ks izfroknhaph dwG Eg.kwu uksan vkgs ^^ The learned Member further points out :- "This clearly shows that opponent No. 1 admits the tenancy of the present applicants. Secondly, Advocate Shri S.V. Datar, one of the landlords had sent a notice which is at page 63 of the trial Court's file terminating the tenancy of the present applicants on or about 3.12.56 makes a mention in para one stating as under:- ^^Xkko nIrjh [kjsnh fnysY;k tfefups [kjhnnkj o vkeps vkf'kykadMhy 18 ,dj 27 XkqaBs tfefups Qwy Eg.kwu rqEgk lokZaph ukos ykXkysyh vk<Gr vkgsr^^ 5. By making such observations and pointing out the portions from the records, the learned Member of the M.R.T. held that Datar's contention that Bagades are "trespassers is a loud talk without substance and without lawful base". By pointing out this, he expressed his opinion:- "I am of the opinion that the landlords have attempted to grab the land of the tenants on the eve of enforcement of the Tenancy Act as the notice and deleting the names of the applicants from the record is on the eve of enactment." The leaned Member further went on observing :- "The learned Advocate of Datar's family names above has certainly thought of dislodging the claim of the applicants and made a vain attempt to take over the suit lands in the name of making it to N.A. use as the land was fallow. On perusal of the record it is seen that out of the suit land only 1-A-12 Gs. is shown as P.K. (pot Kharba) and the remaining land in Survey No. 163-A and B are being cultivated by the tenants. So only because their names have disappeared from the Record of Rights for the period of 2 years, their legitimate right cannot be brushed aside, in view of the fact that the trial Court which has considered all these aspects in the proper perspective has served that the applicants have proved their tenancy, they are cultivating the suit lands continuously and their names were deleted only for a period of two years prior to 1.4.57 which is an attempt to dislodge the valuable rights of the tenants which were to accrue on 1.4.57. The trial Court has rightly observed that the fact finding authority in terminating tenancy after 1.4.57 is the A.L.T. and two years prior to 1.4.57 is the Special Tahsildar appointed for the purpose of disposing of the cases under section 32(1-B) of the Amending Act, 1948 and that the applicants were still in possession of the suit property even after their names were deleted. Therefore, the opponents have no case at all. It is also worthy to be seen that it is a well settled principles of law that in the matter of application of evidence and the credibility of witnesses, the opinion of the trial Court should not be lightly disturbed in appeal. It requires circumstances of exceptional character to justify reversal. The trial Judge sees, hears and questions witnesses and finding of fact arrived at by him on oral testimony should not be disturbed except in rare cases where some error susceptible of being dealt with only by arguments is disclosed such as omission to take account of circumstances of truth itself material to establish of the evidence or giving credence to testimony which turns out on more careful analysis to be substantially inconsistent with itself or any disputable fact. It is open to an Appellate Court to differ from the Court which heard the evidence where it is manifest that the evidence accepted by such Court of first instance is contrary or is, so improbable or is to be incompletely or is for other sufficient reasons not worthy of acceptance. The Appellate Court should not disturb findings of the facts of the trial Court unless evidence accepted is contradictory or so improbable or is to be incompletely or otherwise unworthy of acceptance. If this test is applied to the lower appellant Court's judgment, then it is certainly to be viewed that the lower Appellate Court has failed in applying law of evidence in the instant case as can be seen by the hastily and hurried observations of the Sub-Divisional Officer viz. If this test is applied to the lower appellant Court's judgment, then it is certainly to be viewed that the lower Appellate Court has failed in applying law of evidence in the instant case as can be seen by the hastily and hurried observations of the Sub-Divisional Officer viz. The learned Advocate for the opponents stated that Shri Datar the present appellant in his deposition has admitted that the present appellants are cultivating the lands and that but for his say he has no other evidence to show that the opponents are not the tenants of the suit property." These observations made by the learned Member of M.R.T. are quoted as they are because the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner criticised the approach adopted by the learned Member of M.R.T. by submitting that the learned Member of M.R.T. went on appreciating the evidence for dislodging the findings recorded by Sub-Divisional Officer which, according to him, happens to be the last Court of facts. The learned Counsel for the petitioner had criticised this approach adopted by the leaned Member of M.R.T., and, therefore, it was necessary for this Court to examine whether the learned Member of the M.R.T. was exercising the jurisdiction which vested in him in his revisional jurisdiction. It became necessary for this Court to examine the approach which was adopted by the learned Member of the M.R.T. which was heavily criticised by the Counsel appearing for the petitioner for the purposes of justifying the case of the petitioner for getting the writ of certiorari for correcting the error, as he thought, committed by the member of the M.R.T. 6. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner has criticised the approach adopted by the learned Member of M.R.T., he did not notice that the same approach has been adopted by the S.D.O. Haveli, Sub-Division, Pune when he upheld the findings of facts recorded by the Tahsildar and A.L.T. Haveli which examined the persons concerned and recorded their statements. The Counsel appearing for the petitioner did not notice that the learned Member of M.R.T. had pointed out in his judgment that by going for discarding the findings of facts recorded by Tahsildar and A.L.T. Haveli, the S.D.O. Haveli, Sub-Division, Pune ignored that the said Court had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses whom he examined for recording their statements. 7. 7. When the petitioner is criticising the approach adopted by the M.R.T., the petitioner ignores that the same attitude was followed by S.D.O. when he dislodged the judgment and order passed by Tahsildar and A.L.T. who recorded the findings of facts. 8. When that is the criticism and when that is the approach adopted by the S.D.O., and member of M.R.T., it becomes necessary for this Court to examine whether the learned Member of the M.R.T. was right or wrong in examining the judgment of S.D.O. Haveli, Sub-Division Pune in context with material on record. When a revisional authority is exercising the jurisdiction of revision, it is entitled to examine the record of the subordinate forum for the purposes of satisfying itself whether such subordinate forum was right in dislodging the findings of facts recorded by the trial forum. In this context, it is necessary to be seen whether there was a justifiable cause to do so. Had there been concurrent findings of facts, the revisional authority should not have gone for examining the material on record in that context. But when the appellant forum had dislodged the findings of facts recorded by the trial forum, the revisional authority gets justified in its exercise of examining its correctness, propriety and legality in context with material on record. In such cases, the revisional authority is required to focus its attention towards the judgment passed by the appellate authority which goes for setting aside the findings of facts recorded by the trial forum. 9. A party who is to prove its case can do it by examining the witnesses by adducing the oral evidence as well as by relying on the admissions given by the adversaries in oral evidence. It can also prove its case by placing reliance on the documents which are already on record. In this case as it has been pointed out by the learned Member of M.R.T., the respondents in the present petition were in continuous possession of the suit land from the year 1943 till mutation Entry No. 2083 was passed. It has pointed out that only for a period of two years, the names of Bagades were missing from records of rights. It has pointed out that only for a period of two years, the names of Bagades were missing from records of rights. It also pointed out that Mamlatdar and A.L.T. Haveli has rightly pointed out that in view of the provisions of Amending Act of 1948 in view of provisions of section 32(1)(b) Special Tahsildar was appointed for the purposes of disposing of the cases which were pertaining to the period of two years prior to 1-4-1957 (Tillers day). The learned Member of M.R.T. has rightly pointed out that the learned S.D.O. did not consider this aspect of the matter properly when he dislodged the findings of facts recorded by the Mamlatdar and A.L.T. holding that Bagades were the tenants of the said land. When the learned Member of M.R.T. notices such aspect of the matter while dealing with the said matter in his revisional jurisdiction, nothing prevents him from assessing the correctness, propriety and legality of the findings recorded by the appellate authority and in that context nothing prevents him from placing its attention to the evidence on record or the material on record. In fact the learned Member of M.R.T. has given cogent, justified and detailed reasoning for justifying his conclusions which are being assailed by the present petition. 10. When this Court is exercising the jurisdiction in view of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it has to see whether the judgment which has been assailed by the writ petition really requires an inference in its supervisory jurisdiction. If the forum below has exercised the jurisdiction properly which vested in it, there is no need of interference by the High Court when it is to exercise the jurisdiction in view of Article 227 of the Constitution of India in jurisdiction of Superintendence. Thus, the petition stands dismissed with costs. Rule stands discharged. 11. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this judgment duly authenticated by the Private Secretary of this Court. Petition dismissed. -----