JUDGMENT - VISHNU SAHAI, J.:---Through this writ petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-detenu has impugned the order dated 19-2-2001 passed by the first respondent Mr. M.N. Singh, Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai detaining him under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (No. LV of 1981) (Amendment 1996) (Hereinafter referred to as the M.P.D.A. Act). The detention order along with the grounds of detention which are also dated 19-2-2001, was served on the petitioner-detenu on 22-5-2001, and their true copies are annexed as Exhibits A and B respectively to this writ petition. 2. A perusal of the grounds of detention (Exhibit B) would show that the impugned order is founded on 3 C.Rs. namely :- C.Rs. No. 660 of 2000 under section 399 read with section 325 of the Arms Act, read with section 37(1)(a) of the Bombay Police Act, registered on the basis of complaint dated 26-6-2000 lodged by D.C.B. Unit No. 7, C.I.D. Bombay; C.R. No. 313 of 2000 under sections 324, 34 I.P.C. registered on the basis of a complaint dated 9-6-2000 lodged by Mangaldas Pandurang Jagtap at D.N. Nagar Police Station and C.R. No. 34 of 2000 under sections 323, 506(2) 114 I.P.C. registered on the basis of a complaint dated 26-6-2000 lodged by Mohammed Syed at D.N. Nagar Police Station and in camera statements of two witnesses namely A and B which were recorded on 20-9-2000. A perusal of the in-camera statement of witnesses A and B would show that the offence of extortion has been disclosed in them. 3. A perusal of para 5 of the grounds of detention would show that the petitioner-detenu has been detained as a dangerous person under section 2(b-1) of the M.P.D.A. Act. 4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Although in this writ petition, Mr. U.N. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has pleaded a large number of grounds numbered from Ground Nos. 7(A) to 7(H) but, he has only pressed before us two grounds namely Ground Nos. 7(B) and 7(H) of the said grounds. There is a common plea in them namely there was a delay in the execution of the impugned detention order. U.N. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has pleaded a large number of grounds numbered from Ground Nos. 7(A) to 7(H) but, he has only pressed before us two grounds namely Ground Nos. 7(B) and 7(H) of the said grounds. There is a common plea in them namely there was a delay in the execution of the impugned detention order. The pleadings therein in short are as under :- Although the impugned detention order was issued on 19-2-2001, it was executed and served upon the petitioner detenu on 22-5-2001 i.e. after a gap of more than three months despite the fact he was always available at his Bombay address. It has also been averred therein that the most effective steps enjoined by law like moving for cancellation of petitioner-detenu's bail in the said C.Rs. and taking action against him under section 7 of the M.P.D.A. Act were not resorted to and consequently the impugned detention order is vitiated in law. 5. Ground Nos. 7(B) and 7(H) have been replied to in three returns namely in para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority, para 9 of the return of P.S.I., Suresh Bhogle (Sponsoring Authority) dated 8-11-2001 and paras 2 to 4 of the second return of P.S.I. Suresh Bhogle dated 7-12-2001. It is pertinent to mention that the second return of P.S.I. Bhogle was necessitated because, Ground No. 7(H) has been incorporated by learned Counsel for the petitioner pursuant to leave to amend being granted by this Court vide order dated 8-11-2001. 6. We now propose setting forth the averments contained in the aforesaid returns. We begin with the averments contained in para 9 of the return of the detaining which in short are as under :- The detention order dated 19-2-2001 was forwarded to the Sponsoring Authority for execution on 20-2-2001. Since the detenu had jumped bail in C.R. No. 313 of 2000, and a non bailable warrant of arrest had been issued against him by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 44th Court, Andheri, Bombay on 12-1-2001, no application for cancellation of bail was preferred. It was also not preferred because, the grounds for cancellation of bail are totally different. Since there was no property in the name of the detenu, there was no question of its attachment and consequently no purpose would have been served by making an application for issuance of proclamation or attachment of property. It was also not preferred because, the grounds for cancellation of bail are totally different. Since there was no property in the name of the detenu, there was no question of its attachment and consequently no purpose would have been served by making an application for issuance of proclamation or attachment of property. It is denied that for the failure to take action under section 7 of the M.P.D.A. Act, the detention order would be rendered illegal and bad in law. The averments contained in para 9 of the first return of P.S.I. Bhogle in short are as under:- The detention order was forwarded to the Sponsoring Authority on 20-2-2001 and was received by it on the said date. On 21-2-2001, at 7.35 p.m. Officers of the Sponsoring Authority went to execute the detention order upon the petitioner-detenu at the address as mentioned in the detention order but, they did not find him. In furtherance of secret information received from time to time, about the whereabouts of the detenu and his brother against whom a detention order had also been issued, efforts were made to execute the detention order by visiting the known address of the detenu on 23-2-2001 at 8.15 p.m. on 24-2-2001 at 8.10 p.m. on 25-2-2001 at 11.40 a.m. on 27-2-2001 at 3.35 p.m; on 28-2-2001 at 5.55 p.m. on 1-3-2001 at 4 p.m. on 3-3-2001 at 7.15 p.m., on 5-3-2001 at 7.20 p.m., on 7-3-2001 at 15.40 p.m., on 10-3-2001 at 8.10 p.m., on 15-3-2001 at 11.45 a.m., on 19-3-2001 at 14.00 p.m., on 21-3-2001 at 17.20 p.m., on 26-3-2001 at 18.05 p.m., on 31-3-2001 at 1.10 p.m., on 3-4-2001 at 17.20 p.m., on 8-4-2001 at 17.10 p.m., on 13-4-2001 at 16.10 p.m., on 15-4-2001 at 13.25 p.m., on 20-4-2001 at 15.05 p.m., on 23-4-2001 at 14.00 p.m., on 28-4-2001 at 13.15 p.m., on 4-5-2001 at 15.05 p.m., on 11-5-2001 at 18.45 p.m., and on 19-5-2001 ant 18.50 p.m. The detenu was trying to evade the execution of the order but, he was ultimately arrested on 22-5-2001 and thereafter, the detenu order was served on him. As regards not moving an application for cancellation of bail and not making an application for issuing proclamation or attachment of property, the same explanation which has been furnished in para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority has been furnished in this return and we do not want to burden our judgment by reiterating it. Finally, it has been mentioned that failure to take action under section 7 of the M.P.D.A. Act or issuing a proclamation and publishing the same in Gazette or taking action under section 82 or 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code would not render the detention order illegal and bad-in-law. We now come to the averments contained in the in paras 2 to 4 of the second return of P.S.I. Suresh Bhogle. We make no bones in observing that they are the same as those contained in para 9 of his first return, we do not want to burden our judgment by reiterating them. 7. We have considered the averments made in Ground Nos. 7(B) and 7(H) of the petition, those contained in para 9 of the return of the Detaining Authority para 9 of the return of the Sponsoring Authority dated 8-11-2001 and the return of the latter dated 7-12-2001. We are constrained to observe that we do not find any merit in Ground Nos. 7(B) and 7(H). 8. Mr. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner true to his customary fairness does not dispute that since the detenu did not have any property, there was no question of taking action under section 7(1) of the M.P.D.A. Act. However, he made a serious grievance that the failure to take action under section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act and to apply for cancellation of the detenu's bail make it manifest that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to detain the detenu under section 3(1) of the M.P.D.A. Act was not genuine and the Detaining Authority was not sincere in executing the detention order against the detenu and hence the impugned detention order be quashed. 9. We now propose examining the said submissions of Mr. Tripathi. 9. We now propose examining the said submissions of Mr. Tripathi. We begin with his submission pertaining to section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act which provision reads thus :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) if the State Government or an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3 has reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, the State Government or the officer, as the case may be order notified in the Official Gazette, direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order." Mr. Tripathi contended that since the Detaining Authority and the Sponsoring Authority have in their returns mentioned that the petitioner-detenu was avoiding execution of the detention order, by absconding and concealing himself, the Detaining Authority should have by an order, notified in the Official Gazette and directed him to appear before such an officer at such place or at such time as notified in the order. 10. We have reflected over Mr. Tripathi's contention. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that the Detaining Authority can invoke it if he has reason to believe that a person against whom a detention order is issued is avoiding its execution either by absconding or concealing himself. In our view, the Detaining Authority would normally have a reason to believe in the aforesaid terms if despite a reasonable time the detention order cannot be executed. We have seen that in the instant case, the detention order was executed on the detenu within three months and three days of its issuance. We have also seen that the Sponsoring Authority repeatedly on a large number of dates mentioned in his first return was trying to nab the petitioner-detenu on his address which he (Sponsoring Authority) had pursuant to the secret information received by him. In such a situation, the Detaining Authority cannot be faulted for not taking recourse to the provisions contained in section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act. In our view, on the facts of this case, failure to take recourse to the provisions contained in section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act would not vitiated the detention order. In such a situation, the Detaining Authority cannot be faulted for not taking recourse to the provisions contained in section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act. In our view, on the facts of this case, failure to take recourse to the provisions contained in section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act would not vitiated the detention order. It should be remembered that the provisions contained in section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act are only one of the modes of executing a detention order and the failure to resort to them simplicitor would not vitiate a detention order on the vice of delay in its execution. But, we hasten to add that since the legislature in all its wisdom has enacted them, it is expected that the Detaining Authority will normally take recourse to them provided he has reason to believe that the person against whom the detention order is issued is absconding or concealing himself to frustrate its execution. 11. Mr. Tripathi also contended that a Division Bench of this Court (G.D. Patil and R.M. Lodha, JJ.) in its judgment dated 15-9-2000, passed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 633 of 2000 (Rafiq Shaikh v. R.H. Mendonca others)1, has quashed a detention order merely because, no action under section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act was taken. Consequently, he contended that we should also quash the impugned detention order. We have gone through the aforesaid judgment and are constrained to observe that Mr. Tripathi's premise that the detention order in the said case was merely quashed because, no action under section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act was resorted to is misconceived. A perusal of the said judgment makes it clear that apart from the circumstance, that no action under section 7(2)(a) was taken, there was an inaction of 8 days, 11 days, 18 days and 19 days in four different pockets on the part of the Sponsoring Authority in executing the detention order and in our view, this has also weighed with the learned Judges in quashing the detention order. 12. For the said reasons, in our view, failure to take action under section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act would not be fatal to the impugned order in the instant case. 13. We now take up Mr. 12. For the said reasons, in our view, failure to take action under section 7(2)(a) of the M.P.D.A. Act would not be fatal to the impugned order in the instant case. 13. We now take up Mr. Tripathi's submission that failure of the Sponsoring Authority to apply for cancellation of bail of the detenu makes it manifest that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to detain the detenu under the impugned order was not genuine and his officers were not serious in executing the detention order. To fortify his submission, Mr. Tripathi, placed reliance on the oft quoted decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of (P.M. Harikumar v. Union of India others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court Page 70. It is true that in para 13 of the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Curt has laid down that moving an application for cancellation of bail makes it manifest that the authorities are serious in executing a detention order. However, in our view in the instant case, both the Detaining Authority and the Sponsoring Authority in para 9 of their return (the first return of the latter) have given very cogent reasons as to why no application for cancellation of detenu's bail was moved in C.R. No. 313 of 2000; that being since the detenu had jumped bail in the said C.R. the Metropolitan Magistrate, 44th Court, Andheri, Bombay on 12-1-2001 had issued non bailable warrant of arrest against him. In our judgment, application for cancellation of bail would not have been more effective than a non-bailable warrant of arrest issued by the Court. Hence, in view of these facts, in our judgment the failure of the Sponsoring Authority to move for cancellation of detenu's bail cannot be a basis for concluding that the Detaining Authority and the Sponsoring Authority were not sincere in their endeavour to execute the detention order and the subjective satisfaction of the former to detain the detenu under section 3(1) of the M.P.D.A. Act was not genuine. 14. We also feel it pertinent to mention, that after perusing the averments contained in the first return of the Sponsoring Authority, we are implicitly satisfied that with all its sincerity the Sponsoring Authority was attempting to execute the detention order on the detenu. 14. We also feel it pertinent to mention, that after perusing the averments contained in the first return of the Sponsoring Authority, we are implicitly satisfied that with all its sincerity the Sponsoring Authority was attempting to execute the detention order on the detenu. At the cost of repetition, we would like to mention that at very short intervals, the Sponsoring Authority was continuously visiting the detenu at the place where he was likely to be found as per secret information received by it. The dates and time of the visits are : 2322/2001 at 8.15 p.m. 24-2-2001 at 8.10 p.m. 25-2-2001 at 11.40 a.m. 27-2-2001 at 3.35 p.m. 28-2-2001 at 5.55 p.m. 1-3-2001 at 4 p.m. 3-3-2001 at 7.15 p.m., 5-3-2001 at 7.20 p.m., 7-3-2001 at 15.40 p.m., 10-3-2001 at 8.10 p.m., 15-3-2001 at 11.45 a.m., 19-3-2001 at 14.00 p.m., 21-3-2001 at 17.20 p.m., 26-3-2001 at 18.05 p.m., 31-3-2001 at 1.10 p.m., 3-4-2001 at 17.20 p.m., 8-4-2001 at 17.10 p.m., 13-4-2001 at 16.10 p.m., 15-4-2001 at 13.25 p.m., 20-4-2001 at 15.05 p.m., 23-4-2001 at 14.00 p.m., 28-4-2001 at 13.15 p.m., 4-5-2001 at 15.05 p.m., 11-5-2001 at 18.45 p.m., and 19-5-2001 at 18.50 p.m. 15. It should also be borne in mind that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the question whether there has been a delay in the execution of the detention order is a question which has to be answered on the facts of a given case and the explanation contained therein. In this connection, there is no dearth of authorities but, to eschew prolixity we would only like to refer to two of them namely those reported in A.I.R. 1975 Supreme Court page 1517 (S.K. Serajul v. State of West Bengal)3, and A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court page 1446 (Abdul Salam v. Union of India)4. Para 2 of the former decision reads thus :- "We must not be understood to mean that whenever there is delay in making an order of detention or in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable. Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The Detaining Authority may have a reasonable explanation for the delay and that might be sufficient to dispel the inference that its satisfaction was not genuine." (Emphasis supplied) Para 15 of the latter decision reads thus :- "..........It can therefore be seen that on the mere delay in arresting the detenue pursuant to the order of detention the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority cannot be held to be not genuine. Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances. The Court has to see whether the delay is explained reasonably........" 16. We make no bones in observing that in the instant case both the Detaining and Sponsoring Authorities have plausibly explained the delay in the execution of the detention order. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in Ground Nos. 7(B) and 7(H) of the petition. 18. No other ground was pressed before us by Mr. Tripathi learned Counsel for the petitioner. 19. In the result, we dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule. Writ petition dismissed. -----