JUDGMENT - S.G. MAHAJAN, J.:---The appellant Bansiram @ Nathu Karnuji Gohokar has challenged by this appeal the order of conviction and sentence passed against him by the Additional Session Judge Yeotmal, in Session Trial No. 37 of 1994. The appellant was convicted of the offence under section 376 Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- or in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 months more. 2. On the appeal being presented, my learned brother Judge who was dealing with the admissions of criminal appeals, by the order dated 16-4-2001, directed the issuance of notice of enhancement to the appellant. The notice was accordingly issued to the appellant and the same was served upon him. 3. The case of the prosecution as it is revealed from the evidence is as below: a) The prosecutrix Prabhavati wife of Vinayak Pimpalkar is the resident of village Bhalar. Accused/appellant Bansiram @ Nathu also belongs to the same village. On 1-12-1993 the prosecutrix was working in her field. She was plucking Barbati pods. She was alone in the field. At about 5 p.m. the accused/appellant arrived in the field of the prosecutrix. He came near her and straightway caught hold of her hands and felled her down on the ground. He removed his full pant and underwear. He also undid the nicker of the prosecutrix after felling her down. The accused/appellant then committed a forcible sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. He thereafter went towards his field. The prosecutrix first went to the house of the accused/appellant to inform his wife about the incident. She informed the wife of the accused/appellant about the incident and then arrived at her house. b) On the date of incident the husband of the prosecutrix had been to Wani in the morning itself in the bullock cart to sell Soyabean. As per the prosecutrix he came back home at about 9 p.m. The prosecutrix informed the incident to her husband P.W. Vinayak. She and Vinayak went first to the house of Police Patil Ramsunder Gohokar and informed the incident to him. Then they went to Police Station Wani on bicycle. It was at about 10 p.m. The prosecutrix lodged an oral report which was reduced into writing by A.P.I. Jadhav. She and Vinayak went first to the house of Police Patil Ramsunder Gohokar and informed the incident to him. Then they went to Police Station Wani on bicycle. It was at about 10 p.m. The prosecutrix lodged an oral report which was reduced into writing by A.P.I. Jadhav. On the basis of the said report A.P.I. Jadhav registered the crime under sections 376 and 506 Indian Penal Code. (c) The accused/appellant was arrested on 2-12-1993 at about 8.30 a.m. A.P.I. Jadhav then went to the spot of occurrence and drew the spot panchanama (Ex. 14). He thereafter seized the garments from the prosecutrix which were on her person at the time of incident, vide seizure memo (Ex. 19). He also seized clothes from the person of the accused vide seizure memo (Ex. 32). (d) On the date of the incident after the report was lodged by the prosecutrix she was at Wani itself during the night at the house of one lady Police Constable. On 2-12-1993 A.P.I. Jadhav referred the prosecutrix to Rural Hospital Wani for her medical examination. However, the Medical Officer Wani advised to refer the prosecutrix to Women's Hospital Yeotmal as no lady Medical Officer was available at the hospital at Wani. So A.P.I. Jadhav referred the prosecutrix to Women's Hospital Yeotmal for her medical examination. The Medical Officer Women's Hospital Yeotmal examined the prosecutrix medically at 7 p.m. The Medical Officer could not give the exact opinion as to whether sexual intercourse was performed with the prosecutrix. No injuries were noticed on the private parts of the prosecutrix. The Medical Officer issued the Medical Certificate (Ex. 39) accordingly. (e) On 3-12-1993 the accused/appellant was referred to Rural Hospital Wani for his medical examination. Dr. Manthanwar who was attached as a Medical Officer to the said Hospital examined the accused/appellant medically and found that the accused/appellant was capable of performing sexual act. No fresh injury or the evidence of injury was noticed on the genitals or else where on the body of the accused/appellant. Dr. Manthanwar issued the Medical Certificate (Ex. 37) accordingly. (f) During the further investigation the property was forwarded to Chemical Analyser Nagpur for examination. The reports of Chemical Analyser were received, which are at Exs. 27 and 28. As per Chemical Analyser's report Ex. Dr. Manthanwar issued the Medical Certificate (Ex. 37) accordingly. (f) During the further investigation the property was forwarded to Chemical Analyser Nagpur for examination. The reports of Chemical Analyser were received, which are at Exs. 27 and 28. As per Chemical Analyser's report Ex. 28 human semen stains were detected on the petticoat that was seized from the prosecutrix and the underwear that was seized from the accused/appellant. So also spermatozoa was detected in the vaginal smear of the prosecutrix. As per the Chemical Analyser's report the group of blood of accused/appellant and the group of blood in the semen detected on the aforesaid garments could not be determined as the results were inconclusive. 4. On completion of the investigation the accused/appellant was charge-sheeted. 5. On the case being committed to the Court of Session the learned Judge, Special Court-Atrocities on Women, Yeotmal, framed the charge of the offences under sections 376 and 506-II Indian Penal Code. It was read over and explained to the accused and he pleaded not guilty. 6. The defence of the accused as it is revealed from his examination under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code was of total denial and false implication. 7. On considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the defence of the accused and the submissions made on both the sides, the learned trial Judge found that the offence under section 376 Indian Penal Code was made out against the accused and he accordingly convicted the accused of that offence. However for the reasons stated in the concluding para of the judgment on hearing the accused on the question of sentence, the learned Judge took a lenient view and passed the sentence as stated earlier. The trial Judge found that the offence under section 506-II Indian Penal Code was not made out and he accordingly acquitted the accused of that offence. The above order of conviction and sentence is impugned by the accused/appellant in this appeal and as already stated above this Court in its revisional powers issued the notice of enhancement of sentence. 8. Heard Miss Dave and Shri Manoj Kariya the learned Counsel for the accused/appellant and Shri Yogesh Mandape the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State. 9. As stated earlier the defence of the accused/appellant as it is revealed from his examination under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code is of total denial and false implication. 8. Heard Miss Dave and Shri Manoj Kariya the learned Counsel for the accused/appellant and Shri Yogesh Mandape the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State. 9. As stated earlier the defence of the accused/appellant as it is revealed from his examination under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code is of total denial and false implication. The accused/appellant denied to have performed the sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. At the hearing in this appeal the learned Counsel for the appellant suggested the possibility of consent of the prosecutrix in the alternative. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of the prosecutrix shows that she did not resist and allowed the things to go coldly and from this evidence it appears that she may be a consenting party, if at all the sexual intercourse was performed with her. It was pointed out that the clothes of the prosecutrix were not torn, there were no injuries either on the person or on the private part of the prosecutrix and there were no scratches on the person of the accused so as to suggest that the prosecutrix had offered resistance. The learned Counsel for the accused/appellant further canvassed that the incident did not take place in the 4 closed walls and it was alleged to have taken place in the open field. So as per the learned Counsel the prosecutrix had an ample time and also had every opportunity to run away from the place. The learned Counsel also contended that the prosecutrix could have caused injuries to the accused by making struggle or could have even taken a bite. She contended that since there were no injuries either on the person of the prosecutrix or on the person of the accused, the story is doubtful. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant further pointed out that in the spot panchanama only the 5 ft. site is shown to have been affected. She contended that had the forcible sexual intercourse been performed on the aforesaid place the land not less than 6 ft. would have been affected. The learned Counsel meant that the above aspect indicates the falsity of the story. 11. site is shown to have been affected. She contended that had the forcible sexual intercourse been performed on the aforesaid place the land not less than 6 ft. would have been affected. The learned Counsel meant that the above aspect indicates the falsity of the story. 11. The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the prosecutrix deposed that her husband came back home from Wani at about 9 P.M. As per the learned Counsel this version of the prosecutrix is falsified by the evidence of the husband of the prosecutrix/P.W. Vinayak who testified that he came back home from Wani at about 6 to 6.30 P.M. The Counsel for the appellant also canvassed that although as per the evidence of P.W. Vinayak he came back home at 6 to 6.30 P.M., the report was lodged by the prosecutrix in the Police Station at 11 P.M. and thus there is a delay of 5 hours in lodging the report. 12. The Counsel for the appellant further pointed out that as per the evidence of the prosecutrix her father and mother were residing with her in the year of incident. However, the prosecutrix did not claim to have disclosed the incident to them. The learned Counsel further submitted that although the prosecutrix claimed to have informed the incident to the wife of the accused by going to the accused's house she was not examined; so also though the recitals in the report lodged by her at Ex. 17 show that on her way back to home from the field she met one Vasudeo Bapuji Bothale from her village and she narrated the incident to him, he was also not examined as a witness by the prosecution. The learned Counsel also canvassed that though the prosecutrix Prabhavati and her husband P.W. Vinayak claimed to have approached first the Police Patil and to have informed the incident to him, the Police Patil was also not examined as a witness. 13. So far as the Chemical Analyser's reports Exhs. 27 and 28 are concerned the group of blood in the semen of the accused as well as the group of his blood collected in phials could not be determined as the results were inconclusive. So also the blood group in the semen detected on petticoat is not given. The Counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding in the C.A.'s report (Ex. So also the blood group in the semen detected on petticoat is not given. The Counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding in the C.A.'s report (Ex. 28) that the semen stains were detected on the garments of the prosecutrix and accused would not be of much consequence and the same will not make much difference because obviously the evidence on record shows that the prosecutrix was with her husband since 6 P.M. till the lodging of report by her in the Police Station. As per the learned Counsel it cannot be conclusively said that the semen stains detected on the petticoat of the prosecutrix were of accused only. 14. The testimony of the prosecutrix is reliable and trustworthy. It is corroborated by the finding in the C.A.'s report (Ex. 28), showing that the semen stains were detected on the petticoat of the prosecutrix and on the underwear of the accused/appellant as well as spermatozoa was detected in the vaginal smear of the prosecutrix. Of course as argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the group of blood of the accused in the semen or phial could not be determined as the results were inconclusive. However, the testimony of the prosecutrix about the sexual intercourse having been performed with her is corroborated by the finding in the Chemical Analyser's report about the detection of semen stains on the garments as above and the detection of spermatozoa on the vaginal smear, to that limited extent. As already stated above, the learned Counsel for appellant canvassed that the prosecutrix was in the company of her husband since 6 P.M. till the lodging of report. The evidence of the prosecutrix in this respect is that her husband came home at 9 P.M. How far this variance between the versions of the prosecutrix and her husband P.W. Vinayak is material and what must be the time of the arrival of P.W. Vinayak at home would be considered subsequently at its relevant place, but it can be seen that there is no material on record to raise a doubt that the husband of the prosecutrix P.W. Vinayak might have committed sexual intercourse with her after his arrival at home till both of them went to Police Station and the prosecutrix lodged the report. The evidence on record shows that the prosecutrix and her husband first went to Police Patil and then to Police Station which was 6 kms. away from their village. So the husband of the prosecutrix had a little time to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. 15. The prosecutrix had no reason to state lie that the accused/appellant committed sexual intercourse with her. It is contended by the accused/appellant in his statement under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code that there are two parties in his village; his field is beyond the field of the prosecutrix (Marathi version may be seen); and he is required to cross the field of the prosecutrix; sometimes he used to go by the boundary of the field of the prosecutrix and the prosecutrix had threatened him asking him not to go by the boundary of her field. Though the enmity as above is alleged by the accused/appellant, it is not established. No suggestions were made to the prosecutrix to that effect during her cross-examination. The plea taken by the accused/appellant as above is not substantiated. Further for the simple reason that the accused/appellant used to go sometimes by the boundary of the field of the prosecutrix, she will not level the serious charges of sexual intercourse having been performed by the accused with her falsely so as to put the reputation of her character in peril. 16. To over come the above reasoning the appellant has suggested the possibility of consent. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that if at all there was a sexual intercourse the prosecutrix may be a consenting party since her evidence shows that she did not offer the resistance and make the struggle. The prosecutrix did not expressly state in her evidence that she resisted the sexual intercourse. But that does not mean that she was a consenting party. The evidence of the prosecutrix shows that the accused suddenly came, caught hold of her hands and felled her down. Her evidence also shows that she was alone in the field. Naturally she could not have struggled. She had no opportunity even to run away from the place within such a short while. In such situation the woman who is alone in the field may get confused. The prosecutrix categorically deposed that the accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. Her evidence also shows that she was alone in the field. Naturally she could not have struggled. She had no opportunity even to run away from the place within such a short while. In such situation the woman who is alone in the field may get confused. The prosecutrix categorically deposed that the accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. It can be gathered from the circumstances coming in her evidence that she must have been over powered by the accused. 17. The prosecutrix is a married woman, habituated to sexual intercourse. In such circumstances no injuries were likely on her private parts. Injuries to the accused were also not likely as the circumstances show that the prosecutrix must have surrendered because of the sudden arrival of the accused in her field on seeing her alone and felling her down on the ground. The clothes of the prosecutrix were not torn because the evidence shows that she could not make a struggle. The Medical Officer who examined the prosecutrix did not note any injury on the person of the prosecutrix. The learned Counsel submitted that when the prosecutrix was felled down on the ground some injuries ought to have occurred on her back. In this connection it is worthy to note the recitals in the spot panchanama (Ex. 14). It is mentioned that on minute inspection of the spot of occurrence the land measuring 5 ft. was found to be trampled, the grass was found to be pressed and the Barbati pods were found lying scattered. Besides the fact that these recitals corroborate the story of the prosecutrix, the fact that the land concerned was covered by grass shows that it was not a rough ground but the same was smooth and, therefore, there was no possibility of the occurrence of any injuries on the back of the prosecutrix. 18. The absence of injuries on the person and private parts of the prosecutrix and on the person of the accused is of no consequence in this case since the circumstances in the evidence show that the prosecutrix must have surrendered and therefore, she could not make a struggle. The question is why she would falsely implicate the accused. The consent theory is not acceptable. The evidence of the prosecutrix shows that on the arrival of her husband at home she disclosed the incident to him. The question is why she would falsely implicate the accused. The consent theory is not acceptable. The evidence of the prosecutrix shows that on the arrival of her husband at home she disclosed the incident to him. The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the evidence of P.W. Vinayak shows that the prosecutrix did not disclose the incident to him immediately on his arrival but she disclosed it after he took the dinner. It could be that first she may be hesitant to disclose the incident immediately on his arrival and she might be preparing her mind as to in what manner it should be disclosed to her husband. It might be that after she gained courage she disclosed the incident to him. But the fact lies that she disclosed the incident to her husband on her own. No body had seen the incident of sexual intercourse. Had the prosecutrix been a consenting party she would have kept silence and would not have disclosed the incident to her husband. Thus the fact of disclosure of the incident to the husband shows that she was not a consenting party. 19. The Counsel for the appellant canvassed that although the parents of the prosecutrix were residing with her she did not disclose the incident to them. On going through the evidence of the prosecutrix one will find that she did not depose that she disclosed the incident to her parents, but her evidence also does not show a negative fact that she did not disclose the incident to them. There was no cross-examination of the prosecutrix on this point. 20. The prosecutrix has asserted in her evidence that after the incident she went to the house of the accused and informed the incident to his wife. The prosecution did not examine the wife of the accused. The non-examination of the wife of the accused is not fatal to the prosecution case because she was not expected to state anything against the accused. 21. Although it is stated by the prosecutrix in her report (Ex. 17) that on her way back to home from the field she met one Vasudeo Bapuji Bothale of her village and she narrated the incident to him, the said Vasudeo was also not examined by the prosecution. 21. Although it is stated by the prosecutrix in her report (Ex. 17) that on her way back to home from the field she met one Vasudeo Bapuji Bothale of her village and she narrated the incident to him, the said Vasudeo was also not examined by the prosecution. But considering the other evidence on record I am of the view that the non-examination of Vasudeo would not affect the prosecution story. 22. The arguments were advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant that there was a 5 hours delay in lodging the report by the prosecutrix in the Police Station. The evidence of the prosecutrix is that her husband (P.W. Vinayak) arrived at home at 9 P.M. where as the evidence of P.W. Vinayak is that he arrived at home at about 6 to 6.30 P.M. The learned Counsel calculated the time of lodging the report from 6 P.M. One may see that the prosecutrix and her husband P.W. Vinayak are the rustic villagers. They cannot have the sense of time. The incident occurred in the month of December. In this month it grows dark early. So when the prosecutrix stated that it was 9 P.M. when her husband arrived back home, it may be her impression because of the early growing of dark. It could happen that P.W. Vinayak might have come home sometime between 6.30 and 9 P.M. The evidence on record shows that after the prosecutrix disclosed the incident to her husband Vinayak both of them first went to the Police Patil and narrated the incident to him and thereafter they went to the Police Station. Though they went on bicycle the distance of Police Station was of about 6 kms. The time of lodging the report as shown in the registration of F.I.R. is 11 P.M. Thus considering the time consumed in going to the house of Police Patil and then going to the Police Station which is 6 kms. away from the village, it cannot be said that any delay had occurred in lodging the report in the Police Station. The so-called delay cannot be in fact regarded as a delay. 23. The argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the fact that the land measuring 5 ft. away from the village, it cannot be said that any delay had occurred in lodging the report in the Police Station. The so-called delay cannot be in fact regarded as a delay. 23. The argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the fact that the land measuring 5 ft. only was found to be trampled during the preparation of the spot panchanama indicates that the story of rape is doubtful, is not convincing. Even if the persons are having the height above 5 ft. the arms and legs are somewhat folded at the time of sexual intercourse. So the land measuring 5 ft. only was found to be trampled will be of no consequence. 24. The learned Counsel for the appellant cited some cases on the point of absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix. The first one is (Puttan v. State)1, 1972 Criminal Law Journal 270. It was observed in this cited case : "Where the accused subjected to a girl to sexual intercourse in a field on uneven and rough ground the complete absence of any injury or scratches on the person of the accused and the victim shows clearly that the intercourse was not forcible and the girl must have been a consenting party." In the present case as already stated above the ground on which the sexual intercourse was performed by the accused was not a rough ground and the same was covered with grass. There was no likelihood of injuries or scratches on the person of the prosecutrix. The injuries on the person of the accused were not caused because there was no struggle by the prosecutrix since the facts show that she must have been overpowered. 25. The next case cited is (Lachhman and another v. State)2, 1973 Criminal Law Journal 1658. The relevant observations pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant are as below : "It is a very well-settled rule that in rape cases the evidence of the complainant must be corroborated. A charge of rape is a very easy charge to make and a very difficult one to refute and in common fairness to accused persons the courts insist on corroboration of the complainants's story. However, the nature of the corroboration must necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case. A charge of rape is a very easy charge to make and a very difficult one to refute and in common fairness to accused persons the courts insist on corroboration of the complainants's story. However, the nature of the corroboration must necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case. Where rape is denied, the sort of corroboration one looks for is medical evidence showing injury to the private parts of the complainant, injury to other parts of her body, which may have occasioned in a struggle, seminal stains on her clothes or the clothes of the accused, or on the places where the offence is alleged to have been committed; and in all cases importance is attached to the subsequent conduct of the complainant." The present case differs on facts from the case cited above. The facts of the cited case show that there were material discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses and in those circumstances the corroboration from medical evidence was necessary. In the present case there are no material discrepancies in the evidence. Further though there is no corroboration of medical evidence, the corroboration in the form of presence of semen stains on the garments of the prosecutrix as well as the detection of spermatozoa in the vaginal smear is there and the recitals in the spot panchanama also corroborate the story of the prosecutrix. 26. The next case cited is (Pratap Misra and others v. State of Orissa)3, A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 1307. The facts of this cited case are entirely different. In the cited case three persons had a forcible intercourse with the pregnant woman one after another. So immediate abortion would have been the result. But the abortion was not immediate and it was 4-5 days thereafter. The learned Counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the observations made in para 8 as below : "The opinions of medical experts also show that it is very difficult for any person to rape single-handed a grown up and an experienced woman without meeting stiffest possible resistance from her." However, it may be seen that the opinion of medical experts as above may vary from case to case. If a woman surrenders then there would be no resistance or struggle on her part. 27. If a woman surrenders then there would be no resistance or struggle on her part. 27. In (Bharat v. State of Madhya Pradesh)4, 1992 Criminal Law Journal 3218, there were no injuries on the person of prosecutrix suggesting any resistance. In this cited case the rape was held not proved and the accused was acquitted. The facts of this cited case are also different. The prosecutrix was accustomed to sexual intercourse and at the time of incident she was staying alone in her house while other family members had gone away to fair. However, her mother unexpectedly came back and caught prosecutrix and accused together. Considering all these facts it was found to be a case of consent and, therefore, the medical corroboration in the form of injuries on the person of prosecutrix was necessary. 28. The next case cited is (Kuldeep K. Mahato v. State of Bihar)5, 1999(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)81. In this cited case also the medical evidence was showing that there were no injuries on the person of the prosecutrix including her private part. However, on facts this case is also not applicable to the present case. In the case cited above the conduct of the prosecutrix was showing that she was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse. She was with the accused for a long time, i.e. for about two days before the alleged rape. The facts of the case show that she had an ample opportunity of fleeing from the house at Ramgrah and she could have also taken the help of neighbours from the said village but nothing of that sort was done and she did not avail the above opportunity. In these circumstances it was found to be a case of consent and, therefore, the medical corroboration in the form of injuries was necessary. 29. The last case cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant is (Prem Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh)6, 2000 Criminal Law Journal 951. In this cited case, in order to accept the statement of prosecutrix that she was compelled, threatened or otherwise induced for sexual intercourse, the corroboration from some independent source was felt necessary. But that was in view of the peculiar facts of that case. In this cited case, in order to accept the statement of prosecutrix that she was compelled, threatened or otherwise induced for sexual intercourse, the corroboration from some independent source was felt necessary. But that was in view of the peculiar facts of that case. The medical evidence in that case was showing that the prosecutrix though she was unmarried was used to sexual intercourse and considering this aspect, the corroboration from independent source was found necessary. Such are not the facts of the present case. In the present case the prosecutrix is a married woman and hence she was habituated to sexual intercourse. In such circumstances when she testified that she was subjected to sexual intercourse, the medical corroboration in the form of injuries would not be necessary. In the result none of the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant on the point of medical corroboration is applicable to the present case on facts. 30. On the other hand the learned A.P.P. cited two cases which are on the point that even in absence of corroboration the testimony of the prosecutrix can be relied upon. The first one is (Rafiq v. State of Uttar Pradesh)7, 1980 Criminal Law Journal 1344. It will be useful to refer to the following observations in this cited case : "Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of a prosecutrix is not a matter of law, but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. Indeed, from place to place, from age to age, from varying life styles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with dead uniformity but realistic diversity lest rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this area be introduced through a new type of presidential tyranny. The same observation holds good regarding the presence or absence of injuries on the person of the aggressor or the aggressed." The next case cited is (State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain)8, 1990(2) Bom.C.R. 630 , which lays down the standard of proof to be expected by a Court in the cases of rape. In this case the accused was a Police Officer. It was held that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. In this case the accused was a Police Officer. It was held that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. It was observed that the Evidence Act no where says that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. During the course of discussion it was also observed that if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. It was further observed that if the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. It will also be useful to refer to the following observations : "To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a crime." The third case cited by the learned A.P.P. is (Nawabkhan and others v. The State)9, 1990 Criminal Law Journal 1179. In this cited case the prosecutrix was a married woman, habituated to sexual intercourse. She was compelled to submit at the point of knife. There was a gap of many hours between the commission of rape and medical examination. The Physician could not opine as to whether the rape was committed. It was held that the testimony of prosecutrix could not be discarded on that ground. Presence of human spermatozoa in the vaginal smear and on clothes was found to be a sufficient corroboration. In the present case the prosecutrix is a married woman who is habituated to sexual intercourse. The circumstances show that she must have surrendered due to sudden arrival of the accused finding her alone in the field and her felling down by him. There was also a gap of about 26 hours between the commission of rape and medical examination. In the present case the prosecutrix is a married woman who is habituated to sexual intercourse. The circumstances show that she must have surrendered due to sudden arrival of the accused finding her alone in the field and her felling down by him. There was also a gap of about 26 hours between the commission of rape and medical examination. The semen stains were found on her petticoat as well as human spermatozoa was found in her vaginal smear, which is a corroborating factor. 31. As a result of the whole discussion made above I find that the learned trial Judge did not commit any error in passing the order of conviction against the accused/appellant for the offence under section 376 Indian Penal Code. The order of conviction shall have to be maintained. 32. As stated earlier this Court by the order dated 16-4-2001 had directed issuance of notice of enhancement of sentence to the accused/appellant. The same was served upon him and I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned A.P.P. for the State on the point of enhancement of sentence. The sentence awarded to the accused/appellant by the trial Court is of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and of the payment of fine of Rs. 2000/- or in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 months more. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the sentence awarded by the trial Court is appropriate and it is to be seen that after coming out from the jail the appellant should not be a hardened criminal. He should return home as a man and not as a criminal and his family may not be ruined. On the other hand the learned A.P.P. submitted that the sentence awarded to the accused/appellant by the trial Court is meagre and it needs to be enhanced by awarding him a maximum sentence. 33. In support of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for appellant in above respect, she cited (Phul Singh v. State of Haryana)10, A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 249. The learned Counsel invited the attention of this Court to the following observations: "We must however, direct our attention in a different penological direction. For, sentencing efficacy in cases of lust-loaded criminality cannot be simplistically assumed by Award of long incarceration, for, often that remedy aggravates the malady. The learned Counsel invited the attention of this Court to the following observations: "We must however, direct our attention in a different penological direction. For, sentencing efficacy in cases of lust-loaded criminality cannot be simplistically assumed by Award of long incarceration, for, often that remedy aggravates the malady. Punitive therapeutics must be more enlightened than the blind strategy of prison severity where all that happens is sex starvation, brutalisation, criminal companionship, versatile vices through bio-environmental pollution, dehumanised celldrill under 'zoological' conditions and emergence, at the time of release, of an embittered enemy of society and its values with an indelible stigma as convict stamped on him a potentially good person 'successfully' processed into a hardened delinquent, thanks to the penal illiteracy of the Prison System. The Court must restore the man." In this cited case the accused was sentenced by the trial Court to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 4 years. The Apex Court reduced the sentence to the rigorous imprisonment for 2 years. The facts of the case show that the offender was in his early twenties and the signs of repentance were seen. He was the first cousin of the victim. The victim and her parents had forgiven him. It was found that the two families being close cousins were ready to take a lenient view of the situation. Taking over all view of the familiar and criminal factors involved the sentence was reduced as aforesaid. The authority does not propose to make the aforesaid observations about the reformatory measures as a general rule. In the background of the special circumstances in that case the reformation was found to be a proper remedy. It can be seen that the sentence was reduced in the peculiar situation in that case. On the other hand it was observed that : "Ordinarily rape is violation, with violence, of the private person of a woman-an outrage by all canons. In our conditions of escalating sex brutality a four year term for rape is not excessive." 34. In support of the contention that the sentence needs to be enhanced the learned A.P.P. cited (Kamalkishore v. State of Himachal Pradesh)11, 2000 Criminal Law Journal 2292. In this cited case the accused was convicted of the offence of rape. The accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. This was the sentence below the minimum which is prescribed by law for the offence. In this cited case the accused was convicted of the offence of rape. The accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. This was the sentence below the minimum which is prescribed by law for the offence. The reason given by the High Court for not awarding the minimum sentence of 7 years was that the occurrence took place 10 years ago and the accused might have settled in life. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the reasons for awarding the sentence less than minimum should be adequate and special both. The reason mentioned by the High Court that the occurrence took place 10 years ago and the accused might have settled in life were not special to the accused or to the situations in that case and such reasons could be noticed in many other cases and hence they could not be regarded as special reasons. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years that was awarded to the accused was, therefore, enhanced to the rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. 35. In the present case the trial Court has taken a lenient view in respect of the punishment considering the fact that the case was of the year 1994 and since then the accused was facing the trial. In view of the ratio of the authority cited above by the learned A.P.P. this reason cannot be a special reason. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years awarded by the trial Court is much less than the minimum prescribed for the offence, that is an imprisonment for 7 years. Thus the sentence is liable to be enhanced. However, at this stage the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the family of the accused/appellant consists of 5 members besides himself, that is to say, 3 children aged about 12, 8 and 6 years, wife and old mother-in-law. He further submits that the accused/appellant is the only earning member and since he is in jail his elder son had to give up the education. The learned Counsel submitted that the career of the other children may not be spoiled. Considering these aspects although I am inclined to enhance the sentence it shall not be enhanced to the minimum prescribed for the offence. To my mind the sentence of 5 years imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. The learned Counsel submitted that the career of the other children may not be spoiled. Considering these aspects although I am inclined to enhance the sentence it shall not be enhanced to the minimum prescribed for the offence. To my mind the sentence of 5 years imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. As observed in the authority cited above Kamalkishore v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the fact that long time has elapsed subsequent to the date of offence can be a factor to be considered by the executive authorities while granting remission of sentence. The accused/appellant may make an appropriate representation for such remission of sentence to the authorities concerned. 36. In the result the appeal filed by the accused/appellant is dismissed. The order of conviction passed against him for the offence under section 376 Indian Penal Code is maintained and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years awarded by the trial Court is enhanced to the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. The sentence in respect of payment of fine of Rs. 2000/- or in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 months shall remain as it is. -----