JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J.—This petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure arises out of the orders passed by the learned District Judge, Mandi, on 7th November, 2000 in CMP No. 559/2000 in Civil Appeal No. 86/1999 (Parveen Kumar and others v. Prem Chand). 2. It appears that the present petitioners filed an application before the learned District Judge under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and prayed that the petitioners, who were appellants before the learned District Judge, may be permitted to lead additional evidence in terms of certified copy of the demarcation order of the Consolidation Officer, dated 14th December, 1999 alongwith the report of the Field Kanungo dated 23rd October, 1999 and copy of the order of Consolidation Officer dated 24th May, 1999 and certified copy of Aks Shajra. For that purpose Record Keeper of the office of the Consolidation Officer, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, was proposed to be examined as additional evidence to prove the documents. 3. The case of the petitioners before the learned District Judge was that since the demarcation proceedings were pending when the case was decided by the learned trial Court, therefore, the copies of the demarcation report could not be produced. It was further stated that additional evidence was necessary for the proper decision of the dispute between the parties. 4. The application was resisted by the respondent. It was contended that the suit of the plaintiff was decreed for possession in respect of Khasra No. 1294/1 which, admittedly, belongs to the plaintiff-respondent and was encroached by the defendants-petitioners. The encroachment was to the extent of 20 square meters. According to the respondent, report which was sought to be produced on record related to land comprised in Khasra No. 1295 which has nothing to do with the land subject matter of controversy. It was further averred that the respondent, in any event, was not a party to those proceedings and therefore, the demarcation report sought to be produced has no relevance nor this report, in any way, will help the appellate court in deciding the matter more effectively. 5. Learned District Judge vide impugned order rejected the application. Feeling dis-satisfied, the defendants-applicants are in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. 5. Learned District Judge vide impugned order rejected the application. Feeling dis-satisfied, the defendants-applicants are in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. While dismissing the application of the petitioners, learned District Judge observed that controversy between the parties was about 20 square meters of the land which plaintiff claimed was encroached by the defendants-applicants and is comprised in Khasra No. 1294/1. Learned District Judge proceeded to observe that Local Commissioner was not sought to be appointed under Order 26 of the Code by any of the parties to the suit and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed on the basis of a demarcation report relied by the plaintiff in respect of the land comprised in Khasra No. 1294. The defendants, noticed learned District Judge, instead of asking for the demarcation of the land in question through a Local Commissioner, preferred to wait for the result of the demarcation which he had claimed with regard to his own land. The learned District Judge wondered that how demarcation report in respect of Khasra No. 1295 owned by the defendants-applicants would help to resolve the controversy between the parties which according to the learned District Judge has no relevance to the proceedings before him, nor such demarcation report, according to the learned District Judge, would help the court to decide the matter more effectively. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the judgment of the learned District Judge. 8. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent, at the outset contends that the revision petition is not maintainable as the impugned order of the learned District Judge does not amount to "case decided" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. The contention is that the impugned order does not determine the right of the parties in any manner. Mr. Sood refers to Poshu Ram v. Chobe Ram and another (C.R. 187/ 1999) in support of his contention. The contention is that the impugned order does not determine the right of the parties in any manner. Mr. Sood refers to Poshu Ram v. Chobe Ram and another (C.R. 187/ 1999) in support of his contention. In Poshu Ram learned Single Judge of this Court relying upon Smt. Parmeshwari Devi and others v. Mohinder Kumar and others, 1998 (2) PLJ 406; Sher Singh and another v. M/s. Kashmiri Lai Chaman Lal Saraf, 1998 (2) PLR 225 and Balwant Singh and another v. Bishan Singh, 1998 (2) PLR 482, took a view that an order dismissing an application for additional evidence would not fall within the meaning of "case decided" for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code. 9. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Counsel for the petitioners-defendants, relying upon Major S.S. Khanna v. RJ. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497, contends that order of the learned District Judge refusing to grant the application of the petitioners for additional evidence will amount to "case decided" for the purpose of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code. He argues that High Court has power and jurisdiction to rectify an order of the Subordinate Court which prejudicially effects the case of the petitioners. 10. In Major S.S. Khanna a suit was filed in the court of Subordinate Judge for a decree of Rs. 54,250 with future interest. A preliminary objection was taken that the suit was not maintainable and the plaintiff was not entitled to institute the suit. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was not maintainable being by a partner against another partner of a dissolved firm which was in the process of winding up. The High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction set aside the order and directed that the suit be heard and disposed of in accordance with law. In this background. Their Lordships observed that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure consists of two parts, the first, provides for the conditions in which jurisdiction of the High Court arises i.e. it is a case decided in which no appeal lies to the High Court, the second part contemplates the circumstances in which the jurisdiction may be exercised. Their Lordships held that the jurisdiction is not limited or restricted to a litigation in a nature of civil suit alone. Their Lordships held that the jurisdiction is not limited or restricted to a litigation in a nature of civil suit alone. It includes a proceeding in Civil Court in which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked for the determination of some claim and right legally enforceable. Their Lordships noticed that there was a serious conflict in the views of the various High Courts on question whether an order of a Court which does not finally dispose of the suit or proceeding amounts to "case decided". One view "which is accepted by a majority of the High Courts" is that the expression "case" includes an interlocutory proceedings relating to the rights and obligations of the parties, and the expression "record of any case" includes so much of the proceedings as relates to the order disposing of the interlocutory proceeding and therefore, the High Court has the power to rectify an order of a Subordinate Court at any stage of a suit or proceeding even if there be another remedy open to the party aggrieved i.e. by reserving his right of such a party to file an appeal against the ultimate decision, and making the illegality in the order as a ground of appeal. Other view was that the expression "case" does not include an issue or a part of a suit or proceeding and therefore, the order on an issue or a part of a suit or proceeding is not a "case decided" and therefore, the High Court has no power in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to correct an error of interlocutory order. 11. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that the meaning of the expression "case" must be sought in the nature of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 115 and the purpose for which the High Courts were clothed with such powers which were conceived to have effective control over the Courts Subordinate to the High Court. 12. In paras 10 and 11 of the judgment Their Lordships observed: "10. The necessity arising out of peculiar circumstances to invest the High Courts with the power to rectify errors committed by subordinate courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction and the consequent investiture of the power are indicative of the extent of that power. 12. In paras 10 and 11 of the judgment Their Lordships observed: "10. The necessity arising out of peculiar circumstances to invest the High Courts with the power to rectify errors committed by subordinate courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction and the consequent investiture of the power are indicative of the extent of that power. The power being one of superintendence and visitorial and vested because the supervisory jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and Prohibition over subordinate courts in the mofussil could not be exercised, it would be reasonable to hold that it was intended in the absence of any overriding reasons disclosed by the statute (and none such appears on an examination of the statute) to be analogous with the jurisdiction to issue the high prerogative writs and the power of supervision under the Charter Act and its successor provisions in the Constitution Acts. "11. The expression "case is a word of comprehensive import: it includes civil proceedings other than suits, and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirety of the proceeding in a Civil Court. To interpret the expression "case" as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice." (Emphasis supplied) 13. Major S.S. Khanna was considered and explained in Baldevdas Shivlal and another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 1970 SC 406, Their Lordships explaining the expression case observed that the expression "case" is "not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in an action". The expression "case" is word of comprehensive import and it includes a civil proceedings and is not restricted by anything contained in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the entirety of the proceedings in the Civil Court. The expression "case" is word of comprehensive import and it includes a civil proceedings and is not restricted by anything contained in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the entirety of the proceedings in the Civil Court. Their Lordships proceeded to observe that to "interpret the expression "case" as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of powers of superintendence and may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice". But at the same time, every order in the suit cannot be regarded as "a case decided" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. Mr. K.D. Sood then refers to a Division Bench authority of our own High Court in Ram Dass v. Smt. Subhash Bakshi, ILR (Himachal Series) 1976, 111. In that case wife had filed a suit before the District Judge praying for a decree for judicial separation against the husband-petitioner. Husband thereafter filed a suit before the Subordinate Judge, Mandi for a declaration that parties are not husband and wife. During the pendency of the suit wife moved an application under Section 10 of the Code for the stay of the proceeding in the suit on the ground that previously instituted petition for judicial separation between the same parties was pending in the District Court at Ludhiana and the subject matter of those proceedings was substantially the same as in the suit before the learned Subordinate Judge at Mandi. The application was allowed. The suit before the learned Sub Judge, Mandi, was stayed. Husband moved a petition for the revision of the order before the High Court. 15. A Division Bench, speaking through R.S. Pathak, Chief Justice, as His Lordship then was, noticed the difference of the opinion amongst the various High Courts in the interpretation of the expression "case decided" Their Lordships noticed decision of the apex Court in S.S. Khanna and Filmistan Distributors (supra) and observed in para-11 of the judgment: The main purpose of conferring such power on the superior court is to enable it to correct a subordinate court if it errs on the jurisdictional plane. By keeping it within the limits of its jurisdiction the superior court confines the subordinate court to its true course in point of jurisdiction. Where such errors of the subordinate court cannot be corrected by resorting to an appeal, they can be corrected in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior court. For this reason, it will be found that a superior court, such as the High Court, is empowered to exercise its supervisory or revisional jurisdiction in those cases only where no appeal lies". 16. The Division Bench proceeded to observe that the power under Section 115 of the Code should be exercised to correct jurisdictional error by the Subordinate Courts. 17. Their Lordships also observed that a "case is decided" when there is an adjudication on the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy. For example, the entire suit or appeal may be disposed of or a distinct part of the suit or appeal may be disposed of finally so far as the subordinate court is concerned. 18. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent, contends that the right of the respondent to lead additional evidence is not determined finally by the impugned orders of the learned District Judge and it would be open to the respondent to take the refusal of the learned District Judge to lead additional evidence in the grounds of the appeal. He further submits that though appellate court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined in exercise of the powers under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code, but requirement of the said court must be limited to those cases where it is found that it was necessary to obtain such evidence to enable the court to pronounce the judgment. The provision does not contemplate leading in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence the judgment can be pronounced. He further points out that the provisions of Rule 27 Order 41 of the Code cannot be resorted for adding to the evidence already on record and it is the satisfaction of the court whether such evidence is required or not to pronounce the judgment. Mr. K.D. Sood draws my attention to Mahavir Singh and others v. Naresh Chandra and another, (2001) 1 SCC 309. Mr. K.D. Sood draws my attention to Mahavir Singh and others v. Naresh Chandra and another, (2001) 1 SCC 309. In that case in appeal an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code was filed by the respondents for permission to lead additional evidence. The District Ju4ge dismissed the application. The revision was filed before the High Court. A Single Judge of the High Court, in exercise of the powers under Section 115 of the Code interfered with the orders of the learned District Judge and allowed the application. In this context Their Lordships observed that Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 107 of the Code enables an appellate Court to take additional evidence subject to such conditions and limitation as are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code. Their Lordships reiterated that ordinarily the appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the trial Court and should not take evidence in appeal. The additional evidence should be taken only when the conditions and limitations laid down in the said rule are found to exist. Their Lordships reiterated that the additional evidence may be admitted when there is some lacuna or defect in the evidence and court found itself unable to pronounce the judgment. Mere difficulty in coming to the decision is not sufficient for admission of the evidence under this rule and the expression "or for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the appellate court requires additional evidence, that this rule should be invoked. Their Lordships proceeded to observe : "Therefore, when the first appellate Court did not find the necessity to allow the application, we fail to understand as to how the High Court, in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not have interfered with such an order, particularly when the whole appeal is not before the Court. It is only in the circumstances when the appellate Court requires such evidence to pronounce the judgment the necessity to adduce additional evidence would arise and not in any other circumstances. It is only in the circumstances when the appellate Court requires such evidence to pronounce the judgment the necessity to adduce additional evidence would arise and not in any other circumstances. When the first appellate Court passed the order on the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the whole appeal was before it and if the first appellate Court was satisfied that additional evidence was not required, we fail to understand as to how the High Court interfere with such an order under Section 115 CPC." (Emphasis supplied) 19. In view of the ratio of the Supreme Court in Major S.S. Khanna and Filmistan Distributors (supra) the ambit, scope and limitation of the powers of the High Court is no longer res integra. The expression "case decided" is not restricted to the entirety of the proceedings in Civil Court. It includes part of proceedings in the same case including the proceedings which may be of interlocutory nature. The High Court will be within its supervisory jurisdiction to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if it is shown that the appellate Court acted, in exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity and the order passed by the Court, if allowed to stand, will cause failure of justice or irreparable injury to the party aggrieved. 20. It is equally settled, as held in Naresh Chandra, the first appellate Court would be within its right to admit additional evidence if that Court found itself unable to pronounce judgment owing to lacuna or defect in the evidence. The ability to pronounce a judgment must be understood to mean to pronounce a judgment "satisfactorily to the mind of the court delivering it". When the first appellate Court does not find the necessity for additional evidence, the High Court normally should not interfere with such order in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. In the present case two contentions were raised before the learned District Judge. The first contention was that when suit was filed the application for demarcation of the land of the respondent was pending and therefore, the copy of the demarcation report could not be produced before the trial Court and that the additional evidence was required for the proper decision of the dispute between the parties. The first contention was that when suit was filed the application for demarcation of the land of the respondent was pending and therefore, the copy of the demarcation report could not be produced before the trial Court and that the additional evidence was required for the proper decision of the dispute between the parties. Learned District Judge found that the demarcation report sought to be produced as additional evidence does not pertain to the land subject matter of dispute which is admittedly comprised in Khasra No. 1294, whereas the demarcation report sought to be produced as an additional evidence pertain to Khasra No. 1295. The second contention was that the plaintiff-respondent was not party to such demarcation report. In these circumstances, the learned District Judge was satisfied that the additional evidence was not relevant for the purpose of deciding the appeal and that the same was also not required to enable it to pronounce the judgment. It is noticed that the learned District Judge passed the impugned order when the entire appeal was before him. 22. In the given circumstances, the impugned order, in my view, does not call for any interference. 23. In the end learned Counsel for the petitioner points out that the learned District Judge has himself observed that the defendants ought to have resorted to the provisions of Order 26 of the Code for appointment of Local Commissioner for the demarcation of the land subject matter of dispute to find out whether or not any part of the land of the plaintiff-respondent was encroached by the defendant-petitioners and that this court may direct the District Judge to appoint such Local Commissioner. To my mind, no such directions are required to be passed. It would, however, be open to the petitioners to approach the learned District Judge for the appointment of Local Commissioner to demarcate the land subject matter of dispute to find out whether or not any part of the land of the plaintiff-respondent comprised in Khasra No. 1294 is encroached by the petitioners-defendants, such application, if filed, shall be decided by the learned District Judge on its own merits. 24. No other point is urged before me. The revision petition is dismissed. Any observation made hereinabove shall not be construed to be any reflection on the merits of the appeal which will be decided by the learned District Judge, in accordance with law. No costs. 24. No other point is urged before me. The revision petition is dismissed. Any observation made hereinabove shall not be construed to be any reflection on the merits of the appeal which will be decided by the learned District Judge, in accordance with law. No costs. The parties are directed to appear before the learned District Judge, Mandi, on Second July, 2001. Revision dismissed. -