JUDGMENT 1. - Because of the reason that common facts and question of law involved in between the same parties, therefore, all these appeals are being decided by this common order. 2. The appellants by filing these misc. appeals have challenged the order dated 29.11.2000 passed by Additional District Judge No. 1, Ajmer in misc. case Nos. 70/2000 : 68/2000 : 71/2000 : 67/2000 and 72/2000 whereby rejected the application for setting aside the award passed by the sole Arbitrator dated 15.7.2000. 3. One Mr. D.C. Sharma was appointed as a sole Arbitrator on 12.1.1998 on the application made under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. The Arbitrator gave its award on 15.7.2000 and submitted the same before the court on 1.8.2000 for making Rule of the Court. The court had given notice to defendant-appellants on 5.8.2000 by fixing 4.9.2000 as date for appearance. 4. It is submitted that on 4.9.2000 the appearance was made through Mr. J.S. Rana, Advocate. The respondent submitted objection under Section 34 pf the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The present appellants defendant has not filed the objection in time, therefore, on 29.11.2000 the objections were filed under section 5 of Limitation Act along with the application for setting aside the Award. The application for setting aside the Award was rejected and so was the application under section 5 of limitation Act. Being aggrieved by the order dated 29.11.2000, the present appeal has been filed. 5. It is the contention of counsel for appellant that the application for setting aside the Award has been wrongly rejected and that there were sufficient reasons to condone the delay in filing the application. It is also one of the contention of the appellant that the provisions of Arbitration Act of 1940 were applicable in the present case, and therefore, the notice as required under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 should have been given to the appellants. 6. It is not denied that the Advocate had appeared in the court on 4.9.2000 in response to filing of the award. It was alleged that in the award dated 15.7.2000, the respondent prayed that the interest should have been awarded from the date of breach of agreement. However, later on the respondent had not pressed the objections and prayed that the award be made rule of court. The present appellant had also filed certain objections. It was alleged that in the award dated 15.7.2000, the respondent prayed that the interest should have been awarded from the date of breach of agreement. However, later on the respondent had not pressed the objections and prayed that the award be made rule of court. The present appellant had also filed certain objections. The objections were relating to non affording of opportunity to the representative before the Arbitrator. It was found by the trial court that the Advocate Mr. J.S. Rana was regularly appearing before the Arbitrator, and therefore, the objection being raised was not correct. The present appellant submitted the objections on 27.11.2000 before the court below. 7. It is proved that the copy of the award dated 15.7.2000 had been given to UIT on 17.7.2000 and as per Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996 the objections could be filed within three months of the receipt of award. In case the sufficient reasons are shown, as per section 30 of the Act, the maximum time of another 30 days can be extended, but not later than that period, meaning thereby, the objections could be filed within 120 days only. It was held by the trial court that the period of three months had expired on 17.10.2000, after which date no objection could be entertained and the award became final award under section 35 of the Act. Section 36 of the Act provides that in such situation the award itself becomes Rule of Court. The trial court held that the statutory period of 120 days had since elapsed and the appellant had filed objections beyond the statutory period, therefore, the objections cannot be entertained. 8. In the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act for accepting the objections beyond the period of limitation, the trial court has observed that the application was filed when the order was being dictated. Copy of the application was given to counsel for respondent at 12.15 p.m, but still the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was argued. The trial court had not accepted the reasons given by UIT, as sufficient reasons for condoning the delay. The reasons given by UIT was that the department was busy because of URS Mela (FAIR OF 'URS') and in regard to regularisation of temporary colonies. 9. The trial court had not accepted the reasons given by UIT, as sufficient reasons for condoning the delay. The reasons given by UIT was that the department was busy because of URS Mela (FAIR OF 'URS') and in regard to regularisation of temporary colonies. 9. After hearing counsel for parties, I am in full agreement with the reasons given by the trial court to the effect that only because there was Ursa Mela, therefore, the department was unable to give attention to the court case and that the department was busy in regularisation of temporary colonies, which is general function of the department and it cannot be said that it is sufficient reason for not filing the objections within the statutory period. In my opinion, no sufficient reason has been given at all to show as to how the department was dealing with the case, particularly when the Advocate of the department was appearing in court regularly. 10. It is not denied that the copy of the award itself was received in the department on 17.7.2000 and normally 90 days time was available to the department to file the objections, i.e., up to 17.10.2000 the objections could have been filed. Under Section 34 of the Act, the objections could be entertained within 30 days even thereafter, if the sufficient reasons are shown. No objections were filed even within such extended period. The appellant has not been able to show proper cause for not filing the objections within the statutory period. Admittedly the objections were filed beyond the period of limitation. In my opinion, the trial court was justified in holding that the reasons given by the appellant were not sufficient reasons at all to condone the delay. The department was dealing the case in very casual manner. The opposite party did file the objections, but later on did not press such objections and still the appellant did not wake up to exercise its obligations of filing of the objections within time. 11. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the impugned order and In view of the above discussions. I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order. The trial court has rightly dismissed the application and has rightly made the Award the Rule of Court. There is no merit in the misc. appeals. 12. With the above observations, the Misc. Appeals are dismissed in limine.Misc. I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order. The trial court has rightly dismissed the application and has rightly made the Award the Rule of Court. There is no merit in the misc. appeals. 12. With the above observations, the Misc. Appeals are dismissed in limine.Misc. Appeals Dismissed. *******