JUDGMENT E. Padmanabhan, J. These two writ appeals have been preferred against the very same order of the learned single Judge dated 23.12.1994 made in W.P.No.448 of 1992. 2. W.A.No.370 of 1995 has been preferred, by the requisitioning body. M/s. Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan represented by its Manager, for whose benefit the land was sought to be acquired challenging the order quashing the Acquisition. 3. W.A.No.426 of 1995 has been preferred by the State of Tamil Nadu and its Special Deputy Collector seeking to sustain the acquisition proceedings while praying the Division Bench to set aside the order of the learned single Judge. 4. The learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition quashed the acquisition proceedings on the sole ground that the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the Newspapers preceding the Gazette publication vitiates the acquisition by following the judgment in Rajagopal v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990)2 MLJ. 404 . Being aggrieved the present writ appeals have been preferred. 5. The view of the learned single Judge that the publication of 4(1) Notification in the paper preceding the Gazette Notification is an illegality is no longer good law since it has been held that the provision namely Sec.4(1) as to publication of notification is only a directory and such a publication not an illegality but a mere irregularity which will not vitiate the acquisition. 6. In this respect the learned Special Government Pleader rightly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Venkatasomappa v. Special Deputy Collector A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 503 where their Lordships of the Supreme Court have taken a contrary view to the view taken in Rajagopal v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990)2 MLJ. 404 and the sole point sustained to quash the acquisition, deserves to be reversed. 7. However, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents/land owners contended that the respondents could sustain the order of the learned single Judge various other grounds which are prima facie in nature and therefore persuaded this Court to take up and consider other contentions, which have already been raised in the writ petition and not been gone into by the learned single Judge. There is every justification to permit the writ petitioner to advance arguments on their grounds though raised, but considered unnecessary at that stage. The learned counsel for the appellants/state also cannot have any objection. There is every justification to permit the writ petitioner to advance arguments on their grounds though raised, but considered unnecessary at that stage. The learned counsel for the appellants/state also cannot have any objection. Hence, this Court directed the counsel for the contesting respondents to serve a notice on the counsel for the appellants in both the writ appeals as to the grounds of challenge by which the respondents seek to sustain the order quashing the acquisition. 8. In that context on 23.7.2001 this Court passed the following order: “Heard the Government Pleader appearing for the appellant in W.A.426 of 1995 and Mrs. Rita Chandrasekar for the appellant in W.A.370 of 1995 and Mr. K.Sridhar appearing for the respondents. On the sole ground the paper publication has proceeded the Gazette Notification under Sec.4(1), the acquisition proceedings have been quashed by the learned single Judge. However, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners/respondents herein represents that he would like to address arguments in support of the other points which were raised but had not been gone into by the learned single Judge. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents Mr. K.Sridhar shall serve a notice, on the points which he intends to argue, on the learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals before 26.7.2001. Call this on 30.7.2001. The Government Pleader shall produce the files also.” 9. Accordingly the counsel for the contesting respondents/writ petitioners served a memorandum setting out other grounds on which the acquisition proceedings are challenged to sustain the order of the learned single Judge. 10. In the interest of justice, we permitted the counsel for the contesting respondents to advance arguments on other grounds raised by them in the writ petitions. Instead of remitting the matter back to the learned single Judge, with a view to avoid further delay and to render substantial and ultimate justice, we have heard either side in respect of the other grounds on which the impugned land acquisition proceedings are challenged. The counsel for the appellants took notice and they also made their submissions. 11. For convening the parties will be referred as arrayed in the writ petitions as we propose to consider the other contentions which have not been gone into by the learned single Judge, though raised in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. 12. The counsel for the appellants took notice and they also made their submissions. 11. For convening the parties will be referred as arrayed in the writ petitions as we propose to consider the other contentions which have not been gone into by the learned single Judge, though raised in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. 12. The petitioners are admittedly owners of the land and building located on Mount Road, wherein a massive building measuring 15000 sq.ft., and odd stands. The extent of the land is not in dispute as well as the existence of substantial building standing thereon and in the occupation of the requisitioning body for more than four decades. Admittedly the third respondent in the writ petition M/s. Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan is a tenant of the premises for decades. The writ petitioners instituted Rent Control Proceedings for fixation of fair rent. In the fair rent proceedings, ultimately the parties have filed a joint memo agreeing for the revision of rent at Rs.21,000 per month in C.R.P. No.4876 of 1984 and 1185 of 1985 and a compromise was recorded on 10.7.1987. It is also admitted that the writ petitioners instituted eviction proceedings against the third respondent on the ground that the third respondent had committed act of waste by running an unauthorised restaurant for the public in the premises. The said eviction petition has since been dismissed. 13. It is admitted that M/s. Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and its objects being to sub-serve the rural poor villagers by encouraging sale of Khadi and Village industries products and those products are being stored, exhibited and sold in the premises. According to the petitioners their late father, who was interested in Gandhian movement and a close associate of late Kamaraj, the then Chief Minister, on his persuasion allowed the society to occupy on a nominal rent to encourage the Khadi and Village Industries. The land and building is located on the busiest part of Mount Road, now renamed as Anna Salai very next to India Silk House and surrounded by the leading business houses, a peak point in the city of Chennai. 14. The third respondent which has been facing the eviction proceedings and fair rent proceedings moved the State Government to acquire the entire land and building to the petitioners for its office. 14. The third respondent which has been facing the eviction proceedings and fair rent proceedings moved the State Government to acquire the entire land and building to the petitioners for its office. The State Government issued a notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 6.7.1988 and the same was published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette dated 10.8.1988. 15. As seen from the 4(1) Notification, the land has been notified under Sec.4(1) for a public purpose “to wit for Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan and the existing office”. The said Notification which was published in the Government Gazette dated 10.8.1988. The Sec.4(1) Notification was published in the Tamil Dailies on 6.6.1988 preceding the Gazette Notification. According to the petitioners substance of Sec.4(1) Notification was published highly belated in the locality only on 2.3.1989, as set out in the Sec.5-A proceedings and communicated to the writ petitioners by the second respondent-Land Acquisition Officer. 16. As seen from the counter affidavit on 14.10.1988 an errata to Sec.4(1) Notification was issued as the name of the persons interested. Survey Number and the extent were omitted to be set out in the 4(1) Notification as was published in the dailies. The said Errata dated 26.12.1988 was published in the newspapers “Thina Thanthi” and Ponmanam” on 17.2.1989 and in the Government Gazette dated 22.2.1989. Thereafter, the substance of the Sec.4(1) Notification was published in the locality only on 2.3.1989, after a lapse of Eight months. 17. Afterwards, on 6.5.1989, a notice under Sec.5-A enquiry was served on the petitioners and the petitioners submitted their objections. On 24.5.1989, as seen from the counter affidavit Sec.5-A enquiry was conducted by the Land Acquisition Officer. At the request of the petitioners 5-A enquiry was adjourned to 7.6.1989 on which date the writ petitioners submitted their objections. The objections were communicated to the requisitioning body on 7.6.1989 itself. On 16.6.1989 the remarks of the requisitioning body was received by the Land Acquisition Officer and it was communicated to the petitioners on 22.6.1989. An enquiry under Sec.5-A was once again conducted on 26.2.1990. One of the writ petitioners appeared along with this counsel and presented their objections once again on 26.2.1990 reiterating their objections already submitted and requested for dropping of the acquisition. An enquiry under Sec.5-A was once again conducted on 26.2.1990. One of the writ petitioners appeared along with this counsel and presented their objections once again on 26.2.1990 reiterating their objections already submitted and requested for dropping of the acquisition. Once again the said objections were communicated to the requisitioning body, who was present at that time and they in turn presented their remarks to the said objections by 2.00 p.m. on 26.2.1990. The copy of the reply or remarks submitted by the requisitioning body was served on the counsel for the petitioners on the same date. With that the enquiry under Sec.5-A came to be concluded. 18. It is the stand of the respondents that as the Declaration under Sec.6 of the Act is required to be published on or before 1.3.1990 and there was no time for obtaining a reply from the land owners with respect to the rejoinder of remarks submitted by the third respondent. The Land Acquisition Officer after considering the objections and remarks submitted a report to the Government to overrule the objections and to publish a Declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. 19. The State Government issued a Declaration on 1.3.1990 in G.O.Ms.No.72 and the same was published in the Gazette on the same day, besides it was published in the dailies as well as in the locality. 20. As seen from the counter affidavit the Land Acquisition Officer had served a notice before passing an Award for conducting award enquiry. The Award enquiry was fixed on 21.1.1992 and a Notice under Secs.9(3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act was served on the land owners and the requisitioning body on 24.12.1991 and published in the locality on 24.12.1991. On 21.1.1992, the land owners appeared and took time for filing a claim statement. The award proceedings came to be adjourned to 18.2.1992. At that stage the writ petitioners moved this Court and secured orders of interim stay. 21. In the writ petition on the above facts, the petitioners raised the following points: (a) Rule 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Rules which is mandatory had not been followed. (b) The Declaration published under Sec.6 of the Act has been made after the expiry of one year from the last of the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification. (c) The land has not been acquired for a public purpose. (b) The Declaration published under Sec.6 of the Act has been made after the expiry of one year from the last of the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification. (c) The land has not been acquired for a public purpose. (d) The acquisition made under Part II of the Land Acquisition Act is invalid and acquisition if at all should have been resorted under Part VII of the Act as it is for the third respondent Society, falling within the definition of “Company”? (e) The Acquisition is mala fide, not a bona fide exercise of power and it is an arbitrary exercise of power of eminent domain in acquiring a large commercial building at Mount Road? (f) The Notification and Declaration in so far as it had not included the name of the persons having interests as well as had omitted to set out the massive structure of 15000 sq.ft in the schedule vitiates the acquisition. (g) The substance of Sec.4(1) Notification has not been published in the locality within the reasonable time and this vitiates the acquisition. (f) The errata said to have been issued and published is highly belated and the entire acquisition proceedings is liable to be quashed as there has been inordinate delay in the acquisition proceedings. 22. While meeting the above contentions, Mrs.M.G.Kalaiselvi, learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for respondents 1 and 2 Mr.A.L. Somayaji, the learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent contended that there are no merits in the above contentions. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel contended that there is no delay between Sec.4(1) Notification and Sec.6 Declaration. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, further contended that Rule 3(b) has been complied with and there is a valid publication of substance of Sec.4(1) Notification. 23. The counsel for the respondents further contended that the acquisition is only for a public purpose as the third respondent-society is sub-serving a Sec. of the public namely poor villagers where Khadi and other village products are being manufactured and brought to sale at Madras and that the third respondent is under the control and supervision of the Government and therefore the acquisition is for a public purpose and it is not necessary to resort to Part VII of the Act. It is contended that Rule 3(b) had not been violated? 24. It is contended that Rule 3(b) had not been violated? 24. On the above contentions, the following points arise for consideration: (I) Whether the acquisition for the third respondent-society not being made under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, but under Part II of the Act is invalid and liable to be quashed? (II) Whether there is valid publication of substance of 4(1) Notification in the locality? Whether the failure and delay vitiates the acquisition proceedings? Whether there is any interruption in the acquisition proceedings by reason of the delay in publishing the substance of Notification under Sec.4(1) Notification in the Gazette and the acquisition proceedings had been interrupted by the delay? (III) Whether the mandatory provisions of Rule 3(b) had been complied with? (IV) Whether the failure to mention the existing massive building in 4(1) Notification and Sec.6 Declaration vitiates the acquisition? (V) Whether Sec.6 Declaration has been published beyond the period of one year from the date of Sec.4(1) Notification? 25. Before taking up the above material points in the order, it is essential to set out the Notification issued under Sec.4(1) as well as the Declaration issued under Sec.6 of the Act for immediate reference and the same are set out hereunder: NOTIFICATION “WHEREAS it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that the lands specified in the schedule below and situated in Triplicane Village in Mylapore Triplicane Taluk, Madras is needed for a public purpose to wit for Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan existing office, notice to that effect is hereby given to all to whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of sub Sec.(1) of Sec.4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894). NOW, THEREFORE in exercise of the powers conferred by sub Sec. (2) of Sec.4 of the said Act, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby authorises the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) (City Works) Madras-5 to perform the functions of the Collector under Sec.5-A of the said Act.” THE SCHEDULE District, Madras Taluk Mylapore/Triplicane Village Triplicane (Total extent to be acquired approximate) Government House site R.S.No.3225, Part Block No.64, Registered Holder (1) P.S.Ayya Mudaliar (2) P.S. Muthu Mudaliar present owners (3) Mohammed Habibullah Sahib (deceased) legal heirs (4) Razia Begum (wife) (5) Mr.M.Azra, (6) Mr.M.Isharath, (7) Mr.M.Showkath, (8) Mr.M.Hasmath, (9) Mr.M.Rabath (5 to 9 are sons of the deceased). 10. 10. Mrs.Dardana, Daughter, bounded on North by 3224/2, 3225 part, South by R.S.No.3224/2, 3226/1, 3280 East by R.S.No.3280 and West by R.S.No.3224/2.6. Extent: 0.2.1730 sq.ft., DECLARATION The Government of Tamil Nadu having been satisfied that the lands specified in the schedule below has to be acquired for the public purpose, to wit, for Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan existing office and it having already been decided that the entire amount of compensation to be awarded for the lands is to be paid by the requisitioning body, the following declaration is issued under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894). DECLARATION “Under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby declares that the land specified in the schedule below and measuring an extent of 0.0.2 Grs. 1730 sq.ft. be the same little more or less is needed for a public purpose to wit, for the locating of Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan, Madras-2. A plan of the land is kept in the office of the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Works, Madras city, Madras-5 and may be inspected at any time during office hours.” THE SCHEDULE Madras District, Mylapore Triplicane Taluk, Triplicane Village, Government House site R.S.No.3225, of Triplicane Village Registered Holders (1) P.S.Ayya Mudaliar (2) P.S.Muthu Mudaliar present owners (3) Mohammed Habibullah Sahib (Deceased) legal heirs (4) Rasheeda Begum (wife) (5) Mr.M.Azra, (6) Mr.M.Isharath, (7) Mr.M.Shoawkath, (8) Mr.M.Hasmath, (9) Mr.M.Rafath (10) Mrs.Durdana Sl.Nos. 6 to 9 are sons and 5 and 10 are daughters of the deceased 10. Mrs.Dardana, daughter, bounded on the North by 3224/2, 3225 part, South by R.S.No.3224/2, 3226/1. 3280 East by R.S.No.3280 part and West by R.S.No.3224/2 (Total Extent 0-3-0916 sq.ft.,) Extent to be acquired 0-2-1730 sq.ft., Total: Grounds 2-1730 sq.ft., 26. As seen from the Notification the public purpose being to wit for the Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. As seen from the Sec.6 Declaration the Declaration has been made to wit for Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan, existing office and it having already been decided that the “entire amount of compensation to be awarded for the land is to be paid by the requisitioning body” and no portion of it is borne from and out of public funds of the state. 27. The expression “public purpose” is defined in Sec.3(f) of the Act. It is an inclusive definition. 27. The expression “public purpose” is defined in Sec.3(f) of the Act. It is an inclusive definition. Sec.3(e) defines the expression “company”. 3(e) The expression “Company” means:-- (i) (ii) “A society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1960 or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, other than a society referred to in clause (cc).” 28. There is no dispute that the third respondent-Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan is a “Society” registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 and not falling under the expression Corporation Board owned or controlled by the State. Nor, it could be stated that it is a society established or administered either by the Central or State Government. Nor, it is a Co-operative Society within the meaning of law relating to any Co-operative Society. 29. It may be that to encourage production of Khadi and sale of Khadi and Village Industry products the State Government as well as the Central Government sanction subsidies during festival season for sale of Khadi. But that does not mean that the Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan is a society established or administered by Government. Even according to the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent, it has nowhere been stated that it is a society controlled or administered by the Government or any contribution had been made by the Government. Therefore factually the third respondent will not fall under the expression Corporation owned or controlled by state. Being a society, the third respondent definitely falls under the expression “company” as defined in Sec.3(e) of the Act. The expression “public purpose”, though it is an inclusive definition, the requirement of the third respondent will not fall under any one of the clauses falling in Sec.3(f). 30. Mr.A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel contended that the acquisition may fall under clause (iv) of clause 3(f), namely the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State. We are not persuaded to sustain this as the Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan is not a Corporation owned or controlled by the state. Nextly it was contended that the acquisition will fall under clause (vi) of the expression “public purpose”. We are not persuaded to sustain this as the Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan is not a Corporation owned or controlled by the state. Nextly it was contended that the acquisition will fall under clause (vi) of the expression “public purpose”. This plea of Mr.A.L.Somayaji, cannot be sustained as the land is not required for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by the Government, or, by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme or with the prior approval of the appropriate Government by the local authority or a Society or a Co-operative Society registered under the Societies Registration Act or a Co-operative Society. As seen from the Sec.4(1) Notification and Sec.6 Declaration the land acquisition proceedings had not been initiated for any educational, housing, health or for slum clearance scheme. Hence the plea that it will fall under Clause (vi) of definition clause 3(f) “public purpose” cannot be sustained. 31. It was nextly contended that the requirement will fall under clause (viii), namely provision of any premises or building for locating a public office. This plea also cannot be sustained as the location of a show room or continuation of Sales and stock centre run by the third respondent-society cannot be equated to a public office, nor it could be deemed to be a public office, as the very definition of public purpose makes it clear that the acquisition of land for companies is not included in the definition of public purpose and it should not be forgotten that no part of the compensation is being paid out of public revenue or funds controlled by the State. Hence the acquisition of land for the third respondent-Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan as contended by Mr.Sridhar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner is not a public purpose as defined in Sec.3(f) of the Act. 32. It has to be pointed out that the acquisition in favour of the third respondent-Khadi Gramodyog Bhavan, if at all has to be initiated and completed under Part VII of the Act and not under Part II of the Act. Part VII of the Act provides for acquisition of land for companies. The expression “Company” as already referred includes the third respondent-society. It is admitted that the acquisition under challenge has been made under Part II and not under Part VII. Part VII of the Act provides for acquisition of land for companies. The expression “Company” as already referred includes the third respondent-society. It is admitted that the acquisition under challenge has been made under Part II and not under Part VII. Admittedly the provisions of Part VII had not either been applied or been complied with by any of the respondent and consequently acquisition for the third respondent-society is invalid in its entirety. There is no escape from this legal position as the provisions of Part VII admittedly and not been complied with. The acquisition under Part II of the Act cannot be invoked for the purpose of the third respondent-society, it is clear that the acquisition cannot be proceeded by invoking Part II of the Act and if at all it could be made only under Part VII of the Act. In this respect it is useful to refer to the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry and others Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry and others Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry and others (1994)4 S.C.C. 675 as well as HMT Housing Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2244. In Srinivasa Co-operative Housing Building Society case the Apex Court while considering the scope of the expression public purpose, held thus: “3. Sec.3(e) of the Act defined company under pre-1984 Amendment Act as meaning a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882 and included a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, or any other law relating to Co-operative Societies for the time being in force in any State. Sec.3(f) defined the expression public purpose to include the provision of village-sites in districts in which the Appropriate Government shall have declared by notification in the Official Gazette that it is customary for the Government to make such provision. Chapter VII deals with the acquisition of land for companies. Art.31 of the Constitution (preceding 44th Constitution Amendment Act, 1978) prohibits compulsory acquisition of the property for anything except for a public purpose. Public purpose is not capable of precise definition. Each case has to be considered in the light of the purpose for which acquisition is sought for. Chapter VII deals with the acquisition of land for companies. Art.31 of the Constitution (preceding 44th Constitution Amendment Act, 1978) prohibits compulsory acquisition of the property for anything except for a public purpose. Public purpose is not capable of precise definition. Each case has to be considered in the light of the purpose for which acquisition is sought for. It is to serve the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual. Public purpose broadly speaking would include the purpose in which the general interest of the society as opposed to the particular interest of the individual is directly and vitally concerned. Generally the executive would be the best Judge to determine whether or not the impugned purpose is a public purpose. Yet it is not beyond the purview of judicial scrutiny. The interest of a section of the society may be public purpose when it is benefited by the acquisition. The acquisition in question must indicate that it was towards the welfare of the people and not to benefit a private individual or group of individuals joined collectively. Therefore, acquisition for anything which is not for a public purpose cannot be done compulsorily. Admittedly, there is no group having scheme approved by the State Government. On the other hand, housing schemes are being executed by the A.P. Housing Board under the Act. We are not concerned with the public purpose as amended under the 1984 Act. 4. The Act recognises dichotomy, namely, acquisition for a public purpose in Chapter II and acquisition for a private purpose of a type restricted in Chapter VII. There is no provision in the Act to say that when a land is required for a company, it may also be for a public purpose. Therefore, if a company, namely, a Co-operative Society registered under the Central or State Co-operative Societies Act, preceding 1984 Amendment Act, had to acquire the land it had to do so in strict compliance with Chapter VII. If the Company (Co-operative Society) requires land for any purpose other than those mentioned in Sec.40, then no compulsory acquisition under the act is possible. Part VII nowhere authorities the Government to apply the provision of that part to private acquisition. If the Company (Co-operative Society) requires land for any purpose other than those mentioned in Sec.40, then no compulsory acquisition under the act is possible. Part VII nowhere authorities the Government to apply the provision of that part to private acquisition. A.P. State Amendment Act expressly included acquisition for providing house sites for the poor; for the execution of any housing scheme under A.P. Housing Boards Act; godowns for a cooperative society as for public and urgent purposes. By necessary implication the acquisition for a private cooperative House Building Society to construct houses for its members must be a private purpose.” 33. In HMT Housing Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2244 the Apex Court held thus: “15. The substituted definition of the expression “company” in Sec.3(3)(iii) will certainly include the appellant-society. The substituted definition of the expression “company” shall include cooperative society, within the meaning of any law relating to cooperative societies other than those referred to in clause (cc) of Sec.3 of the Act. Such cooperative society shall be deemed to be a company, to which provisions of Chapter VII relating to acquisition of land for company shall be applicable. 34. In Shyam Behari and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others Shyam Behari and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others Shyam Behari and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 427 a Five Judges Bench of the Apex Court while considering the scope of Sec.6 (1) of the Act where in the entire compensation to the land owner is to be paid by the company for which the land is acquired and no part of compensation is to come out of public revenues, the declaration issued that the land is needed for a public purpose must be held to be invalid. After placing reliance on the earlier pronouncement in Jhandulal v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 343 it has been held thus: “3. The only question that has been urged before us on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court was in error in reading the two notifications as in substance amounting to a declaration that the land was required for a company. Sec.6 (1) of the Act requires that whenever any land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect. Sec.6 (1) of the Act requires that whenever any land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect. Further the proviso to Sec.6(1) provides that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. This clearly contemplates to kinds of declarations. In the first place, a declaration may be made that land is required for a public purpose, in which case in view of proviso, the compensation to be awarded for the property to be acquired must come wholly or partly out of public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. No declaration under Sec.6 for acquisition of land for a public purpose can be made unless either the whole or part of the compensation for the property to be acquired is to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority; see Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab (1961)2 S.C.R. 459 : A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 343. In the second place, the declaration under Sec.6 may be made that land is needed for a company in which case the entire compensation has to be paid by the company. It is clear therefore that where the entire compensation is to be paid by a company, the notification under Sec.6 must contain a declaration that the land is needed for company. No Notification under Sec.6 can be made where the entire compensation is to be paid by a company declaring that the acquisition is for a public purpose, for such a declaration requires that either wholly or in part, compensation must come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. In the present case, it is not in dispute that no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority; on the other hand the whole compensation was to be paid by the company. In the present case, it is not in dispute that no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority; on the other hand the whole compensation was to be paid by the company. Therefore, the notification under Sec.6 if it was to be valid in the circumstances of the present case had to declare that the land was needed for a company. No valid notification under Sec.6 could be made in the circumstances of this case declaring that the land was needed for a public purpose, for no part of compensation was to be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.” 35. In R.L.Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others R.L.Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others R.L.Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1230 (popularly known as second Arora case), a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court had occasion to consider the validity of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (Act 31 of 1961). In the said case the majority of the Judges while upholding the validity of the Amendment and holding that the said Amending Act is not in contravention of Art.31(1) as well as Art.14 of the Constitution, while examining the scope of Part VII and in particular Sec.40 of the Act held thus: “As we read the clause we are of opinion that the public purpose of the company for which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from the purposes of the building or work and it is not open for such a company to acquire land under Clause (aa) for a building or work which will not subserve the public purpose of the company. We are therefore of opinion that in the setting in which clause (aa) appears and in the circumstances in which it came to be enacted, a literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is not the only construction of this clause and that there is another construction which in our opinion is a better construction, and which is that the public purpose of the company is also implicit in the purpose of the building or work which is to be constructed for the company and it is only for such work or building which subserves the public purpose of the company that acquisition under Clause (aa) can be made. Thus there are two possible constructions of this clause, one a mere mechanical and literal construction based on rules of grammar and the other which emerges from the setting in which the clause appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and also from the words used therein, namely, acquisition being for a company which has a public purpose behind it and therefore the building or work which is to be constructed and for which land is required must also have the same public purpose behind it, that animates the company making the construction. We are therefore clearly of opinion that two constructions are possible of this clause of which the second construction which is other than literal is the better one. It is well settled that if certain provisions of law constituted in one way will be consistent with the Constitution, and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction: (see Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962)2 S.C.R. (Supp) 769: A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 955. We are therefore of opinion that clause(aa) does not permit acquisition of land for construction of some building or work for a company engaged or to be engaged in an industry or work, which is for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also subserves the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged. This is in our opinion the better construction of clause (aa) taking into account the setting in which it appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and the words used therein. This is in our opinion the better construction of clause (aa) taking into account the setting in which it appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and the words used therein. If that is the true construction of clause (aa) it cannot be said took contravene Art.31(2) for the public purpose required therein is present where land is required for the construction of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which a company is engaged or is about to be engaged.” It is true that acquisition for the purpose of clause(aa) can only be made for a Government company or a public company and cannot be made for a private company or a public company or an individual; but there is in our opinion a clear classification between a public company and a Government company on the one hand and a private company and an individual on the other, which has reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved under the law. The intention of the legislature clearly is that private individuals and private companies which really consist of a few private individuals banded together should not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they may be intending to engage in some industry or work which may be for a public purpose inasmuch the enrichment consequent on such work goes to private individuals or to a group of them who have formed themselves into a private company. Public companies on the other hand are broad based and Government companies are really in a sense no different from Government, though for convenience of administration a Government company may be formed, which thus becomes a separate legal entity. Thus in one case the acquisition results in private enrichment while in the other it is the public which gains in every way. Therefore, a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object behind clause (aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under this head must therefore also fail.” 36. Therefore, a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object behind clause (aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under this head must therefore also fail.” 36. In State of West Bengal v. P.N. Talukdar State of West Bengal v. P.N. Talukdar State of West Bengal v. P.N. Talukdar A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 646 a Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court examined the validity of acquisition for Ramakrishna Mission, a company mentioning that the acquisition is for a public purpose and the expenses to be borne by the mission. It was held that the acquisition is valid since the acquisition was undertaken in compliance with Part VII. In that respect the Apex Court held thus: “9. The law on the subject relating to land acquisition whether for a public purpose of for a company is now well settled after the decisions of this Court in Babu Narkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (1961)1 S.C.R. 128 : A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1203; Jhandu Lal We may refer to the gist of these decisions as given in Arora's case, with respect to the notification under Sec.6 of the Act, whether acquisitions is for a public purpose or for a company: “In a case, the notification under Sec.6 will say that the acquisition is for a public purpose, in the other case the notification will say that it is for a company. The Proviso to Sec.6(1) shows that where the acquisition is for a public purpose, the compensation has to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority. Where however the acquisition is for a company, the compensation would be paid wholly by the company. Though therefore this distinction is there where the acquisition is either for a public purpose or for a company, there is not a complete dichotomy between acquisition for the two purposes and it cannot be maintained that where the acquisition is primarily for a company it must always be preceded by action under Part VII and compensation must always be paid wholly by the company. A third class of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the same time for a public purpose and the whole or part of compensation may be paid out for public revenues or some find controlled or managed by local authority. In such a case though the acquisition may look as if it is primarily for a company it will be covered by that part of Sec.6 which lays down that acquisition may be made for a public purpose if the whole or part of the compensation is to be paid of the revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.” 10. The first question that falls for consideration is whether the acquisition in this case was for a public purpose in which case the whole or part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues etc or for a company in which case the whole of the compensation has to be paid by the company. The argument of behalf of the respondents is that as one reads the notification under Sec.6 issued in this case, it appears that the acquisition is for a public purpose and not for a company and therefore, in order that the notification may be valid the whole or part of the compensation had to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. It is urged that it is clear in this case that the entire compensation was to be paid by the Mission and therefore when the notification said that the acquisition was for a public purpose it must be held to be invalid. Reliance in this connection has been placed on a decision of this Court in Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, C.A.No.177 of 1963 D/3-2-1964 Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, C.A.No.177 of 1963 D/3-2-1964 Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, C.A.No.177 of 1963 D/3-2-1964 A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 427. That decision referred to the law on the subject which we have quoted above from R.L.Arora's case, and then turned to the interpretation of the particular notification under challenge in that case. It is therefore to help in the present case where we have to consider the interpretation of the notification quoted above. That decision referred to the law on the subject which we have quoted above from R.L.Arora's case, and then turned to the interpretation of the particular notification under challenge in that case. It is therefore to help in the present case where we have to consider the interpretation of the notification quoted above. The notification here says that the land is needed for a public purpose, namely, for construction of staff-quarters, hostel buildings and playground of Ramakrishna Mission at Nerendrapur. Though therefore the notification beings by saying that the land is needed for a public purpose and does not say that it is needed for a company it does specify for what particular purpose the land is needed, namely, for construction of staff quarters, hostel buildings and playground of the Mission which as we have already said is a company. The notification therefore, indicate that the land is needed for a company, though it does not say so in so many words. Finally, the notification says that the land is needed for “the aforesaid public purpose at the public expenses of the Ramakrishna Mission”. We must say that this language is rather curious, for if the compensation was to be paid by the Mission it could not be at the “public expenses” and in any case the words “the public expenses of the Ramakrishna Mission”, are a contradiction in terms. The reasonable interpretation these words therefore is that the acquisition will be at the expense of the Mission. This is borne out by the fact that the agreement under Sec.41 which preceded the notification and which must precede in view of Sec.39 provides in clause (1) thereof that “all and every compensation in respect of the said land shall be paid by the Mission”. There is no doubt that the notification under Sec.6 is very clumsily drafted and we cannot fail to condemn such clumsy drafting where the notification is the bass of all subsequent proceedings. But on a fair and reasonable reading of the notification under Section in this case there can be no doubt that it means that the land is required for a company (namely, the Mission) and that it is to be acquired at the expense of the company (namely, the Mission). But on a fair and reasonable reading of the notification under Section in this case there can be no doubt that it means that the land is required for a company (namely, the Mission) and that it is to be acquired at the expense of the company (namely, the Mission). Therefore the contention on behalf of the respondents that the notification is bad inasmuch as it says that the land is needed for a public purpose and there is no provision for payment of compensation in part on in whole from the public revenues or some fund managed or controlled by a local authority, must fail.” 37. In Valjibhai v. State of Bombay Valjibhai v. State of Bombay Valjibhai v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1890 a Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court while examining the Declaration issued under Sec.6(1) of the Act as to the public purpose of the acquisition and the scope of judicial review held thus: “7. We must, however, point out that before effect can be given to a notification under Sub-Sec.(1) of Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act the terms of the Proviso to that Section should be satisfied. Sec.6(1) and the Proviso read thus: “Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Sec.5A, Sub-sec.(2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders: Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.8. The Proviso clearly precludes the Government from making a notification under Sub-Sec.(1) of Sec.6 unless (a) the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company or is to come(b) wholly or partly out of (i) public revenues or (ii) some found controlled or managed by a local authority. 9. It is no doubt true that it has been the appellants case throughout that the State Transport Corporation is a company. 9. It is no doubt true that it has been the appellants case throughout that the State Transport Corporation is a company. It is also a fact that the entire compensation is to come out of the funds of the State Transport Corporation. If, therefore, we accept the contention of the appellants on this point the terms of the Proviso will be said to have borne satisfied. On the other hand it has been the case of the respondent that the State Transport Corporation is not a company but a local authority. The reason why this contention is raised on behalf of the respondent is that the provisions of Part VII of the Act have not been complied with here and therefore, if in fact the acquisition is on behalf of a company it will have to be said to be bad on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Part VII.” 38. In State of Gujarat v. Bhoglal A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 367 while examining the validity of acquisition which was declared after the first Notification and followed it with second notification under Sec.6, the Apex Court held thus: “4. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was in error in striking down the second notification under Sec.6 issued on September, 10, 1964. In Valjibhai Muljibhai Sonaji v. State of Bombay (1964) S.C.R. 686 the Court held that the Government has no power to issue a notification for acquisition of land for a public purpose, where the compensation is to be entirely paid by a company. The first notification issued by the Government under Sec.6 of acquisition of the land for a public purpose, at the expense of the second respondent, the Co-operative Society, was, therefore, invalid. The State Government was, therefore, justified in issuing the second notification under Sec.6 after removing the lacune i.e., by providing for acquisition of the land for the said public purpose, at public expense.” 39. In the light of the said pronouncements, it is clear that the acquisition in the present case having not been undertaken under Part VII, but undertaken under Part II in favour of the third respondent-Society is invalid in law and it cannot be proceeded. In the light of the said pronouncements, it is clear that the acquisition in the present case having not been undertaken under Part VII, but undertaken under Part II in favour of the third respondent-Society is invalid in law and it cannot be proceeded. As already pointed out the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired, namely for the third respondent existing office, also will not fall under the inclusive definition of public purpose. 40. If we are required to examine the legality to invoke Part VII, even under Part VII, even assuming Part VII has been invoked, in our considered view, it cannot be sustained as an existing building in the occupation of very beneficiary as a statutory tenant is not permissible as the acquisition is not for purposes provided in Sec.40(1)(a) or (aa) or (b). Hence even Part VII cannot be invoked. However, we are not called upon to decide the same at this stage as admittedly the acquisition is not under Part VII. 41. We shall take up the next ground of challenge, namely, the acquisition is invalid as substance of Sec.4(1) Notification has been published belatedly after seven months. Sec.4(1) Notification was made on 6.7.1988. It was published in the Dailies on 6.8.1988, in the Government Gazette on 16.8.1988. Subsequently, the state Government issued an Errata to Sec.4(1) Notification on 26.12.1988. The said Errata was published in the Government Gazette on 22.1.1989. Errata was published in the dailies on 17.2.1989. The Errata issued to Sec.4(1) notification dates back to original Sec.4(1) Notification by fiction. But it will not alter the date of Sec.4(1) Notification, nor it could be taken the issue of Errata as the date of Sec.4(1) Notification. Substance of Sec.4(1) was published in the locality for the first time only on 2.3.1989. From the above it is clear that the substance of Sec.4(1) Notification had not been published within a reasonable time at all from the date of issue of Sec.4(1) Notification. But substance of Sec.4(1) Notification alone had been published in the locality only on 2.3.1989, even according to the respondents. Hence it is clear there is a failure to publish the substance of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality within a reasonable time, which failure as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners vitiates the acquisition. But substance of Sec.4(1) Notification alone had been published in the locality only on 2.3.1989, even according to the respondents. Hence it is clear there is a failure to publish the substance of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality within a reasonable time, which failure as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners vitiates the acquisition. It has been held that Sec.4(1) which provides for publication of substance of Sec.4(1) Notification in the Gazette as well as in the locality is mandatory and the omission renders a Notification void as has been held by the Apex Court in Ajay Krishna Singh v. Union of India A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2677 and by a Division Bench of this Court in Kumar Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu (1998)2 MLJ. 533 . 42. Though it is pointed out that substance of the Sec.4(1) Notification has been published in the locality, the said publication was made only on 2.3.1989 i.e. after a lapse of seven months. Assuming the same for a moment such as a publication of substance of Sec.4(1), there is a delay of seven months and this delay also is fatal to the acquisition. Delay being abnormal it cannot be taken that the respondent had published the substance within a reasonable time, as has been held by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in Nandakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1986 W.L.R. 164. In the said case the Division Bench held that by such a delayed publication of substance demonstrates that there is no continuity of the acquisition proceedings and the acquisition proceedings is broken by a deep gap and it cannot be held that there is any bona fides in such belated publication. The Division Bench held thus: “12. In this connection we may also notice a decision of the Supreme Court on the subject reported in Deepk Bahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi. In that case, the Supreme Court held as follows: “It may be noticed at once that Sec.4(1) does not prescribe that public notice of the substance of the notification should be given in the locality simultaneously with the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette or immediately thereafter. Publication in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality are two vital steps required to be taken under Sec.4(1) before proceeding to take the next step of entering upon the land under Sec.4(2). Publication in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality are two vital steps required to be taken under Sec.4(1) before proceeding to take the next step of entering upon the land under Sec.4(2). The time factor is not a vital element of Sec.4(1) and there is no warrant for reading the words simultaneously or immediately thereafter into Sec.4(1). Publication in the official Gazette and public notice in the locality are the essential elements of Sec.4(1) and not the simultaneity and immediacy of the publication and the public notice. But since the steps contemplated by Sec.4(1) cannot be undertaken unless publication is made and public notice given as contemplated by Sec.4(1), it is implicit that the publication and the public notice must be contemporaneous though not simultaneous or immediately after one another. Naturally contemporaneous may involve a gap of time and by the very nature of the things, the publication in the Official Gazette and the public notice in the locality must necessarily be separated by a gap of time. This does not mean that the publication of the public notice may be separated by a long interval of time. What is necessary is that the continuity of action should not appear to be broken by a deep gap. If there is publication in the Gazette and if there is public notice in the locality, the requirement of Sec.4(1) must be held to be satisfied unless the two are unlinked from each other by a gap of time so large as may lead one to the prima facie conclusion of lack of bona fides in the proceedings for acquisition. If the Notification and the public notice are separated by such a large gap of time. It may become necessary to probe further to discover if there is any cause for the delay and if the delay has caused prejudice to any one. We may consider here an argument which is usually advanced against any time gap between the publication in the Official Gazette and the public notice in the locality. Sec.5-A provides that any person interested in any land which has been notified under Sec.4(1) may object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality within 30 days after the issue of the notification. Sec.5-A provides that any person interested in any land which has been notified under Sec.4(1) may object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality within 30 days after the issue of the notification. It is, therefore, suggested that if the publication of the notification in the gazette is not immediately followed by a public notice in the locality, it may lead to a denial to the person interested of an opportunity to object to the acquisition. We think, that this is too narrow an interpretation of Sec.5A. Notice to interested persons of a proposed acquisition of land is given by publishing a notification to the effect that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose in two ways-first, by causing publication of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality. There is no reason to confine the period of 30 days prescribed by Sec.5A to one mode. The period of 30 days may be reckoned from either the date of publication in the Gazette or the date of public notice of the substance of the notification in the locality, whichever is later. In our view, that is the only reasonable and practical way of construing Sec.5A so as to advance the object of the provision, which is to provide a reasonable opportunity to interested persons to oppose the acquisition. We particularly notice that Sec.5A does not refer either to the date of publication in the Official Gazette or the date of public notice of the substance of the notification in the locality. It speaks of the issue of the notification. This we consider is significant and, in the context, the words the issue of the notification can only signify the completion of the prescribed process-rather, the twin process of notifying the interested public of the proposed acquisition in the manner provided for by Sec.4(1), that is by publication in the Official Gazette and giving public notice in the locality.” It may be seen from this that though the publication need not be simultaneous, the public notice must be contemporaneous. We have already noticed that Sec.4(1) notification was published in the gazette on 7th June, 1978 and the publication in the locality was made only on 19th December, 1978 more than six months later. We have already noticed that Sec.4(1) notification was published in the gazette on 7th June, 1978 and the publication in the locality was made only on 19th December, 1978 more than six months later. No counter affidavit has been filed to show the continuity of action as required in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The learned Additional Government Pleader vaguely suggested that there was an errata published in respect of the same some time on 1st November, 1978 and that the reason for the delay. We have perused the land acquisition file produced by the learned Additional Government Pleader. The errata related to one or other of the boundaries of 4 or 5 survey numbers and not any deletion or omission of any property. Nothing prevented the Government from publishing the notification in the locality immediately after publication in the Gazette. Even after the alleged errata published on 1st November, 1978, there was a long gap of more than one month and 15 days in the issue of public notice. We are satisfied that the continuity of action was broken by a deep gap. We are not satisfied that the delay in the publication in the locality was caused by any bona fide reasons.” 43. While respectfully agreeing with the said pronouncement of the Division Bench, we hold that the delay in the present case is fatal and there could be no explanation at all for the delay and there is no continuity of action on the facts of the case. Hence, on this point also the acquisition deserves to be quashed. 44. Nextly it was contended that no Declaration under Sec.6 could be issued at all as it had been issued after the expiry of one year from Sec.4(1) Notification. While calculating the period with reference to Proviso to Sec.6, it is contended that the Declaration has been issued after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the Notification viz., Gazette which is the last of the publication. In terms of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 67, the last date of publication ether paper publication or publication in the locality shall be taken as the date of publication. Sec.4(1) also provides that last date of publication and giving of such public notice shall be the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification. In terms of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 67, the last date of publication ether paper publication or publication in the locality shall be taken as the date of publication. Sec.4(1) also provides that last date of publication and giving of such public notice shall be the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification. In this case he already pointed out the last of the publication is the gazette publication namely 16.8.1988 and the period of one year has to be reckoned from the said date. If reckoned from 16.8.1988 Sec.6 Declaration should have been published on or before 15.8.1989. But in this case, Declaration has been made only on 1.3.1990 and it was published in the locality on 2.3.1990 and in the dailies on 3.3.1990. Therefore, it is clear that there is a gap of more than one year in publishing Sec.6 Declaration reckoned from the date of publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the Gazette viz., 16.8.1988, which is the last date of the publication for all purposes. 45. However, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent as well as the learned Special Government Pleader contended that the substance of Errata has been published in the locality on 2.3.1989 and therefore reckoned from 2.3.1989, the declaration made on 1.3.1990 is well within time. This contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be sustained as it is the publication of Errata which is sought to be relied upon for extension of the period, which is impermissible and such interpretation placed on Sec.6 is impermissible. If such a contention is to be sustained, then there could be an Errata just a day before the last date on which Sec.6 Declaration be validly issued and delay the mater or gain time. It cannot be pleaded that reckoned from that date, Sec.6 Declaration has been issued within time. This plea cannot be sustained at all. The delay between Sec.4(1) Notification and the issue of Sec.6 Declaration is fatal to the acquisition. Insofar as Sec.4(1) refers to the last of the publication of the Notification, it will be too wide a proposition to contend that Errata issued and published nearly after a eight months has to be taken as the date of publication of Sec.4(1) for the purpose of calculating the period of one year within which a Declaration under Sec.6 has to be made. This period of one year provided for in the first proviso to Sec.6(1) shall commence only from the last of publication of Sec.4(1) Notification and not any Errata to Sec.4(1) Notification. This publication is by fiction dates back to Sec.4(1) as well. From this it is clear that there is delay of more than one year between Sec.4(1) Notification and Sec.6 Declaration and this delay renders Sec.6 Declaration invalid and illegal. 46. As regards the delay in publication of Sec.6 Declaration. Once an Errata is issued to Sec.4(1) Notification, while noticing the defect, namely the omission to set out the survey number, such an errata dates back to the date of the initial date of Sec.4(1). Notification. The Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu and others v. Mahalakshmi Ammal and others (1996)7 S.C.C. 269 while examining the effect of Errata issued to Sec.4(1) Notification held that the errata will date back to the date on which the Sec.4 (1) Notification was issued. That being the legal position, the publication of substance of notification in this case is highly belated and after a lapse of several months. The substance published is not in respect of the entire 4(1) notification, but in respect of the errata only. Therefore, the publication of substance of errata will not satisfy the mandatory requirement of Sec.4(1) Notification and it cannot be taken as the last of the publication under Sec.4 for the purpose of calculating the period of one year. Hence we hold that in this case, there is delay and Sec.6 Declaration has been published beyond a period of one year from the last date of publication to Sec.4(1) Notification, namely, Gazette. The contention advanced by the counsel for the respondents that the last date has to be reckoned from the date of publication of substance of erra cannot be sustained at all as the errata notification for all purposes dates back to the issue of the original Sec.4(1) Notification. Hence the delay is fatal. 47. With respect to publication of substances, it is admitted that only errata had been published. A perusal of the errata would show that only a Survey Number 3225 is added and no other particulars is set out in the errata. Hence, the publication of errata cannot be equated to publication of the substance of the entire Sec.4(1) Notification, which is a prerequisite for a valid acquisition. 48. A perusal of the errata would show that only a Survey Number 3225 is added and no other particulars is set out in the errata. Hence, the publication of errata cannot be equated to publication of the substance of the entire Sec.4(1) Notification, which is a prerequisite for a valid acquisition. 48. As regards the contention that there had been a violation of Rules 3(b) as well as violation of principles of natural justice, the notice dated 25.4.1989 requiring persons interested to raise their objections within 15 days from the date of service of the notice and that objections will be enquired into at 11.00 a.m. on 24.5.1989. The said notice has been sent under certificate of posting as seen from the file on 7.6.1989. Mr.Arafath, one of the joint owners of the property appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer, further to the written objection submitted on 24.5.1989, which settlement has been recorded running to two pages. In that settlement, he had claimed that Rule 3 (b) had not been complied with, besides stating that the property is not required for Khadi Bhavan, who is a tenant for decades together and paying a minimum rent. 49. The requisitioning body on 16.6.1989 offered its remarks. A perusal of the remarks would show that its attention had been drawn to para-7 of the objections and claimed that the property is required for the purpose of the 3rd respondent. The amended 4(1) Notification had been gazetted in the gazette dated 22.2.1989 as seen from the gazette copy available in the file, Part-II Sec.2 No. 7-A. 50. On 6.7.1989, one of the co-owners requested the Land Acquisition Officer to postpone the 5-A enquiry as it was desired to cross-examine the Managing Director, Khadi Bhavan, the requisitioning body. As seen from the file, the Joint Commissioner of the Office of the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chepauk, by letter dated 8.2.1990, directed the Land Acquisition Officer to conduct fresh enquiry under Sec.5-A, while reminding that the last date for publication of declaration is 1.3.1990. On 8.2.1990, the Land Acquisition Officer sent a notice to the persons interested to appear at 11.00 a.m on 26.9.1990 for the enquiry under Sec.5-A. 51. On 8.2.1990, the Land Acquisition Officer sent a notice to the persons interested to appear at 11.00 a.m on 26.9.1990 for the enquiry under Sec.5-A. 51. It is also clear from the file that the objections filed by the land owners were communicated to the requisitioning body on 26.2.1990 and remarks were received from the said requisitioning body on 26.2.1990 and the same has been communicated to the persons interested on the same day. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer had considered the objections raised by the persons interested. vis-a-vis, the remarks submitted by the requisitioning body as seen from his proceedings and the Land Acquisition Officer overruled the objections and submitted draft declaration to the Government. As seen from the file, it is clear that Rule 3(b) had been complied with since the objections submitted by the land owners were forwarded to the requisitioning body and its remarks had also been communicated to the land owners before the time fixed for enquiry and, therefore, statements have been recorded. Merely because an additional rejoinder had been filed, i cannot be held that there is a violation of Rule 3(b), since factually the requirements of Rule 3(b) had been complied in this case, we hold that there is no violation of either Rule 3(b) nor there is any defect in the 5-A enquiry conducted in this case. Hence, this contention deserves to be rejected. 52. As seen from the 5-A enquiry proceedings, the Land Acquisition Officer had considered as many as six objections as well as the remarks of the requisitioning body. There has been earlier enquiry also on 19.7.1989. Subsequently on 8.2.1990 and 26.2.1990 further enquiry under Sec.5-A was conducted. Hence, it is clear that there is no violation of Rule 3 (b). Hence this contention fails. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Division Bench in 1994 W.L.R. 326 in support of his contention. In this case, we hold that there is no violation of Rule 3(b) and it is unnecessary to refer to the said decision. 53. Nextly it is contended that in Sec.4(3) Notification as well as the Sec.6 Declaration made/issued respectively, only the land had been mentioned and a large super structure, which is more than 15,000 sq.ft. had been omitted to be mentioned and it is vitiates the acquisition. 53. Nextly it is contended that in Sec.4(3) Notification as well as the Sec.6 Declaration made/issued respectively, only the land had been mentioned and a large super structure, which is more than 15,000 sq.ft. had been omitted to be mentioned and it is vitiates the acquisition. In this respect, it is pointed out that the expression “land” as defined in Sec.3(a) includes benefits to arise out of land and attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The expression “land” includes the superstructure, as has been held by the Apex Court in Malimabu v. State of Gujarat Malimabu v. State of Gujarat Malimabu v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 515. In the present case what is notified his house site R.S.No.3225 Part measuringO.2.1730 sq.ft. Nowhere the existence of a large and voluminous two floor building had been set out either in Sec.4(1) Notification of Sec.6 Declaration. This definitely a vitiating factor. The acquisition of a large building at the instance of a statutory tenant against whom Rent Control Proceedings being proceeded also deserves to be commented upon as it is not a bona fide action, besides it is not a public purpose as sought to be contended since it is to subserve the interest of a tenant who is using the Building for commercial purposes. 54. Though the purpose for which the property is acquired is to house Khadi Garamodyog Bhavan existing office. The door number of the property had not been set out in the Notification as well as in the Declaration. Therefore, the counsel for the writ petitioner is well justified in pointing out that Sec.4(1) Notification as well as Sec.6 Declaration are defective as they do not include the superstructure which stands on the property and it measures more than 15,000 sq.ft. However, it may not be necessary to mention the building in the 4 (1) Notification as well as Sec.6 Declaration as the land includes superstructure standing thereon. But on that score, this Court would not justified in interfering and holding that the 4(1) Notification and Sec.6 Declaration are invalid. 55. As regards the contention of mala fides advanced, we are not persuaded to sustain the same as there is no allegation of mala fides against the respondents 1 and 2. What is suggested is against the 3rd respondent, who is not the authority under the Act. 55. As regards the contention of mala fides advanced, we are not persuaded to sustain the same as there is no allegation of mala fides against the respondents 1 and 2. What is suggested is against the 3rd respondent, who is not the authority under the Act. It may be that the 3rd respondent was anxious to retain the building. But on that score, it cannot be held that the acquisition is a mala fide action. 56. All these points are to be answered in favour of the writ petitioners and for the above reasons the impugned Land Acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed and accordingly we sustain the order of the learned single Judge on other grounds and consequently dismiss both the appeals, but without costs. 57. Consequently connected C.M.P. is closed. Appeals dismissed.