Association of Managements of Hindu Educational Institutions Sri Ramakarishna Asrams v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others
2001-09-10
E.PADMANABHAN, K.NARAYANA KURUP
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- E. PADMANABHAN, J. The Petitioner, an Association of Managements of Hindu Educational Institutions, represented by its Secretary has prayed for the issue of a Writ of declaration declaring that Rule 15(1) and 15(4)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulations) Rules 1974 as unconstitutional, ultra virus and repugnant to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu (Recognised) Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973. Heard Mr. A. Fathtmanathan, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. M. Muthukumarasamy, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr. V. R. Rajasekar, Special Government Pleader (Education) for Respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. C. Selvaraju, learned counsel appearing for the third Respondent. The only and substantial question that arises for consideration is whether rules 15(1) and 15(4)(ii) of the Rules is ultra virus of the Rule making power conferred by the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 ? Before examining this point, it is essential to extract the existing Rule as well as the amendment as introduced by G.O. Ms. No. 1376 (Education) dated 6-7-1981. Rule 15 prescribes qualifications, conditions of service of teachers and others employed in Private Schools. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 15 reads thus :- "(1) The number of teachers and other persons employed in a private school shall not exceed the number of posts sanctioned by Director of School Education from time to time, with reference to the academic requirements teacher-pupil ratio and overall financial considerations." Sub-rule (4) of Rule 15 as amended reads thus :- (4)(i) Promotion shall be made on grounds of merit and ability, seniority being considered only when merit and ability are approximately equal (ii) Appointments to the various categories of teachers shall be made by the following methods :- (i) Promotion from among the qualified teachers in that school. (ii) If no qualified and suitable candidate is available by method (i) above. - (a) Appointment of other persons employed in that school, provided they are fully qualified to hold the post or teachers. (b) Appointment of teachers from any other school. (c) Direct recruitment. "In the case of appointment from any other school or by direct recruitment, the School Committee shall obtain the prior permission of the District Educational Officer in respect of Pre-Primary, Primary and Middle School and that of the Chief Educational Officer in respect of High Schools and Higher Secondary Schools. Teachers Training institutions setting out the reasons for such appointment.
"In the case of appointment from any other school or by direct recruitment, the School Committee shall obtain the prior permission of the District Educational Officer in respect of Pre-Primary, Primary and Middle School and that of the Chief Educational Officer in respect of High Schools and Higher Secondary Schools. Teachers Training institutions setting out the reasons for such appointment. In respect of corporate body running more than one school, the schools under that body shall be treated as one unit for purpose of this Rule." Neither sub-rule (2), nor sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 had been challenged. Before the amendment introduced by G, O. Ms. No. 1376, Rule 15(4) stood thus :- (ii) While making promotions, the school committee shall first consider the claims of the qualified teacher in that school and if no such teacher is available consider the appointment of teacher from any other school, "In such cases the school committee shall obtain the prior permission of the District Educational Officer in respect of Pre Primary. Primary and middle school and that of the Chief Educational Officer in respect of High School setting out the reasons for such appointment. In respect of a corporate body running more than one school, the schools under that body shall be treated as one unit for the purpose of this Rule." Sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 prescribes that the number of teachers and other persons employed in a Private School shall not exceed the number of posts sanctioned by the Director of School Education from time to time, with reference to the academic requirements, teacher-pupil ratio and over all financial considerations. Sub-rule (1) and sub rule (4) are being challenged as ultra virus of the rule making provision. According to the learned counsel for the Petitioner the rule, as it stood prior to amendment provided that while making promotions, the School Committee shall first consider the qualified teacher in that school and if no such teacher is available consider the appointment of a teacher from and other school. In such cases, the School Committee shall obtain prior permission of the District Educational Officer or Chief Educational Officer, as the case may be, for such appointment. Mr. Fathimanathan, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the said unamended rule apply only in respect of promotions and not in respect of recruitments.
In such cases, the School Committee shall obtain prior permission of the District Educational Officer or Chief Educational Officer, as the case may be, for such appointment. Mr. Fathimanathan, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the said unamended rule apply only in respect of promotions and not in respect of recruitments. Per contra, it is pointed out that the amended rule which provided for appointment to various categories of teachers in the manner provided for in Clause (ii) of sub-rule (4) of rule 15 and no other manner is permissible. According to the learned counsel for the Petitioners the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, hereinafter referred to as the School Act for brevity, do not confer power to frame a rule with respect to the recruitments and therefore the amended rule is ultra virus of the School Act. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General contended that the amended rule had widened the scope of appointments, which includes recruitment by promotion or by transfer or by direct recruitment and the power of the School Committee has not been taken away, as it is still the School Committee which is the appointing authority either by promotion or by recruitment by transfer or direct recruitment as the case may be. The amended rule, according to the learned Additional Advocate General provides for promotion among the qualified teachers already employed in that school at the first instance and if no qualified and suitable candidate is available under the first method, it is open to the School Committee to appoint other persons employed in that school, subject to their possessing the qualification prescribed to hold the post. In case no such person is available, the School Committee may appoint teachers from any other school. Sub-Clause (c) prescribes the prior permission being secured for direct recruitment from any other school in the case of appointment from any other school. A perusal of the amended rule also makes it beyond doubt that it is the School committee which has to appoint and fill up the vacancies by any one of the modes namely recruitment by promotion, recruitment by transfer and direct recruitment.
A perusal of the amended rule also makes it beyond doubt that it is the School committee which has to appoint and fill up the vacancies by any one of the modes namely recruitment by promotion, recruitment by transfer and direct recruitment. The scope of recruitment had been extended by three different modes and priority had been given to the existing employees in the school who are eligible to be appointed either by promotion or by transfer of teachers from other schools or by direct recruitment. Therefore it is clear that the right of the School Committee had not been denied or taken away or reduced or deprived by the amended rule and the amended rule prescribes the procedure of priority to fill up the vacancy and in no way it diminishes the authority or power of the School of the School Committee. It has to be pointed out that the said amended rule 15(1) or 15(4)(ii) is not being challenged as violative of Articles 14 or 16 or any other constitutional provisions, but it is being challenged as ultra virus of rule making provision and sections 15, 19, 20 and 56 of the Schools Act. Though the contention advanced by Mr. Fathimanathan, learned counsel is persuasive, we are not persuaded to countenance the same on a consideration of the statutory provisions of the school Act and the rules. Mr. Fathimanathan, learned counsel contended that the conditions of service will not Include recruitment, nor it will take in the recruitment Rules and therefore Rule 15(1) as well as Rule 15(4)(ii) is beyond the scope of the rule making authority. The learned counsel contended that the rules relating to conditions of service is different from recruitment rules and insofar as Section 19 do not confer the power on the State to frame recruitment rules, the rule is impugned is ultra virus the powers of the rule making authority of the State Government. Sections 19 and 20 confer power on the State Government to make rules regulating the number qualifications and conditions of service including promotion, pay. allowances, leave, pension, provident fund, insurance and age of retirement and rights as respect disciplinary matters of the teacher and other persons employed in any private school.
Sections 19 and 20 confer power on the State Government to make rules regulating the number qualifications and conditions of service including promotion, pay. allowances, leave, pension, provident fund, insurance and age of retirement and rights as respect disciplinary matters of the teacher and other persons employed in any private school. Section 20 provides that no person who does not possess the qualifications prescribed under Section 19 shall on or after the date of commencement of the Act, be appointed as teacher or other employee in any private school. Section 18 prescribes the function of the School Committee and responsibility of educational agency under the Act. It further provides that subject to provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder the School Committee shall have the power to appoint teachers or other employees of the Private Schools among other powers. The said power of the School Committee to appoint teachers or other employees of the private school has not at all been interfered by the amended Rule as has already been pointed out. The learned Additional Advocate General contended that Sections 19 and 20 are regulatory in nature and the Sate Government could very well frame the Rules regulating not only the number of teachers or their qualification or conditions of service, but also could very well prescribe the mode of recruitment or appointment or selection as the case may be. Being regulatory in nature it has to be given the full meaning and effect. In our view, the said Sections confer power on the State Government to frame Rules inclusive of rule relating to recruitment or promotion, transfer as the case may be, and it has been provided for in the impugned rules. A conjoint reading of Sections 19 and 20 together, it is clear that the statutory provisions have conferred power on the Rule making authority to frame Rules relating to appointment, recruitment or conditions of service etc., or whatsoever with respect to employment of teachers and other persons employed in any Private School. Section 56 of the Act also confers powers on the State Government to make Rules. Sub-section (1) of Section 56 enables the State Government to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the School Act, which could mean that the State Government has the authority to frame all rules required to carry out the purposes of the Act.
Section 56 of the Act also confers powers on the State Government to make Rules. Sub-section (1) of Section 56 enables the State Government to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the School Act, which could mean that the State Government has the authority to frame all rules required to carry out the purposes of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 56 enumerates other provisions with respect to which rules could be framed in particular and without prejudice to the generality of power conferred to sub-section (1) of Section 56. The learned counsel for the Petitioner sought to contend that insofar as sub-section (2) of Section 56 do not provide fro conferment of power on the State, the delegated authority, to frame Rules relating to recruitment and appointment of teachers. Section 19 and 20 should be given a restricted meaning, namely rules if any could be framed with respect to conditions of service, not with reference to recruitment of teachers or other persons employed in a private school. We are not persuaded to sustain the said contention in the light of Section 19, 20 and sub-Section (1) of Section 56 of the School Act, Section 56(1) is exhaustive in that it confers power on the Government to make Rules to carry out purposes of the Act, which could include the rules relating to recruitment of teachers and other staff. In this writ petition, the Management of Private Schools which are aided are the Petitioners and Rule 15(1) in no way takes a way the right of the Petitioners, but on the other hand, it is a regulatory measure which directs that the number of teachers shall not exceed the number of posts sanctioned with reference to academic requirements, teacher pupil ratio etc. This Rule is not ultra virus. By Rule 15(4) (ii), none of their rights or the power to appoint a teacher or other staff had been taken away or denied or diminished.
This Rule is not ultra virus. By Rule 15(4) (ii), none of their rights or the power to appoint a teacher or other staff had been taken away or denied or diminished. Even according to petitioners, Section 19 as well as Section 20 of the Schools Act has already been held applicable as well as Section 19, 20, and 21 of the School Act are also valid and held even applicable to minority Institution by the earlier Division Bench of this Court where few of the provisions of the Act and Rules have been held to be violative of Art. 30(1) and therefore they are not applicable to minority institutions. In an enactment which is regulatory an identical Rule was the subject-matter of consideration before the Apex Court in Tribal Education Agriculture and Medical Society v. State of M.P. reported in 1996 (7) SCC 108. The Apex Court in the said case had occasion to consider Rules 4 and 5 of the M.P. Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha. 1979. The relevant rules read thus :- "4. Recruitment to a post of a teacher or other employee of an institution shall be made by one of the following methods, namely : (a) absorption of teachers or other employees of other institutions hose services have been terminated : (b) direct recruitment (c) promotion : or d) deputation of persons either from Government or Ayog or from any other organization approved by the Government for the purpose : Provided, that the method of recruitment under clause (a) shall have priority over other methods of recruitment specified in clauses (b), (c) and (d), as the case may be. If suitable retrenched persons who are otherwise qualified for the posts are available. 5. (1) Where the service of a teacher or an employee is terminated by an institution whether as a result of closure of the institution or abolition of post or for any other reason whatsoever, such institution shall send information in respect thereof to the Education Officer and Divisional Superintendent of Education concerned in case of schools and to the Education Officer and Ayog in case of colleges in Form 1. (2) The Education Officer, Divisional Superintendent of Education and the Ayog shall keep a record of the information received under sub-rule (1) in a register to be maintained in Form-II." The above Rules have been challenged and the Apex Court held thus :- "6.
(2) The Education Officer, Divisional Superintendent of Education and the Ayog shall keep a record of the information received under sub-rule (1) in a register to be maintained in Form-II." The above Rules have been challenged and the Apex Court held thus :- "6. We are unable to construe the provisions of Rule 4(a) and the Proviso thereto in this light. In this context, we may mention that sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 6 of the Adhiniyam came up for consideration before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Siddhi Bala Bose Library Assn. v. State of M.P. 1979 MPLJ 379 : 1979 AIR(NOC) 136), wherein the validity of the said provision was assailed on the ground that it was violative of the right of minorities guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Rejecting the said contention, the High Court has held : "So far as laying down the mode or procedure of recruitment of personnel is concerned, there can be no objection so long as there is no interference in the actual recruitment of personnel in the case of minority institutions. All that this sub-clause does is to enable the State Government to fix the scales of pay and lay down the general mode or procedure for recruitment of teachers and other employees and it does not enable any interference by the State Government in the choice of personnel selected by that mode, which continues to remain with the management of the institution. It has not been shown to us that scale of pay in any case has been fixed so high as to be unreasonable and an indirect interference with the running of any such educational institution. It has also not been shown that the mode of procedure of recruitment laid down is such as to amount to an undue interference with the right of management of any educational institution run by any minority." 7. We are in agreement with the said view of the High Court on the interpretation, of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 6 of the Adhiniyam. Rules 4 and 5 have been framed with a view to give effect to the provisions contained in sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of Section 6 of the Adhiniyam.
We are in agreement with the said view of the High Court on the interpretation, of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 6 of the Adhiniyam. Rules 4 and 5 have been framed with a view to give effect to the provisions contained in sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of Section 6 of the Adhiniyam. The ambit and scope of Rules 4 and 5 have therefore, necessarily to be read in consonance with the ambit and scope of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 6 of the Adhiniyam as construed above. In other words, it would mean that the said rules do not in any way interfere with the right of the minority institution in the matter of selection of personnel for recruitment in the Institution. The said rules do not, in our opinion, enable any interference by the authorities of the State Government in the choice of personnel to be recruited by that mode by a minority institution. If rules 4 and 5 are thus construed, it cannot be said that the said Rules infringe the right conferred by Article 30(1) of the Constitution." The said pronouncement is in respect of minority Institution and even in respect of a minority institution a Rule which is in pari materia has been declared valid and upheld by the Apex Court in the said pronouncement. In Deepak Theatre. Dhuri v. State of Punjab, reported in, the Apex Court held that the power to regulate may include the power or authority to prescribe all reasonable rules, regulations or conditions which are reasonable rules. In the said case the Apex Court had examined whether the licencing authority had the authority to fix the rates of admission with respect to cinema theatres for which license being granted. In that context, the Apex Court held thus :- (at P. 1521 of AIR) "It is settled that the rules validly made under the Act, for all intents and purposes, be deemed to be part of the statute. The conditions of the license issued under the Rules form an integral part of the statute. The question emerges whether the word regulation would encompass the power to fix rates of admission and classification of the seats.
The conditions of the license issued under the Rules form an integral part of the statute. The question emerges whether the word regulation would encompass the power to fix rates of admission and classification of the seats. The power to regulate may include the power to license or to require taking out a license and may include the power to take or exempt from taxation, but not the power to impose a tax for the revenue in rule making power unless there is a valid, legislation in that behalf. Therefore, the power to regulate a particular business or calling implies the power to prescribe and enforce all such proper reasonable rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to conduct the business in a proper and orderly manner. It also Includes the authority to prescribe the reasonable rules, regulations or conditions subject to which, the business may be permitted or conducted. A conjoint reading of S. 5. S. 9 R. 4 and condition 4A gives, therefore, the power to the licensing authority to classify seats and prescribe rates of admission into the cinema theatre." Applying the said ratio, the provisions of the School Act os being regulatory, on a reading of the said Sections 19 and 20 as well as sub-section (1) of Section 56, we hold that the State has the power to frame the Rules including the rules relating to mode or, manner or procedure of recruitment of teachers or other staff, their qualifications as well as their conditions of service and the impugned Rule is not ultra virus, nor it is beyond the powers conferred by the statutory provisions of the School Act. Incidentally a Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools. Manager's Association, reported in 1995 WLR 499 "(1995 Lab IC 22851 had occasion to consider the validity of Rule 7, Rule 11(5), (II)(D). (C). (d) and (e) and (g) of the very same Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973. When the management of private schools contended that the State Government cannot issue a direction to the private educational Institutions, be it minority or otherwise to make recruitment to the post of teachers only from among the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange, the Division Bench repelled the contentions and upheld the directions issued by the State Government.
When the management of private schools contended that the State Government cannot issue a direction to the private educational Institutions, be it minority or otherwise to make recruitment to the post of teachers only from among the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange, the Division Bench repelled the contentions and upheld the directions issued by the State Government. In that context, it has been held thus :- 11. It may be pointed out here that the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) specifically empowers the State Government while granting aid, to impose such conditions as may be prescribed. Section 14 of the Act deals with the payment of grant. Section 14 (1) (ii) deals with the conditions which can be imposed while granting the aid. Clause (e) of Section 14(1) (ii) specifically provides that the Government may subject to, such other conditions as may be prescribed, pay to other financial assistance at such rate and for such purposes as may be described. Rule 11 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') deals with the payment of grant. Rule 11(1) specifically says that the recognised private schools may be paid grants from State funds directly or through Panchayat Unions and such payment of grants shall be subject to Government Orders and instructions issued from time to time. The impugned Government Orders do fall within Rule 11 (1) of the rules, in addition to that. Rule 11 (5) (ii) (e) is also similar to Section 14 (1) (ii) (e). Thus, a reading of Section 14(1)(ii)(e) and Rule 11 together makes it clear that the State Government is empowered by the statute to Issue the directions to the Private educational institutions receiving aid regarding the mode and manner of filling up the vacancies. The contention that the power of the management is taken away by this process or by issuing such directions, also does not hold water. It may be pointed out here that the power of the Management to make selection of the candidates is not taken away. It is open to the Management to make selection out of the candidates who are sponsored by the Employment Exchange.
It may be pointed out here that the power of the Management to make selection of the candidates is not taken away. It is open to the Management to make selection out of the candidates who are sponsored by the Employment Exchange. It is only when no candidate is available from the employment Exchange or the Candidates who are sponsored from the Employment Exchange, are found to be unfit, it would be open to the private educational agency to seek the permission of the concerned authority and go ahead with the recruitment from the open competition. 14. As far as the power of the Management is concerned, we have already pointed out that such direction does not take away their power as to who should be selected and who should be suitable for the post in their institutions is not justified. We have already explained the scope and ambit of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Ramaswami's case and held that the decision on the other point was not necessary as such it was obiter dicta and as such, learned single Judges who have followed the said decision cannot be held to have correctly construed in appreciating the said decision. 15. In Francis John v. The Director of Education (1990 Lab IC 376), it has been specifically held that, "Any private school which receives aid from the Government under the Grant-in-Aid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the management but also for the benefit of the employees in the school for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant-in Aid Code cannot escape from the consequences following from the breach of the Code and particularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumentality of the state is participating in the decision making process." It is also further held that when the Government gives the grant-in-aid in exercise of executive power though not under a statute, still the Management is bound by the directions that would be issued as a condition for making the grant. It may also be pointed that this decision related to a minority school. 16.
It may also be pointed that this decision related to a minority school. 16. In The All Saints High School, v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, the scope and ambit of Article 30 of the Constitution were pointed out and it was also held that in spite of the right guaranteed under Article 30, it is open to the State Government to issue instructions or directions in the matter relating to conducting of a course and also other matters to ensure the standard and discipline in the schools and such directions which are regulatory measures, will not in any way destroy the administrative autonomy of the institution, nor start interfering willy pilly with the core of the management of the institution so as to render the right of the administration of the management of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory. "We are in respectful agreement with the said view of the Division Bench and the said Division Bench supports the contentions advanced by the Additional Advocate General will respect to the powers of appointment. Mr. Fathimanthan, learned counsel for the Petitioner relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth reported in support of his contention that generalia speclalibus non derogant and contended that the specific Section or Rule namely Section 19 do not confer power on the State to frame Rule regarding recruitment and therefore the general provision namely Section 56(1) cannot be" relied upon. With respect to the legal proposition laid down by Their Lordships of the Apex Court, there is no quarrel. But the contention advanced in this respect cannot be sustained as the three Sections namely Sections 19, 20 and sub-Section (1) of Section 56 have 'to be read together and in our considered view the said Sections confer power on the State Government to frame the impugned Rules and they are not ultra virus of the Rule making authority. The learned counsel also contended that the payment of grant at least in respect of schools sustained. This contention just requires to be mentioned for being rejected as the provisions of the Act is regulatory and in respect of a regulatory enactment it is needless to add that it encompasses all such provisions or rules which the Act enables the delegated authority to frame.
This contention just requires to be mentioned for being rejected as the provisions of the Act is regulatory and in respect of a regulatory enactment it is needless to add that it encompasses all such provisions or rules which the Act enables the delegated authority to frame. In this case the statutory provisions confer power to recruit either by promotion or by recruitment by transfer or direct recruitment which are the normal modes or procedure or recruitment. Besides, the Rules insofar as it prescribe the conditions of service of teachers and other persons employed in the school not being challenged, we are emboldened to hold that the impugned Rules are not ultra virus. In the circumstances, we hold that there are no merits in the contentions advanced by Mr. Fathimanthan, learned counsel for the Petitioner and the contentions deserve to be rejected. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed, but without costs. Consequently, connected W.M. Ps are closed. Petition dismissed.