Jupiter Cashew Company, Rajahmundry v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Hyderabad
2001-09-17
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Appeal is directed against the order of the Commissioner of commercial Taxes, Andhra Pradesh, hyderabad dated 15-10-1993 passed in ref. LV (3)/138/89. The petitioner-firm was finally assessed for the assessment year 1979-80 by the Commercial Tax officer, Rajahmundry on a total and net turnover of Rs. 35,59,950/- vide his order no. 8845/79-80 dated 16-7-1981. Out of this total turnover, Rs. 35,37,370/- related to purchase of cashew nuts and the balance, turnover of gunnies and preferred an appeal before the the petitioner disputed the assessement of the entire turnover appellate Deputy Commissioner, kakinada. The Appellate Deputy commissioner, Kakinada, by his Order no. 427/91-82 dated 30-6-1982 allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner-assessee and ordered exemption of the entire turnover. Thereafterwards, the Joint Commissioner (Legal) revised the order of the Appellate deputy Commissioner relating to turnover of Rs. 35,37,370/- on cashew nuts and passed orders confirming the assessment to tax on a turnover of Rs. 7,23,639/- and permitted exemption on the remaining turnover by his order dated 30-9-1996. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said order preferred Special Appeal No. 26 of 1998 and this Court by its order dated 22-6-1990 set aside the order of the Commissioner and remanded the proceedings to the commissioner with a direction to give opportunity to the petitioner and decide the dispute afresh. After remand, the commissioner by his order dt. 15-10-1993 set aside the order of the Appellate Deputy commissioner as confirmed by the Joint commissioner (legal) and held that the exempted turnover of Rs. 28,13,725. 51 is liable to tax under Section 5 (3) of the CST act read with Section 20 (1) of the APGST act, thus restoring the original assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer. Hence this Special Appeal. ( 2 ) IN our considered opinion, apart from the points raised in this Special Appeal, this special Appeal should fail in the light of the Judgment of the Apex Court in vijayalakshmi Cashew Company v. Commercial tax Officer, Srikakulam, In the said judgment, the Apex Court has declared and opined that cashew kernels and raw cashew nuts are two different commercial commodities and they are not the same goods.
While holding so, the Apex Court observed -"the question in this case is whether the cashew nut kernels which were exported are "those goods" which were purchased by the assessee in the penultimate transaction. In other words, whether the raw cashew nuts which were exported? This was precisely the question that was answered in the negative in shanmugha Vilas case [ (1953) 4 STC 205 (SC) = (1954) SCR 53]. Therefore, no distinction can be drawn between the cases now under appeal and the decision of this Court in Shanmuga vilas case (supra) on the plea that the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act was wider than article 286 of the Constitution. It is true that sub-section (3) by a legal fiction has widened the scope of export sale, but the basic concept remains the same. In order to get immunity from taxation by the State legislature, the goods exported must be the same goods which were purchased. The question raised in these appeals is whether the purchase of raw goods made by the appellants after which the cashew kernels were extracted and exported to foreign countries could be subjected to the State Sales Tax Act in view of the provisions of Section 5 (3) of the Central Sales Tax Act. In other words, the question is whether the export of cashew kernels obtained out of raw cashew nuts would amount to export of "those goods which had been purchased". The answer will depend on the nature of the cashew kernels that are exported and the raw cashew purchased by the dealers. This aspect of the matter was gone into in depth in Shamugha Vilas case (1953) 4 stc 205 (SC) supra by S. R. Das J, (as he then was ). It has been recorded in the Judgment of Das, J. , that the case was heard at great length and over several days and ultimately the High court was directed to investigate into the disputed facts and send a report. On the basis of the report given by the high Court, the appeals were heard and finally disposed of. It will be wrong tq distinguish this case on the ground of any special facts. It does not appear from the judgment that any special feature of cashew trade peculiar to Shanmugha Vilas was considered by this Court.
On the basis of the report given by the high Court, the appeals were heard and finally disposed of. It will be wrong tq distinguish this case on the ground of any special facts. It does not appear from the judgment that any special feature of cashew trade peculiar to Shanmugha Vilas was considered by this Court. The appellants have also not been able to show any special fact in this case which is contrary to what has been found in the judgment of Das, J. In fact, no endeavour has at all been made to show how cashew kernels are extracted and in what way the kernels are basically nothing but the fruits originally plucked. The facts noted in the remand report sent by the High court have not been shown to be contrary to the facts found in the case of appellants. " ( 3 ) IN Consolidated Coffee Limited v. Coffee board, Bangalore, the Supreme Court laid down the conditions precedent for applying section 5 (3) of the CST Act. They are - (1) There must have been a preexisting agreement or order to sell specific goods to a foreign buyer; (2) The last purchase or sale referred to in section 3 must have taken place after the said agreement or order with the foreign buyers was entered into; (3) The sale or purchase must have been for the purpose of complying with such pre-existing agreement or order. ( 4 ) THEREFORE, the petitioner is not entitled to claim exemption from tax under Sec. 5 (3) of the CST Act, However, the learned counsel for the petitioner would strenuously contend that, that was not the reason set out by the Joint Commissioner (legal)" or the Commissioner to revise the assessment order under Section 20 (1) of the apgst Act. The learned counsel would also point out that in the light of the judgment of this Court in Singh Trading Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Srikakulam, such a ground was also not available to the Joint commissioner (legal) or the Commissioner to revise the order under Section 20 (1) of the APGST Act. ( 5 ) THE law declared by the Supreme court in Vijayalakshmi Cashew Co. (1 supra) is declaratory in nature and that declaration came to be made by the Apex Court arising out of Central Sales Tax Act only.
( 5 ) THE law declared by the Supreme court in Vijayalakshmi Cashew Co. (1 supra) is declaratory in nature and that declaration came to be made by the Apex Court arising out of Central Sales Tax Act only. Apart from this legal position, on merit also, we do not find any case for the petitioner. There is no controversy between the parries that during the relevant period, the petitioner purchased 6,04,560 kgs of cashew nuts at Rajahmundry between 24-4-1979 and 16-7-1979, but there is controversy relating to actual dates of export contracts entered into between the petitioner-firm and foreign customers. The Commissioner has pointed out that during the same period only 4,28,526 kgs of cashew nut kernels were exported from Rajahmundry unit of the petitioner-firm. No acceptable substantive evidence was placed before the commissioner to establish that the entire purchases made at Rajahmundry between 24-4-1979 and 16-7-1979 were exported in pursuance of pre-existing contracts. The findings recorded by the Commissioner are essentially on questions of facts. No material is placed before us to satisfy ourselves that the factual findings recorded by the Commissioner are perverse or based on no evidence. Further, in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in vijayalakshmi Cashew Co. (1 supra) the judgment of this Court in Singh Trading company case (3 supra) is no longer good law. ( 6 ) THE Special Appeal is devoid of any merit and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.