JUDGMENT 1. - All these petitions have been filed against the judgment and order of the Non-Governmental Educational Institutions Tribuanl dated 17.8.99, by which the claims of the employees have been accepted. 2. In all these cases, the employees have been appointed by the present petitioner on different dates ranging from July 1995 to August 1996. The employees had worked for a reasonable period and suddenly they were not permitted to work or even sign in the attendance register. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, they approached the authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "the I.D. Act"). The conciliation proceedings remained pending for a long time and ultimately it was pointed out that the teachers are not "workmen" therefore, they did not fall within the ambit of the I.D. Act. Immediately thereafter, all these employees approached the learned Tribunal and after hearing the parties, the Tribunal passed the impugned judgments and orders granting relief to all the employees involved in these cases and directed the present petitioner to reinstate them with all consequential benefits. Hence these petitions. 3. Mr. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the petitions have been filed at a very belated stage before the Tribunal and the same could not have been entertained being hopelessly time-barred. 4. It is settled legal proposition that in a case where the litigant under bona fide mistake approaches the wrong forum, he is definitely entitled for the benefit of provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The learned Tribunal has considered this issue and decided in favour of the employees giving them the benefit of the said provisions of the Limitation Act and this issue is not worth reopening. 5. Mr. Mathur has further urged that the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal are contrary to the evidence on record. On the contrary, Ms. The learned Tribunal has considered this issue and decided in favour of the employees giving them the benefit of the said provisions of the Limitation Act and this issue is not worth reopening. 5. Mr. Mathur has further urged that the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal are contrary to the evidence on record. On the contrary, Ms. Bharti, learned counsel for respondent-employees, has vehemently submitted that in a limited scope of secondary judicial review, this Court is not permitted to re-appreciate the evidence and this Court can interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal only if it is fully satisfied that the findings are perverse or based on no evidence, but in a case like the instant where the present petitioner itself did not produce the material evidence before the Tribunal in spite of giving several opportunities, the Tribunal was right in drawing the inference against the institution under the provisions of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Ms. Bharti has drawn the attention of the Court to the findings of facts recorded by the learned Tribunal that in spite of several opportunities given to the present petitioner, the record was not produced; thus, the Tribunal had no option but to draw the inference against the institution. Mr. Mathur could not furnish any explanation as why the institution did not place the record before the Tribunal and failed to discharge its burden to adduce evidence.The submission made by Ms. Bharti is fully of substance and worth acceptance. 6. In the case like the instant, the Court can review only the "decision making procedure" and not the "decision" of the Authority. The Court, not being a Court of Appeal, is incompetent to substitute its own view on factual aspects of the case. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in "exceptional circumstances". The Court, not being a Court of Appeal, is incompetent to substitute its own view on factual aspects of the case. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in "exceptional circumstances". (Vide Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 2185 ; State Bank of India v. Saarendra Kishore Endow, (1994) 2 SCC 537 ; State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh, (1996) 8 SCC 350 ; State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Singh, AIR 1996 SC 736 ; State of U.P. v. Nand Kishore Shukla & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1561 ; Transport Commissioner, Madras v. Thiru ARK Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 ; Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Singh & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1908 ; State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh, AIR 1997 SC 2696 ; and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 739 . 7. In Rajendra Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , the Court observed as under:- "It is equally well settled that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal or arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non- application of mind and stands vitiated. Viewed from either angle, the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence. Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of and the High Court ought not to have short-circuited the writ petition." 8. In Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1999 SC 677 . In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the finding of fact is based on appreciation of evidence, the Writ Court should not normally interfere with those findings unless the findings are shown to be wholly perverse or illegally untenable. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the finding of fact is based on appreciation of evidence, the Writ Court should not normally interfere with those findings unless the findings are shown to be wholly perverse or illegally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the Court as the High Court cannot sit as appellate forum for the factual finding, disciplinary. 9. Thus, in view of the above, no interference is warranted on this count also. 10. Mr. Mathur has submitted that the employees were appointed for a short period and after expiry of the tenure, the employment came to an end automatically. There is nothing on record to show whether the respondents had been appointed casually, ad hoc, temporarily or on regular basis or on a tenure post. Thus, the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant any interference by this Court on this count, and the contention raised by Mr. Mathur is hereby rejected. 11. Mr. Mathur has submitted that removal of the employees was strictly in accordance with law. On the contrary, Ms. Bharti has most vociferiously opposed the said submission, placing reliance upon the statutory provisions of Section 18 and rule 39 of the Rajasthan Non-Governmental Educational Institutions Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The learned Tribunal has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Secretary, Maheshwari Girls School v. Ravindra Pareek & Ors., 1996 (3) WLC 102 , wherein this Court has elaborately dealt with the said provisions of Sections 18 and 39 of the said Act and held as under:- "A combined reading of Sections 18 and rule 39 will make it evidently clear that in case of temporary employees appointed for six months, his services can be terminated by the management at any time after giving at least one month's notice or one month's salary in lieu thereof, the first proviso of Section 18 also requires that no final order in regard to removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of Education or officer authorised in this behalf has been obtained. It is true that in case of removal of an employee appointed temporarily for six months, an opportunity as turns out from rule 39(1) of the Rules. It is true that in case of removal of an employee appointed temporarily for six months, an opportunity as turns out from rule 39(1) of the Rules. However, the first proviso to Section 18 which required approval of the Director Education or any officer authorised by him in this behalf, applies to all removals. dismissal or reduction in rank of employees and it covers even the temporary employees. The whole purpose behind the above provision is to check arbitrary action on the part of unscrupulous, Management of education institutions. The language of rule 39 and Section 18 being plain and clear admits of no other interpretation. In my view, the view taken by the Tribunal is in consonance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It may be stated here that both the Act and the Rules were in force when the order terminating service of the petitioner was passed." 12. In view of the above, Ms. Bharti has submitted that as the present petitioner-employer did not comply with the requirements of the aforesaid provisions of the Act, question of terminating the services of the respondent-employees did not arise. The submission made by her is worth acceptance and the judgment under challenge does not present any special features requiring interference by this Court for the reason that the cases are squarely covered by the judgent of this Court referred to and relied upon by the learned Tribunal. 13. No other point has been urged. 14. Petitions are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the Cases, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******