JUDGMENT - CHITRE J.G., J.:---Mr. G.S. Godbole for the petitioner. Mr. S.G. Karandikar for respondent No. 1. Other respondents have been served but they are absent and they are treated to be ex parte in this writ petition. 2. The land in dispute in Survey No. 98 H. No. 14 admeasuring about 1 acre situated at village Chendwan, Taluka Kudal, District Sindhudurg. Respondent No. 1 Smt. Satyawati Tanaji Naik made an application to the Tahsildar, Kudal on 28-1-1981 for getting declaration under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Tenancy Act" for convenience). It was her contention that she was the tenant of the suit land and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the landlords of the suit land. The petitioners claim the possession on the basis of the tenancy of the suit land. 2-A. The applicant filed by respondent No. 1 Satyawati Tanaji Naik was treated to be tenancy case No. 3 of 1981 by Tahsildar, Kudal. After going through the oral and documentary evidence on record, he came to the conclusion that Satyawati Tanaji Naik was the tenant of the suit land and hence he directed that the necessary entries be effected in the record of rights about her tenancy. 3. Gangaram Krishna Shirodkar, the deceased petitioner, filed an appeal before the S.D.O. Sawantwadi which was numbered as tenancy appeal No. 121 of 1982. The learned S.D.O. without touching other points, came to the conclusion that on account of previous proceedings and the doctrine of res judicata, Satyawatibai, the present respondent No. 1, could not have the right of claiming that she happens to be the tenant of the suit land. Therefore, he set aside the judgment and order passed by the Tahsildar by allowing the said appeal. 4. The said judgment and order was challenged by Satyawatibai by filing revision application before M.R.T. which was numbered as T.E.N.A. 164 of 1986. The learned Member of M.R.T. after considering all the relevant aspects of the matter concluded that the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable to the present case because Satyawatibai was not party to the previous proceeding. He also held that the issues in question were not substantially the issues in question in the previous proceedings and hence, on this ground also, the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable. He also held that the issues in question were not substantially the issues in question in the previous proceedings and hence, on this ground also, the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable. The learned Member of the M.R.T. held that the said land was not a "Ghat-bhat" land but it was "warkas" land as the relevant entry shows. He held that the said land was in possession of Satyawatibai and there was no joint Hindu family between Satyawatibai and the landlords. He also came to the conclusion that the suit land was under cultivation and, therefore, it could not be treated to be "Ghat-bhat" land. He pointed out that the cattle shed which was there in the suit land was built there long back and that was in dilapidated condition. Thus, the learned Member of M.R.T. set aside the judgment and order passed by S.D.O. Satara and, therefore, the present petitioners are assailing the correctness, propriety and legality of the same. 5. Shri Godbole placed reliance on the following judgments of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court. (1) (Maruti Bala Raut v. Dashrath Babu Wathare and others)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2051. (2) (Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil (dead) by LRs and another)2, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1712, and (3) (Laxman Dhondu Bhor, since deceased through his heirs Vithoba Laxman Bhor and others)3, 1987 Mh.L.J. 641. 6. In the matter of Laxman Dhondu Bhor (supra), the Bombay High Court dealt with the doctrine of estoppel and doctrine of res judicata. In the present case the fact that Satyawatibai was not party to the previous proceedings revolving around the provisions of section 32-G has to be kept in mind so also the facts in issue were not substantially involved in the previous proceedings. Therefore, on these two grounds, the doctrine of res judicata could not be made applicable to the present matter. The same is the case in respect of the doctrine of estoppel. The learned S.D.O. had committed the error of law in deciding the case on these two principles when those two principles were not applicable to this case. 7. In Maruti Bala Raut's case the power of the Revenue Tribunal in appreciating the evidence was considered. But in that case Special Deputy Collector had dealt with Mamlatdar's order in proper perspective. The learned S.D.O. had committed the error of law in deciding the case on these two principles when those two principles were not applicable to this case. 7. In Maruti Bala Raut's case the power of the Revenue Tribunal in appreciating the evidence was considered. But in that case Special Deputy Collector had dealt with Mamlatdar's order in proper perspective. In view of that, the Supreme Court had held that the M.R.T. was not having the power to reappreciate the evidence on record. In the Sita Ram Bhau Patil's case, the Supreme Court dealt with the admission given by the party as well as the ground for revision which was to be considered by the Revenue Tribunal. Again in that case, the judgment of the Special Deputy Collector was dealing with all relevant aspects of the matter. Needless to point out that in the present case, the judgment and order passed by the S.D.O. is perfunctory and was deciding the point on solitary question of res judicata. When the facts and circumstances of the present case were not allowing the introduction of the doctrine of res judicata or principle of estoppel, how the said doctrine can be put to operation here. 8. Shri Karandikar placed reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court, in the matter of (Dagadu Narayan Kale v. Uttamchand Panalal Dudhedia)4, reported in Bombay Law Reporter Vol. No. 65, 1963 page 551 wherein the Division Bench of this Court dealt with Rule 29 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules and declared that those rules were not ultra vires provisions of section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy Act so also any other provisions of the Act. Rule 29 provides that in any application, the Tribunal may, if the evidence on record is sufficient, determine any issue of fact necessary for the disposal of the application, which has not been determined by the authority against whose order the said application has been made, or which has been wrongly determined by such authority by reason of any such illegality, omission or defect as it referred to in sub-section (1) of section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. In the present case, the S.D.O. did not apply its mind to other facets of the judgment and order passed by Mamlatdar and, therefore, his judgment and order was silent over other and important aspects of the matter. In the present case, the S.D.O. did not apply its mind to other facets of the judgment and order passed by Mamlatdar and, therefore, his judgment and order was silent over other and important aspects of the matter. He had dealt with the point of res judicata and estoppel only. When the S.D.O. is dealing with the judgment and order passed by the Mamlatdar in appeal, he is obliged to advert his attention towards all relevant facts, points and facets of the matter and has to deal with them and to adjudicate over them because that Court happens to be the last Court of facts. He has to do that exercise because that enables the M.R.T. to consider it in the jurisdiction which has been regulated by provisions of section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Failure in doing so, makes it obligatory on the part of the M.R.T. to consider the points which have been omitted to be considered by the Sub-Divisional Officer or Assistant Collector or the Collector, as the case may be. When such last fact finding authority ignores the relevant facets of the matter, the M.R.T. is duty bound to consider it for the purpose of getting the course of administration of justice flawless, unobstructed, in the larger interest of the society and in the interest of justice. 9. In the present case, the Member of the M.R.T. has done the same and, therefore, his judgment and order cannot be called in any proper perspective of a litigation as incorrect, improper, illegal or bad in law. 10. When a litigant is invoking the jurisdiction and power of High Court of Superintendence in view of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, he has to make out a case which would allow the High Court to come to the conclusion that it is a fit case where under the power of superintendence the High Court should interfere in the judgment and order which has been assailed by a writ petition. 11. In the present case, it is not so and, therefore, this petition will have to be dismissed with costs. This petition stands dismissed and the rule stands discharged. 12. Parties to act on authenticated copy of this judgment duly authenticated by the Private Secretary of this Court. Petition dismissed. -----