RAMESH MADHAV BAPAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is filed by the petitioners with a prayer to issue a writ of mandamus or Certiorari declaring the impugned judgment of the Land Grabbing court in L. G. C. No. 46 of 1989 dated 30-10-1995 as illegal, arbitrary and inoperative, and consequently to allow l. G. C. No. 46 of 1989 as prayed for. ( 2 ) BEFORE the commencement of the arguments of Mr. Mahmood All, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ramakrishna reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 6 - Society, raised a preliminary objection stating that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the rights finally decided in C. C. C. A. No. 14 of 1972 by a Division bench of this Court, which arose out of O. S. No. 29 of 1965 decided by the learned II-Additional Chief judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. ( 3 ) ON raising such an objection, mr. Mahmood Ali, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted at the Bar that the writ petition is maintainable if it is shown that the impugned judgment itself is erroneous on the face of it. In support of his contention, he relied upon a ruling reported in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh and others, in which their lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that if the judgment is fraudulent or collusive, it may be challenged in a later suit or proceeding and it is not necessary to file an independent suit for declaration or for setting it aside, more so where public property is in jeopardy. The learned counsel further relied upon a judgment of a Full Bench of this Court reported in Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Tribes employees Association v. Aditya Pratap Bhanj dev and others wherein the Full Bench of this court was pleased to hold that Section 44 of the Evidence Act empowers the Court to declare a judgment or an administrative order as void on the ground of fraud. Further reliance was placed on a ruling reported in Janatha Bazar v. Secretary, Sahakari noukarana Sangha and others, in which their lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that where the charge or misappropriation of goods was established in the domestic enquiry and the delinquent employee was dismissed, the Labour Court erred in directing his reinstatement with 25% back wages on the ground that his past record was without blemish and a proved case of misappropriation does not call for any sympathy. With these rulings, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that the writ petition is maintainable. ( 4 ) THIS point will be dealt with elaborately to ascertain whether the ratio laid down in the above three rulings is applicable to the present set of facts. ( 5 ) THE father of the applicants in L. G. C. , named late Mulla Abdul Basith, was the owner and possessor of Ac. 6. 34 Gts. , equivalent to 27,700 square metres covered by S. No. 129/51 (old ). Thereafter, there was a revision in survey number and s. No. 129/51 was numbered as Revision survey No. 328, which further corresponds to T. S. No. 11, ward No. 10, Block h of shaikpet village of Hyderabad District. ( 6 ) AFTER the death of late Mulla Abdul basith, the applicants, as legal heirs of their deceased father, became the owners in the year 1966 and their names were mutated in the revenue records, and they were also in possession of the said property till they were dispossessed by the respondents in the year 1983. ( 7 ) IT is the further case of the writ petitioners that respondent No. 4 in the l. G. C. , named M/s. Kaushik Co-operative housing Society, represented by its president, entered into an agreement with the writ petitioners on 09-12-1981 to purchase the said property, and in violation of the agreement, respondent No. 4 and its members, who were arrayed as respondents 5 to 43 in the L. G. C, started claiming title to the said property through one Mohd. Moulana, who happened to be the father of respondents 1 and 2 in the L. G. C. ( 8 ) IT is the further case of the petitioners that as per the contention of the respondent- society, respondent No. 3 had purchased the said property from late Mohd. Moulana. Moulana, who happened to be the father of respondents 1 and 2 in the L. G. C. ( 8 ) IT is the further case of the petitioners that as per the contention of the respondent- society, respondent No. 3 had purchased the said property from late Mohd. Moulana. Originally six applicants filed L. G. C. No. 46 of 1989. Respondent Nos. 53 to 55 were transposed as respondents, by the Land grabbing Court as they were staying abroad. The said six persons filed L. G. C. No. 46 of 1989 to declare respondent Nos. 1 to 43 as land grabbers. Respondent No. 44 - the Sub-Registrar was included in the l. G. C. , but his name was subsequently struck down by the Land Grabbing Court, as he was not a necessary party. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 45 to 52 were included as party-respondents. ( 9 ) IT is further stated that the case of the respondents was that Ac. 6. 34 gts. , forms part of Survey No. 129/68 (paiki), which is admeasuring Ac. 16. 09 Gts. This survey number was assigned to one Dilawar Ali by surfekhas Authorities, who by an unregistered mortgage deed mortgaged the said property in favour of one Gousuddin, a minor aged about 10 years. As the said dilawar Ali failed to repay the loan amount, patta was transferred in the name of gousuddin in the year 1352 Fasli. The said gousuddin under registered sale deed document No, 563/1963 dated 27-03-1963 sold the said property in favour of Mohd. Moulana, and later a rectification deed was executed by Gousuddin on 16-03-1964, whereunder Sy. No. 129/8, shown in the sale deed document No. 563/1963, was rectified as S. No. 129/68. ( 10 ) IT is further stated by the writ petitioners that the said Mohd. Moulana, under an agreement of sale dt. 29-12-1963, sold an extent of Ac. 12. 09 Gts. , out of the said property in favour of respondent No. 3. As Mohd. Moulana failed to execute a sale deed, respondent No. 3 filed O. S. No. 29 of 1965 on the file of the Court of II Additional chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for specific performance. The father of the applicants was added as Defendant No. 4 in the said suit and one Abdul Qayyum s/o. Abdul Rub was added as Defendant no. 3. The father of the applicants was added as Defendant No. 4 in the said suit and one Abdul Qayyum s/o. Abdul Rub was added as Defendant no. 3. Defendant No. 4 claimed that he was the owner of S. No. 129/51 measuring ac. 6. 34 gts. , whereas defendant No. 3 claimed that his father was the owner of s. No. 129/52 measuring Ac. 8. 18 gts. , and contended that both the properties have been falsely claimed by Mohd. Moulana as s. No. 129/68 (paiki), admeasuring about ac. 16. 09 Gts. ( 11 ) IT is further stated by the petitioners herein that in the above suit, defendants 3 and 4 filed a common written statement to that effect. Defendants 6 and 7 had also placed their rival claims, but they were set ex parte before the trial Court. Defendant No. 4 in the said suit, who happened to be the father of the petitioners herein, died during the course of trial of the suit. It was so recorded by the trial Court. The legal representatives of defendant No. 4, i. e. , the petitioners herein, were not brought on record. Therefore, the suit against defendant no. 4 stood abated. The trial Court by judgment dated 17-04-1970 declined to grant the relief of specific performance, but awarded alternative relief of compensation. ( 12 ) IT is further stated by the writ petitioners that respondent No. 3 in the l. G. C. , named V. R. K. Shastry, who was the plaintiff in the said suit, filed C. C. C. A. No. 14 of 1972 before this Court and this Court by an order dated 18-12-1975 called for the findings of the trial Court as to whether s. No. 129/68 (paiki) exists or not. Pursuant to the said direction, the trial Court gave a finding in positive terms, and, therefore, ccca. NO. 14 of 1972 was allowed decreeing o. S. No. 29 of 1965 for the relief of specific performance. ( 13 ) IT is further stated by the writ petitioners that respondents 45 to 52 in l. G. C. claimed title through one qamarunnisa Begum, sister s daughter of late Mohd. Moulana. Their contention was that Mohd. Moulana, during his lifetime, orally gifted an extent of Ac. 12. 00 out of Ac. 16. 09 Gts. ( 13 ) IT is further stated by the writ petitioners that respondents 45 to 52 in l. G. C. claimed title through one qamarunnisa Begum, sister s daughter of late Mohd. Moulana. Their contention was that Mohd. Moulana, during his lifetime, orally gifted an extent of Ac. 12. 00 out of Ac. 16. 09 Gts. in favour of said quamrunnisa Begum, and that in view of the said gift, the District Collector caused sub-division and allotted two separate numbers, i. e. , S. No. 129/68 (paiki)/1 to the extent retained by Mohd. Moulana, and s. No. 129/68 (paiki)/2 to the extent gifted to qamarunnisa Begum, and that these respondents purchased their respective plots from Qamarunnisa Begum. ( 14 ) IT appears from the record that with the above rival contentions, the Land grabbing Court framed the following issues:" (I) Whether the petitioner is the owner of application schedule property? (ii) If so, whether the respondents are not land grabbers? (iii) Whether the application schedule property is in Survey No. 129/51 (old survey No.) and R. Survey no. 328 corresponding to T. S. 0. 11, ward No. 10, Block h as alleged by the petitioner in Survey No. 129/ 68 (paiki) (old) as alleged by the respondents? (iv) To what relief?"the following additional issues were framed on 03-01-1990:" (I) Whether the sales in favour of the interested persons are invalid in view of the Section (1) of Telangana area Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act and also the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and regulation) Act, 1976? (ii) Whether the order of the Special executive Magistrate, Hyderabad dated 01-05-1987 in file No. B/64/ 83 in respect of the lands in Survey no. 129/51 situated at Shaikpet is res judicata? (iii) Whether the Judgment in c. C. C. A. No. 14 of 1972 operates as res judicata against the applicants? (iv) Whether the applicants have no locus standi to file the application? (v) Whether the applicants are the heirs of late Mulla Mohd. Abdul Basith? (vi) Whether Inayat Ali, son of Abdul rub is the G. P. A of the applicants? (vii) Whether the application is barred by time?" ( 15 ) WRIT petitioners examined in all seven witnesses as P. Ws. 1 to 7, and certain documents filed by them were marked as exs. A-1 to A-32. Respondents examined three witnesses as R. Ws. 1 to 3 and marked exs. (vii) Whether the application is barred by time?" ( 15 ) WRIT petitioners examined in all seven witnesses as P. Ws. 1 to 7, and certain documents filed by them were marked as exs. A-1 to A-32. Respondents examined three witnesses as R. Ws. 1 to 3 and marked exs. B-1 to B-31 and Ex. X-1. ( 16 ) THE Land Grabbing Court dismissed the application filed by the petitioners, holding that CCCA. No. 14 of 1972 operates as res judicata against the applicants. The land Grabbing Court also held that s. No. 129/68 (paiki) exists. Aggrieved by the said Judgment, the present writ petition has been filed by the applicants in the L. G. C. ( 17 ) WRIT Petitioners filed W. P. M. P. No. 13664 of 2000 along with this writ petition bringing to the notice of this Court certain subsequent developments, stating that in respect of the same property the government filed L. G. C. No. 15 of 1996 and a third party Sri Sai Nagar Co-operative housing Society Limited, Hyderabad filed l. G. C. No. 29 of 1992 and the parties to l. G. C. NO. 46 of 1989 are also parties to those i proceedings. The Land Grabbing Court by order dated 09-09-1996 in I. A. No. 851 of 1996 directed joint trial of the above two cases. It is also stated that the issue involved in the above two L. G. Cs. is also an issue whether s. No. 129/68 (paiki) exists, and land covered by S. Nos. 129/51 and 129/52 is being falsely claimed by respondents as S. No. 129/68 (paiki ). In view of the above facts, the applicants were constrained to move w. P. M. P. NO. 18165 of 2001 in this writ petition, and this Court by an order dated 17-08-2001 stayed the trial of the above two land grabbing cases. With this background of the litigation between the parties, the present writ petition came to be filed by the writ petitioners. ( 18 ) MR. Mahmood Ali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, submitted at the Bar that the Judgment of the Land Grabbing Court is liable to be set aside by this Court by exercising its power vested in it under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India. ( 18 ) MR. Mahmood Ali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, submitted at the Bar that the Judgment of the Land Grabbing Court is liable to be set aside by this Court by exercising its power vested in it under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India. He further submitted that the Land Grabbing Court erred in holding that the decision in C. C. C. A. No. 14 of 1972 binds the applicants - writ petitioners, though on the death of their father they were not brought on record as his legal representatives. He further submitted that finding of facts about the existence of S. No. 129/68 (paiki) as recorded by the Land Grabbing Court is without any basis and, therefore, it is a fit case for calling the interference in the impugned Judgment by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further contended that Tippon Book has been tampered to incorporate S. No. 129/68 (paiki), and the original book itself was summoned by the Land Grabbing Court in l. G. C. Nos. 29 of 1992 and 15 of 1996 and photo copies have been supplied to all parties, and the report of the Commissioner mr. Madhusudhan Rao highlights the tampering of the document, and that the government records, both revenue and survey, do not show the existence of s. No. 129/68 (paiki), and the Map (Ex. A-22), prepared at the instance of Land Grabbing court, does not show the existence of s. No. 129/68 (paiki), and these facts would show that the finding recorded by the trial court in O. S. No. 29 of 1965 about the existence of S. No. 129/68 (paiki) is the result of fraud played upon the Court, and the entire proceedings are vitiated by fraud and the same are open to challenge in a collateral proceedings. ( 19 ) AS stated earlier, Mr. Ramakrishna reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf respondent No. 4 in the Land Grabbing case, contended that in view of Ex. A-15, sale agreement dated 09-12-1981 executed by the applicants in favour of the Society, the proceeding before the Land Grabbing court is not maintainable. To this objection, mr. ( 19 ) AS stated earlier, Mr. Ramakrishna reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf respondent No. 4 in the Land Grabbing case, contended that in view of Ex. A-15, sale agreement dated 09-12-1981 executed by the applicants in favour of the Society, the proceeding before the Land Grabbing court is not maintainable. To this objection, mr. Mahmood Ali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, submitted at the bar that if the Society sticks to their contention and relies upon the said agreement, he would advise the writ petitioners to withdraw the writ petition. Then this Court, on this aspect, directed the respondent No. 6-Society to state as to whether they stick to their contention that possession of property is by virtue of the said agreement (Ex. A-15), and matter was adjourned for filing an affidavit. Then, the learned counsel Dr. G. Ramswaroop Reddy filed an affidavit on 07-08-2002 stating that under Ex. A-15 agreement the Society did not come into possession and that the agreement itself is void, and fraud was played on the Society, and that the Society executed an agreement with respondent no. 3 to sell an extent of Ac. 12. 09 Gts. , covered by S. No. 129/68 (paiki ). In view of the above statement, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the Land Grabbing Case itself is maintainable and, therefore, submitted at the Bar that the writ petition is maintainable in view of the above said fact, and, therefore, the impugned order in L. G. C. has to be set aside. ( 20 ) THE question that is posed for adjudication before this Court is whether the decree passed in O. S. No. 29 of 1965 is binding on the petitioners herein. ( 21 ) THE learned counsel Mr. Mahmood ah pointed out that the father of the petitioners was arrayed as defendant No. 4 in the suit and on his death during the pendency of the suit, petitioners herein were not brought on record as his legal representatives. The trial Court also recorded in O. S. No. 29 of 1965 that on the death of defendant No. 4, the father of the petitioners, suit against him abates, and, therefore, the decree passed in the above suit, confirmed in CCCA. No. 14 of 1972, is not binding upon the petitioners. The trial Court also recorded in O. S. No. 29 of 1965 that on the death of defendant No. 4, the father of the petitioners, suit against him abates, and, therefore, the decree passed in the above suit, confirmed in CCCA. No. 14 of 1972, is not binding upon the petitioners. He pointed out that the Land Grabbing Court gave elaborate reasoning on the issue of res judicata, stating that the father of the writ petitioners, who was defendant No. 4 in the suit, and defendant No. 5 in the suit filed a common written statement, though both of them were claiming different properties covered by different survey numbers, and the written statement, being common, their defence is bound to be common, and, therefore, the decree in O. S. No. 29 of 1965 is binding on them. ( 22 ) WE are not in agreement with the said proposition. Filing of common written statement by the father of the writ petitioners and defendant No. 5 cannot be a ground to hold that the decree in O. S. No. 29 of 1965 would operate as res judicata. Though they have filed a common written statement, there can be modalities of proving their respective cases by leading different evidence, as defendant No. 4 and defendant No. 5 were claiming two different survey numbers. Therefore, this Court is of a considered view that the finding, of the land Grabbing Court that the decree in o. S. No. 29 of 1965 operates as res judicata against the petitioners herein cannot be sustained. It is also a fact that defendants 4 and 5 were claiming title from two different persons and, therefore, the Judgment in o. S. No. 29 of 1965 is not binding on the writ petitioners herein. ( 23 ) TO substantiate the above contention, mr. Mahmood Ali relied upon a ruling reported in Drupad Chandra v. Bindumoyi dasz, wherein it is held that the test as to whether the previous decision operates as res judicata or not depends on whether the court which tried the former suit could have tried the subsequent suit, and for determining Court s jurisdiction plaintiff is bound by his valuation, but, if a particular relief claimed in the subsequent suit was adjudicated in the previous suit, the previous Court having jurisdiction to try, that relief would be barred in the subsequent suit. ( 24 ) HE also placed reliance upon a ruling reported in Union of India v. Ram Charan, in which the Apex Court was pleased to hold that on the death of a defendant/respondent in a suit/appeal, if no application is moved by the plaintiff/appellant to bring the legal representatives on record, then the suit/ appeal abates against the defendant/ respondent. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the finding given by the Land Grabbing Court that the decree in o. S. No. 29 of 1965 operates as res judicata on the petitioners is not a correct legal proposition. ( 25 ) IT is also brought to our notice by mr. Mahmood Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners, that S. No. 129/68 (paiki), which was claimed by Mohd, Moulana, consists a total extent of Ac. 16. 09 Gts. , and that respondent No. 3 in the Land Grabbing Case claimed to have purchased Ac. 12. 09 Gts. , out of Ac. 16. 09 Gts. , and in turn he sold the property to respondent No. 4 Society in the lgc, and respondent No. 4 Society sold this property to its members - respondents 5 to 43, and respondents 45 to 52 claimed ac. 12. 09 Gts. , which was originally gifted by Mohd. Moulana in favour of his niece qamarunnisa Begum, and thus the total area transferred by Mohd. Moulana comes to ac. 29. 09 Gts. , as against the total extent of ac. 16. 09 Gts. , held by him, and this fact was not noticed by the Land Grabbing Court. ( 26 ) WE agree with the submission made by the learned counsel Mr. Mahmood Ali. As a matter of fact, at what point of time s. No. 129/68 (paiki) came into existence is not known. We had made queries to the learned Counsel appearing for petitioners as to what is understood in this area the meaning of "paiki". We also made queries whether the word "paiki" is a Telugu word or an Urdu word. The learned counsel for petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for respondents were not able to tell us the meaning of the word "paiki". Then one of us (RMBJ) told in the open court that the word "paiki" is used in marathi language. The meaning of word "paiki" is "out of". When S. No. 129/51 comprises of Ac. 6. 34 Gts. Then one of us (RMBJ) told in the open court that the word "paiki" is used in marathi language. The meaning of word "paiki" is "out of". When S. No. 129/51 comprises of Ac. 6. 34 Gts. , and S. No. 129/52 comprises of Ac. 8. 18 Gts. , totalling to ac. 15. 12 Gts. , it is not understood how the land claimed by Mohd. Moulana out of s. No. 129/68 (paiki) admeasuring Ac. 16. 09 gts. , came in existence, when there is no land left out in S. Nos. 129/51 and 129/52. Therefore, we hold that existence of s. No. 129/68 (paiki) itself is a doubtful proposition. ( 27 ) WHEN the arguments of mr. Mahmood Ali were over, we called upon the learned counsel for respondents to advance their arguments and submissions. Mr. Ramakrishna Reddy, appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 6 Society in this writ petition sought time for one reason or the other for advancing his arguments. Ultimately he stopped attending the Court for the reasons best known to him. Then we heard Mr. Koka Raghava Rao, appearing for respondent No. 41. We also heard mr. Ashok Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No. 16, Mr. Ram Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for Respondents 51 to 53, and Mr. Narender Reddy, learned counsel for respondents 15 and 42, who supported the arguments advanced by Mr. Koka raghava Rao, who raised only the point of res judicata, which we have negatived in the aforesaid paragraphs of this Judgment. It was also brought to our notice by mr. Mahmood Ali that earlier this matter was placed before three Division Benches, firstly presided over by NYH, J and for some reason, which is not clear from the docket order, it was directed to be posted before the bench presided over by BSR, J. and lastly it came up before a Division Bench presided over by Dr. MBN, J. From the docket order of the Bench presided over by Dr. MBN, J. dated 09-10-2001, it is seen that the learned counsel Mr. Ramakrishna Reddy appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 6 Society submitted that only few working days were available before the commencement of dasara vacation and it would be difficult to complete the arguments, and sought an adjournment after vacation. On that, mr. MBN, J. dated 09-10-2001, it is seen that the learned counsel Mr. Ramakrishna Reddy appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 6 Society submitted that only few working days were available before the commencement of dasara vacation and it would be difficult to complete the arguments, and sought an adjournment after vacation. On that, mr. Mahmood Ali submitted that the said statement may not be taken seriously and the arguments could be completed before dasara vacation. It appears that the said bench of this Court posted the matter after vacation i. e. , on 09-11-2001. Then on 27-02-2002, the said Bench directed the matter to be placed before another Bench. Thus, this writ petition came up for hearing before this Bench. ( 28 ) AS stated earlier, the counsel, especially the counsel appearing for respondent No. 6 Society, did not argue the matter for whatever reasons, though sufficient adjournments, at their request, were granted to prepare the case. Ultimately, by an order dated 02-09-2002, when we noticed that the counsel for respondent No. 6 Society is not prepared to argue the matter, we posted the matter for judgment. We do not wish to give any more opportunity to the counsel for respondent no. 6 Society to make any submissions. ( 29 ) CONSIDERING all the above facts as discussed above, we are of the considered view that the decision of the Land Grabbing court, holding that the decree passed in o. S. No. 29 of 1965, confirmed in c. C. C. A. No. 14 of 1972, operates as res judicata against the petitioners, is not maintainable. The Land Grabbing Court has also not taken into consideration how s. No. 129/68 (paiki) came into existence when the land was not available, and at what point of time the word "paiki" was introduced in revenue records. It is also not understood that when two more Land grabbing Cases in L. G. C. Nos. 15 of 1996 and 29 of 1992 are pending before the Land grabbing Court involving the same issue in respect of the same property and in respect of the same litigants, how an independent judgment in this L. G. C. was given by the land Grabbing Court. 15 of 1996 and 29 of 1992 are pending before the Land grabbing Court involving the same issue in respect of the same property and in respect of the same litigants, how an independent judgment in this L. G. C. was given by the land Grabbing Court. As a matter of fact, all the three land grabbing cases ought to have been disposed of by recording common evidence, giving a specific finding as to who is the owner of the land in dispute and who is the land grabber. Such an exercise was not done by the Land Grabbing Court. ( 30 ) THEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned order passed in L. G. C. No. 46 of 1989 and remand the case to the file of the Land Grabbing court for disposal in accordance with law along with L. G. C. No. 15 of 1996 and 29 of 1992. It is also made clear that the stay granted by this Court in W. P. M. P. No. 18165 of 2001 stands automatically vacated. With this direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No. costs. The Tribunal is directed to dispose of all the 3 LGCs as expeditiously as possible.