Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner seeks for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the order dated 16.4.2001 on the file of the Presiding Officer, XVI Small Causes Court Chennai - 104, in M.P. Nos. 47 and 48 of 2001 in E.P. No. 554 of 2000. 2. According to the petitioner she is the Managing Director of the petitioner Company incorporated as a Private Limited Company under the Indian Companies Act. 1955 during August, 1996. The petitioner took up the business run by Thiru S.S. Pandian and there are four Board of Directors in the Company. After the incorporation of the Company, the Company was looking after the affairs of the business. The building bearing Door Nos. 31 and 32, Namachivaya Chetty Street, Chennai -21, was rented out to the said S.S. Pandian. After the company took over the business, the owner, the fourth respondent attorned the tenancy in favour of the petitioner/company. The petitioner/company thereafter paid the rental amounts by way of cheques and the landlord used to realise the cheque amounts through the bankers. On 8.1.2001, the petitioner Company was threatened to vacate the said premises on the ground that the landlord had obtaineed an order of eviction against S.S. Pandian as confirmed by the Supreme Court of India. The petitioner Company has been paying the monthly rent till the month of November, 2000 which has been credited in the account of the landlord. On 10.1.2001 when the petitioner company sent the cheque, the same was returned. Apprehending the forcible eviction, the petitioner filed a suit in O.S. No. 237 of 2001 before the V. Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, to establish their rights, and the same was still pending. While so, the landlord brought the Court bailiff to the premises. The petitioner Company informed him that they were in possession and enjoyment as a tenant attorned by the fourth respondent. Thereafter, the landlord filed an application in M.P. Nos. 47 and 48 of 2001 in E.P. No. 554 of 2000 on the file of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, for removal of obstruction under Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. stating that the petitioner company was an obstructor. Thereafter, the landlord filed an application in M.P. Nos. 47 and 48 of 2001 in E.P. No. 554 of 2000 on the file of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, for removal of obstruction under Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. stating that the petitioner company was an obstructor. The petitioner filed a detailed counter stating that the petitioner was not an obstructor, but a tenant under the fourth respondent herein, for which there was sufficient evidence. The landlord did not adduce any contra evidence. The petitioner further states that from the beginning of the proceedings, the second respondent was expressing that the petitioner company was only an obstructor and there was no merit in their case. However, the petitioners counsel insisted on oral evidence being taken and also to mark all the documents to show that the petitioner had obtained proper licence from the Corporation of Madras, Police Department and from other officials to show that it was the petitioner company which was paying the rent and was also received by the landlord. On 27.3.2001 the case was posted for chief examination of R.W.3 and was adjourned to 29.3.2001. On 29.3.2001, the petitioner partly examined R.W.3 and requested for time to mark the documents including the licences which have been sent to the authorities for renewal as the period was ending on 31.3.2001 and requested the second respondent to adjourn the case on 3.4.2001. But the second respondent insisted that the petitioneers counsel should put all the questions to the witness on 29.3.2001 itself and could mark all the documents on the next day. Though his counsel pleaded that he was required to appear before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, in respect of another case, the second respondent posted the case on 30.3.2001. On 30.3.2001, the counsel filed a petition for adjournment through his colleague, but the second respondent refused to receive the same and closed the evidence. The petitioner thereupon filed a petition to reopen on 2.4.200i which was allowed on 3.4.2001 and the petitioner completed the cross examination of R.W.3. They had also marked the statement of accounts of the Bank, copy of cheque etc. Therefore, it was clear that the petitioner company was a tenant under the fourth respondent and was neither a sub tenant nor an obstructor. However, the second respondent in the course of taking evidence pressurised petitioners counsel to complete the evidence before 15.4.2001. They had also marked the statement of accounts of the Bank, copy of cheque etc. Therefore, it was clear that the petitioner company was a tenant under the fourth respondent and was neither a sub tenant nor an obstructor. However, the second respondent in the course of taking evidence pressurised petitioners counsel to complete the evidence before 15.4.2001. The petitioner was shocked to hear the said observation from the second respondent. 3. The petitioner further states that thereafter they had filed an application in SR. No. 7522 of 2061 under Section 28 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, to issue summons to the manager of the petitioners bank to give evidence with regard to the payment of rent by cheque. But it was rejected by the second respondent without even properly hearing the arguments. Therefore, the second respondent has been proceeding with a prejudicial view and the petitioner apprehended that they will not get fair disposal at the hands of the second respondent and hence Transfer M.P. No. 80 of 2001 was filed before the first respondent. The fourth respondent took time for filing counter and the case was posted on 26.4.2002. Before the second respondent, the petitioner filed a memo mentioning about the pendency of the Transfer Application, but the second respondent did not pass any orders on the memo. The petitioner further submits that on 16.4.2001, the second respondent had allowed M.P. No. 47 of 2001 for removal of obstruction and M.P. No. 48 of 2001 for removal of the machinery without hearing the arguments of the petitioner. Under Order 21, Rule 101 C.P.C. all the questions including the right and title of the parties have to be decided only by executing Court and not by a separate suit. Hence, the petitioner Company should have been given an opportunity to place all the evidence before the Court. Therefore, the order had been passed without giving reasonable opportunity and the conclusion of the second respondent were based on surmises and conjectures. The petitioner company thereupon filed R.C.A.S.R. Nos. 8150 to 8155 of 2001 before the Court of Small Causes. Though the appeal papers were processed, the third respondent had returned the appeal papers with an endorsement as to how the appeal was maintainable. The petitioner company complied with the return and represented the same. The petitioner company thereupon filed R.C.A.S.R. Nos. 8150 to 8155 of 2001 before the Court of Small Causes. Though the appeal papers were processed, the third respondent had returned the appeal papers with an endorsement as to how the appeal was maintainable. The petitioner company complied with the return and represented the same. The petitioner further states that he understands that number of appeals have been pending before the various Courts as against the order of removal of obstruction passed under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. While so there was no reason to the office to return the appeal papers filed by the petitioner Company. On the other hand, the Office has given a helping hand to the fourth respondent, thereby shutting the doors to the petitioner company. The petitioner also filed a memo stating that Transfer M.P. No. 80 of 2001 was posted to 25.4.2001. The suit in O.S. No. 237 of 2001 filed by the petitioner to establish his rights, was still pending before the V. Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. All the said facts would go to show the respondents not having exercised the jurisdiction vested on them in a proper manner. It is at this stage, the petitioner Company had sought for legal advice and had been advised to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. In the counter affidavit filed by the fourth respondent in support of the petition to vacate the interim order granted in the above writ petition, in W.M.P. No. 11073 of 2001, the landlord had contended that the writ petition as well as the petition for interim stay were not only abuse of process of Court, but also a fraud on the judicial system. According to the fourth respondent, S.S. Pandian was the tenant under him. He had filed a petition for eviction in R.C.O.P. No. 2852 of 1989 and eviction was ordered on 2.5.1990. In the Execution Proceedings for delivery of the property the tenant requested for time undertaking to deliver the same within a period of three years. The landlord agreed to the same as a gesture of goodwill and the same has also been recorded in the execution proceedings. But after a period of three years he did not deliver possession as undertaken by him. The landlord agreed to the same as a gesture of goodwill and the same has also been recorded in the execution proceedings. But after a period of three years he did not deliver possession as undertaken by him. Thereafter he applied for issue of warrant of delivery of possession which was contested on the ground that in respect of the same tenant, a new tenancy has been created. Though the tenant succeeded before the lower Court, C.R.P. No. 2705 of 1996 was filed before this Court in which also he was successful. The landlord took up the matter to the Supreme Court and the order of this Court was set aside with a direction that the executing Court shall give effect to the order of eviction passed on 16.11.1993 and the respondent shall pay the cost of the appeals to the appellant. The landlord further submits that the dates of the order of this Court in C.R.P. No. 2705 of 1996 and the order of the Supreme Court are very pertinent. The tenant claims that it is the petitioner Company which took over the business from S.S. Pandian and that the landlord had attorned the tenancy in favour of the Company. The said averments were false. The Company was incorporated on 6.8.1996 in a different premises altogether. If they had really taken over the business at the disputed premises, the respondent/tenant in C.R.P. No. 2705 of 1996 namely, S.S. Pandian ought to have reported that he was no longer the tenant and that a new tenancy had been created in favour of the Company. Neither before this Court nor before the Supreme Court, such a representation was made. Admittedly, S.S. Pandian is also a Director of the Company. In fact, even thereafter S.S. Pandian filed Review Petition before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed on 12.12.2000. Even in the Revision Petition there was no whisper about the Company having taken over the lease. Therefore, now the obstructor was putting up a totally different case claiming that the Company had taken over the business and that the landlord had attorned the tenancy. There was no acceptance of any cheque tendered by the Company claiming’ to be the tenant. When an attempt was sought to be made, the cheque was immediately sent back. Therefore, now the obstructor was putting up a totally different case claiming that the Company had taken over the business and that the landlord had attorned the tenancy. There was no acceptance of any cheque tendered by the Company claiming’ to be the tenant. When an attempt was sought to be made, the cheque was immediately sent back. The landlord further states that the suit in O.S. No. 237 of 2001 on the file of the City Civil Court, was filed by Poongothai Pandian who is none else than wife of S.S. Pandian as representing the Company after her husband had faied in his Review Petition before the Supreme Court. She did not succeed in getting any interim order in the suit. The said Poongothai Pandian claiming herself to be the Managing Director, had sworn to a false and fraudulent affidavit by stating conflicting facts. The cheques which were issued by the petitioner Company also disclose S.S. Pandian having signed the same as Managing Director. The said cheque was returned by the landlord. Therefore, it was clear that the petitioner was playing all tricks for delaying the execution by obstruction. It is handi-work of S.S. Pandian in delaying the delivery of possession as directed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, if the delivery of possession was delayed further it would amount violating the orders of the Supreme Court and also denial of justice to the landlord. 5. As both the counsel expressed urgency in disposing of the miscellaneous petitions considering that an interim order had been granted in favour of the writ petitioner, both parties had consented for the hearing of the main writ petition itself during summer vacation. 6. Mr. S. Periyaswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant contends that S.S. Pandian was the original tenant. Subsequently, it is the Hotel/Company which was recognised as the tenant by the landlord himself. The partnership had been registered in the year 1996. From the date of incorportion of the Company, the landlord was receiving rent from the writ petitioner. S.S. Pandian was only one of the partners, his wife and son being other partners. Under Order 21, Rule 101 C.P.C. it is the duty of the E xecuting Court to go into all the questions relating to the right, title, or interest as put forth by all the parties. The Executing Court in the present case, had failed to do so. Under Order 21, Rule 101 C.P.C. it is the duty of the E xecuting Court to go into all the questions relating to the right, title, or interest as put forth by all the parties. The Executing Court in the present case, had failed to do so. Learned counsel would further contend that it was the petitioner who was the tenant within the meaning of expression “tenant” as defined in Section 2(8) of Act 18 of 1960. The landlord was receiving rent from the writ petitioner and hence the writ petitioner was the lawful tenant as on date and hence the order obatined by the landlord as against the previous tenant S.S. Pandian was not enforceable. The fact that the rent was received only from the writ petitioner is a fact which is admitted by the landlord. Therefore, the writ petitioner has to be construed and treated as the lawful tenant. The fact that the rents were paid by cheques issued by the Hotel is admitted by the landlord. Learned counsel also referred to xerox copies of the cheques issued by S.S. Pandian on behalf of the Hotal Pandian Private Limited. He also refers to the letter dated 10.2.2001 enclosed along with the cheques and he would contend that the said letter would clearly show that it was the Hotel which was the tenant. The writ petitioner Hotel was attorned as the tenant of the property and hence the statement in the counter to the contrary was incorrect. Learned counsel also refers to the letter of Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank, certifying that a cheque for Rs. 5,000/- dated 10.2.2000 issued by their customer Hotel Pandian Limited favouring the landlord was presented through the Central Bank of India, Washermenpet branch and duly honoured. Therefore, in short, according to learned counsel, the decree obtained against S.S. Pandian was not executable against the petitioner. The Court below instead of permitting the petitioner to adduce evidence to substantiate the tenancy and instead of appreciating that in a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 101 C.P.C. there should be a proper and full fledged enquiry into the right, title and interest of the parties, was adopting a biased approach with closed mind. Hence, the writ petition. 7. The Court below instead of permitting the petitioner to adduce evidence to substantiate the tenancy and instead of appreciating that in a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 101 C.P.C. there should be a proper and full fledged enquiry into the right, title and interest of the parties, was adopting a biased approach with closed mind. Hence, the writ petition. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents took me through the events which had taken place from the beginning, the landlord having taken proceedings for eviction, how the tenant made an endorsement of undertaking to vacate the premises in three years, but will not do so after the period of three years and how he took an untenable defence of fresh tenancy with the same tenant and ultimately the Supreme Court ordered eviction of S.S. Pandian after finding that he was illegally trying to avoid eviction, in spite of a concluded order of eviction against him. It was only during the pendency of the said proceedings, the tenant with intention to defeat the due process of law, had camouflaged a change of tenancy in favour of the hotel, which never took place according to laarned counsel for the respondents. The self serving constitution of the Company cannot in any manner defeat the rights of the landlord. To permit the petitioner to do so would mean circumventing the administration of justice. The tenant was adopting deliberate delaying tactics by taking several unnecessary adjournments and filing petition after petitions. He examined himself as a witness for several days. Though his wife was one of the Managing Directors of the Hotel, she has not been examined as a witness. Therefore, the entire affairs of the Hotel was being conducted by him even while the matter was pending before the Supreme Court. Learned counsel also contended that the writ petition was not maintainable. Reference is made to judgment of S. Natarajan, J. as he then was, in Mohammed v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984) (II) M.L.J., 326 = 97 L.W. 361). Learned counsel also contended that the writ petition was not maintainable. Reference is made to judgment of S. Natarajan, J. as he then was, in Mohammed v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984) (II) M.L.J., 326 = 97 L.W. 361). holding that Section 18 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act confers powers of the Civil Court on the Rent Controller while executing the order of eviction but it is not open to any one of the parties to contend that the Rent Controller has been conferred the status of a Civil Court and hence, no appeal or revision was tenable against the order of eviction in execution. That being so only with the sole object of delaying the proceedings, the tenant had ventured to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Learned counsel further contends that the very constitution of the partnership and the Company was a deliberate attempt to evade statutory and contractual obligations namely, to obey the order of eviction passed in the earlier proceedings and ultimately confirmed by the highest Court. The Court was entitled to lift and pierce corporate veil and to find out the real intent to defeat the process of law. 8. I have considered the submissions of both sides. It is not necessary to go into the issue as to whether this writ petition is maintainable or not. It cannot be disputed that even if Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked, undoubtedly, a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be definitely maintained under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court and the petitioner can be permitted to convert the writ petition into a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, The said objection is only technical and may be ignored. 9. A perusal of series of facts placed before this Court and referred to earlier, signifies that this is one of those cases in which the process of administration of justice is rendered a mockery by raising technical pleas with deliberate intention to throw aside valid decrees and orders. Such decrees and orders are reduced into nothing more than pieces of paper. The landlord even after having obtained an order of eviction as early as 2.5.1990, is unable to execute the same due to unconscionable action on the part of the writ petitioner. Such decrees and orders are reduced into nothing more than pieces of paper. The landlord even after having obtained an order of eviction as early as 2.5.1990, is unable to execute the same due to unconscionable action on the part of the writ petitioner. Poongothai Pandian who describes herself as the Managing Director of M/s. Pandian Hotels, is none else than the wife of S.S. Pandian, who is the tenant of the premises. After eviction was ordered against him on 2.5.1990, in the Execution proceedings he manages to convince the landlord to agree for a compromise with an undertaking to vacate the premises in three years namely, by 16.11.1993. After the lapse of three years he does not vacate the premises but sets up new tenancy. The Executing Court on 16.11.199? ordered delivery of possession. This was again resisted by the tenant under the guise of seeking for amendment of the decree relating to description of the property and managed to squat on the property. Ultimately, the issue went up before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 7809 and 7810 of 1997 in which by order dated 4.9.2000, the Supreme Court held that the executing Court shall give effecl to the order of eviction dated 10.11.1993. When the landlord attempted to pursue his remedy in terms of the orders of the Supreme Court, the tenant sets up his wife by describing herself as the Managing Director of S.S. Pandian Hotels to file O.S. No. 237 of 2000 on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, claiming to be the real tenant. As she did not succeed in obtaining any interim order, execution was resisted when the landlord attempted to execute the order of eviction through the Rent controller. There also the tenant manages to protract the proceeding by filing series of objections for adjournment, petition transferring the E.P. to some other Court, summoning witnesses, etc. Ultimately the order of removal of obstruction was ordered on 16.4.2001. Hence, the above writ petition complaining bias against the executing Courl and violation of principles of natural justice. 10. I am inclined to hold that there is no basis for the said two grounds. It is highly improper on the part of the petitioner to have continued to resist the steps taken for the eviction pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court. 10. I am inclined to hold that there is no basis for the said two grounds. It is highly improper on the part of the petitioner to have continued to resist the steps taken for the eviction pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court. It at all the tenancy has been transferred in favour of the plaintiff Company, the question arises as to why the same was not disclosed before the Supreme Court. When I had put the specific question to learned counsel for the petitioner, there was absolutely no answer, much less any acceptable answer on the side of the petitioner, In fact, the very appeal had been moved before the Supreme Court only in the year 1997, though the tenancy in favour of the petitioner is claimed to have commenced in the year 1996 itself when the company came to be registered. S.S. Pandian is admittedly a Director of the Company, though he claims not to be the Managing Director. It is only in the year 2000 the appeal had been taken up for hearing and even then the Supreme Court had not been informed about the alleged transfer of tenancy. Again a Review Petition Nos. 1275 and 1276 of 2000 had been filed and dismissed by the Supreme Court on 12.12.2000 and even then there is no disclosure of the transfer of tenancy. That the present attempt on the part of the petitioner is only a scheme to avoid execution, is obvious from the fact that immediately after the dismissal of the Review Petition, the petitioner had filed the suit in O.S. No. 237 of 2001 on 9.1.2001. Not having succeeded in obtaining any interim order, the petitioner had now chosen to resist the eviction by raising all sorts of untenable and unconscionable defences aimed at circumventing the orders of the Supreme Court upholding the order of eviction. Some of the series of happenings before the Executing Court namely, series of adjournments obtained by the petitioner for summoning witnesses of documents from the bank which have no bearing on the real dispute between the parties, filing transfer petition because the executing Court will not bend down to the delaying tactics of the petitioner, etc., reflect very badly on the inherent defects of our system of administration of justice, giving room for exploitation. 11. 11. The right of an innocent and genuine occupant as an obstructor is recognised under Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. But such a right cannot be converted into a tool in the hand of high handed and self seeking persons/Judgment debtors in order to defeat the rights of the parties and to render the decrees and orders of the Court nothing more than pieces of paper. Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. is intended to protect a person who is genuinely in possession of he property claiming independent rights. That is why under Order 21, Rule 101 C.P.C. the Court is required to go into all allegations of title, right and interest as if it is a suit by itself. But the most important feature to be borne in mind is Rule 102 which is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The provisions relating to the resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property will not apply to obstruction by a person to whom the judgment debtro had transferred the property pendente lite. In the present case, the petitioner is the judgment debtor or at the most a transferee. Admittedly S.S. Pandian Hotels is alleged to have taken possession from S.S. Pandian, who had suffered an order of eviction and hence bound by the decree against S.S. Pandian. There is nothing on record to show that the landlord had been informed about the alleged transfer nor the landlord attorning to the tenancy of Pandian Hotels. In fact it is admitted in the oral evidence of S.S. Pandian that the landlord had not been informed about the transfer of the business in favour of the Company, but would claim that the landlord was orally informed. This is nothing but a lie considering the strained relationship between the parties and that a legal battle was going on between the parties at that time before this Court and subsequently before the Supreme Court. Also admittedly, the so called transfer of business had not been mentioned before this Court when the Revision was pending or subsequently before the Supreme Court. Therefore, for deciding the rights of the parties between the landlord and the tenant S.S. Pandian, conversion of the business into a Company, is irrelevant. It cannot affect the rights of the landlord to secure vacant possession in terms of the orders of the Supreme Court. Therefore, for deciding the rights of the parties between the landlord and the tenant S.S. Pandian, conversion of the business into a Company, is irrelevant. It cannot affect the rights of the landlord to secure vacant possession in terms of the orders of the Supreme Court. The fact that the transfer of business was neither informed in writing to the landlord nor to this Court or the Supreme Court, betrays clandestine attempt to avoid eviction in an unfair manner. The said fact is also indicative of the position that the petitioner himself had not attached any importance to the so-called transfer of business. If they had thought that it was a relevant and important factor then they ought to have informed this Court or the Supreme Court about the transfer of business. Therefore, viewed from any angle the conduct of the petitioner is a clear action of abuse of process of Court aimed at thwarting eviction proceedings which had become concluded before the Supreme Court upholding the order of eviction. The very documents relied on by the petitioner namely, the cheque said to have been issued by Pandian Hotels is signed by S.S. Pandian as Managing Director for Pandian Hotels. The attempt on the part of S.S. Pandian and his wife to project as if Pandian Hotels is a different entity which had entered into a separate tenancy with the landlord, is a highly deplorable conduct and has to fail. The Court cannot allow such hide and seek tactics. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has rightly contended that it is open to the Court to pierce veil of the legal entities and to find out the real motives. Learned counsel relies on the following passage in A. Ramiahs Companies Act, 14th Edition, at page 352 which is an follows: “The Court may disregard the separate existence of the company where it appears that the company was incorporated for evading contractual and statutory obligations. An observation about such cases is to be found in Cower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 126-127 (Fourth Edn. 1979): “Thus in Cilford Motor Co. v. Home (1993) ch 935 (CA), Home a former employee of the plaintiffs covenanted not to solicit its customers. He attempted to evade this obligation by forming a company which undertook the soliciting. An observation about such cases is to be found in Cower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 126-127 (Fourth Edn. 1979): “Thus in Cilford Motor Co. v. Home (1993) ch 935 (CA), Home a former employee of the plaintiffs covenanted not to solicit its customers. He attempted to evade this obligation by forming a company which undertook the soliciting. An injunction was granted against both him and the company (notwithstanding that it was not a party to the covenant). The company was described in the judgment as “a device, a stratagem:, at 956, 961 and a “mere cloack or sham” Ibid p. 969. In Jones v. Lipman, (1962) 1 All ER. 442; the defendant attempted to avoid completing the sale of his house to the plaintiff by conveying it to a company formed for the purpose. In ordering both the defendant and his company specifically to perform the contract with the plaintiff, Russel, J described the company as “a devise and a sham a mask which he holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity (Ibid p. 836, See also Einhorn v. Westmount Investment Ltd. (1969) DLR (3d) 71, Sask Q.B. (Affd.) 73 WWR 161, (CA))”. 13. In Jyoti Ltd. v. Kanwaljil Kaur Bhasin (1987 (62) Com. Cases, 626 (Del), the Delhi High Court dealt with a case where two persons who were joint owners attempted to thwart an order of injunction against alienation of certain rights by transferring the leasehold rights to a private limited company of which they alone were the shareholders and Directors. The Court held that the corporate veil was being used as a cloak to wilfully disobey the orders of the Court. 14. The series of the action by the petitioner commencing from violating the undertaking given by him for vacating the premises in 1993 after a period of three years, then raising a dispute as though there was fresh tenancy and now even after the proceedings had finally concluded before the Supreme Court in December, 2000, filing a review petition without mentioning the alleged transfer of tenancy then the present defence being taken up as an obstructor or as a new tenant, expose a determined and high handed attitude on the part of the petitioner to circumvent the order of eviction. The attitude of the writ petitioner deserves to be seriously viewed. 15. The attitude of the writ petitioner deserves to be seriously viewed. 15. In the result, there are no merits in the above writ petition and the same is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/-, of which a sum of Rs. 2,500/- is payable to the counsel for the respondents, Rs. 2,500/- to the Tamil Nadu Legal Services Authority and Rs. 5,000/- to the respondents, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Connected W.M.Ps. are also.