ORDER: The decree-holder in the suit O.S. No.1385 of 1981 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thanjavur, is the revision petitioner. The respondents in the revision are the defendants 2 to 7 in the suit. The first civil revision petition is filed against the order in E.A. No.185 of 1998 and the second one is filed against the order in E.P. No.128 of 1997 in O.S. No.1385 of 1981 and both the orders are dated 22.3.1999. The parties are hereinafter referred to as described in the plaint. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. No.1385 of 1981 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thanjavur for delivery of possession and to put the plaintiff in possession of the suit property and to direct the defendants to pay the past mesne profits and also for future profits and for other reliefs. The plaintiff instituted the suit on the ground that the suit property absolutely belonged to the third defendant and the plaintiff purchased the same by a registered deed of sale dated 29.8.1981. It is stated in the plaint that at the time of sale, the third defendant represented to the plaintiff that the first defendant and his family members were in occupation of the suit building as tenants on a monthly rent of Rs.75 and the third defendant requested the plaintiff to take possession of the property from them. The plaintiff by a notice issued through his lawyer dated 5.10.1981 requested the first defendant to vacate the property and handover possession. The plaintiff came to know that the second defendant was also in possession of the property along with the first defendant. The first defendant sent a reply notice stating that he has not entered into a tenancy agreement with the third defendant and his case was that he was inducted into possession on payment of Rs.4,000 to the third defendant. The plaintiff came to know that the second defendant was also in possession of the property along with the first defendant. The first defendant sent a reply notice stating that he has not entered into a tenancy agreement with the third defendant and his case was that he was inducted into possession on payment of Rs.4,000 to the third defendant. The plaintiff has also stated that even after the issue of reply notice, the plaintiff personally requested the first defendant to vacate the property and when the first defendant failed to vacate the property, the suit was filed on the score that the first defendant has stated that there was no relationship of tenant and landlord between him and the third defendant and the first defendant refused to deliver possession of the premises and the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Lease and Rent Control Act) are not applicable in this case. 3. The first defendant has filed a written statement denying that there was a landlord and tenant relationship between him and the third defendant and his case was that he was not a tenant at all. According to him, the third defendant has received a sum of Rs.4,000 from him and therefore he was allowed to occupy the suit building. According to him, the second defendant was also residing along with him. His case was that till the loan amount of Rs.4,000 is repaid by the third defendant, he is entitled to occupy the building. 4. The third defendant filed a written statement stating that the first defendant was not a tenant and he denied the receipt of Rs.4,000. During the pendency of the suit, the first defendant died and defendants 4 to 7 were impleaded as his legal representatives. The fourth defendant also filed a written statement claiming that they are in possession of the suit property for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit, and the title of the plaintiff, if any, is barred by limitation and adverse possession. 5. The trial Court found that the defendants cannot plead by adverse possession and they were only licensees. The trial Court also recorded a finding that there was no landlord and tenancy relationship between the first defendant and the third defendant. 5. The trial Court found that the defendants cannot plead by adverse possession and they were only licensees. The trial Court also recorded a finding that there was no landlord and tenancy relationship between the first defendant and the third defendant. According to the trial Court, the first defendant was residing on the basis of the permission granted by the third defendant without paying any rent and disbelieved the case set out by the first defendant that he gave Rs.4,000 to the third defendant and he was entitled to continue in possession till Rs.4,000 was repaid. The findings were confirmed in the appeal. 6. The matter was taken up in further appeal before this Court in S.A. No.142 of 1987 and the same was dismissed. This Court while dismissing the second appeal on 29.11.1996 held as under: “12. In this connection, it is also to be noted that second defendant accepted the defence taken by deceased first defendant. He has not withdrawn that statement. That also prevents him form joining with other defendants and filing this second appeal in their claim of adverse possession. Once it is held that the defendants 4 to 7 are only legal representatives of the first defendant, their plea of adverse possession also will have to fail. 14. I do not find any irregularity has been committed by the Courts below in passing a personal decree against the defendants. Even though defendants 4 to 7 are impleaded as legal representatives after the death of first defendant, their continued possession is wrongful especially when the permission already granted has been withdrawn by plaintiff. Possession of the second defendants is also wrongful and he is not impleaded as legal representative. In either way, granting personal decree against the defendants is also, therefore, justified.” 7. The plaintiff thereafter filed the execution petition for the execution of the decree and the defendants 2, 4 to 7 have filed execution application under Sec.47 of Code of Civil Procedure that the suit property is situate at Thanjavur and the Lease and Rent Control Act would be applicable to Thanjavur and since the plaintiff has alleged that the first defendant was a tenant, the petition to execute the decree is not maintainable. According to them, they have denied the title of the plaintiff to the suit property. According to them, they have denied the title of the plaintiff to the suit property. Hence, it is stated that the decree is not executable at all and on that ground it is null and void. 8. The Executing Court held that the decree obtained in O.S. No.1385 of 1981 is not executable and it is null and void and dismissed the execution petition. The plaintiff has preferred these civil revision petitions on the ground that the District Munsif has sat in appeal over the judgment of this Court in S.A. No.142 of 1987, dated 29.11.1996. 9. Mr.S.V. Jayaraman, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the first defendant has stated that there was no landlord and tenant relationship between him and the third defendant in the reply notice sent by him as well as in the suit and in the case of the first defendant was that there was no tenancy at all and he has not raised the plea of tenancy during the course of pendency of the suit or the appeals. Hence, the defendants are not entitled to set up a new plea in the execution proceedings. The learned senior counsel referred to the notice issued by the plaintiff and the reply notice as well as the plaint and he also referred to the judgment of the trial Court, lower appellate Court and this Court and submitted that the decision of this Court in T.M.Nawabjan v. Piyari Bee and another, (1998)1 M.L.J. 60 would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. The learned senior counsel submitted that the defendants have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and when the suit was decreed, it is not open to the first defendant or his legal representatives to raise the question of jurisdiction at the execution stage. 10. Mr.R.Krishnamachari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the plaintiff has issued the notice on 5.10.1981, prior to the filing of the suit on the ground that the first defendant was a tenant and he also referred to the averments made in the plaint and submitted that the plaint proceeds on the basis that the first defendant was the tenant. He therefore, submitted that when the tenant has denied the title, he should have approached the Rent Controller under Sec.10(2) of the Lease and Rent Control Act, and the Rent Controller should be satisfied that the denial of the claim of the tenant was bona fide. He therefore submitted that it is not open to the plaintiff to approach the Civil Court straightaway and obtain a decree for eviction and then proceed with the execution. 11. The learned counsel very strongly placed reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in M/s. East India Corporation Limited v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Limited, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1094 and submitted that the decision of the Rent Controller is a condition precedent for the exercise of the powers of the Civil Court and the decree obtained in the suit instituted by the plaintiff, without obtaining the finding from the Rent Controller that the denial of title is bona fide, is null and void and has no effect at all. The learned counsel relied on the decisions of this Court reported in (1) Abdul Khadar v. Rajammal, (1980)1 M.L.J. 331; (2) Mana Pillai and another v. Naina Mohammed Beevi and four others, (1992)1 L.W. 451 ; (3) A Krishnaswami v. S.Rasheeda, (1980)2 M.L.J. 463 . The learned counsel also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Patankar, B.V. v. C.G. Sastry, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 272 and the decision of this Court in Sundaram, R.M. alias Meenakshi Sundaram v. Correspondent National Elementary School, (1998)1 C.T.C. 195 . He therefore submitted that it is a condition precedent for the Rent Controller to give a finding that the denial of title is a bona fide for the Civil Court to decide the suit for eviction. He therefore submitted that the decree is inexecutable and it is open to the tenant to raise the plea of inexecutability of the decree in the execution proceedings. The learned counsel also referred to the decision of this Court in Ramiah v. Ariyakudi Kalyana Krishna Hospital Trust, (1998)1 M.L.J. 237 and submitted that it is open to the tenant to question before the Executing Court that the decree is inexecutable. The learned counsel also submitted that the decision of this Court in Nawabjan v. Piyari Bee, (1998)1 M.L.J. 60 has been rendered without noticing the other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. 12. The learned counsel also submitted that the decision of this Court in Nawabjan v. Piyari Bee, (1998)1 M.L.J. 60 has been rendered without noticing the other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. 12. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondents. At the outset, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the plaintiff has admitted that the first defendant is a tenant. The plaintiff soon after the purchase of the property issued a notice to the first defendant stating that the plaintiff is the owner of the building and he has purchased the same from the third defendant and the third defendant represented to him that the first defendant was a tenant and hence the plaintiff called upon the first defendant/ tenant to deliver vacant possession of the property. The first defendant in his reply notice has categorically stated that the first defendant was not a tenant and he was inducted into possession of the property on the permission granted by the vendor on payment of Rs.4,000 to him. The case pleaded by the first defendant was that till the sum of Rs.4,000 is returned, he is entitled to continue to be in possession of the suit property and he has clearly stated that there was no landlord and tenancy relationship between the first defendant and the plaintiff’s vendor viz., Alagirisami. I have also perused the plaint and in the plaint the plaintiff has narrated the events prior to the institution of the suit and has stated that the first defendant has categorically denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and hence the plaintiff was forced to file the suit for eviction. The plaintiff has not admitted that the first defendant was a tenant. The first defendant in the written statement has not raised the plea that there existed landlord and tenancy relationship between him and the vendor of the plaintiff. On the other hand, his case was that he came into possession of the property on payment of Rs.4,000 to the third defendant and the written statement filed by the first defendant was adopted by the second defendant also. 13. On the other hand, his case was that he came into possession of the property on payment of Rs.4,000 to the third defendant and the written statement filed by the first defendant was adopted by the second defendant also. 13. The trial Court found that the claim of the first defendant was that he was in possession of the property on the basis of the money given by him and he was in permissive possession, and the authority to continue in possession of the same was validly terminated. It was found by the trial Court that after the death of the first defendant, his legal representatives defendants 4 to 7 continued to be in possession and their possession was wrongful as the permission granted was revoked by the plaintiff. The above finding was also confirmed by the first appellate Court which was confirmed by this Court in S.A. No.142 of 1987 by judgment dated 29.11.1996. The question arose whether the possession of the first defendant or his legal representatives was legal or their possession is wrongful. The trial Court in considering the said question went into the matter and held that their possession was unlawful and the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession and the same was confirmed by the first appellate Court and ultimately upheld by this Court. I am of the view that it is not open to the legal representatives of the first defendant to raise a new plea that the first defendant is a tenant which is clearly inconsistent with the earlier findings of the Court. It is also to be remembered that after the death of the first defendant his legal representatives were brought on record and they sought to raise the plea of adverse possession and this Court held that it is not open to the legal representatives to raise the plea of adverse possession and the plea of adverse possession failed. Therefore, it is clear that the possession of the first defendant as well as by the second defendant and after the death of the first defendant, the possession by his legal heirs was held to be wrongful. The judgment of this Court in S.A. No.142 of 1987, dated 29.11.1996 has become final. 14. Therefore, it is clear that the possession of the first defendant as well as by the second defendant and after the death of the first defendant, the possession by his legal heirs was held to be wrongful. The judgment of this Court in S.A. No.142 of 1987, dated 29.11.1996 has become final. 14. AR.Lakshmanan, J. (as His Lordship then was) in T.M.Nawabjan v. Piyari Bee, (1998)1 M.L.J. 60 was considering a case of maintainability of an execution petition against a tenant who did not raise the plea of tenancy in the suit, and the learned Judge held as under: “The respondents are not entitled to raise a new plea now in the execution stage. The respondents have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and contested the suit and suffered a decree and having suffered a decree before a competent Court which declared the rights of the petitioner herein to the suit property and also when the Court below ordered eviction of the respondents, it is not open to the respondent to raise a new plea at the execution stage. I am of the opinion, that Sec.10 is not attracted in this case, since the respondents have already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and that therefore, the execution petition filed by the petitioner herein is legally executable.” I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge. 15. As far as the various decisions relied upon by the counsel for the respondent are concerned, the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.East India Corporation v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Limited, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1094 deals with the case where all the three Courts have found that the appellant was a tenant of the respondent and questioned the bona fide of the respondent’s title as a landlord. Since a finding has been recorded in the case that appellant was a tenant, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be invoked only when the Rent controller gives a finding that the denial of title by the tenant was bona fide. Since a finding has been recorded in the case that appellant was a tenant, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court can be invoked only when the Rent controller gives a finding that the denial of title by the tenant was bona fide. The decision of the Supreme Court in Patankar, B.V. v. C.G. Sastry, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 272 is also a case of a tenant and in that case by virtue of the extension of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to the State of Mysore, it was contended that the House Rent Control Order of 1948 was repealed by the Mysore Rent Control Act of 1951, but the Supreme Court held that the House Rent Control Order, 1948 was in force and in view of Clauses 9(1) and 16 of the Rent Control Order which operated as a bar it was held the Court has no power to execute the decree for possession. The Supreme Court also dealt with the question of res judicata and estoppel, but the decision of the said decision is distinguishable as the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a tenant. As far as the other decisions of this Court in Abdul Khadar v. Rajammal, (1980)1 M.L.J. 331;A Krishnaswami v. S.Rasheeda, (1980)2 M.L.J. 463 ,Rukmani v. Narayani, (1996)2 M.L.J. 477 and Sundaram, R.M. alias Meenakshi Sundaram v. Correspondent National Elementary School, (1998)1 C.T.C. 195 are concerned, they are all cases of denial of title of the landlord by the tenant and in that situation the Court held the Civil Court cannot bye-pass the procedure prescribed under Secs.10(1) and 10(2) of the Rent Control Act and straightaway grant decree for possession without reference to the Rent Controller and obtain an order therein. Since they are all cases dealing with the tenants, those decisions are not applicable. As far as the decision of this Court in Mana Pillai v. Naina Mohammed Beevi, (1992)1 L.W. 451 is concerned that was a case where an application was filed for eviction under the Rent Control Act and the tenant denied the title of the landlord and the denial of title was found to be bona fide. The landlord filed the suit for declaration of his title and for recovery of possession and the suit was decreed. The landlord filed the suit for declaration of his title and for recovery of possession and the suit was decreed. Thereafter an application was filed for eviction on the ground of wilful default and this Court held that the second proviso to Sec.10(1) of the Rent Control Act merely enables the landlord to file a suit for eviction in a Civil Court, but that does not mean the landlord should obtain an order of eviction in the Civil Court. It was held that the landlord has no doubt to prove his title in the Civil Court. This decision does not assist the learned counsel for the respondents as it was a case dealing with the powers of the Rent Controller and not the powers of a Civil Court. In Natesan Pillai v. Sethumani Ammal, (1992)2 L.W. 564 this Court was considering the maintainability of the suit for declaration of title and possession. In that case the defendant contested the suit on the ground that he was a tenant and also relied upon an agreement of sale in his favour. The trial Court rejected the case of the defendant that there was an agreement of sale and disbelieved the case of the plaintiff that the defendant was the tenant. In Natesan Pillai’s case, it was the specific case of the plaintiff that the defendant was the tenant and there was no denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendant. But the defendant has only disputed the tenancy. The Court therefore held that the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.East India Corporation Limited v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Limited, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1094 would apply. However on the facts of the case, the case of the plaintiff was that the defendant was not a tenant. But the defendant has only disputed the tenancy. The Court therefore held that the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.East India Corporation Limited v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Limited, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1094 would apply. However on the facts of the case, the case of the plaintiff was that the defendant was not a tenant. The defendant herein also not disputed the title of the plaintiff and the only claim was that the first defendant was in permissive possession and was entitled to continue in possession of the suit property till the sum of Rs.4,000 is repaid and all the Courts have found that the first defendant was not entitled to continue in possession of the suit property as the permission was validly terminated and it was also found that the defendants are not entitled to claim adverse possession against the plaintiff and it has been specifically recorded that possession by the first defendant and after his death the possession by his legal representatives was wrongful. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Natesan Pillai’s case, (1992)2 L.W. 564 is not applicable. 16. The facts of the case clearly show that the possession by the first defendant and after his death the possession by his legal representatives was found to be wrongful and they are not the tenants. In my view the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Hajee Abdullah v. Mohandas, A.I.R. 1977 Mad. 218 would apply to the facts of this case. In that case, the legal representatives of the deceased tenants were denied protection from eviction under Sec.10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act on the ground that they were not tenants, but mere trespassers of the property. This Court held that if according to the respondents they were the tenants and entitled to the benefit of the Act, they ought to have made a specific plea at the earlier stage. It is significant to note that this Court was considering an appeal filed against an order passed on an application filed under Sec.47 of Civil Procedure Code to declare the decree as null and void, and it was held that having failed to raise the plea at the earlier point of time, it was not open to them to raise in appeal the plea that the judgment was erroneous at the time of execution of the decree. In Sultan v. Ganesh, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 716, a suit was filed for declaration of title and for possession by the plaintiff, who claimed to have purchased the premises, but the defendant, who was in possession, claimed title by adverse possession against the vendor. The defendant in the suit never raised the plea that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant. Even prior to the filing of the suit, the defendant never disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant but claimed adverse possession. In the suit the defendant never raised the plea that he was a tenant. The Supreme Court held that the defendant could not claim protection of the Rent Act, since he relied on title on the basis of adverse possession and had never raised the plea before the lower Courts that he was entitled to protection under the Rent Act. I am of the view that the above decision would apply to the facts of the case. I am of the view that when it is not open to the respondents to raise the plea in the appeal against the decree that they are the tenants entitled to protection under the Rent Control Act, it would be paradoxical to allow them to raise the plea of tenancy at the time of execution of the decree. 17. I am of the view that when the rights of the parties are finally determined upto the level of this Court and the possession of respondents was held to be wrongful, I hold that the view of the lower Court that the decree is not executable in view of Sec.10 of the Lease and Rent Control Act, is not sustainable in law. In my view, a clear line must be drawn between cases where the suit is filed by the plaintiffs, who admitted that the defendants are tenants, for eviction against the tenants and cases where the suits for eviction filed against the trespassers and persons whose possession is found to be unlawful. In my view, a clear line must be drawn between cases where the suit is filed by the plaintiffs, who admitted that the defendants are tenants, for eviction against the tenants and cases where the suits for eviction filed against the trespassers and persons whose possession is found to be unlawful. In the former class of cases, where the landlord admits the tenancy but the tenant denies the title of the landlord, the plaintiff, or course, must first approach the Rent Controller and obtain his verdict on the question whether the denial of title by the tenant is bona fide or not, and then approach the Civil Court for eviction, but in the latter category of cases, where the plaintiff has not admitted the tenancy and the plea of the defendant is also that he is not a tenant, and ultimately it is found that he is not a tenant, but he is a trespasser or his possession was declared to be unlawful, it is not necessary for the owner of the property to comply with the condition of first approaching the Rent Controller and then file a suit in the Civil Court. Moreover, on the facts of the case, the plaintiff has not admitted the tenancy and it has been declared that the possession of the respondents was unlawful and it will be an empty formality to direct the landlord to exhaust the procedure prescribed under the Rent Control Act and then institute another suit for eviction if permissible, on the basis of certain new objections raised in execution proceedings. Further, it would not be in the interests of justice and public policy to allow the party to relitigate the matter once again when the issue was tried and determined by the Court and I am of the view that it would be a travesty of justice to allow the respondents to reagitate the matter on the same issue. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner should approach the Rent Controller and obtain a finding that the denial of title by the respondents herein is bona fide and then institute another suit and then execute the decree is not acceptable as the acceptance of the same would allow the respondent to reagitate the same issues, which were extensively dealt with by three Courts. 18. 18. I am therefore of the opinion that it would be a mistake in driving the petitioner once again to the Rent Control proceedings and then institute a suit at the risk of obtaining an inconsistent verdict and then execute the decree. I am therefore of the view that when the finding of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court which was confirmed by this Court is that the possession of respondents is wrongful, it is not necessary for the landlord to obtain a declaration from the Rent Controller that the denial of title by the tenant is bona fide and then institute the suit. As already held, the various cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents relate to suits filed by landlords against the tenants and the existence of landlord and tenancy relationship was not disputed. I hold that the Executing Court was not correct in holding that the execution petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable in view of Sec.10 of the Lease and Rent Control Act, and in allowing the petition filed by the respondents. The civil revision petitions stand allowed. The Executing Court is directed to restore the execution petition on its file and pass orders on the merits of the case. The petitioner is entitled to costs of Rs.500 one set.