R. H. ZAIDI, J. ( 1 ) BY means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner prays for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 8. 12. 1972 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad. Prayer for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to act in accordance with law has also been made. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts of the case giving rise to the present petition are that in the basic year, khata No. 158 was recorded in the name of the petitioner, Jangi Lal. On receipt of C. H. Form no. 5, objection was filed by Miru, respondent No. 4, claiming that he was the co-tenure holder to the extent of 1/2 share in the said Khata on the basis of pedigree which is given below : deena reepubhuwar smt. Murli (daughter) Meeru (respondent No. 4)Masuriadeen (Son)Jangi Lal (Petitioner) ( 3 ) IT was pleaded by respondent No. 4 that he was the son of the brother of petitioner and he was entitled to 1/2 share, therefore, the basic year entry was liable to be expunged and the names of contesting respondent No. 4 as well as Jangi Lal, petitioner were liable to be recorded showing their shares as 1/2 each in the Khata in dispute. Petitioner denied the claim of respondent No. 4 and supported the validity of basic year entry. Pleading that father of the petitioner purchased 1/2 share from the father of respondent No. 4 long back in 1916 and since then he was in exclusive possession of the land in dispute and that basic year entry was quite legal and valid. It may, however, be noted that correctness of above noted pedigree was not disputed or denied in the objection nor any sale deed was produced by the petitioner. ( 4 ) THE parties in support of their cases produced evidence, oral and documentary. The consolidation Officer after going through the evidence on the record, recorded findings cursorily in favour of the petitioner on the relevant issues and dismissed the objection of the contesting respondent No. 4 by his judgment and order dated 16. 7. 1971. ( 4 ) THE parties in support of their cases produced evidence, oral and documentary. The consolidation Officer after going through the evidence on the record, recorded findings cursorily in favour of the petitioner on the relevant issues and dismissed the objection of the contesting respondent No. 4 by his judgment and order dated 16. 7. 1971. Challenging the validity of the judgment and order passed by the Consolidation Officer, an appeal was filed by the contesting respondent before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, which was also dismissed by judgment and order dated 15. 9. 1971. Thereafter the contesting respondent filed a revision before the deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, after re-appraisal of evidence, set aside the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on the relevant issues and allowed the revision and the objection of contesting respondent by his judgment and order dated 18. 12. 1972. Hence, the present petition. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently urged that the Deputy Director of consolidation has exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing the revision outright. According to him, in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the act) the Deputy Director of Consolidation could interfere with the findings of fact, if they were found to be illegal, irregular, improper or incorrect but he had no jurisdiction to substitute his own findings in place of the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. Therefore, according to him, after setting aside the said findings and allowing the revision he had to remand the case back for decision afresh to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, in support of his submission he has referred to and relied upon the decisions of this Court in Ram Karan shukla v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Fatehpur and others, 2001 (92)RD 695 and Bechna v. Deputy Director of Consolidation. 2001 (92) RD 693 . On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent supported the validity of impugned order and submitted that the judgment and order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is concluded by the findings of fact, which are based on the relevant evidence on the record, therefore, the same could not be challenged before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further urged that having come to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Settlement officer, Consolidation were illegal and contrary to the evidence on the record, the Deputy director of Consolidation had ample power not only to set aside the findings recorded by the settlement Officer. Consolidation but also to record his own findings in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Act. Therefore, the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not exceed his jurisdiction in setting aside the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and allowing the revision. In support of his submission learned counsel for the contesting respondent referred to and relied upon a decision in Gaya Din (D) through L. Rs. and others v. Hanuman prasad (D) through L. Rs. . JT 2000 (Suppl 3) SC 199. ( 6 ) I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. ( 7 ) BY this Court, it has been consistently held that in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the act if the Deputy Director of Consolidation comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the authorities below, i. e. , the Settlement Officer, Consolidation or the Consolidation Officer were illegal or Irregular or improper or incorrect, he could set aside the said findings after reappraisal of the evidence, but he could not substitute his own findings. A reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this Court in case of Ram Karan Shukla (supra) and another case of Smt. Bechna (supra ). So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Gayadins case is concerned, the Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13 was pleased to observe/hold as under : "11. The scope of the powers of the Deputy Director under the amended provision came up for consideration of this Court in Ram Dular v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and others, JT 1994 (3) SC 341 : 1994 Suppl (2) SCC 198. 11, 12 and 13 was pleased to observe/hold as under : "11. The scope of the powers of the Deputy Director under the amended provision came up for consideration of this Court in Ram Dular v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and others, JT 1994 (3) SC 341 : 1994 Suppl (2) SCC 198. It was observed that in considering the correctness of the proceedings or regularity under Section 48 of the Consolidation Act, the deputy Director of Consolidation could not assume the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for himself of those facts the Director of Education novo : he had to consider whether the legally admissible evidence had been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by them was based on evidence or any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity which would go to the root of the matter. That judgment was relied on in a recent judgment of this Court in Seshmani and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti, U. P. and others. 2000 (2) AWC 1136 (SC) ; JT 2000 (2) SC 43 : 2000 (2) SCC 523 . " 12. It is true in Sheo Nand and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others. 2000 (2) AWC 1276 (SC) : JT 2000 (2) SC 332 : AIR 2000 SC 1141 , this Court observed : "section 48 of the Consolidation Act gives very wide powers to the Deputy Director. It enables him either suo motu on his own motion or on the application of any person to consider the propriety, legality, regularity and correctness of all the proceedings held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the Revenue records may be prepared accordingly. " 13. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the Revenue records may be prepared accordingly. " 13. But in the very next para, the amplitude and the extent of the powers have been qualified thus : "normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of his powers, is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) but where the findings are perverse, in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they are against the weight of evidence. It would be the duty of the Deputy Director to scrutinize the whole case again, so as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. " ( 8 ) FROM the fact of Gayndins case, it is evident that the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision and remanded the case to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 6. 7. 1971. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation by order dated 22. 9. 1973 allowed the appeal. Thereafter, the Deputy Director of Consolidation set aside the order passed by the settlement Officer, Consolidation and allowed the revision by order dated 7. 4. 1975. Subsequently, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation was set aside by the high Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was restored. Challenging the validity of the order of the High Court. Civil Appeal No. 191 of 1991 was filed in the Supreme Court which was dismissed by the Supreme Court by judgment and order dated 27. 11. 2000. Thus, ultimately, the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 22. 9. 1973, was upheld. The question as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation had the jurisdiction to substitute his own findings for the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was neither raised before it nor was considered by the Supreme Court in the said decision. 2000. Thus, ultimately, the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 22. 9. 1973, was upheld. The question as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation had the jurisdiction to substitute his own findings for the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was neither raised before it nor was considered by the Supreme Court in the said decision. From the reading of the judgment of the Apex Court, it is apparent that the view taken by the said Court is that the deputy Director of Consolidation could set aside the findings of fact if they were found to be perverse or against the weight of evidence on record but it has not been held that after setting aside those findings, the Deputy Director of Consolidation himself could substitute his own findings. Therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent cannot be accepted. In the cases arising out of the provisions where phraseology similar to the phraseology used in Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act came to be considered. For example. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, this Court consistently held that the revisional court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the original or the appellate authority. A reference in this regard may be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Laxmi Kishore and others v. Har Prasad shukla, 1979 ACJ 473, wherein it was ruled as under : "14. The court deciding a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act has to satisfy itself that the trial courts decree or order is according to law. Of course, the revisional Court should keep in mind the Supreme Courts dictum in Naickers (supra), that a wrong decision on facts Is also a decision according to law. 15. If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on inadmissible evidence. In such cases the Court will be Justified in deciding the question of fact Itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The Court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law viz. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on inadmissible evidence. In such cases the Court will be Justified in deciding the question of fact Itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The Court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law viz. , validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. 16. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires ; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for Itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact. 17. Our answer to the question referred to us is that in the state (sic) circumstances, the revisional court has no power to consider the evidence for itself in order to determine an issue of fact. The proper course is to remand the case to the trial court. " ( 9 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion this petition deserves to be allowed and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is liable to be set aside to the extent it has substituted its own findings for the findings recorded by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation. In so far as it has set aside the findings of the orders of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, the same is valid. ( 10 ) THE writ petition, thus, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 8. 12. 1972 passed by the respondent No. 1 and the order dated 15. 9. 1971 passed by the Settlement Officer, consolidation are quashed. The case is remanded to the Settlement Officer. Consolidation for decision afresh in the light of the observations made above. It is further directed that the findings recorded on the relevant issues by the Deputy Director of Consolidation shall be ignored and appeal will be decided independently and in accordance with law after affording full opportunity of hearing to the parties on all the questions of fact and law involved in the case. It is further directed that the findings recorded on the relevant issues by the Deputy Director of Consolidation shall be ignored and appeal will be decided independently and in accordance with law after affording full opportunity of hearing to the parties on all the questions of fact and law involved in the case. ( 11 ) AS the case is old one, the appeal shall be decided expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of this order is communicated to the Settlement officer. Consolidation. .