Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. The aforesaid revision and writ petition have been heard analogous because they arise out of the same judgment dated 23rd January 1999, passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Katihar, in S. T. No. 421 of 1996. The informant Shambhu Nath Pandey of the case is the revisionist and the Investigating Officer of the case, namely, Pramod Kumar Jha is the writ-petitioner. 2. On the fardbeyan of the revisionist, Shambhu Nath Pandey, a case was registered at the Dandkhora P.S. and the investigation was taken up by P. K. Jha and whereafter on submission of charge-sheet etc., the accused persons of the case, who are opposite party nos. 2 to 10. were tried and acquitted by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Katihar. 3. Initially, the case of the prosecution which originated on the fardbeyan of the revisionist was that on 2nd July, 1996 at 7.30 P. M., the informant (P.W.10) and his brother-in-law (Bahnol) (P.W.5) were sitting in the court yard of the informants house and were taking light refreshment sitting on a cot. The informants sister, Pushpa Pandey, younger sister Neelam and his mother were also sitting. The informants father was sitting on a chair at the main door and he was also taking refreshment. Suddenly, 4-5 persons rushed to the courtyard of the informant and fired at him and at his Bahnoi. Later, they also fired at his mother and father who succumbed to the injuries while being carried to the Hospital. The informant and his Bahnoi were also carried to the Sadar Hospital, Katihar, where the informants fardbeyan was recorded where he named one llyas and Razzaq as the main assailants on the deceased and upon himself and his brother-in-law (Bahnoi). 4. So according to the fardbeyan of the informant, llyas and Razzaq were the two named accused. However, the informants re-examination by the I.O., gave a twist to the prosecution case, so far the assailants were concerned and altogether different accused persons were named in his statement and the investigation proceeded on the lines of re-statement of the informant. One Jay Prakash Sharma and Raj Kumar Sharma were named as the main assailants in the re-statement of the informant. So thereafter charge-sheet was submitted against the accused opposite party and Md. Ilyas and Razzaq were not sent up for trial. One Jay Prakash Sharma and Raj Kumar Sharma were named as the main assailants in the re-statement of the informant. So thereafter charge-sheet was submitted against the accused opposite party and Md. Ilyas and Razzaq were not sent up for trial. All the witnesses examined by the prosecution, including P.W.10 the informant and some neighbours, including several villagers, all made statements to the I.O. implicating Jay Prakash Sharma and Raj Kumar Sharma and others. Witnesses were also examined under Section 164 Cr. P.C. and they named only Jay Prakash and Raj Kumar and others, but none of the witnesses named Razzaq and Ilyas before the I.O. The motive for the alleged occurrence, as per the fardbeyan of the informant, was that the informants father had agreed to sell certain lands to Ilyas and Razzaq and some advances were also made and the informants father insisted for payment of full consideration money which was not paid and Md. Ilyas and Razzaq, in turn, insisted for execution of the sale-deed and there was noncompliance of their request, by the informants father, for which the alleged occurrence took place. The motive as supplied in the restatement of the informant was that during the election, there was some kind of row with the informants family and Jay Prakash and Raj Kumar and so for taking revenge, these two persons perpetrated the alleged crime along with their associates. The learned Sessions Judge, taking notice of complete somersault of the initial case and the complete departure of the same in restatement of the informant, held that the I.O., had misdirected himself by delaying the re-statement of the informant almost for 38 hours deliberately and intentionally, when he had good opportunity to take his restatement already armed with the fardbeyan of the informant in the F.I.R. So the learned trial court disbelieved the story of the alleged occurrence as developed by the informant and he also disbelieved the statements of the eye witnesses and other witnesses supporting the fresh story of assault on the informant and his family members, implicating Raj Kumar Sharma and, others completely exonerating, rather omitting, the names of Ilyas and Razzaq. The trial court also took special note of the fact that the Superintendent of Police and the I.O. both visited the P.O. village on 2nd July 1996 itself in the wee hours (3.7.1996) and had queried some witnesses who failed to give names of assailants. The trial court further noted the fact that the I.O. (P.W.12) had stated in his evidence that he had gone to the P.O. in the night of 2nd July 1996 at 1.30 A.M. {3rd July 1996) and there he learnt that all the witnesses, including the family members of the deceased had gone to the Hospital. But the statements of other witnesses were that, at least, Neelam, the informants sister, and uncles of the informant were present in the village itself who were not queried or examined. Moreover, the I.O. failed to examine the eye witnesses, such as, Pushpa Pandey, Neelam and the Bahnoi of the informant, when he visited Katihar Hospital on 3rd July, 1996 at 10.30 A.M. At least, Pushpa Pandey and informants brother-in-law were very much present in the Hospital, because Pushpa Pandey was signatory to the fardbeyan and informants Bahnoi was another injured in the Hospital, but the I.O. failed to take statement of these witnesses, and even the informant on 3rd July 1996, when he visited the Hospital. So in the opinion of the trial court, the I.O. had deliberately delayed taking the statement of the eye witnesses, as early as possible, even though he had confronted them. The trial court, therefore, doubted the integrity of the I.O. (P.W.12) and he suspected foul play by the I.O. in taking delayed re-statement of the informant on 4th July 1996 at 4.00 P.M. just to give a deliberate Uturn to the entire prosecution case, as per the fardbeyan of the informant. It was contended before me by the revisionists lawyer that when the fardbeyan of the informant was recorded by a Police Officer of Katihar P.S. the informant was not in proper senses being an injured person himself, and he gave his fard beyan by beckoning (signs) and, therefore, his fardbeyan was not an exhaustive piece of statement and giving a full and correct account of the alleged version of the occurrence. In this connection, the evidence of P.W.6 was relevant. In this connection, the evidence of P.W.6 was relevant. This witness had said that after the alleged occurrence, the informant took this witness and drove the motor-cycle himself, went to village Pathara and brought a tractor to carry the deceased and the injured to the hospital. So if the informant was in such an injured condition, it was not understandable as to how he will ride a Motor-cycle to go to another village for taking a tractor. It is also surprising that the informant would make his statement before a Police Officer just by signs and name the assailants by. signs and give also the motive of the occurrence just by signs. It was suggested to me by the revisionists lawyer that the Police Officer recording the fardbeyan had put certain questions to the informant and had got the answer and recorded the fard beyan. But this situation is also off the point because the Police Officer, according to the fardbeyan, cannot on imagination supply the names of assailants as also the motive to get the affirmative reply from the informant and subsequent recording of fardbeyan. So it is apparent that the informant was in his full senses and in perfect state of his mental condition to narrate the entire occurrence. If at all, the informant was not in a position to give his fard beyan, there was another injured in the Hospital, the Bahnoi of the informant and Pushpa Pandey, his own sister. So the fardbeyan of these persons could have been recorded to form the basis of the initial case and actually Pushpa Pandey had signed on the fardbeyan of the informant. So the departure from the initial case was, of course, of mysterious circumstance in the case and the learned trial court, therefore, genuinely and candidly doubted the veracity of the case that developed on the restatement of the informant allegedly recorded by the I.O. of the case. So in the opinion of the trial court, all the witnesses, including the injured and his family members, who figured as eye witnesses, had committed perjury and they had implicated innocent persons in the case. The trial court, accordingly, acquitted the accused and directed further investigation, rather, fresh investigation, by a Police Officer of the rank of Inspector. So in the opinion of the trial court, all the witnesses, including the injured and his family members, who figured as eye witnesses, had committed perjury and they had implicated innocent persons in the case. The trial court, accordingly, acquitted the accused and directed further investigation, rather, fresh investigation, by a Police Officer of the rank of Inspector. So it is to be seen whether the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court is visited by any legal flaw in recording its finding. The above discussion has shown that the trial court disbelieved the evidence of P.Ws. and doubted their veracity and in this behalf, I do not think he committed any illegality or misapplied the procedural law. The trial court is fully within its jurisdiction to place doubt in the veracity of the prosecution evidence and it is also free to record a judgment of acquittal, if it is not convinced with the truthfulness of the case of the prosecution and testimony of witnesses supporting the same. There is no error of record also committed by the trial court in coming to its findings on the basis of evidence adduced. It was pointed out by the revisionists lawyer that the witnesses had all along been supporting the prosecution case as it turned out to be according to the re-statement of the informant, and all the witnesses were examined under Section 164 Cr. P.C. as welt where also they had supported the same version of the alleged occurrence which the informant stated in his further examination (re-statement). Besides the same, one of the accused who faced trial had made a confessional statement before the Block Development Officer of the area in which he had referred to a Motor-cycle which was used in the alleged occurrence and which was recovered from the house of one of the accused facing trial. So the trial court had no business to ignore the confessional statement of the co-accused. In this connection, it is to be noted that the alleged confessional statement was made before the B.D.O. who came to the Police Station at the request, rather bidding of the I.O. and recorded the socalled confessional statement when the accused was in Police custody. So the trial court had no business to ignore the confessional statement of the co-accused. In this connection, it is to be noted that the alleged confessional statement was made before the B.D.O. who came to the Police Station at the request, rather bidding of the I.O. and recorded the socalled confessional statement when the accused was in Police custody. The B.D.O. was not a Magistrate,Judicial or Executive, and so, if at all, any of the accused was prepared to make his confessional statement, the I.O. should have produced him before a Judicial Magistrate to record his statement instead of engaging the B.D.O. So the learned trial court disbelieved this confessional statement and I am of the opinion that he rightly did so. It is also surprising that the B.D.O. acted at the behest of the I.O. and went just to oblige the I.O. to do an act which, under the law, he was not at all authorised to do. There was, therefore, no alternative but to reject this confessional statement and not to rely on the same. The trial court here also did not commit any "faux pas". This court cannot interfere in revision simply because a different view of the evidence on the record can be taken by this Court. 5. In all circumstances, therefore, the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity which will inspire this court to interfere with the same in this revision. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the revision has no merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. 6. Before I part with the revision, I would like to refer to certain directions regarding enquiry under Section 340 Cr. P.C. against witnesses who were examined in court, including the informant so that responsibility for their false evidence in court may be fixed and they may be prosecuted under the relevant provisions of law. In this connection, I am of the opinion that it was the informant who made a departure from his initial case in the fardbeyan and who may be fastened with the guilt of making two different and contradictory versions of the alleged occurrence. But so far the other witnesses are concerned, except Pushpa Pandey, who had signed the fardbeyan on the informant, they had remained consistant in their statements made under Section 161, the same under Section 164 Cr. But so far the other witnesses are concerned, except Pushpa Pandey, who had signed the fardbeyan on the informant, they had remained consistant in their statements made under Section 161, the same under Section 164 Cr. P.C. and their statements in court. Whether their statements in court and before the I.O. were false or genuine, depends upon the circumstances of the case and it is a matter of common knowledge that when witnesses are brought to depose in court, they are told not to depart from their statements made before the I.O. It is the State Lawyer conducting the prosecution case who makes the witnesses adhere to their earlier statements made before the I.O. So, whether the I.O. who recorded the re-statement of the informant and who took the statement of witnesses under Section 161 Cr. P. C. had manipulated those statements himself or whether those witnesses had made those statements voluntarily was the moot question in considering whether the witnesses were making false statement. In such a circumstance, I do not think the witnesses were liable to be prosecuted for making false statements in court. Already the informant and his relations and even his collaterals who had figured as eye witnesses to the occurrence alleged were traumatised by the grief of two persons of their family being killed and, therefore, I am of the opinion that it would be unwise for the court to put further misery upon them by embroiling them in fresh prosecution. So I am of the opinion that they, at best, deserve sympathy and, therefore, the direction of the trial court in his over-enthusiasm to hold an enquiry under Section 340 Cr. P. C. in order to find out their guilt of false statement in court, was not a proper direction under the circumstances of the case. So this part of the judgment of the trial court is set aside. There shall be no enquiry under Section 340 Cr. P. C. against the witnesses of the case including the informant. 6A. Now I shall take up for consideration the merit of Criminal writ filed by the I.O. (P.W.12), namely, P. K. Jha. So this part of the judgment of the trial court is set aside. There shall be no enquiry under Section 340 Cr. P. C. against the witnesses of the case including the informant. 6A. Now I shall take up for consideration the merit of Criminal writ filed by the I.O. (P.W.12), namely, P. K. Jha. In this connection, before I proceed to examine the merits of the writ petition, I would like to refer to certain facts regarding the conduct of the I. O. on the basis of which the learned trial court directed fresh investigation into the case and he also directed the authorities of the Police Department to hold a departmental enquiry. It was further directed by the judgment of the trial court that the I.O. was not to be entrusted with investigation of any case, unless he was exonerated by the departmental enquiry. The trial court had also directed a departmental enquiry against the conduct of the B.D.O. who has not filed any appeal or revision before this Court. It is against the aforesaid direction of the court that this writ has been filed, 7. It is to be noted that the occurrence took place on 2nd July 1996 at 7.30 P.M. The injured informant and his Bahnoi were carried to Katihar Hospital on 2nd July 1996 itself and they were undergoing treatment there. The I.O., P.W. 12 had said that he learnt about the alleged occurrence while he was in village Sauria, on patrol duty. The Choukidar gave him the information. Then he went to the P.O. village on a private jeep and reached at 1.30 A. M. (3.7.1996). Thereafter, he went to Katihar Hospital where he saw the informant, his brother-in-law and Pushpa Pandey. He left the Hospital at 10.30 A. M. on 3rd July 1996 and went back to Maheshpur village at 11.30 A. M. There he records the statement of some witnesses, such as, P.W. 8 Raj Kumar Pandey, Jagdish Mahto but he did not record the statements of eye witnesses, such as, Neelam Kumari, sister of the informant, and who according to the statements of other witnesses, were in the village itself. If they were, however, not in the village, as the I.O. said in his evidence that when he had first reached the P.O. village, he had learnt that all the family members of the deceased had gone to the Hospital, it was expected of him that he would record the statement of these family members when he visited the Katihar Hospital at 10.30 A. M. of 3rd July 1996. But the I. O. did neither of the two and took a circuitous excuse for not recording the statement of eye witnesses before recording the restatement of the informant on 4th July 1996 at 4.00 P.M. After visiting Maheshpur village on 3rd July 1996, the I.O. rushes to his RS. and registers the F.i.R. at 4.00 P.M. on 3rd July 1996 and then he again visits Katihar Hospital on 4th July 1996 and records the restatement of the informant at 4.00 P. M. This conduct of the I. O. was taken special note of by the trial court and he observed that the I.O. (P. W. 12) delayed registration of the case as also recording the restatement of the informant for reasons best known to him. This conduct of the I.O. was, therefore, highly deprecated and motive was imputed upon him by the trial court and I am of the opinion that the circumstances which impelled this I. O. to delay the restatement of the informant, of course, throw doubt regarding his integrity in conducting the investigation, when he had already received information and had visited the Hospital on 3rd July 1996 itself after visiting the P.O. village first and had received the fardbeyan etc. of the informant; and therefore, it was incumbent on his part to go to his P.S. Dandkhora in order to register a case (to institute the F.I.R.) and record the restatement of the informant immediately when he had visited the Hospital first on 3rd July 1996. If the plea of the prosecution that the informant was not in a position to give his restatement is taken up, it has already been seen above, while discussing the merit of the revision, that this plea was untenable. Even if this plea is accepted for a moment for argument sake, in that case, the I. O. had full opportunity to examine Pushpa Pandey, the signatory to the fardbeyan and other eye witnesses. Even if this plea is accepted for a moment for argument sake, in that case, the I. O. had full opportunity to examine Pushpa Pandey, the signatory to the fardbeyan and other eye witnesses. It was, therefore, not understandable why he delayed taking the statement of eye witnesses before taking the re-statement of the informant. So the allegation that he was delaying these statements, including the restatement of the informant, because of certain unexplained and mysterious motives in his mind very much sticks. The trial court had, therefore, rightly nursed a suspicion regarding integrity of the I.O. in conducting investigation. 8. Now I shall advert to the remarks and so called strictures by the trial court against the I.O. All that the trial court directed was that there should be a departmental enquiry regarding the conduct of the I.O. and during the course of this departmental proceeding, he should not be entrusted with any investigation work. This writ is concerned with the aforesaid remarks and direction of the trial court. It was submitted before me that the trial court had passed strictures against the I.O. and his remark was a stigma upon his career. I am of the opinion that, of course, a court of law should not resort to passing strictures against any government official being moved by sentiments. But when a particular remark is warranted by the evidence on the record, and it forms basis of a particular finding I do not think, such remarks can be withheld by the trial court. The remarks casting doubt or veiled aspersion on the conduct of Police Official which is well meritted on the circumstances on the record, can legitimately be passed and some times such remarks form the basis of a particular finding of fact and it becomes inevitable. In the instant case, the trial court had simply doubted the integrity of the I.O. in taking the re-statement of the informant and imputed certain motive upon him which was well warranted by the circumstances on the record. So there was nothing wrong in the remarks recorded by the trial court. Then he directed the proper authority to initiate just a departmental proceeding and directed that no investigation work should be entrusted to the I.O., during the course of departmental proceeding. So there was nothing wrong in the remarks recorded by the trial court. Then he directed the proper authority to initiate just a departmental proceeding and directed that no investigation work should be entrusted to the I.O., during the course of departmental proceeding. In the opinion of petitioners lawyer, this direction was a sort of punishment which the trial court was not authorised to inflict. In this connection, I am of the opinion that by directing that no investigation work should be entrusted to P.W. 12, I. O. Pramod Kumar Jha, the court did not impose any punishment upon the I. O.; rather to safeguard the interest of the public in general, he made this direction. Of course, it is not necessary that the Police Officer must be entrusted with the investigation work, as part of his duty. He may be entrusted with other duties, such as, maintenance of law and order etc. and simply because he is debarred from taking up investigation, I do not think that that will be a sort of punishment upon his career, nor can this cast a stigma, because if he is exonerated in the departmental proceeding, the direction in this connection shall automatically lapse. So the courts direction was neither punishment imposed by the I.O. nor it was a stigma upon his career. So far other directions and observations passed by the trial court in its judgment regarding payment of compensation to the accused and the departmental proceeding be initiated against the B.D.O. etc., I need not touch upon those directions. So those directions remain in tact. 9. In the result, I am of the opinion that this writ has no merit and it is accordingly, dismissed.