JUDGMENT The Court: This writ petition is being heard in presence of the learned Advocates for the parties. Union of India, represented by its Manager, Government of India Press, Publication Unit, Howrah is the petitioner before us. 2. The writ petitioner has challenged an order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench (in short Tribunal) by which the Tribunal has allowed an application filed by the writ petitioners/ respondents before it for appointment on compassionate ground. 3. Late Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury, was under employment of Union of India, Government of India, Press Publication Unit, Howrah. He died in harness on 26th May, 1992. Immediately thereafter, the widow of Late Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury made an application before the concerned authority for appointment of her second son Shri Argha Roychowdhury on compassionate ground. The said application was, however, rejected by the concerned authorities against which a petition was moved before the Tribunal which was allowed by the impugned order. Feeling aggrieved by this order, of the Tribunal, this writ petition has been moved at the instance of Union of India. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We have examined the order impugned in this writ application as well as other materials on record. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits before us that the claim of the writ petitioners/respondents was not a genuine one as would be evident from the records that they did not disclose the existence of another son of the deceased Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury. Secondly, there was no disclosure of the assets left by Late Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury. It was also contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that even assuming that the finding of the Tribunal was correct, even then the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct the authorities to appoint the writ petitioner/respondent No.2 on compassionate ground. In support of this centention the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has drawn our attention to two decisions of the Supreme Court and one Single Bench decision, of this Court, viz., 1994(2) S.C.C. 718 (Life Insurance Corpn. of India vs. Ashka Ramchandra Ambedkar & Anr.) 1994(4) S.C.C. 448 (State of Haryana vs. Naresh Kumar Bali) and 1995(1) C.L.J. 145 (Haradhan Mitra vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.). This submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner was hotly contested by the learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners/respondents. of India vs. Ashka Ramchandra Ambedkar & Anr.) 1994(4) S.C.C. 448 (State of Haryana vs. Naresh Kumar Bali) and 1995(1) C.L.J. 145 (Haradhan Mitra vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.). This submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner was hotly contested by the learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners/respondents. According to the learned counsel for the writ petitioners/respondents, question of suppression of fact of existence of the eldest son Shri Anup Kumar Roychowdhury cannot arise at all in view of the fact that in the first representation before the authorities filed by the respondent No.1 for appointment on compassionate ground, the existence of her eldest son was duly noted. It is true that in the proforma the existence of the eldest son was not mentioned. That does not mean that the writ petitioners/respondents have suppressed the fact of existence of the eldest son of the writ petitioner/respondent No.1. It was also submitted that the question of the eldest son being a dependent in the facts of this case cannot arise at all in view of the fact that the said son was residing elsewhere separately when his father was very much alive. Therefore, the said son cannot be considered to be the dependant of Late Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury at the time of his death. The finding of fact on this question was arrived at by the Tribunal by holding that at the time of the death of Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury, the eldest son Shri Anup Kumar Roychowdhury was very much separate and was living in a different place and accordingly he would not be considered to be the dependant of the deceased Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury as the time of his death. The authorities also rejected the claim of the writ petitioners/ respondents on the ground that there was a joint account with this eldest son and the widow, the respondent No.1 in which a sum of Rs. 3,328.71 was lying. 6. In our view, the Tribunal was justified in coming to a finding that the said son Shri Anup Kumar Roychowdhury was living separately from the family of the respondents and also the sum that is now lying in the joint account with Shri Anup Kumar Roychowdhury and the respondent No.1 is a mere sum of Rs. 3,328.71 was lying. 6. In our view, the Tribunal was justified in coming to a finding that the said son Shri Anup Kumar Roychowdhury was living separately from the family of the respondents and also the sum that is now lying in the joint account with Shri Anup Kumar Roychowdhury and the respondent No.1 is a mere sum of Rs. 3,328.71 which by stretch of imagination can be said to be sufficient fund to maintain the family of the writ petitioner/respondent No.1. The Tribunal, in our view after considering the entire materials on record and after considering the fact that the eldest son was living separately at the time of death of his father came to a finding that the said son could not be considered to be a dependant of Late Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury and, therefore, the only dependent person on the death of Amiya Kumar Roychowdhury was the widow and the respondent No.2 being the second son. This is a finding of fact which in our view cannot be upset under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. The second question that was urged on behalf of the writ petitioner was that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the authorities to appoint the writ petitioner No.2 on compassionate ground. In support of this contention, the aforesaid decisions were cited by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner. We need not go into this question as we find from the order of the Tribunal that the Tribunal by the impugned order has only directed the authorities to consider the appointment of writ petitioner/respondent No.2 in accordance with law. So it cannot be said from this finding that the writ petitioner No. 2/respondent was directed to be appointed on compassionate ground. That being the position, we do not find any merit in this writ application. The writ application is, therefore, rejected. 8. There will be no order as to costs. 9. Let xerox certified copies of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned counsel for the parties. Tarun Chatterjee, J. Writ application rejected. Hrishikesh Banerji, J.