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2001 DIGILAW 107 (PAT)

Hira Lal Singh v. State Of Bihar

2001-02-07

SACHCHIDANAND JHA

body2001
Judgment Sachchidanand Jha, J. 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by notification No. 346 dated 14.1.2000 by which he has been repatriated to his parent department, namely, Agriculture Department. His services had been placed at the disposal of the Rural Development Department by the Agriculture Department on 30.12.1996. After deputation, he was posted as Block Development Officer on 30.6.1998. 2. It appears that similar repatriation order was passed against the petitioner on 3.11.1999 which he challenged before this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 11534 of 1999. By order dated 20.12.1999, this Court observed that the matter relating to period of deputation cannot be looked into in writ jurisdiction and the petitioner was at liberty to raise his grievance before the competent authority. It is pertinent to mention here that the said writ petition seems to have been argued on the premise that the period of deputation was three years and, therefore, his repatriation was premature. Be that as it may, pursuant to the above said order dated 20.12.1999 of this Court, the petitioner filed representation which was rejected by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Rural Development Department, on 14.1.2000. The petitioner seeks quashing of the said order in this writ petition and consequential directions. 3. Shri Narendra Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that though an officer serving on any post on deputation is not entitled to hold that post as a matter of right, like appointment on probation or temporary appointment, where he is sought to be repatriated from the post on the ground of any misconduct, the authorities are required to hold inquiry and give an opportunity of hearing to him. He placed reliance on Depti Prakash Banerjee V/s. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors. -- and K.H Phadnis V/s. State of Maharashtra -- . On facts, he referred to the order of the Commissioner and Secretary to contend that the impugned order of repatriation was punitive in nature. 4. The case of Depti Prakash Banerjee (supra) related to termination of the services of a probationer. The Court observed that even though the services of the probationer can be terminated without any inquiry where it is proposed to be done on the ground of misconduct, inquiry with respect to the allegation constituting misconduct must be held. 4. The case of Depti Prakash Banerjee (supra) related to termination of the services of a probationer. The Court observed that even though the services of the probationer can be terminated without any inquiry where it is proposed to be done on the ground of misconduct, inquiry with respect to the allegation constituting misconduct must be held. In this connection, the Court made distinction between foundation and motive and observed that where the foundation of the order is misconduct the person is entitled to an opportunity of hearing. The case of K.H. Phadnis (supra) was one of temporary affiliation on a post. The person concerned was an employee of the Department of Excise and Prohibition in the Government of Bombay. In view of his past experience in the Civil Supplies Department, he was appointed on the post of Controller of Foodgrains Distribution in the Civil Supplies Department. Later certain accusations were made by him following his daughters marriage whereafter he was repatriated from the post. The Court observed that a Government servant holding a temporary post and having lien on substantive past may be sent back on substantive post in ordinary course in exigency of service but where such reversion is the result of accusations against character and integrity of the person, the order becomes stigmatic and in such a situation he becomes entitled to inquiry and opportunity of hearing. 5. the case of termination of probationers services and/or cessation of temporary appointment on higher post, in my opinion, stand on a different footing from the case of repatriation simpliciter. Any order terminating probation results in the cessation of employment and likewise, termination of temporary appointment also puts and end to the appointment or officiation on a higher post, as the case may be, altogether. Thus, where the services of a probationer are terminated and, similarly, where a person holding a higher post in the same department or other department is reverted to his substantive post without giving him opportunity, such an order causes loss and prejudice to him. In such a case, the Court may feel inclined to examine as to whether the order is stigmatic, that is to say, whether the misconduct is the foundation or motive of the impugned action. But where the person serving another department on deputation basis is sent to his parent department or cadre, the case does not stand on the same footing. But where the person serving another department on deputation basis is sent to his parent department or cadre, the case does not stand on the same footing. There is no question of the repatriation causing any loss or prejudice to him. The law on the point is settled that no person has a right to remain on the post on deputation basis and he may at any time be reverted to his parent post/cadre. The decision in Ratilal B. Soni V/s. State of Gujarat -- may be referred to in this connection. The petitioner admittedly being an officer of the Agriculture Department sent to the Rural Development Department on deputation, had no legal right whatsoever to remain in that department. Since the order of repatriation is not likely to cause any loss or prejudice to him the question of the order being stigmatic so as to warrant any inquiry or giving opportunity of hearing, therefore, does not arise. 6. Before I conclude the discussions, I must observe that in the notification dated 30.6.1998 posting the petitioner as Block Development Officer no tenure was fixed, even then C.W.J.C. No. 11534/99 seems to have been argued on the premise that the said deputation was for three years, as mentioned above. That being so, the very basis of the grievance made in the earlier writ petition, in my opinion, did not have any substance. Be that as it may, in view of my conclusion on the main point urged by the Counsel, I have no difficulty in holding that the petitioner has no legal right to remain in the Rural Development Department and the impugned order, therefore, does not suffer from any illegality. 7. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed.