JUDGMENT: The 1st respondent herein filed an application under Sec.50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (“the Act” in short). It was allowed. The appellant is aggrieved by the order of the copy right Board expunging the entry made in the Register. 2. The copy right is in respect of the artistic work is the device of a Kuthuvilakku. According to the 1st respondent, one P.R.Srinivasan is the author of the Artistic work and the 1st respondent is the owner and it was first published in the year 1966 had been used by them from time to time. The 1st respondent's copyright was registered on 1.4.1992. The appellant applied for registration on 28.8.1996. The 1st respondent filed the application for cancelling the registration given to the appellant. The appellant herein resisted the rectification and after hearing both the parties, the Copyright Board, the second respondent was satisfied that the 1st respondent's petition should be allowed. Against this, the present appeal has been filed. 3. Mr. A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel for the appellant referred to the various provisions of the Act. He would submit that when the 1st respondent had not established his locus standi to maintain the application, the 2nd respondent ought not to have entertained the same. The extract from the Register of Copyrights would show that the author of the copyright is one P.R. Srinivasan. This P.R. Srinivasan is admittedly no more. The learned senior counsel would say, therefore, that when there is nothing in writing to show that the rights in respect of the artistic device of Kuthuvilakku had been assigned or transferred to the 1st respondent, they cannot maintain a petition under Sec.50 of the Act. He would also submit that though the extract on the Register shows that the first user is from the year 1966, the 1st respondent has not established such user by any acceptable evidence. In a suit between the same parties, the present 1st respondent had clearly prove that the entry made in the Register of copyrights that the respondent's user is from 1966 is patently false. In such circumstances, the 2nd respondent ought not to have entertained the application. He also submitted that the appellant had produced certain documents which could not be brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent at the time of hearing. These documents were very relevant for the purpose of deciding the case. In such circumstances, the 2nd respondent ought not to have entertained the application. He also submitted that the appellant had produced certain documents which could not be brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent at the time of hearing. These documents were very relevant for the purpose of deciding the case. He would submit that the impugned order has been signed only on 12.8.1999, the communication sent by the appellant enclosing the documents on 26.7.1999 ought to have been considered. On the other hand, this was returned by the Licensing Officer and Deputy Registrar of Copyrights by letter dated 9.8.1999 on the ground that since the Board has already passed final orders on the case between the parties, these documents cannot be entertained. The learned Senior Counsel raised two grievances in this contest; (1) that until the order has been signed by the Board, they would have the power and discretion to consider any additional documents forwarded by the parties to the proceeding; (2) even if the documents deserved to be rejected, it is only the Copyright Board which has the power to reject the documents and not the Licensing Officer. Several documents were filed before the 2nd respondent and they are also referred in the order. The 1st respondent had filed several invoices to show that they had been in existence long prior to the date on which the copyright was registered. The learned senior counsel would submit that the invoices do not show that the 1st respondent had been using the Kuthuvilakku device and therefore, merely on the basis of the invoices, one cannot come to the conclusion that there was prior use. He would also submit that the ownership of the device is “shrouded in mystery”. In the petition there is no categoric statement as to who is the owner of the copyright. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the Sales Tax assessments filed by the 1st respondent date from the year 1974 only and not from 1966 as claimed by the 1st respondent and even in these assessments, there is no reference to Kuthuvilakku brand and therefore, these cannot be relied on. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the Sales Tax assessments filed by the 1st respondent date from the year 1974 only and not from 1966 as claimed by the 1st respondent and even in these assessments, there is no reference to Kuthuvilakku brand and therefore, these cannot be relied on. He also submitted that it is the case of the appellant that he had been manufacturing and selling Kuthuvilakku, Vermicelli and Ada from 1984-85 and merely because the registration was done in 1996, it cannot in any way dislodge the claim of the appellant of user before 1992 which is the date of registration in favour of the 1st respondent. He would submit that the case of the 1st respondent that the appellant was their agent is not correct. He would submit that it is needless to say that registration is not compulsory under the Act and therefore merely because the appellant came forward to register his device in 1996, it cannot be a ground for expunging the entry in his favour. The learned senior counsel would also submit that the appellant has also filed an application challenging the entry made in the Register of copyrights in favour of the 1st respondent and the Board ought to have heard both the matters together. He also submitted that the very fact that the additional documents produced by the appellant were not considered by the 2nd respondent would at least warrant an order of remand directing the 2nd respondent to hear the matter afresh. The learned senior counsel also pointed out to the impugned order, where it is observed that an examination of the two artistic work shows that they are identical and one mark could be mistaken for the other and that the appellant's artistic work is a verbatim reproduction of the 1st respondent's and that there is clear “passing off”. He submitted that these observations would show that the 2nd respondent had gone beyond the scope of their powers under Sec.50. For all these reasons, he would submit that the impugned order should be set aside. 4. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the appellant was fully aware that the artistic work Kuthuvilakku belonged to the 1st respondent. For all these reasons, he would submit that the impugned order should be set aside. 4. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that the appellant was fully aware that the artistic work Kuthuvilakku belonged to the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent had been in the business of manufacture and sale of Vermicelli and Ada for over 30 years and the appellant had been purchasing the Kuthuvilakku brand Vermicelli and Ada packed in polythene bags from the 1st respondent for many years. Subsequently, because of business rivalry, the appellant thought it fit to apply for registration as though it was his own artistic work. The authorities without taking into note the prior registration had also mistakenly issued a registration certificate in 1996. The learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant was only selling the 1st respondent's products on their behalf. Several documents were referred to by the learned senior counsel to show that there is no evidence to support the case of the appellant that they were manufacturing Ada. On the other hand, they started business only as grocery merchants. No material was placed before the 2nd respondent to show that the appellant was manufacturing Ada. He also submitted that the power under Sec.50 is very wide and they cannot be restricted as claimed by the appellant. He also pointed out that there was no specific denial by the appellant of the allegation made by the 1st respondent that he was only their agent. It was further submitted that the matter cannot be rounded merely because the documents were returned. The appellant had a fair opportunity to produce all the documents that they had in their possession. In fact, in March 1999, the appellant had filed a rejoinder to the 1st respondent's application stating thus “The registered proprietor will produce at the appropriate time documents proving manufacture and sale of ad bearing the artistic work Kuthuvilakku brand since the year 1984.” When these documents were in their power and custody, nothing prevented them from producing those documents at the time of hearing. This statement made by the appellant in his application is sufficient to throw out the objection raised by the appellant regarding the non-consideration of documents. Learned senior counsel submitted that the 2nd respondent had exercised its power properly and correctly and there was no necessity to interfere with the same. 5. This statement made by the appellant in his application is sufficient to throw out the objection raised by the appellant regarding the non-consideration of documents. Learned senior counsel submitted that the 2nd respondent had exercised its power properly and correctly and there was no necessity to interfere with the same. 5. Sec.18 of the Act deals with the Assignment for copyright. Sec.19 enacts that for an assignment of copyright in any work to be valid, it shall be in writing which is signed by assignor or by his duly authorised agent. Chapter X of the Act deals with Registration of copyrights. Chapter II which contains Secs.9 , 10 , 11 and 12 and deals with the copyright office and Copyright Board and Chapter X which deals with Registration do not contain any provision which makes the registration of copyright compulsory. A copyright can exist and an action for infringement can be laid even if the copyright is not registered. But in the instant case, we are concerned with the rectification of the Register of copyrights. Sec.44 refers to the Register of Copyrights which is a Register in the prescribed form kept at the copyrights office in which various particulars of the copyright can be found and which will put people on notice of all the particulars relating to the copyrights. The particulars which are prescribed shall be furnished as prescribed in Form 3 of the Copyright Rules. Sec.45 deals with entries in the Register of copyrights. An application can be made in the prescribed form for entering the particulars of the literacy, dramatic, musical or artistic work, as the case may be, in the Register of copyrights. This application is made in Form No.4 of the Copyright Rules. The author or the publisher of, or the owner of or any other person interested in the copyright is entitled to make an application. On receipt of the application, the Registrar of Copyrights enters the particulars of the work after holding such enquiry as he deems fit. Sec.46 deals with indexes of the Register of Copyrights and Sec.47, Form and inspection of register. On receipt of the application, the Registrar of Copyrights enters the particulars of the work after holding such enquiry as he deems fit. Sec.46 deals with indexes of the Register of Copyrights and Sec.47, Form and inspection of register. Sec.48 is very important, it provides that the Register of Copyrights is prima facie evidence of the particulars entered therein and documents purporting to be copies of the entries of the Register or extracts of the Register certified by the Registrar and sealed with the office seal are admissible in evidence without further proof or production of the original. Sec.50 deals with rectification. It reads thus: “Any person aggrieved by an entry wrongly omitted or an entry wrongly made or any correction or defect may make an application under Sec.50.” The Act does not provide any prescribed form for application under Sec.50. No procedure is also laid down for proceedings under Sec.50. However, Sec.12(7) of the Act provides that all proceedings before the Board are deemed to be judicial proceedings and under Sec.12(1) the Board has the power to regulate its own procedure. There is a reference in the book “Law of copyright and Industrial Designs” at paragraph 24.07 to the evidentiary value of the Register and to a case before the Copyright Board (H.M.T. Ltd. v. Girnar Knitwear) where the Board held that when the defendants registered a logo identical to the plaintiff under the Copyright Act, evidence of prior adoption and use was produced which was accepted by the Copyright Board for expunging the registration of the defendant's logo. 6. Arguments advanced by the counsel on both sides were also towards establishing who was using the Kuthuvilakku device first. According to the appellant, they were using the device from 1984, while the 1st respondent miserably failed to prove their case of user from 1966. Whereas according to the 1st respondent, any sale made by the appellant of Kuthuvilakku brand Ada or Vermicelli in the year 1984 was only as the agent of the 1st respondent and not on their own. The comparison of the two copyrights show that they are almost identical. The question whether the appellant had the locus standi to maintain the petition was raised. The comparison of the two copyrights show that they are almost identical. The question whether the appellant had the locus standi to maintain the petition was raised. A perusal of the extract of the Register dated 1.4.1992 where under the 1st respondent's artistic work was registered as A-51695/92 shows that the appellant who is P.R.Srinvasan & Sons is the owner, the author is P.R.Srinivasan, the name and address of the owners of various rights comprising the copyright is shown and it refers to P.R.Srinivasan & Sons, P.R. Srinivasan and others. The person who filed the petition under Sec.50 is P.R.Srinivasan & Sons. We have already seen that application for entering the particulars of copyright can be made by the author, publisher, owner or other person interested. So, any of these persons can also be “a person aggrieved” with regard to a wrongly made entry and can file an application under Sec.50. The 2nd respondent, while considering this objection had held that it does not make a difference whether the author Srinivasan is a partner or an employee of the petitioner firm since the registration had been made in the name of the petitioner. This is the extract from the order of the Board: “In any case, the death of the author in this case would not make any difference in the ownership of the copyright which had already vested in the petitioner at the time of registration.” 7. Both the objection relating to the author's death and the objection regarding the case of the absence of any assignment in writing lack merit. The registration has been made in the name of the firm even through P.Srinivasan was shown as the author. So, whether he was or was not a partner in the firm is really not material since the firm can apply for rectification as the owner of the work and the question of absence of assignment in writing does not arise. 8. As regards prior user, the case of the 1st respondent is that the appellant was selling their Kuthuvilakku brand Vermicelli and Ada as their agent and also that this was not denied by the appellant. A statement denying that was pointed out by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant. 8. As regards prior user, the case of the 1st respondent is that the appellant was selling their Kuthuvilakku brand Vermicelli and Ada as their agent and also that this was not denied by the appellant. A statement denying that was pointed out by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant. When one looks at the document that were filed before the 2nd respondent, there are several invoices spread over the several years in the name of P.R. Srinivasan and Sons and also bearing the name Kuthuvilakku mark Semia and Adai. These invoices show that the 1st respondent had sold large quantities of cartons containing these Ada and Vermicelli packets to “Sridevi Stores” which is the name of the predecessor in interest of the appellant. 9. In the grounds filed in the C.M.A. the appellant has taken an objection that photocopies of invoices were produced to show the 1st respondent's existence in 1985 and they ought not to have been relied on in the absence of original. But, when the invoices clearly show that these products had been despatched to the appellant, the least that the appellant could have done is to prove that no point of time had they received bulk packets of the 1st respondent's Kuthuvilakku brand Vermicelli and Ada. The entries in the Register are prima facie evidence of what is contained therein. The last respondent claims to have been in existence from 1966. The Sales Tax assessment which are produced through without referring to the brand name, at least show that they were manufacturing Vermicelli and Ada right from 1974. The invoices show that the appellant had been supplied with bulk quantities of Kuthuvilakku brand Vermicelli and Ada. The Act itself does not make the registration of copyright compulsory. Therefore, all these documents cumulatively would show that the 1st respondent had been in the business of manufacturing and selling vermicelli and Ada under the brand name Kuthuvilakku. That they have also used the artistic device Kuthuvilakku is evidenced by the entry in the Register. This can be accepted as prima facie proof unless the party wanting to disprove the same does so to the satisfaction of the 2nd respondent. The appellant on the other hand had not chosen to produce any document to show that they had been manufacturing and selling Kuthuvilakku brand Vermicelli and Ada before the 1st respondent. This can be accepted as prima facie proof unless the party wanting to disprove the same does so to the satisfaction of the 2nd respondent. The appellant on the other hand had not chosen to produce any document to show that they had been manufacturing and selling Kuthuvilakku brand Vermicelli and Ada before the 1st respondent. On the materials produced before it, the 2nd respondent had established prior adoption and user of the artistic device. 10. The other objection raised by the appellant is with regard to the non-consideration of their documents. In fact, pending this C.M.A. C.M.P.No.17151 of 1999 was filed to receive the original documents Nos.1 to 14 marked in the affidavit as Annexure “A”. These are the documents which the appellant had sought to produce before the Copyright Board and had failed in the attempt. The appellant will have to satisfy the Board that there was sufficient cause for not producing these documents at the appropriate time. As pointed out on behalf of the respondents, it is evident from their application that the appellant had these documents under his control and custody, but yet, he did not choose to produce them before the Board. The reference by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant to the date 12.8.1999 is not really relevant. The order copy enclosed with the C.M.A. papers show that the date of the order is 20.7.1999 and 12.8.1999 is only the date on which the order was certified as a true copy by the Deputy Registrar of Copyrights. It is seen from the records that the matter was “decided at the Bangalore meeting on 2.7.1999”. The order was signed on 20.7.1999. The appellant appears to have forwarded the documents on 26.7.1999 which had been duly returned. As stated earlier the 2nd respondent's proceedings are deemed to be judicial proceedings and under Sec.12, power is given to the 2nd respondent to regulate its own procedure. Sec.74 of the Act gives the Registrar of copyrights and the copy right Board the power to secure fully and effectively the necessary evidence for effective adjudication of the matter before them. Under O.18 , Rule 17(A), C.P.C. a party who satisfies the Court that despite exercise of due diligence, some evidence could not be produced by him at the appropriate time, may be permitted to produce it at a later stage. Under O.18 , Rule 17(A), C.P.C. a party who satisfies the Court that despite exercise of due diligence, some evidence could not be produced by him at the appropriate time, may be permitted to produce it at a later stage. In this case, the appellant had clearly stated that they had the documents and would produce them at the appropriate time, but did not do so. Now the appellant cannot complain that his additional documents were not received in evidence. The C.M.P. for receipt of the evidence also deserves to be rejected since the appellant has not satisfied the conditions required under O.41 , Rule 27, C.P.C. for production of additional evidence. As stated above, the documents were not produced at the appropriate time and therefore the Board did not consider them and since the conditions laid down inO.41 , Rule 27, C.P.C. have not been established, this Court is also not inclined to receive those documents in evidence. 11. The only question therefore that has to be considered is whether the 1st respondent had satisfied the Board that their user and adoption of the artistic device was prior to the appellant's. In this case the evidence on record and the pleadings unambiguously show that it is the 1st respondent who had been using the artistic device of Kuthuvilakku for his Vermicelli and Ada and the appellant's entry in the Register of Copyrights was wrongly made. The expunging of the entry by the Copyright Board is in accordance with the provisions of Sec.50 of the Act and therefore, there is no need to interfere with the same. The C.M.A. is therefore dismissed. No costs. Connected C.M.Ps. are closed. S.S.----- Appeal dismissed.