S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 3953 of 1991 whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by appellant-writ petition herein was dismissed, ( 2 ) THE appellant, admittedly, is a purchaser of a land to an extent of Ac. 06 gts. in S. No. 132 of Mutrajpaly village, Medak District from one Chakali Peda balaiuh. According to him, he was not aware of the notification issued by the Government under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. He was also not aware of the award passed in the acquisition proceedings. As such, even after publication of the award he could not question the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant submits that although the award cannot be questioned, if the notification is vitiated by reason of non-publication of the same in two newspapers as required under Section 4 of the Act, the writ petition would be maintainable. ( 4 ) RELYING on the decision of the Apex Court in Khub Chand v. Stale of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074 , it was submitted that the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act is void ab in to. Strong reliance in this connection has also been placed on the decisions of this Court in the Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Smt. Ch. Adilakshamamma, 1988 (2) ALT 425 and Gompa Dali Naidu v. Slate of Andhra Pradesh, 1990 (2) ALT 363. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel would contend that the appellant herein did not lose locus to question the notification only because his name had not been entered in the revenue records which is neither a proof of title nor confer any right on any person. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Guru Amarjit Singh v. Retan Chand, 1993 (4) SCC 349 . ( 6 ) THE learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, would submit that the appellant inter alia questioned the notification-dated 8. 8,1988 on the ground that his name was not published in the notification which omission does not vitiate the notification itself. ( 6 ) THE learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, would submit that the appellant inter alia questioned the notification-dated 8. 8,1988 on the ground that his name was not published in the notification which omission does not vitiate the notification itself. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Narasimha Murthy, AIR 1996 SC 90 , State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh, AIR 1996 SC 675 and Smt. P. Choudrani v. District Social Welfare Officer (LA.), Cuddapah, 1979 (1) ALT (NRC) 59. ( 7 ) IN the instant case, the petitioner did not file any objection in the enquiry made under Section 5-A of the Act. In such a situation, an award was passed on 7. 3. 1991. Admittedly, the appellant s name was not entered in the revenue records. He, however, having regard to the manner of publication of the notice as prescribed under the Act, must be deemed to have knowledge of issuance of the said notification under Section 4 (1 ). Apart from the fact that the appellant is not a recognised owner, if he has any interest in the amount of compensation, he had a right to file objection at any stage of the proceedings. But, he did not choose to do so. ( 8 ) HAVING not taken any steps for a long time, the point which arises for consideration, is as to whether at this stage he can be permitted to raise the said question. The answer thereto must be rendered in negative. ( 9 ) DELAY and laches alone may be a ground for refusal to grant any equitable relief. Those who sleep over their rights cannot be granted an equitable relief. ( 10 ) IN Sharad Narula v. State of West Bengal, 2001 (3) ICC 63, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has refused to interfere in a writ petition although a substantial question had been raised in the following terms: although a substantial question has been raised by the petitioner, it appears that the said question had not been raised either before the Commissioner or before the learned Tribunal. Such a question cannot, therefore, be permitted to be raised for the first time before this Court. Furthermore, the best judgment assessment having been passed on 19. 4. Such a question cannot, therefore, be permitted to be raised for the first time before this Court. Furthermore, the best judgment assessment having been passed on 19. 4. 1994, we do not find any reason why certified copy could be obtained only on 27. 11. 1998. The purported explanation of the petitioner to the effect that its representative had gone to the department on a number of occasions but was told by the clerk that the same was not ready, cannot be believed. In any event, having regard to the fact that both the learned Tribunal as also the Commissioner has refused to accept the explanation offered by the petitioner herein in the matter of condonation of delay in preferring the appeal and the reasons assigned therefor, in our opinion, being not perverse, the same should not be interfered within exercise of our judicial review. As on this question alone, the writ applications are liable to be dismissed, we need not go into the other questions raised at the Bar. ( 11 ) IN Sohan Singh v. General Manager, Ordinance Factory, Khamaria, AIR 1981 SC 1862 , where a question of jurisdiction of the Labour Court to deal with an issue fell for consideration, the Apex Court setting aside the order of the High Court allowing such plea of jurisdiction, on the ground that the same had not been raised before the statutory authorities observed: the High Court seems to have taken the view that the trial of such an issue was beyond the competence of the Labour Court; but it has rightly been pointed out on behalf of the appellant that instead of challenging the competence of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to try issue No. 4, the respondents went to trial, submitted to its jurisdiction and when a decision was given against them by the Labour Court, thy, for the first time, challenged the jurisdiction to try that issue in the High Court. On the facts of this case High Court ought not to have entertained the point of jurisdiction urged on behalf of the respondents and set aside the order of the Labour Court on that ground alone. ( 12 ) IT is now a well-settled principle of law that those who sleep over their rights are not entitled to any equitable relief. ( 12 ) IT is now a well-settled principle of law that those who sleep over their rights are not entitled to any equitable relief. In A. Hamsaveni v. State of T. N. , (1994) 6 SCC 52, it has been held: ". . . . No reliance can be placed on the averment that they did not approach earlier as they were not affected. Even if it be so they are to thank themselves. Sleeping over the rights, if there were any, with eyes open does not cure laches. . . . " ( 13 ) IN S. S. Rathore v. State of M. P. , AIR 1990 SC 10 , it has clearly been held that an aggrieved person should approach the Court or the Tribunal immediately after rejection of his representation or within a reasonable time when representation is not responded to. ( 14 ) IN State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991 , it has been held: "in our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient to hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had occurred between the alleged taking, of possession of his land and the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody that too against the State. When such general allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to have occurred 20 years earlier, and the State s non-compliance with petitioners demands, State may not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is required to carry on its Governmental functional. . . . " ( 15 ) IN High Court of M. P. v, Mahesh Prakash, AIR 1994 SC 2595 , it has been held: ". . . . . Apart therefrom, the 1st respondent s delay in approaching the writ Court had resulted in the creation of a long settled position as to seniority in the subordinate judiciary disturbing the long settled position adversely affected not only the 39 Civil Judges whose seniority was displaced but also the functioning of the subordinate judiciary, responsibility for which lay with the High Court. It is,, therefore, as open to the High Court to agitate the ground of delay and laches as it would have been open for the 39 Civil Judges had they preferred an appeal. " ( 16 ) IN Principal, Engineering College v. S. Mukherjee, 1998 (1) CHN 471, it has been held: ". . . . The petitioner furthermore, filed the writ application after a long time although the impugned order as contained in annexure d to the writ application passed as aforesaid on 19. 12. 1988. It is now well known that those who sleep over their right could not be granted any equitable relief. Reference in this connection may be made to AIR 1997 SC 2249. . . . " ( 17 ) WE may notice that in State of Karnataka v, Narasimhamurthy (supra) it has been held that omission to publish name of owner in notification does not vitiate the validity thereto. In State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh (supra), the Apex Court held that after the award was made, the Court would not be justified to quash the notification under Section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6 for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A. In Smt. P. Choudrani v. District Social Welfare Officer (LA.), Cuddapah (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that omission to mention names of the owners of lands proposed to be acquired under Section 4 (1) notification would not invalidate the notification. ( 18 ) IN G. Dalminaidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that publication in District Gazette is equal to publication in newspapers. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 698 , the Apex Court held: as regards laches in approaching the Court, this Court has been consistently taking the view starling from State of M. P. v. Bhailal Bhai (AIR" 1964 SC 1006) wherein a Constitution Bench had held that it is not either desirable or expedient to lay down a rule of universal application but the unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner the discretionary extraordinary remedy of" mandamus, eertiorari or any other relief. The same view was reiterated in a catena of decisions viz, Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) I SCC 84, State of Mysore v. V. K. Kangan, MR 1975 SC 2190. Ajlaioon v. Lt. The same view was reiterated in a catena of decisions viz, Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) I SCC 84, State of Mysore v. V. K. Kangan, MR 1975 SC 2190. Ajlaioon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) SCC 285, Tilokchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 1 10, State of T. N. v. L. Krishnan, (1996) I SCC 250, Improvement Trust v Jag/it Singh, 1987 Supp. SCC 608, Stale of Punjab v. Hari Om Co-op. House Building Society Ltd. 1987 Supp. SCC 687, Market Committee v. Krishan Mural. (1996) 1 SCC 311 and State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh (1996) 7 SCC 394 ,wherein this Court had held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the acquisition proceedings. ( 19 ) THE said decisions apply on all fours in the instant case. The decisions of the Apex Court in Khub Chand v. Slate of Rajasthan (supra) and decisions of this Court in The Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Smt. Ch. Adilakshamma (supra) and Gompa Dalminaidu v. State of Audhra Pradesh (supra) have no application to the facts of the present case. ( 20 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned. we find no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed ai Rs. 500/ -.