S. B. SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against the order dated 25-6-1999 passed in O. A. No. 7378 of 1997 by the Andhra Pradesh administrative Tribunal. ( 2 ) THE respondent was the applicant before the Tribunal. He filed an application under Section 19 of the Administrative tribunals Act, 1985 for the following reliefs:" (A) To direct the respondents to step up the pay of the applicant in accordance with G. O. 157 education (HE. I) dated 25-5-94 to be on par with his immediate junior s pay K. Ramachandra reddy, then Principal Government degree College, Kakinada w. e. f. 25-9-86. (b) To direct the respondents that after fixation of scale of pay in accordance with prayer (a) to fix his pay under FR 22-B of fundamental Rules. (c) To declare that the respondents have no jurisdiction and authority under law not to take any action in refixation of the pay in accordance with report submitted to lokayukta as contained in orders of Lokayukta dated 20-10-97 in complaint No. 1889/1996/b1. (d) To direct the respondents to revise the pensionary benefits of the applicant in accordance and in consequent of prayers (a) and (b) w. e. f. date of his retirement 1-3-95, the date on which he retired from service. " ( 3 ) FROM a perusal of the order of the learned Tribunal, it appears that the respondent, inter alia, raised the following questions: (1) That he was entitled to fixation of his pay in terms of FR 22-B having regard to G. O. Ms. No. 157, education (HE. 1) Department dated 25-5-1994; (2) That one, K. Ramachandra Reddy, who was junior to him had been drawing a higher scale of pay. ( 4 ) IT appears that the learned Tribunal did not consider the first question and proceeded to dispose of the matter on the second question stating:"it is not a disputed fact that sri K. Ramachandra Reddy is junior to the applicant in the cadre of Principal. When once the applicant promoted as principal on paper even though the applicant has discharged some other duties as DEO, the applicant is entitled for the pay scale of the Principal only. When once the applicant promoted as principal on paper even though the applicant has discharged some other duties as DEO, the applicant is entitled for the pay scale of the Principal only. In view of the facts and circumstances and the discussion referred to above, the official respondents are directed to fix the pay of the applicant on par with his junior Sri K. Ramachandra Reddy, the then Principal of Government college, Kakinada with effect from 25-9-86 and fix the pay under f. R. 22 (B) and revise the pensionary benefits of the applicant. This exercise should be completed within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order. " ( 5 ) SO far as the judgment of the learned tribunal is concerned, we are of the opinion that the same cannot be sustained as in the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner herein it has inter alia been stated:"in view of the above orders, the petitioner has no grounds in claiming for the benefit of F. R. 22 (B) fixation as he is not eligible for the said benefit. Further the contention of the petitioner is untenable and his allegation made against the respondent that he has denied the pay fixation under f. R. 22 (b) indiscriminately is not correct. Further the petitioner has quoted g. O. Ms. No. 157 Education dated 25-5-1994 in which Government have issued orders for fixation of pay of senior and Junior in U. G. C. Scales under Career Advancement Scheme in respect of Sri A. V. Kotireddy and sri K. Ramachandra Murthy, Principal of Degree Colleges. The petitioner is claiming for considering the F. R. 22 (b) under this G. O. It is submitted that the G. O. Ms. No. 157 Education (H. E. 1) Department dt. 25-5-1994 is applicable to the personnel working in Higher education Department only. Further it is submitted that as and when U. G. C. orders issued by the Government, they will be extended to School Education department regularly and from time to time. It is also submitted that the government orders were applicable to the personnel working in same cadre and the posts to which they were promoted should be identical and in the same cadre. In the instant case the petitioner was promoted as Joint director on 2-7-1992 and hence the cadre is not identical to the cadre of principal, Government College of education. In the instant case the petitioner was promoted as Joint director on 2-7-1992 and hence the cadre is not identical to the cadre of principal, Government College of education. The Government orders were not applicable to the petitioner as the orders were issued for one candidate only and it is not a general order and it is not extended to the personnel working in School education Department. " ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH a typographical mistake has crept in the said counter-affidavit that in place and stead of K. Ramachandra Reddy, k. Ramachandra Murthy has been mentioned, the stand of the petitioner herein stands clarified in view of the fact that it has categorically been stated that the question of said K. Ramachandra Reddy being junior to the petitioner did not arise as the petitioner was promoted as Joint director, whereas K. Ramachandra Reddy had been working in Higher Education department, which is of separate cadre. F. R. 22 (B), therefore, in our opinion cannot have any application whatsoever, which applies only if the conditions precedent mentioned therein are fulfilled. This aspect of the matter is squarely covered by a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. M. Suryanarayana Rao1 wherein following its earlier decision, it has been held:"learned Counsel has also drawn our attention to the orders of this Court dismissing in limine similar Special leave Petitions in other cases. It is contended by learned Counsel that none of these decisions had been considered by the Bench in r. Swaminathan case (1997) 7 SCC 690 and, therefore, the decision r. Swaminathan case requires reconsideration. We are unable to agree. In none of the cases cited by the learned Counsel, there is any reference to the relevant fundamental rules or the Government Memorandum. On the other hand, the Bench has considered all the relevant rules and has laid down the principle clearly. We find no justification to have the matter reconsidered. The learned Counsel suggests that the bench has failed to take note of an earlier judgment of a Bench of two judges in Union of India vs. P. Jagdish (1997) 3 SCC 176 . Subsequent to the promotion of the respondents in that case as Head Clerks from the posts of senior Clerks, some of the posts of senior Clerks were given a special pay of Rs. 35 per month. Subsequent to the promotion of the respondents in that case as Head Clerks from the posts of senior Clerks, some of the posts of senior Clerks were given a special pay of Rs. 35 per month. Though the respondents had not worked on such posts, they claimed refixation of their pay in the cadre of Head Clerks on a notional basis that they were drawing such special pay. That claim was negatived by the Bench. But the Bench held that the respondents therein were entitled to have their pay stepped up to be on a par with that of their juniors who had worked in posts carrying such special pay and were promoted later than the respondent as Head clerks. The Bench took care to say that such stepping up would be only prospective from the date of promotions of the juniors. The facts of the present case are entirely different and the said ruling will not apply. One of the reasons given by the tribunal in support of its order is that when ad hoc promotions were made, the respondent was not considered therefor or offered the same and it was not as if he refused to take up higher responsibility. The reasoning is highly fallacious. As pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, ad hoc promotions are made within the circles where vacancies arose and the respondent who was working in a different circle could not have been considered for such ad hoc promotion or offered the same. The fact that ad hoc promotions are made within the circles has been noticed by the Bench in R. Swaminathan case. We respectfully agree with the ratio in union of India vs. R. Swaminathan and allow this appeal. The order of the tribunal in O. A. No. 913 of 1996 filed by the respondent is set aside and the said application is dismissed. No costs. " ( 7 ) THE Tribunal also has failed to take into consideration the question that there exists a difference between parity of pay and equal pay for equal work. The said two concepts are absolutely different as would appear from a recent judgment of the Apex court in Kshetriya Kisan Gramin Bank vs. D. B. Sharma2. We, therefore, having regard to the aforementioned decisions of the Apex court, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The said two concepts are absolutely different as would appear from a recent judgment of the Apex court in Kshetriya Kisan Gramin Bank vs. D. B. Sharma2. We, therefore, having regard to the aforementioned decisions of the Apex court, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. However, it appears that the respondent, by reason of two different Government Orders issued on the same day viz. , 28-8-1984, was promoted to the post of Principal in relation whereto no posting was indicated and was also promoted to the post of District Educational officer, in relation whereto a posting was indicated, as a result whereof the respondent herein had no other option but to join the post of District Educational officer and functioned therein in the year 1992 till he was posted as Principal, government Comprehensive College, nellore on 30-5-1992 and was allowed to function in the said post till 1995. The possibility of the State s decision to consider the matter relating to the pay fixation of the respondent in terms of Government Order and Memo dated 26-5-1997, in the context referred to hereinbefore, cannot be ruled out. In that view of the matter the writ petition is allowed, the judgment of the tribunal is set aside and the petitioner herein is directed to consider the matter governed by the aforementioned government Order No. 157 dated 25-5-1994 at an early date and preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order, if any final order has yet not been passed.