Judgment Bakhshish Kaur, J. 1. Civil Writ Petition No. 5072 of 2001 was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court on April 23, 2001 with the following directions :- "In these circumstances, it is appropriate that the authorities take a decision with respect to the claim of the petitioners in accordance with law before they can be allowed to approach this Court in writ jurisdiction. This petition is disposed of finally with a direction to the concerned authorities to consider the representation/justice demand notice of the petitioners dated 17.1.2001, copy of which is Annexure P-19 and decide the same by passing a speaking order within four months of the receipt of a certified copy of this order." 2. According to the petitioner, his case has not been considered by the competent authorities. I have heard Shri Sanjiv Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner and also perused the record. 3. The petitioner, apart from filing the present contempt petition, has also issued a notice of contempt Annexure P-3. It was replied vide Annexure P-4 that a speaking order passed on 3.7.2001 was communicated to the petitioner by the competent authorities. Adverting to the order dated July 3, 2001, copy of which is Annexure P-2, its bare perusal reveals that the representation of the petitioner was considered and the order has been passed thereon. The relevant part of the order is reproduced as under :- "As per above said decision of the Honble Court, the representation dated 17.0.2001 (?) of the petitioners has been considered in the light of instructions/policy issued by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government Haryana Chandigarh PWD (B&R) Branch, Chandigarh No. 13/330/92-4-B&R(W) dated 26.11.1993, copy of which was received vide Engineer-in-Chief, Haryana, PWD B&R Branch, Chandigarh No. 18035-18052/EIII dated 28.11.1993, Haryana Government Notification dated 11.5.1994 and No. 5/4/90/GSI dated 27.5.1993 and is hereby rejected with the plea that as per direction, the services of the petitioners were regularised in Group "D" category i.e. in the pay scale of Rs. 750-940 since issued vide this office order No. 6 dated 7.0.1994 (?). However, the case for granting the scale of class III category post is under process at higher level separately. Till the decision, they cannot be given Group "C" scale of Class II category." 4. 750-940 since issued vide this office order No. 6 dated 7.0.1994 (?). However, the case for granting the scale of class III category post is under process at higher level separately. Till the decision, they cannot be given Group "C" scale of Class II category." 4. The order in the aforesaid terms may not be favourable to the petitioner and in that event he is at liberty to challenge the validity of the order in accordance with law, but it cannot be said the respondents have violated the orders passed by this Court in CWP No. 5072 of 2001, or that they have not complied with the order. 5. It is well settled that the Contempt proceedings cannot be initiated merely at the asking of the party. The jurisdiction to punish for contempt is summary but the consequences are serious. That is why the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings in contempt as also the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in spite of a case of contempt having been made out are both discretionary with the Court. 6. In Murray and Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia and another, 2000(1) RCR 729 (SC) : JT 2000(1) 337 (SC), it has been held by the Apex Court in para 21 that unless the Court is satisfied that contempt is of such a nature that the act complained of substantially interferes with the due course of justice, question of any punishment would not arise. It is not enough that there should be some technical contempt of court but it must be shown that the act of contempt would otherwise substantially interfere with the due course of justice which has been equated with "due administration of justice." 7. Further in para 24 it has been held, "that the Contempt of Courts Act puts an obligation on the Courts to access the situation itself as regards the factum of any interference with the course of justice or due process of law." In Mrityunjoy Das and another v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and others, 2001(2) RCR 260 (SC) : 20001 AIR SCW 1162, it has been held that the contempt procedure is to be sparingly exercised with due care and caution. Under para 14 of the judgment, it is observed as under :- "The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed at this juncture viz., the burden and standard proof. Under para 14 of the judgment, it is observed as under :- "The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed at this juncture viz., the burden and standard proof. The common English phrase "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the standard of proof, be it noted that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. The observations of Lord Denning in Re. Bramblevale, 1969(3) All ER 1062, lend support to the aforesaid. Lord Denning in Re. Bramblevale stated : "A Contempt of Court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time-honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies. There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence. Where there are two equally inconsistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right to hold that the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt." In view of the aforesaid, no case is made out for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondents. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge the order Annexure P-2 of so advised. Consequently, this petition is dismissed.