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2001 DIGILAW 110 (CAL)

East India TPT. Agency India Ltd. v. Union of India

2001-02-27

ASOK KUMAR GANGULY

body2001
JUDGMENT Asok Kumar Ganguly, J.: Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. This writ petition, C.O. 13091(W) of 1990, was filed on 29th August, 1990 by the petitioner challenging inter alia the annexures 'F', 'I' & 'L' in the writ petition. Annexure 'F' purports to be a notice issued by Rajasthan State Consumer Protection Council (hereinafter called the said Council), the respondent No.2. Annexure 'I' appears to be an order dated 17th April, 1990 issued by the Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (hereinafter called the said Commission), the respondent No.3. Annexure 'L' purports to be a notice dated 18.7.1990 issued by the said Commission asking the petitioner to show cause why the order dated 17.04.90 should not be implemented under section 25 of Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter called the said Act) and why the petitioner should not be punished under section 27 of the said Act. 2. The writ petition was initially moved on 29th August, 1990 before a learned Judge of this Court and the writ petition was directed to be taken up on an adjourned date upon notice on respondent No.2. On the next date, the learned Judge after hearing the appearing parties was pleased to pass the following order: "No further steps be taken in terms of the application dated 28th August, 1990. In the event any order has been passed no further effect be given thereto until further orders of this Court. No further steps be taken in terms of the application under section 25 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 until further orders of this Court. This order is passed, however, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of both the parties including the maintainability and jurisdiction of this writ application. Let this matter appear in the list as 'contested application' one week after long vacation. Let xerox copies of this order be supplied by the Department to the learned Advocates appearing for the parties upon payment of usual charges and upon an undertaking to apply for and obtain the certified copy of this order". It appears while passing the order the learned Judge made it clear that the said order is without prejudice to the question of maintainability of the writ petition. Thereafter, affidavit has been filed in this case and matter has been argued before me. 3. The writ petition has been contested only by the respondent No.4. It appears while passing the order the learned Judge made it clear that the said order is without prejudice to the question of maintainability of the writ petition. Thereafter, affidavit has been filed in this case and matter has been argued before me. 3. The writ petition has been contested only by the respondent No.4. It appears from the array of parties in this writ petition that the respondent No.4 is the only the contesting respondent. 4. Initially the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner was very much relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of the Peerless General Investment Co. Ltd. vs. The District Consumer Redressal Forum, reported in 1996(1) CHN, page 371 and submitted that a learned Judge of this Court has held that the provisions of the said Act are ultra vires, so all proceedings taken under the said Act may be quashed following the said judgement. 5. This Court found that the provision of the said Act came up for consideration in various cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in all those cases proceeded on the basis of the said Act is a valid piece of legislation. 6. This Court further finds that in a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Medical Association vs. V.P. Shantha, reported in AIR 1966 SC 550, this Apex Court held the Act does not suffer from "the arbitrariness or unreasonableness so as to be violative of articles 14 and 19(1)g of the Constitution" (paragraph 58 page 569 of the report). In view of the aforesaid declaration of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the ratio in Peerless (supra) is not binding on this Court. Therefore, it is not possible for this Court to hold that all proceedings initiated against the petitioner under the said Act are bound to be quashed. 7. So the next question is for consideration whether the writ petition, challenging those proceedings initiated in Rajasthan, is maintainable in Calcutta High Court. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.4 submitted that none of the respondents arrayed in this case reside within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 7. So the next question is for consideration whether the writ petition, challenging those proceedings initiated in Rajasthan, is maintainable in Calcutta High Court. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.4 submitted that none of the respondents arrayed in this case reside within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel for the respondent No.4 raised various factual aspects to show that the case of the petitioner on merit is not sustainable but this Court need not go into those question to decide the merits of the controversies between the parties. This Court, in order to decide on the objection on the territorial jurisdiction of this Court considers admitted facts and those facts which have been pleaded in the writ petition. It is an admitted position that the respondent No.4, the only contesting respondent has no registered office in Calcutta. No body except respondent No.4 has any stake in the matter. 9. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel of the respondent No.4 that from paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 of the writ petition it would be clear that writ petitioner on receipt of the impugned notice at annexure 'F' and complaint filed in the said Council, forwarded the same to the regional office of the petitioner No.1 at Delhi. It also appears from para 36 that the petitioner gave instruction to the said Delhi Office for taking necessary steps and the petitioner was under the impression that the Delhi Office had taken steps. 10. But it appears from para 37 that nobody appeared before the said Council and the complaint made before the Council was heard on merits and was heard ex parte. It also appears from para 38 that by an order dated 17th April, 1990 the said Commission allowed the prayer made in the said complaint and directed the petitioner to pay a particular amount with interest. It is also the case of the petitioner in para 39 that after getting the said order dated 17th April, 1990, the petitioner wrote to the Delhi Office asking them to enquire why the case of Petitioner No.1 was not represented before the said Commission. It is also the case of the petitioner in para 39 that after getting the said order dated 17th April, 1990, the petitioner wrote to the Delhi Office asking them to enquire why the case of Petitioner No.1 was not represented before the said Commission. Thereafter the Delhi Office informed the petitioner that the Jaipur Office of the petitioner No.1 was informed but they did not file any objection to the said complaint as the lawyers of the Jaipur Office opined that the said Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. 11. Having regard to the pleadings in the writ petition itself it is clear that Delhi and Jaipur Offices of the petitioner No.1, even after being informed, did not take the proper steps before the authorities. They were also directed to contest the matter. Whatever may be the reason, they did not contest the matter and order was passed by the Commission. 12. Assuming the stand taken in writ petition is correct even then there is no reason why Calcutta High Court should be moved to impugn the order of the Commission when the entire proceeding took place outside the territorial limits of Calcutta High Court. Even if it is assumed that the order of the Council/Commission in Rajasthan is without jurisdiction, the proper forum to challenge the same is certainly not Calcutta High Court. Just because the petitioners' instructions for contesting the matter was not followed by its office in Delhi and lawyers in Jaipur, that default on their part does not clothe the Calcutta High Court with the jurisdiction which it does not have in law. It is well settle that even consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction, [See Ledgard vs. Bull, 13 I.A. 134; Barton vs. Fincham, 1921(2) KB 291 at page 299] so there is no question of assumption of jurisdiction by Court by reason of default of one of the parties. 13. From the facts admitted in the writ petition it is clear that Calcutta High Court cannot acquire jurisdiction, just because the notice was served in Calcutta. 14. Law in this aspect is quite well settled and reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Swaika Properties and Anrs., reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217 . 14. Law in this aspect is quite well settled and reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Swaika Properties and Anrs., reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217 . As in Swaika Properties (supra) in the instant case also the entire cause of action arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. Therefore, moving the writ petition in Calcutta High Court is misconceived and is an abuse of the process of the Court. 15. The writ petition is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by the petitioner No.1 to the respondent No.4 within a period of one month from today. In default, the respondent No.4 may realize the same from the petitioner No.1 by treating the same as arrears of land revenue. 16. The writ petition is thus dismissed with costs. All interim orders are vacated. Writ petition dismissed with costs.