ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners, who are tenants of Arepalli Agraharam Inam estate village, Rompecherla Mandal, Guntur District - the Inam Estate Lands have filed this writ petition to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the publication of Notification in Form-11 (Rule 3) in Guntur District Gazette dated 21. 9. 1989, under Section 3 (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 and to set aside the same as arbitrary, illegal and violative of the provisions of the Act and consequently direct the respondents to initiate action to take-over the Arepalli Agraharam Inam village under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and grant pattas to the petitioners in accordance with law and pass such other order or orders as this Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. ( 2 ) IT is submitted that the petitioners are agriculturists since several years having engaged in cultivation of their lands in Arepalli village and are ayacutdars drawing water from the local tank situated in Arepalli village. The said Arepalli Agraharam Inam was granted by Raja Maliraz Ramaymi in 1144-Fasli (1733 AD) and in column No. 6 of the Inam Statement, it was shown that as Inam village. In column No. 10 thereof, the boundaries of the Agraharam were given in terms of four different villages on four sides. Thus it is an admitted fact that Arepalli Agraharam is a whole village and named village granted and is an Estate within the meaning of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1937 and also on Inam Estate liable to be abolished under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, of 1948 (for brevity Estates Act ). It is further submitted that after the enactment of the Estates Act, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Vijayawada in SR No. 7 of 1949 held that Arepalli Agraharam in Narasaraopet Taluk, Guntur District is not an estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (d) of the A. P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1937. Against the said order, an appeal As No. 18 of 1952 was preferred to the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vizayanagaram which was dismissed on 18-11-1952 confirming the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer and thus it became final. Against the said order, an appeal As No. 18 of 1952 was preferred to the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vizayanagaram which was dismissed on 18-11-1952 confirming the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer and thus it became final. Thereafter, the Act was amended by an Amendment Act of 1956 by adding an explanation 1-a to Section 3 (2xd) of the Act of 1937 so as to include the hamlets and Khandrigas also within the term "estate" therein. Once again the Assistant Settlement Officer, Ongole took up suo motu enquiry and held by his order dated 9-3-1959 in SR No. 2058 that Arepalli Agraharam is an Estate as per the enlarged definition of the term "estate" by the amendment Act of 1956. Against the said order, TAS No. 19 of 1959 was preferred to the District Court, Guntur which is the Estate Abolition Tribunal, and the same was dismissed confirming the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer. Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 1188 of 1962 was filed before this High Court which was also dismissed, but in Writ Appeal No. 40 of 1969, preferred therefrom, this High Court vide its order dated 11. 8. 1972 held that the Assistant Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to enquire again after the Amendment Act of 1956 because it dealt with only hamlets and Khandrigas. Thereafter Agraharamdars of Arepalli Agraharam viz. , respondents 4 and 5, taking advantage of the above situation claimed themselves the full title to the lands under the occupation and cultivation of the petitioners and other ryots of Arepally Agraharam by virtue of Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (for brevity Inams Act) and managed to get a notification published in Guntur District Gazette dated 21. 9. 1989 by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla in Form-1, Rule 3 to the effect that it has been finally decided by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla under subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Inams Act and the lands specified therein as Inam lands, Inam village and not held by an institution. 9. 1989 by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla in Form-1, Rule 3 to the effect that it has been finally decided by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla under subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Inams Act and the lands specified therein as Inam lands, Inam village and not held by an institution. Consequently, on the publication of the aforesaid notification dated 21-9-1989, the Agrahamdars began to harass the ryots in occupation of the lands in Arepalli Agraharam claiming full ownership and title to the lands by bringing eviction proceedings against the occupants of the lands on the ground that they being tenants since 1983, have defaulted in paying rents, etc. Contrary to this view, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Narasaraopeta, passed an order in OP No. 228 of 1980 dated 21. 9. 1988 holding that the disputed land is their private land and paladugu people (claimants 5 to 11) have no possession of the disputed land for over 12 years and dismissed the suit and found that the actual possessors are claimants herein and their legal representatives and their predecessors in title are in possession and enjoyment of the lands for over statutory period. Therefore, they are entitled for the compensation amount as claimants. The notification of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla, is assailed by the petitioner on the ground that the notification under the Inams Act finally deciding that the land specified therein Arepalli Agraharam is an Inam land in an Inam village is illegal, improper and ab initio void for the reason that it is settled by the entries in the Inam Register and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in WA No. 40 of 1969 dated 11. 8. 1972 that Arepalli Agraharam is a whole village and named village and, therefore, the Inam Estate is liable to be abolished under the Estates Act. It is next contended that before finally deciding the matter, the Mandal Revenue Officer has not given any notice to conduct enquiry as required under Section 3 (2) of the Inams Act calling for the statements of the persons who are interested in the Inams Lands and also after giving reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence in support of their claims and therefore, it is liable to be set aside. It is next contended that the judicial proceedings are rendered in 1972 and after the disposal of the Writ Appeal, the respondents have taken time upto 1989 to give notification under Section 3 (2) of the Inams Act and on that ground also, the notification is liable to be set aside. ( 3 ) IN reply to the above contentions raised by the petitioners, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla, filed counter denying that the petitioners are avacutdars drawing water from the local tank for cultivation of their lands, that there are no minor irrigation or major irrigation tanks in Arepalli village having got registered permanent wet ayacut, called Nanja Nagarjuna Sagar Project water is being utilised for cultivation. The counter reiterated two rounds of litigation and the disposal of the Writ Appeal No. 40 of 1969 dated 11-8-1972. So when once the proceedings have attained finality, now the petitioners who are parties to the above proceedings including their predecessors, have no right to question the action of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla who is competent to conduct enquiry under the provisions of the Act and to grant pattas to the eligible persons. The petitioners forefathers having failed in their attempts before the Settlement Officer, the Tribunal as well as this High Court previously, have resorted to file this writ petition which is misconceived. It is further stated that the petitioners have not stated the correct facts and the writ petition is not maintainable. If the petitioners are aggrieved by the order, they have to pursue alternative remedy and cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to stall the proceedings initiated by the statutory authorities. Insofar as the issuance of notification by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla, is concerned, it is submitted that the Mandal Revenue Officer has already issued notification in District Gazette notifying Arepalli as an Inam village under Section 3 (3) of the Inams Act after duly following the procedure laid down under Section 3 (2) of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules and, therefore, the petitioners have no right to question the notification after lapse of two years. It is further stated that Arepalli Agraharam is Inam land in an Inam village and not held by the institution in accordance with the law and it is within the jurisdiction of the Mandal Revenue Officer Rompecherla and he has not violated any of the provisions of the Act or Rules. Therefore, the petitioners have no right to question the findings of the Tribunal as well as this Court rendered on earlier occasions. As the Tribunal has already declared Arepalli Agraharam, is not an estate under Section 5 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act which was confirmed by this High Court, the same binding on the parties including the petitioners and that cannot be questioned in this writ petition. Therefore, the notification issued by the respondent is legal, valid and well within the provisions of the Act and Rules. ( 4 ) THE 4th respondent has filed counter-affidavit alongwith vacate stay petition contending that the writ petition is not maintainable in law, as they got alternative remedy provided under the Inams Act. This respondent supported the impugned action of the Mandal Revenue Officer, in issuing the notification under section 3 of the Act dated 21. 9. 1989 in discharge of the duties under the provisions of A. P. Inams Abolition Act, 1956 after conducting enquiry in consonance of the procedure prescribed under the Act and Rules made thereunder. The 4th respondent is the Inamdar of Arepalli Agraharam in Rompecherla Mandal and he is entitled to get patta under the provisions of the Inams Act, 1956 and he is the Inamdar within the meaning of Estate Land Act. Therefore, he supported the issuance of impugned notification as valid and legal and well within the provisions of the Act and Rules. Therefore, he supported the issuance of impugned notification as valid and legal and well within the provisions of the Act and Rules. ( 5 ) AS seen from the facts and circumstances of the case, in the first round of litigation, the Assistant Settlement Officer in SR No. 7/49 dated 15-7-1950 held that the Arepalli Agraharam is not an Estate within the meaning of Section 2 (7) of the Estate Abolition Act, which was confirmed by the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram, in AS No. 18 of 1952, after following the judgment of a learned single Judge of Madras High Court in Somasundaram v. State of Madras, 1952 (2) MLJ 202 , which took the view the view that though the grant consists of the whole village or a named village, as per the definition in Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, it would not be an estate if it was not confirmed by the British Government by means of a single title deed and the confirmation was by more than one title deed in favour of different individuals. This judgment of the Tribunal became final as provided under Section 9 (6) of the Abolition Act, no steps having been taken to get it set aside. Subsequently, the decision in Somasundaram s case was overruled by a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Bhavanarayana v. Venkatadu, AIR 1954 Mad. 415 (FB), wherein it was held that as per the definition of Estate under Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, when once the gram was of a whole village or a named village, as defined therein, it would be an estate provided the grant was confirmed or recognized by the British Government and it does not matter if portions of the original grant happened to be in the possession of different individuals and separate title deeds happened to be issued in favour of those individuals. Even after this Full Bench decision, no steps have been taken either for a review of the judgment of the Tribunal in view of the decision of the Full Bench or by way of taking the matter to the High Court in a writ petition to get it set aside. Even after this Full Bench decision, no steps have been taken either for a review of the judgment of the Tribunal in view of the decision of the Full Bench or by way of taking the matter to the High Court in a writ petition to get it set aside. While the matters stood thus, the Amendment Act of 1956, introducing explanation I-A to Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act came to be enacted. After Explanation I-A has been added, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Ongole, again took up sou motu enquiry in SR SEC 9-2-1958 with regard to the same village on the ground that the decision in Somasundaram s case has since been overruled by the Full Bench decision and the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 has been amended by Act of 1956 to include in the definition of "estate" an inam village even though it was confirmed or recognised on different dates or by different title deeds or in favour of different persons in order to determine whether the village is an inam estate or not within the meaning of the Abolition Act as amended. Aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, the appellants therein carried the matter to the Estates Abolition Tribunal - District Judge, Guntur and the Tribunal agreed with the conclusions of the Assistant Settlement Officer and dismissed the appeal. Both the assistant Settlement Officer as well as the Tribunal found that the grant was of a whole village and it is not a hamlet or khandriga and though it was not confirmed by one title deed and it was done in more than one title deed, it would be an estate within the meaning of Explanation I-A added to Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act by the Amendment Act of 1956. Against that order writ petition was filed by the aggrieved persons and the writ petition was dismissed and the matter was carried in writ appeal. A Division Bench of this Court held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to take suo motu enquiry to decide whether the village is a Inam village or not in view of the amendment to the Act. Whatever be the reasons, by virtue of the Full Bench Decision the Appellate Tribunal held that Arepalli Agraharam is an Estate village. A Division Bench of this Court held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to take suo motu enquiry to decide whether the village is a Inam village or not in view of the amendment to the Act. Whatever be the reasons, by virtue of the Full Bench Decision the Appellate Tribunal held that Arepalli Agraharam is an Estate village. By virtue of wrong finding given by the Assistant Settlement Officer, in the first round of litigation, following the judgment of the Madras High Court, which was reversed subsequently by the Full Bench, Arepalli Agraharam is a Inam village even without applying the amended provisions of the Act. Once, a grant of whole village or named village is defined therein, it would be an estate provided the grant was confirmed or recognised by the British Government and it does not matter if portions of the original grant happened to be in the possession of different individuals and separate title deeds happened to be issued in favour of those individuals. Unfortunately, the petitioners and their predecessors in title have not taken appropriate steps questioning the order of the Inam Estate Tribunal, Vizayanagaram, and that has become final. Even though the Division Bench has held that the in view of the Full Bench Judgment of Madras High Court, when the earlier proceedings initiated by the Settlement Officer, Ongole and gave wrong finding, but confirmed by the appellate Tribunal, Vizayanagaram, have attained finality, the Settlement Officer, Vijayawada, has no power to initiate suo motu enquiry for the second time. Therefore, the Division Bench put the second round of litigation an end to. ( 6 ) FROM the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that by virtue of wrong decision of the Settlement Officer, Ongole, though the village is legally held to be Estate, as per the provisions of law and in terms of the Full Bench judgment of Madras High Court, the village is an Estate. But since no appropriate steps were taken at proper stage, the rights of the petitioners were deprived. Therefore, I need not consider the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and respondents as to whether the declaration of the village as an Estate, is legal or not in the earlier proceedings, which attained finality by virtue of the judgment of the Division Bench, sitting single. Therefore, I need not consider the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and respondents as to whether the declaration of the village as an Estate, is legal or not in the earlier proceedings, which attained finality by virtue of the judgment of the Division Bench, sitting single. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, the only question that lies for consideration of this Court is whether the enquiry conducted by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla, in 1989 under Section 3 (2) after disposal of the Writ Appeal in 1972 and issuing the notification dated 21. 9. 1989 under Section 3 (3) of the Inams Act after following due procedure under Section 3 (2) of the Inams Act and Rules is valid or not. ( 8 ) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the respondents have not explained the delay in initiating the enquiry after lapse of 17 years i. e. , from 1972 to 1989 and for all these long years, the petitioners are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the lands as tenants and also contended that no notice was given to the parties interested as contemplated under Section 3 (3) of the Act. Before conducting enquiry, the Mandal Revenue Officer has not issued notices to the interested parties and gave opportunity to the petitioners to explain their case by both oral and documentary evidence and, therefore, the entire proceedings initiated is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The respondents have stated that notices were served by beat of torn torn and, therefore, it cannot be said that no notices were served to the interested parties while conducting enquiry for grant of ryotwari pattas to the eligible persons. ( 9 ) AS seen from the records placed by the respondents, there is no explanation why there was such an abnormal delay from 1972 to 1989 in conducting the enquiry. Section 3 of the Act contemplates that the enquiry shall be conducted as soon as possible immediately after the commencement of the Act. The Act came into force on 14th December, 1956 and therefore, the Assistant Settlement officer, Ongole or the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla, should have commenced the enquiry as soon as the Act came into force, but they have not done so. The Act came into force on 14th December, 1956 and therefore, the Assistant Settlement officer, Ongole or the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla, should have commenced the enquiry as soon as the Act came into force, but they have not done so. Even if we take the end of the legal proceedings in the year 1972, the respondents should have initiated the enquiry with a reasonable time, but initiated the enquiry in 1989. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, 17 years can be said to be as soon as or a reasonable time The Supreme Court in a decision Abdul Jabar Butt and another v. The State of Jamtmi and Kashmir, AIR 1957 SC 28 1 , while dealing with a case which arose under the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act has considered the phrase as soon as and held that the period of time predicated by the phrase as soon as may be begins to run from the time the detention in pursuance of the detention order begins, and to communicate the grounds as soon as may be may well be said to mean to do so within a reasonable time with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time. Further the words as soon as may be came up for consideration before the Court in Ujagar Singh v. the State of observed that a reasonable despatch and then went on to say that what was reasonable must depend on the facts of each case and no arbitrary time limit could be set down. Again in Keshav Nilakanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 28 , the word forthwith occurring in Section 3 (3) of the Indian Preventive Detention Act came up for consideration and the Court after observing that the word forthwith occurring in Section 3 (3) of that Act did not mean the same thing as soon as may be used in Section 7 of the same Act, and that the former was more pre-emptory than the latter, observed that the time that was allowed to authority to communicate the ground to be detenu and was predicated by the expression as soon as may be was want was reasonably convenient or reasonably requisite. Further held that whenever the question of reasonableness arise in computing the period of time the Court has perforce to have regard to the particular circumstances of the case in which the question arises for decision. It may not be possible in many cases to affirmatively say or to preciously quantify the period of time by reference to hours, days or months nevertheless it is possible having regard to the circumstances of the case, to say whether the thing done was or not done as soon as may be i. e. , within the time which was reasonably convenient or requisite. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court in yet another case State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others, AIR 1969 SC 1297 , while considering the expression reasonable time appearing in Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 has held that although there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, the power of the Commissioner to revise under Section 65 must be exercised in reasonable time, must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code, if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it is clear that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Commissioner. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes, the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations atleast within a few months from the date of permission. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes, the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations atleast within a few months from the date of permission. ( 11 ) SO as seen from the ratio that emerges from the decisions of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the Legislature used the words as soon as to do the act by authority empowered to do, it must be done in exercise of the powers within a reasonable time depending upon the facts and circumstances of the nature of the case and in many cases it may not be possible to affirmatively say or to precisely quantify the period of time by reference to hours, days or months. Nevertheless it is possible having regard to the circumstances of the case to say whether the thing done was or was not done as soon as may be within the time it was reasonably convenient or requisite. Therefore, when once the judicial proceedings concluded with the disposal of Writ Appeal No. 49 of 1969 dated 11-8-1972, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla should have enquired into the matter under Section 3 (3) of the Act as soon as possible or within a reasonable time. As stated earlier, by no stretch of imagination, 17 years from 1972 to 1989, can be said to be either a reasonable time or as soon as. Therefore, having regard to these facts and circumstances, I hold that the initiation of enquiry for grant of ryotwari pattas under the Inams Act cannot be said to be in accordance with Section 3 (3) of the Inams Act for the simple reason it being not in conformity with as soon as or within a reasonable time. ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents also raised the plea of res judicata, availability of alternative remedy and that the judgment of Division Bench is binding on single Judge and also delay in question the impugned notification issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer. I need not go into all these issues for the aforementioned reasons whether the village attracts the provisions of law or not in view of the Division Bench judgment. I need not go into all these issues for the aforementioned reasons whether the village attracts the provisions of law or not in view of the Division Bench judgment. ( 13 ) THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, I hold that the impugned notification issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rompecherla, Guntur District is liable to be quashed and is accordingly quashed and there shall lie a writ of certiorari to the respondent as prayed for. No order as to costs.