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2001 DIGILAW 1109 (PNJ)

Ajaib Singh v. Punjab University

2001-10-10

S.S.NIJJAR

body2001
Judgment 1. Differences of opinion expressed by two Hon ble brother Judges : A.S. Gill and V.S. Aggarwal, JJ. in the detailed separate judgments dated 5-10-2000 have resulted in the matter, being listed, for hearing before this Court by orders of Hon ble the Chief Justice. 2. The undisputed facts may briefly be noticed. 3. The petitioner joined the Punjab University, Chandigarh in 1984 as Project Officer in the Centre for Adult Continuing Education and Extension (hereinafter referred to as "the Centre"). In January/February, 1998, the University advertised the post of Director for the Centre. The petitioner applied for the post on the application form meant for Class-A Non-Teaching position. On selection, he was appointed as Director on 11/12/1998. This appointment of the petitioner has been challenged in C.W.P. No. 2121 of 1999, which is pending in this Court. 4. The Punjab University has been established under the Punjab University Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The University is a body corporate. The supreme authority of the University is vested in the Senate which consists of the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and Ex-officio/Ordinary Fellows (Section 8 of the Act). The executive governance of the University is vested in the Syndicate which consists of the Vice-Chancellor as Chairman, D.P.I., Punjab, D.P.I., Haryana, and D.P.I., Chandigarh (Section 20 of the Act). The composition of the Senate is given in Sections 12 to 20 of the Act. Sec. 13(1) of the Act provides that number of Ordinary Fellows shall not exceed 85, out of these 15 shall be elected by the Registered Graduates from amongst themselves (hereinafter referred to as "the Registered Graduates Constituency). Specified numbers are to be elected from other Constituencies like Professors, Readers, Principals of Technical and Professional Colleges, Heads of affiliated Arts Colleges, Professors, Senior Lecturers and Lecturers of affiliated Arts Colleges, various Faculties of the University, Members of Legislative Assemblies of Punjab and Haryana, the remainders to be nominated by the Chancellor. 5. Sec. 31(1) of the Act empowers the Senate with the sanction of the Government to make regulations consistent with the Act to provide for all matters relating to the University. Sec. 2 (a), inter alia, provides that the regulations may provide for the procedure to be followed in holding any election of Ordinary Fellows. 5. Sec. 31(1) of the Act empowers the Senate with the sanction of the Government to make regulations consistent with the Act to provide for all matters relating to the University. Sec. 2 (a), inter alia, provides that the regulations may provide for the procedure to be followed in holding any election of Ordinary Fellows. Pursuant to this power, the Punjab University has framed the regulations which appear at Chapter 2(B) of the Punjab University Calendar Vol. I 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations" and "the Calendar" respectively). These regulations are stated to have been framed under Sections 13, 14, 15 and 31(2)(a) of the Act. The election of the Ordinary Fellows is subject to the approval of the Chancellor as provided under Sec. 13(2) of the Act read with Regulation 34 of the Regulations. 6. The election programme for the election of Ordinary Fellows to the Punjab University Senate in the Registered Graduates Constituency was released in January, 2000. The last date for receipt of the nomination was 3-8-2000. The elections were scheduled to be held on 17-9-2000. Respondent No. 4 on 7-8-2000 submitted objections to the nomination papars filed by the petitioner before the Returning Officer. After scrutinising the nomination papers, the Returning Officer published a list of candidates whose nomination papers have been declared valid. The name of the petitioner appears at serial No. 1 of the list. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 5 to 7 submitted objections to the Vice-Chancellor against the inclusion of the petitioner at serial No. 1 of the list. The petitioner was asked to meet the Vice-Chancellor in his office on 16-8-2000 at 4.30 p.m. in connection with the objections raised by the respondents. In response to this notice, the petitioner met the Vice-Chancellor along with his counsel. The petitioner was supplied with the copy of the objections. The petitioner submitted written arguments before the Vice-Chancellor which are attached as Annexure P-7 to the writ petition. After hearing the parties, the Vice-Chancellor has passed an order dated 17-8-2000 setting aside the decision of the Returning Officer and rejected the nomination papers of the petitioner. It is this order that is challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 7. After hearing the parties, the Vice-Chancellor has passed an order dated 17-8-2000 setting aside the decision of the Returning Officer and rejected the nomination papers of the petitioner. It is this order that is challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 7. The primary objection to the eligibility of the petitioner to contest the election is on the ground that he is a whole time paid servant of the University not on the teaching side.The petitioner does not seek election from the constituency of Professors, Readers, Lecturers, Principals of Technical and Professional Colleges, Heads of affiliated Arts Colleges, or Professors, Senior Lecturers and Lecturers of the affiliated Arts Colleges, as provided under Sec. 13(1) (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Act. In fact, the petitioner had filed nomination papers for election as Ordinary Fellow of the Senate from the Arts Faculty. On objections being received from one Dr. Rajiv Lochan, the nomination papers of the petitioner were rejected by the Registrar/Returning Officer on 14-8-2000 by passing the following order :- "Since the name of Dr. Ajaib Singh does not exist in any of the following categories : -Professors Constituency of P.U. teaching depts. -Readers and Lecturers Constituency of P.U. teaching depts, and -Lecturers/Professors Constituency of the affiliated Colleges. -Therefore, in accordance with the regulation 23, P.81, Vol. I, P.U. Cal 994, his nomination paper is treated invalid. Sd/- Paramjit Singh 14-8-2000" 8 The aforesaid order has not been challenged by the petitioner. It is also not disputed that the petitioner has not been designated as a teacher by the Senate under Regulation 1.1 of the Regulations made under Sec. 31(1) and (2) (e) contained in Chapter V (A) of the Calendar. This Regulation is as under :- 1.1. In this Regulation University teachers will mean Professors, Readers and Lecturers and such other persons as may be approved for imparting instruction in the University or in institutions managed by the University and are designated as teachers by the Senate." 9 No formal decision has been taken by the Syndicate or the Senate to convert the Centre into a teaching department . However, on 14-3-1982, the Senate passed a resolution designating one Jiwar Tiwari as a Teacher. The resolution is as under :- Item No. 40 of the Agenda Papers for the Meeting of the Senate on 14-3-1982 :- 1. However, on 14-3-1982, the Senate passed a resolution designating one Jiwar Tiwari as a Teacher. The resolution is as under :- Item No. 40 of the Agenda Papers for the Meeting of the Senate on 14-3-1982 :- 1. That Shri Jiwan Tewari who has been appointed as Programme Coordinator in the Centre for Continuing Education, be treated as a teacher in terms of Regulation 1.1 at page 131 of the Calendar, Volume 1, 1981." 10 The petitioner has been permitted to contest election on three occasions earlier in the year 1988, 1992 and 1996. The petitioner has contested these elections on the basis of the resolution passed by the Syndicate, which is as follows :- Eligibility of Sh. Ajaib Singh, Project Officer, for contesting Senate Election from Registered Graduates Constituency:- Syndicate meeting held on 16/04/1988, 37 Considered, and RESOLVED :- That Sh. Ajaib Singh, Project Officer (in the U.G.C. Scale of Rs.700-1600), Centre for Adult Continuing Education and Extension (CACEE), P.U. be declared eligible to seek election to Punjab University Senate from the Registered Graduates Constituency." 11 Objectors - Rajiv Lochan and Ashok Kumar were sitting Members of the Senate along with the petitioner. On earlier occasions, they had not objected to the candidature of the petitioner. 12. Numerous other facts and circumstances have been pleaded by the parties to establish their respective cases on merits. It is the case of the petitioner that Core staff of the Centre has been treated to be on the teaching side. All the facilities that have been given to the teaching staff, are also given to the Core staff of the Centre. According to the petitioner, the issue is clinched by the two resolutions passed by the Senate and the Syndicate. The resolution passed in favour of Jiwan Tewari clearly shows that the Core staff has been treated to be teachers as required by Regulation 1.1 of the Regulations contained in Chapter V (A) of the Punjab University Calendar Vol. I, 1994. The petitioner claims that the resolution dated 16-4-1988 puts his eligibility to contest elections beyond dispute. 13. On the other hand, the respondents have maintained that the Centre is not on the teaching side. The staff of the Centre are not designated as teachers. The resolution passed in favour of Jiwan Tewari is specific to him. The resolution passed by the Syndicate in favour of the petitioner is without jurisdiction. 13. On the other hand, the respondents have maintained that the Centre is not on the teaching side. The staff of the Centre are not designated as teachers. The resolution passed in favour of Jiwan Tewari is specific to him. The resolution passed by the Syndicate in favour of the petitioner is without jurisdiction. The petitioner is stated to be disqualified under Sec. 16 of the Act. 14. Very lengthy and detailed submissions have been made by the learned counsel for the parties. I have considered the arguments very anxiously. It goes without saying that the questions posed are intricate and complex. This is evident from the fact that two brother Judges have given divergent opinions on the questions raised. Justice A. S. Gill, J. has held that the impugned order, Annexure P-8 passed by the Vice-Chancellor is without jurisdiction. The petition has been allowed and a direction has been issued that the result of the election shall be declared forthwith. On the other hand, Justice V.S. Aggarwal, J. has held that the Regulations have been framed under Sec. 31 of the Act. The Vice-Chancellor has the jurisdiction to decide the question of eligibility under Regulation 17(viii) contained in Chapter II(B) of the Calendar. This is described as "in house" procedure. It is further held that Sec. 38 of the Act refers to a dispute that can be raised after the election and not before that. The impugned order, Annexure P-B, passed by the Vice-Chancellor is, therefore, held to be within jurisdiction. The writ petition has been ordered to be dismissed. 15. The main controversy in this case centres around the interpretation of Sec. 38 of the Act and Regulation 17(v), (vi) and (viii) of the Regulations. These two provisions have to be interpreted in correlation with Sec. 16 of the Act. The writ petition has been ordered to be dismissed. 15. The main controversy in this case centres around the interpretation of Sec. 38 of the Act and Regulation 17(v), (vi) and (viii) of the Regulations. These two provisions have to be interpreted in correlation with Sec. 16 of the Act. Sections 16 and 38 of the Act and Regulation 17(v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) are as under :- "Section 16 : Disqualification for election :- The whole-time paid servants of the University except those on the teaching side shall be disqualified to seek election to any elected body of the University." "Section 38 : Disputes as to Constitution of the University :- If any question arises as to whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter will be referred to the Chancellor, whose decision thereon will be final." Regulation 17 : The procedure for holding the election of Ordinary Fellows by constituencies other than the Faculties, shall be :- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (v) All nomination papers shall be scrutinised by the Returning Officer on the date prescribed for the purpose. (vi) A nomination paper shall be declared invalid :- (a) if a proposer or a seconder has signed nomination papers of more candidates than the number of vacancies; (b) if the nomination paper is not signed by the candidate or by the proposer or by the seconder; (c) if the nomination paper is not addressed to the Returning Officer by name, and does not reach him under a registered cover, or is not delivered to him personally, by the date and hour notified under clause (i); (d) in the case of an election by the Registered Graduates; (1) if the candidate or his proposer or seconder is a defaulter on the date of publication of the final Register of Graduates; and/or (2) if the sum of Rs. 100 required to be deposited by the candidate under clause (iv) is not received in the office by the prescribed date and hour; (3) if it does not bear the Registered Graduate enrolment number or the serial number of the candidate, the proposer and the seconder, or, if Registered Graduate enrolment number or the serial number of any one of them happens to be wrong. (e) if the candidate has ceased to hold the requisite qualifications or capacity by virtue of which he is seeking election. xxx xxx xxx xxx (viii) A list of candidates whose nomination papers have been declared valid shall be published by affixing the same on the notice board in the office of the Returning Officer on the same day, and a copy of the list shall be forwarded to each of the candidates nominated for election. Any objection to the decision of the Returning Officer in regard to entertainment or otherwise or the invalidity of a nomination paper must be made, within five days of the decision of the Returning Officer, to the Vice-Chancellor, whose decision in the matter shall be final." (Emphasis mine). 16 Mr. Patwalia has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Vice-Chancellor is without jurisdiction. Under the Regulations, the Vice-Chancellor does not have the powers to decide the eligibility of the petitioner to contest the elections. This power is exclusively given to the Chancellor under Sec. 38 of the Act. The same power cannot be granted to the Vice-Chancellor under the Regulations framed under Sections 31(2) (a) of the Act. Sec. 31(2) (a) of the Act empowers the Senate to make regulations which may provide the procedure to be followed in holding any election of Ordinary Fellows. Regulation 17(viii) of the Calendar gives the powers to the Vice-Chancellor to decide on eligibility of a candidate. This is beyond the regulations making power of the Senate under Sec. 31(2)(a) of the Act. The power of Senate to make regulations for all matters relating to University is contained in Sec. 31(1) of the Act. This general power cannot be impliedly read into the regulations which are made under Sec. 31(2)(a) of the Act. 17. Mr. Gupta, however, submits that the Regulations cannot be confined only to procedural matters. Although, according to Mr. Gupta, the Regulations are said to have been made under Sec. 31(2)(a) of the Act, yet they would have to be interpreted to mean that they have also been made under Sec. 31(1) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that if powers of the Returning Officer are restricted to scrutinising the nomination papers with regard to procedural irregularities only, the Returning Officer would not be performing his essential functions. Learned counsel submitted that if powers of the Returning Officer are restricted to scrutinising the nomination papers with regard to procedural irregularities only, the Returning Officer would not be performing his essential functions. The foremost duty of a Returning Officer is to decide the eligibility of a candidate for contesting elections. The specific power under Sec. 31(2)(a) of the Act cannot restrict the generality of the power contained in Sec. 31(1) of the Act. 18. There seems to be much force in the submission made by Mr. Gupta. In the case of Shiv Kirpal Singh V/s. V.V. Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097, the Supreme Court considered the scope of Sec. 171-A and Sec. 171-C contained in Chapter IXA of the Penal Code which deals with offences relating to elections, introduced in the Code by the Indian Election Offences and Enquiries Act (XXXIX of 1920). The relevant portion of Sec. 171-C is as under :- "(1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right commits the offence of undue influence at an election. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), whoever: (a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person in whom a candidate or voter is interested, with injury of any kind, or (b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or voter to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or voter, within the meaning of sub-section (1)." 19. After considering the aforesaid provisions, the Supreme Court observed as under :- We do not think that the Legislature, while framing Chapter IXA of the Code ever contemplated such a dichotomy or intended to give such a narrow meaning to the freedom of franchise essential in a representative system of Government. In the opinion, the argument mentioned above is fallacious. It completely disregards the structure and the provisions of Sec. 171-C. Sec. 171-C is enacted in three parts. The first sub-section contains the definition of "undue influence". This is in wide terms and renders a person voluntarily interfering or attempting to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right guilty of committing undue influence. It completely disregards the structure and the provisions of Sec. 171-C. Sec. 171-C is enacted in three parts. The first sub-section contains the definition of "undue influence". This is in wide terms and renders a person voluntarily interfering or attempting to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right guilty of committing undue influence. That this is very wide is indicated by the opening sentence of sub-section (2), i.e. "without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1)". It is well settled that when this expression is used anything contained in the provisions following this expression is not intended to cut down the generality of the meaning of the preceding provision. (Emphasis supplied). This was so held by the Privy Council in King Emperor V/s. Sibnath Banerji, 1945 FCR 195 : AIR 1945 PC 156. 20 In the Case of Emperor V/s. Sibnath Banerji , AIR 1945 PC 156, their Lordships of the Privy Council considered the scope and ambit of the material provisions of Sec. 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 (Act 35 of 1939) as amended by Sec. 2, Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940. In order to understand the ratio of the opinion rendered by the Privy Council, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant portion of the opinion, which is as under :- "The material portions of S. 2, Defence of India Act, 1939 (Act 35 of 1939), as amended by S. 2, Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940 (Act 19 of 1940) are as follows :- "2. - (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. - (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for, or may, empower any authority to make orders providing for all or any of the following matters, namely : xxx xxx xxx (v) preventing the spreading without lawful authority or excuse of false reports or the prosecution of any purpose likely to cause disaffection or alarm, or to prejudice His Majestys relations with foreign powers or with States in India , or to prejudice the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the tribal areas, or to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes of His Majestys subjects : xxx xxx xxx xxx (x) the apprehension and detention in custody of any person reasonably suspected of being of hostile origin or of having acted, acting or being about to act, in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or interest or to the defence of British India, the prohibition of such person from entering or residing or remaining in any area, and the compelling of such person to reside and remain in any area, or to do, or abstain from doing anything." The material part of R. 26, as it has stood since 1940, is as follows :- "26. - (1) The Central Government or the Provincial Government, if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order. His Majestys relations with foreign powers or Indian States, the maintenance of peaceful conditions, in tribal areas, or the effecient prosecution of the war it is necessary so to do, may make an order. (a) ............... His Majestys relations with foreign powers or Indian States, the maintenance of peaceful conditions, in tribal areas, or the effecient prosecution of the war it is necessary so to do, may make an order. (a) ............... (b) directing that he be detained ." In ILR (1944) Bom 183 the judgment of the Federal Court was delivered by Gwyer C.J., who first dealt with the main argument of the appellant, which had been rejected by the High Court, and proceeded "We, therefore, reject the main argument addressed to us on behalf of the appellant, and, if there were nothing more in the appeal, we should dismiss it without further discussion. There is, however, another aspect of the case, which was not argued until the Court itself drew the attention of counsel to it, for it seemed to us that it was open to question whether R. 26 itself in its present form was within the rule-making powers conferred by the Defence of India Act. If it is not within those powers, then it must be held void and inoperative, either in whole or in part; and the orders made under it will be similarly open to challenge." The learned Judge then proceeded to discuss paras (v) and (x) of S. 2(2) of the Act, and for reasons fully stated by him, he came to the conclusion that Rule 26 was not within the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of S. 2, and (para 214) he stated : "The Legislature having set out in plain and umabiguous language in para. (x) the scope of the rules which may be made providing for apprehension and detention in custody it is not permissible to pray in aid the more general word in S. 2(1) in order to justify a rule which so plainly goes beyond the limits of para (x), though if para (x) were not in the Act at all, perhaps different considerations might apply ........ We are compelled, therefore, to hold that R. 26 in its present form goes beyond the rule-making powers which the Legislature has thought fit to confer upon the Central Government and is for that reasons invalid." Their Lordships are unable to agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court on his statement of the relative positions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 2, Defence of India Act, and counsel for the respondents in the present appeal was unable to support that statement, or to maintian that R. 26 was invalid. In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of sub-section (2) is merely an illustrative one, the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1) and "the rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of sub-section (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section (1), the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section (1), as indeed is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)." (Emphasis supplied). There can be no doubt as the learned Judge himself appears to have thought that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of R.26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned Judge expressed in relation to sub-section (2). Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that ILR (1944) Bom 183 was wrongly decided by the Federal Court, and that R. 26 was made in conformity with the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of S. 2, Defence of India Act." 21. A perusal of the aforesaid opinion stated by the Privy Council makes it abundantly clear that Sec. 31(2)(a) of the Act is merely illustrative of regulations making power under Sec. 31(1) of the Act. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that Regulations made under Sec. 31(2)(a) of the Act can provide only for matters of procedure. The Regulations can and in my opinion do provide for procedural as well as substantive matters. 22. With regard to the powers of the Returning Officer if it is held that the Returning Officer can only examine a nomination paper with regard to the matters mentioned in Regulation 17(vi) of the Calendar, then the power would be limited only to procedural matters. I am of the considered opinion, as pointed out by Mr. 22. With regard to the powers of the Returning Officer if it is held that the Returning Officer can only examine a nomination paper with regard to the matters mentioned in Regulation 17(vi) of the Calendar, then the power would be limited only to procedural matters. I am of the considered opinion, as pointed out by Mr. Gupta, that the powers of the Returning Officer cannot be reduced to scrutinising the "minutiae of the nomination papers." In that case, even if the Returning Officer is faced with a nomination paper of a candidate who is clearly ineligible, he would have no powers to reject the nomination paper. It is accepted even by learned counsel for the petitioner that a candidate who is a whole-time servant of the University on the administrative side would not be eligible to contest the election from the Constituency of Registered Graduates. But if the Returning Officer has the power only to scrutinise the nomination papers for procedural irregularities, ineligible candidate solely employed on the non-teaching side, would have to be permitted to contest the elections. When interpreting a statutory provision the Courts would not give such an interpretation that would lead to chaotic, impossible or absurd results. Therefore, the interpretation that the Returning Officer has power to scrutinise the papers only for procedural errors with regard to matters mentioned in Regulation (vi) of the Calendar has to be avoided. Such an interpretation would clearly lead to absurd results. Therefore, it has to be held that the Returning Officer has the power to decide about the eligibility of a candidate. Sec. 31(1) of the Act can be read into the heading of the Regulations contained in Chapter II(B) of the Calendar whih are said to be made under Sections 13, 14 and 15 and Sec. 31(2) (a) of the Act. For this proposition, Mr. Gupta has rightly pointed out to the Doctrine of Implied Powers and Obligations as contained in N.S. Bindras Interpretation of Statutes, Eighth Edition, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as "Bindras") . It observed as follows :- "Implied powers :- The doctrine of implied powers is embodied in the maxim Quando lex aliquid alicue concedit conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest. It observed as follows :- "Implied powers :- The doctrine of implied powers is embodied in the maxim Quando lex aliquid alicue concedit conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest. Its full and true import is set out in the judgment in the case of Fenton V/s. Hampton, as follows: "Whenever anything is authorised and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. But, if, when the maxim comes to be applied adversely to the liberties or interest of others, it be found that no such impossibility exists, that the power may be legally exercised without the doing that something else, or even going a step further, that it is only in some particular instances, as opposed to its general operation, that the law fails in its intention unless the enforcing power be supplied, then, in any such case, the soundest rules of construction point to the exclusion of the maxim, and regard, the absence of the power which it would supply by implication as a casus omissus." In other words, when any power to control is expessly granted, there is included in the grant, to the full extent of the capacity of the grantor and without special mention, every power and every control the denial of which would render he grant itself ineffective. Where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. This is, in truth not a doctrine of any special system of law, but a statement of a necessary rule of construction of all grants of power, whether by unwritten Constitution, formal written instrument, or other delegation of authority and applies from the necessity of the case; to all to whom is commited the exercise of powers of Government." 23 Applying this doctrine it becomes apparent that a Returning Officer without the power to decide as to whether a candidate is eligible to contest the election would be no Returning Officer. He would only be a glorified clerk. Therefore, Sec. 31 (1) of the Act, will have to be read into regulations. 24. Mr. He would only be a glorified clerk. Therefore, Sec. 31 (1) of the Act, will have to be read into regulations. 24. Mr. Gupta had then argued that if the Returning Officer has substantive powers to decide upon the qualification/eligibility of a candidae, the Vice-Chancellor would enjoy the same powers under Regulation 17(viii) of the Regulations. I am unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Gupta. Relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N. P. Ponnuswami V/s. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem Distt., AIR 1952 SC 64, Mr. Gupta had argued that the order of the Vice-Chancellor could be challenged by the petitioner by way of an election petition before the Chancellor. Therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable. In my view, the very same argument would, in fact, be applicable to the case put forward by the respondents. Once the Returning oficer has accepted the nomination paper of the petitioner, the only remedy open to the respondents would be by way of an election petition under Sec. 38 of the Act. However, they approached the Vice-Chancellor in view of the power conferred on him under Regulation 17 (viii) of the Regulations. In my view, the appeal provided to the Vice-Chancellor under Regulation 17 (viii) of the Regulations, is in conflict with the remedy provided under Sec. 38 of the Act. Once the Returning Officer had decided about the validity or invalidity of the nomination papers, the only other remedy available thereafter is under Sec. 38 of the Act. There is no necessity whatsoever to incorporae the right of appeal to the Vice-Chancellor under Regulation 17 (viii) of the regulations, even if it is assumed to have been made under Sec. 31 (1) of the Act. Not providing an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor would not leave the aggrieved person without a remedy. Therefore, there would be no necessity to incorporate the right of appeal to the Vice-Chancellor by necessary implication. This view of mine can also be supported by referring to Sec. 13 (6) of the Act. The elections to the Ordinary Fellows have to be conducted nder Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Act. Sec. 13 of the Act provides that number of Ordinary Fellows shall not exceed eightyfive. This view of mine can also be supported by referring to Sec. 13 (6) of the Act. The elections to the Ordinary Fellows have to be conducted nder Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Act. Sec. 13 of the Act provides that number of Ordinary Fellows shall not exceed eightyfive. Out of eightyfive, fifteen shall be elected by the Registered Graduates from amongst themselves under Sec. 13(1) (a) of the Act. Sec. 13(1)(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Act, provides for specific number of Ordinary Fellows to be elected from the categories of Professors, Readers, Lecturers, Principals, Heads of affiliated Arts Colleges etc. Sec. 13 (1)(h) of the Act provides that six Ordinary Fellows shall be elected b the various Faculties of the University. Sec. 13 (1)(h)(i) of the Act provides for election of two Ordinary Fellows each by the Members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and Haryana Legislative Assembly. Sec. 13 (1)(j) of the Act provides that the remainder of the Ordinary Members shall be nominaed by the Chancellor. Sub Sec. 6 of Sec. 13 of the Act provides as under :- "If in the case of any election a dispute arises whether any person is or is not a Principal, Professor, Reader, Senior Lecturer, Lecturer, or Head of a College within the meaning of clauses (b),(c), (d), (e) and (f) of Sub-Section (1), the question shall be determined by the Vice-Chancellor whose decision shall be final." 25. A perusal of the above section clearly shows that the Vice-Chancellor has been given the power to decide any dispute which may arise in the case of any election as to whether any person is or is not a Principal, Professor, Reader, Senior Lecturer, Lecturer etc. within the meaning of sub-Section (1) of Sec. 13 of the Act. The decision of the Vice-Chancellor on this question is made final. This power under Sec. 13 (6) of the Act cannot be equated with the power of appeal which is sought to be given to the Vice-Chancellor under Regulation 17 (viii) of the Regulations contained in Chapter II (B) of the Calendar. The decision of the Vice-Chancellor on this question is made final. This power under Sec. 13 (6) of the Act cannot be equated with the power of appeal which is sought to be given to the Vice-Chancellor under Regulation 17 (viii) of the Regulations contained in Chapter II (B) of the Calendar. In the event of a dispute being raised as to whether or not any person falls within the meaning of Clause (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 13 of the Act, before the Returning Officer, by way of objections to the nomination paper, the dispute would be referred to the Vice-Chancellor forthwith. The Returning Officer in those situations would not have the power to determine the dispute envisaged under Sec. 13 (6) of the Act. This power has been vested in the Vice-Chancellor, whose decision on the dispute shall be final. After the dispute is settled by the Vice-Chancellor, the Returning Officer, will decide the question of validity/invalidity of the nomination paper in accordance with the decision of the Vice-Chancellor. From this it becomes apparent that the Vice-Chancellor does not exercise any appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Returning Officer as is sought to be granted under Regulation 17 (viii) contained in Chapter II (B) of the Calendar. Here the Vice-Chancellor exercises a statutory power granted under Sec. 13 (6) of the Act. On the contrary, the power of deciding as to whether a Registered Graduate is eligible to contest the election is specifically not given to the Vice-Chancellor. Sub-Section 6 of Sec. 13 of the Act, appears in a section which deals with numbers of Ordinary Fellows to be elected from various Constituencies. A power which is specifically not given in the parent Act, cannot be permitted to be endowed on the Vice-Chancellor by Subordinate Legislation, such as, the Regulations under consideration. The power of appeal given to the Vice-Chancellor under Regulation 17 (viii) in Chapter II (B) of the Calendar, cannot be related to any provision of the Act. Therefore, it has to be held ultra vires the Act. 26. In view of the above, it is held that for election from the Constituency of Registered Graduates the question of eligibility of a candidate has to be determined by the Returning Officer. Therefore, it has to be held ultra vires the Act. 26. In view of the above, it is held that for election from the Constituency of Registered Graduates the question of eligibility of a candidate has to be determined by the Returning Officer. Any person aggrieved against the decision of the Returning Officer would have to avail the remedy provided under Sec. 38 of the Act. This would be within the accepted principle that "an implication is necessary in the sense that it should be read into an express grant of statutory power which may be ascertained by examining the inconvenience, inconsistencies and absurdities in the contrary consideration. Necessity represents so strong a probability of an intention that a contrary intention cannot be reasonably supposed. Bindra on page 658. 27. Mr. Gupta had addressed a number of other arguments which would show that the Returning Officer has inherent powers to decide on the eligibility of the candidate. He had also submitted that if the inherent power is not implied into the power of the Returning Officer, whole machinery provided with regard to the election from the constituency of Faculties, would collapse. In view of the fact that I have held that the Returning Officer has substantive power to decide on the eligibility of the candidate, it is no longer necessary to examine the arguments addressed on this aspect of the matter. Even otherwise the petitioner has accepted the decision of the Returning Officer, dated 14-8-2000, invalidating his nomination papers from the Faculty of Arts. This would clearly indicate that the power of the Returning Officer to decide the question of eligibility is not seriously disputed. The decision of the Returning Officer is based on Regulation 23, relating to Election of Ordinary Fellows to Faculties. This regulation provides that the Fellows to be elected by the Faculties............. shall be teachers in the University Teaching Department or institutions affiliated to the University. Whether or not a candidate is a teacher, is a question of substance. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Returning Officer has been granted powers to scrutinise the nomination papers only for procedural irregularities. 28. Much has been said by the learned counsel on the scope of the power of the Chancellor under Sec. 38 of the Act. Whether or not a candidate is a teacher, is a question of substance. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Returning Officer has been granted powers to scrutinise the nomination papers only for procedural irregularities. 28. Much has been said by the learned counsel on the scope of the power of the Chancellor under Sec. 38 of the Act. It has been accepted by both the learned counsel for the parties that first part of Sec. 38 of the Act deals with post election scenario. Much debate has centred on the term "is entitled to be a member." According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, this term gives the exclusive power to the Chancellor to decide on the eligibility of a candidate to be a member of any authority or other body. On the other hand, with equal amount of vehemence, it has been argued by Mr. Gupta that the term "entitled" is to be confined to the post election scenario. Mr. Gupta has argued that the meaning of the term "entitled to be" has to take colour from the earlier two terms, namely, "duly elected" and "appointed as". This is sought to be supported by the doctrine of "noscitur a socciis". This term implies that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. In the case of M/s. Rainbow Steels ltd. V/s. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 2101, their Lordships have approved of the meaning given to the Principle of "noscitur a sociis" as explained in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 289, which is under :- "Where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, noscitur a socciis. They are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general." 29. Again in the case of M/s. Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. V/s. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, AIR 1991 SC 754, it is observed as under :- In the context with which we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the "noscitur a socciis" principle. Again in the case of M/s. Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. V/s. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, AIR 1991 SC 754, it is observed as under :- In the context with which we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the "noscitur a socciis" principle. This expression simply means that "the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps." 30 Applying the aforesaid principle, it is held that Sec. 38 of the Act, comes into operation after the election. The term "duly elected" does not admit of any two meanings. It clearly means that the dispute can be raised after a person is declared elected. The term "appointed as" also clearly refers to the situation where a person has been appointed after undergoing due procedure of selection, if any. Similarly, the term "entitled to" would also mean that a person has acquired certain characteristics to enable him to be a Member of any of the bodies of the University. In the case of elections, the entitlement would only mature on the person being duly elected. In other situations, a question may arise before the Chancellor about the entitlement of a person if it is doubted that he no longer possesses the qualifications which earlier entitled him to be a Member. For example in the case of ex-officio members. The members may no longer hold the office, qualification, capacity or the position by virtue of which the person "is entitled to be a member." The term "is entitled to be a member" is not synonymous with the term "is eligible to be a member". A bare perusal of Sections 12 to 15 of the Act, makes it abundantly clear that the Senate consists of Ex-officio Fellows, Ordinary Fellows and Fellows nominated by the Chancellor under Sec. 13 (1) (j) of the Act. Out of these categories of Senators, no elections are held for Ex-officio Fellows. They become entitled to be members of the Senate if they are for the time being, performing duties of the offices mentioned in the list contained in the Schedule to the Act. Sec. 12 of the Act provides that the Government may, by notification, make alterations in the list of offices contained in the Schedule. It is further provided the number of Ex-officio Fellows shall not exceed twelve. Sec. 12 of the Act provides that the Government may, by notification, make alterations in the list of offices contained in the Schedule. It is further provided the number of Ex-officio Fellows shall not exceed twelve. At present, the list of Ex-officio Fellows given in the Schedule to the Act, is as follows :- "1. Chief Minister, Punjab. 2. Chief Minister, Haryana. 3. Chief Justice, High Court of Punjab and Haryana. 4. Education Minister, Punjab. 5. Education Minister, Haryana. 6. Chief Commissioner, Union Territory of Chandigarh." 7. Director of Public Instruction, Punjab. 8. Director of Public Instruction, Haryana. 9. Director of Public Instruction, Chandigarh. 31. Thus, if at any time, it is doubted as to whether any of these Fellows is performing the duties of the officies mentioned above, a question may arise as to whether a person is entitled to be a member of the Senate or any other body of the University. Even here, it is holding of the office and performing the duties of the office that makes a person "entitled to be a member". No other person, who may be, for exaample, "eligible" to hold the office of Chief Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh, could claim that he is entitled to be a member of the Senate. The same example can be repeated for all the offices mentioned in the Schedule, mentioned above. Similarly, a person who is eligible to contest the election, would not "ipso facto" become entitled to be a Member. It is only when the person has undergone the process of election, selection or appointment, that he can claim to be entitled to be a member. The matter can be clarified by taking a homely example. A person may be in possession of a Degree in Law. He would be qualified or eligible to become an Advocate. But he would become entitled to practice as an Advocate only when he is enrolled as a member of a Bar Council. He will then be entitled to practice as an Advocate. Mere possession of a Degree in Law would not entitle him to practice as an Advocate, he would remain a law graduate. Unless he is enrolled as an "Advocate" under the Advocates Act, 1961, he will not be entitled to be a member of a Bar Association or a Bar Council. Therefore, it would not be possible to hold, as canvassed by Mr. Unless he is enrolled as an "Advocate" under the Advocates Act, 1961, he will not be entitled to be a member of a Bar Association or a Bar Council. Therefore, it would not be possible to hold, as canvassed by Mr. Patwalia, that being entitled to contest election would be interchangeable with the term "entitled to be a member", as provided in Sec. 38 of the Act. The eligibility to contest election will have to be scrutinized by the Returning Officer. The decision of the Returning Officer would be open to challenge by way of an election petition under Regulation 19.1 of the Regulations or on a reference, to the Chancellor. At that stage, under Regulation 19.2 the Chancellor will decide as to whether the candidate has been duly elected. Decision on the question of being "duly elected" will include an enquiry by the Chancellor as to the eligibility of the candidate to contest the election. It is also not possible to accept the submission of Mr. Patwalia that the election petition would be limited to the matters mentioned in Regulations 18.1 and 18.2 of the Calendar. These Regulations are as under :- "18.1. Objection, if any, to the decision of the Returning Officer on the validity or otherwise of a ballot paper shall be made forthwith in writing, i.e. when the ballot papers are counted. 18.2. Any objection pertaining to the polling shall be made to the Presiding Officer, in writing on the date and during the time of polling. 19.1. A petition in respect of matters brought to the notice of the Returning Officer or the Presiding Officer as mentioned in Regulations 18.1 and 18.2 and a petition on any of the following points in connection with the election must reach the Registrar within 10 days of the declaration of the result, with a security deposit of Rs. 50 which amount shall be forfeited if the election petition is dismissed :- (a) alleged failure of the Presiding Officer/Returning Officer to discharge his duties as laid down in the Regulations; (b) allegation regarding the secrecy of vote having been infringed by the Presiding Officer/the Returning Officer; (c) allegations regarding any corrupt practice having been indulged in by any party to the election either itself or by its agents, with or without the knowledge of the party concerned. 19.2. 19.2. The petition under Regulation 19.1 shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision thereon shall be final." 32. A perusal of these regulations shows that Regulations 18.1 and 18.2 of the Calendar pertain to objections with respect to validity or otherwise of a ballot paper; or with regard to the polling. Regulation 19.1 (a) of the Calendar provides for an election petition on the ground of alleged failure of the Presiding Officer/Returning Officer to discharge his duties as laid down in the regulations. This regulation permits the challenge to the election on the ground of improper entertainment, acceptance or rejection of the nomination papers by the Returning Officer in the discharge of his duties as laid down in the Regulations. In my view, this is an effective remedy which comes into operation only when the election is complete. Therefore, provisions of an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor amounts to providing a parallel machinery under the Regulations for deciding disputes which are in the exclusive domain of the Chancellor, under Sec. 38 of the Act. Regulation 17 (viii) of the Regulation, in so far as it provides for appeal to the Vice-Chancellor is, therefore, ultra vires Sec. 31 (1) of the Act, as it is in conflict with Sec. 38 of the Act. 33. Mr. Gupta had then argued that Regulation 17 (viii) of the Calendar is not in conflict with Sec. 38 of the Act, as the Vice-Chancellor only decides upon the eligibility of the candidate to contest the election. This power, according to Mr. Gupta, does not impinge on the power of the Chancellor to decide on the entitlement of a person to be member of a University body. In any event, argued Mr. Gupta, that this is only "in house" procedure subject to correction by the Chancellor under Sec. 38 of the Act. It is not possible to accept this argument of Mr. Gupta. The Act does not provide for any appeal to the Vice-Chancellor. The regulations can not be permitted to give such a power in the guise of "in house" procedure. Regulations which are in the nature of subordinate/delegated legislation cannot confer any power or jurisdiction on an authority which is not so conferred by the parent Act. Gupta. The Act does not provide for any appeal to the Vice-Chancellor. The regulations can not be permitted to give such a power in the guise of "in house" procedure. Regulations which are in the nature of subordinate/delegated legislation cannot confer any power or jurisdiction on an authority which is not so conferred by the parent Act. As observed earlier, under the Act no power has been conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to go into the question of eligibility/qualification of a candidate seeking election from the Constituency of Registered Graduates. It is well settled proposition of law that an authority empowered to make regulations cannot extend its authority to an extent so as to modify an Act of Parliament. Regulation 17 (viii) of the Calendar clearly grants to the Vice-Chancellor a power which cannot be located in the Act. Generality of Sec. 31 (1) of the Act can be extended to making regulations for matters provided in the Act. It cannot be extended to matters which are not provided for in the Act. Therefore, Regulation 17 (viii) of the Calendar insofar as it provides for an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor against the order of the Returning Officer, is ultra vires Sec. 31 (1) and 38 of the Act, on this ground also. 34. Similar arguments, as the arguments of the petitioner and the respondents in the present case, were raised before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. K. L. Jaura V/s. Punjab University, (1973) 75 Pun LR 833. In the aforesaid case, a Reader in the Chemistry Department of the Punjab University had successfully contested the election to the Senate. An election petition was filed under Regulations 17.1, 17.2 and 17.3, which existed in the Regulations contained in Chapter-II of the Calendar, 1972. These Regulations had provided as under :- Regulations :- 17.1 : A petition in respect of matters brought to the notice of the Returning Officer or the Presiding Officer as mentioned in Regulations 16.1 and 16.2 and petition on any of the following points in connection wih the election must reach the Registrar within 10 days of the declaration of the result, with a security deposit of Rs. 50 which amount shall be forfeited if the election petition is dismissed :- (a) alleged failure of the Presiding Officer/Returning Officer to discharge his duties as laid down in the Regulations; (b) allegations regarding the secrecy of vote having been infringed by the Presiding Officer/the Returning Officer; (c) allegations regarding any corrupt practice having been indulged in by any party to the election either itself or by its agents, with or without the knowledge of the party concerned. 17.2 : A petition under Regulation 17.1 shall be heard by a Committee consisting of Vice-Chancellor and two other members appointed by Syndicate every year. The Committee may summon suo moto and examine any person whose evidence appears to it to be material. At the conclusion of its proceedings, the Committee shall make an order :- (a) dismissing the election petition; or (b) declaring the election of all or any of the return candidates to be void. 17.3 : The Vice-Chancellor shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Committee. If there is difference of the opinion, the decision of the majority shall prevail. Two members shall form the quorum. If only two members are present and there is a difference of opinion between them, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor shall prevail or in his absence the Vice-Chancellor and his decision shall prevail. The decision of the Committee or the Vice-Chancellor, as the case may be shall be final and binding. 35. A perusal of these regulations shows that the petition for setting aside the election could be filed under Regulation 17.1 of the Calendar. It is to be heard under Regulation 17.2 of the Calendar by a Committee consisting of Vice-Chancellor and two other members appointed by the Syndicate every year. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Committee had power to make order (a) dismissing the election petition (b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void under Regulation 17.3 of the Calendar. The Vice-Chancellor is the ex-officio Chairman of the Committee. The decision of the Committee or the Vice-Chancellor, as the case may be, is made final and binding. It was argued before the Division Bench on behalf of the petitioner that in view of Sec. 38 of the Act, all disputes regarding the constitution of the University are to be referred to the Chancellor for decision. The decision of the Committee or the Vice-Chancellor, as the case may be, is made final and binding. It was argued before the Division Bench on behalf of the petitioner that in view of Sec. 38 of the Act, all disputes regarding the constitution of the University are to be referred to the Chancellor for decision. Therefore, the Chancellor is the only authority to settle disputes regarding election of the members of the Senate and no Committee can be constituted by Regulation framed under Clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) of Sec. 31 of the Act. It was, therefore, argued that Regulation 17.1, 17.2 and 17.3 of Chapter II (B) of the Calendar are ultra vires the provisions of the Act, so far as it authorises the Syndicate to appoint a committee to decide the election petition. It was further argued that election process would be completed only after the notification is published under Sec. 35 of the Act. Therefore, until election process is completed by publication of the notification, the Committee can give a decision under Regulations 17.2 and 17.3 of the Calendar. After considering the various provisions of the Act, the Division Bench, in K. L. Jauras case, (supra) held as follows :- According to Sec. 38 of the Act, in case any question arises as to whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter will be referred to the Chancellor, whose decision thereon will be final. Under Sec. 38 of the Act, the Chancellor has been given the power to decide disputes regarding due election or appointment of a member of any authority or other body of the University. A reading of Sec. 38 and Regulations 17.2 and 17.3 shows that two parallel machineries have been provided - one by the Act and the other by the regulations to adjudicate on the dispute in connection with the election of the members of the Senate. Clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) of Sec. 31 of the Act authorises the Senate, with the sanction of the Government, to frame regulations regarding the procedure to be followed in holding an election of Ordinary Fellows. The aforesaid Clause shows that the Senate can frame the regulations for conducting elections of Ordinary Fellows and not for setting aside the elections. Clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) of Sec. 31 of the Act authorises the Senate, with the sanction of the Government, to frame regulations regarding the procedure to be followed in holding an election of Ordinary Fellows. The aforesaid Clause shows that the Senate can frame the regulations for conducting elections of Ordinary Fellows and not for setting aside the elections. Regulations 17.2 and 17.3 empower the Committee to set aside the election of a member of a Senate which are clearly in excess of the powers conferred on the regulation making authority. Regulations can be framed to conduct elections under Sec. 31 and not to set aside the election. The Act has given powers for deciding such disputes to the Chancellor and no other authority can do so under the regulations." (pages 836 and 837). 36 The Division Bench further held as follows :- "The regulation making authority has not been conferred with any power to frame regulations for setting aside the elections, under Clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Sec. 31 of the Act. In our view, Regulations 17.2 and 17.3 are ultra vires Sections 31 and 38 of the Act............" 37. The aforesaid observations make it abundantly clear that the power granted to the Vice-Chancellor under Regulation 17 (viii) of the Calendar is ultra vires the provisions of Sections 31 (1) and 38 of the Act. 38. As noticed earlier, voluminuous material have been placed on record by the learned counsel for the parties, on the merits of the controversy as to whether the petitioner is employed on the teaching side. I am of the considered opinion that this Court should refrain from making any comments on the validity or otherwise of the two resolutions of the Senate dated 14-3-1982 and of the Syndicate dated 16-4-1988, respectively. The arguments put forward by the learned counsel for the parties have been briefly noticed merely to highlight the dispute. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, would generally avoid going into the intricate questions of fact necessitating evaluation of the material placed on the record by the parties. These are matters best left to be decided by the Tribunals set up under the Act or any other Legislation. I would, therefore, decline to go into the merits of the controversy. 39. These are matters best left to be decided by the Tribunals set up under the Act or any other Legislation. I would, therefore, decline to go into the merits of the controversy. 39. In view of the above, my conclusions to the various points raised by the learned counsel for the parties, may be summarised as follows :- (i) In view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kirpal Singh, (AIR 1970 SC 2097) and the opinion stated by the Privy Council in Sibnath Banerjis cases, (supra), it is held that Sec. 31 (2) (a) of the Act is merely illustrative of regulation making power under Sec. 31 (1) of the Act. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that Regulations made under Sec. 31 (2) (a) of the Act can provide only for matters of procedure. The Regulations can, and in my opinion do, provide for procedural as well as substantive matters. (ii) It is held that the Returning Officer has the power to decide about the eligibility of a candidate. Sec. 31 (1) of the Act can be read into the heading of the Regulations contained in Chapter II (B) of the Calendar which are said to be made under Sections 13, 14 and 15 and Sec. 31 (2) (a) of the Act. (iii) The power granted to the Vice-Chancellor under Sec. 13 (6) of the Act is not a power of appeal over the decision of the Returning Officer. Once a dispute is raised before the Returning Officer as envisaged under Sec. 13 (6) of the Act, the matter has to be forthwith referred to the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor has the power to adjudicate upon the dispute mentioned in the aforesaid sub-section. The Returning Officer will decide about the validity/invalidity of the nomination paper in accordance with the decision of the Vice-Chancellor. (iv) The power of deciding as to whether a Registered Graduate is eligible to contest the election is specifically not given to the Vice-Chancellor. Sub-Section 6 of Sec. 13 of the Act, appears in a section which deals with numbers of Ordinary Fellows to be elected from various Constituencies. A power which is specifically not given in the parent Act, cannot be permitted to be endowed on the Vice-Chancellor by Subordinate Legislation, such as, the Regulations under consideration. Sub-Section 6 of Sec. 13 of the Act, appears in a section which deals with numbers of Ordinary Fellows to be elected from various Constituencies. A power which is specifically not given in the parent Act, cannot be permitted to be endowed on the Vice-Chancellor by Subordinate Legislation, such as, the Regulations under consideration. The power of appeal given to the Vice-Chancellor under Regulation 17 (viii) of the Calendar, cannot be related to any provision of the Act. Therefore, it is held to be ultra vires the Act. (v) It is held that since the Act does not provide for any appeal to the Vice-Chancellor, the regulations can not be permitted to give such a power in the guise of "in house" procedure. Regulations which are in the nature of subordinate/delegated legislation cannot confer any power or jurisdiction on an authority which is not so conferred by the parent Act. (vi) It is held that for election from the Constituency of the Registered Gradutes the question of eligibility of a candidate has to be determined by the Returnuing Officer. Any person aggrieved against the decision of the Returning Officer would have to avail the remedy provided under S. 38 of the Act. (vii) It cannot be said that the Returning Officer has been granted power to scrutinise the nomination papers only for procedural irregularities. (viii) .......................I hold that S. 38 of the Act, comes into operation after the election. (ix) It would not be possible to hold, as canvassed by Mr. Patwalia, that being entitled to contest election would be interchangeable with the term "entitled to be a member", as provided in S. 38 of the Act. The eligibility to contest election will have to be scrutinized by the Returning Officer. The decision of the Returning Officer would be open to challenge by way of an election petition under Regulation 19.1 of the Calendar or on a reference, to the Chancellor. At that stage, under Regulation 19.2, the Chancellor will decide as to whether the candidate has been duly elected. Decision on the question of being "duly elected" will include an enquiry by the Chancellor as to the eligibility of the candidate to contest the election. At that stage, under Regulation 19.2, the Chancellor will decide as to whether the candidate has been duly elected. Decision on the question of being "duly elected" will include an enquiry by the Chancellor as to the eligibility of the candidate to contest the election. (x) Regulation 1 (viii) of the Regulations, in so far as it provides for appeal to the Vice-Chancellor is ultra S. 31 (1) of the Act, as it is in conflict with S. 38 of the Act. (xi) Regulation 17 (viii) of the Regulations clearly grants to the vice-Chancellor a power which cannot be located in the Act. Generality of S. 31(1) of the act can be extended to making regulations for matters provided in the Act. It cannot be extended to matters which are not provided for in the Act. Therefore, Regulation 17 (viii) of the Calendar insofar as it provides for an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor against the order of the Returning Officer, is ultra vires S. 31 (1) and 38 of the Act, on this ground also. (xii) This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, would generally avoid going into the intricate questions of fact necessitating evaluation of the material placed on the record by the parties. These are matters best left to be decided by the Tribunals set up under the Act or any other Legislation. I would, therefore, decline to go into the merits of the controversy. 40. In view of the findings recorded above, the writ petition is allowed. If hold that the impugned order dated 17-8-2000, Annexure P-8, passed by the Vice-Chancellor, is without jurisdiction. The same is hereby quashed and set aside. All interim orders psssed in the these proceedings are hereby vacated. It is directed that the result of the election be declared forthwith. Petition allowed.