JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. (Oral) - These two writ petitions have been filed by one petitioner. The prayer and the issues involved are identical. These can, therefore, be disposed of by a common order. 2. The petitioner prays that the orders passed by the Assistant Collector, the Collector, the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner, copies of which have been produced is Annexures P1 to P5 with this writ petition, be quashed. By these orders the petitioner who was a tenant of respondent No. 6 has been ordered to be evicted from the land in his possession. 3. The solitary contention raised by Mr. P.C. Mehta, Senior Advocate, is that the provision in the 3rd proviso to Section 9-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, which denies the protection to the tenant is arbitrary and, thus, violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Is it so ? Section 9-A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, contains the relevant provision. It reads as under :- "Accommodation of tenants on surplus area. - No tenant liable to ejectment under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of the section next preceding shall be dispossessed of his tenancy unless he is accommodated on a surplus area in accordance with the provisions of Section 10-A or otherwise on some other land by the State Government : Provided that if the tenant concerned is the tenant of a small landowner, he shall be allowed to retain possession of his tenancy to the extent of five standard acres including any other land which he may hold as tenant or owner, until he is so accommodated on a surplus area or otherwise : Provided further, that if a tenancy commences after the commencement of this Act, and the tenant is also an owner and is related to his landlord in the manner prescribed, he shall not be entitled to the benefit of this section : Provided further that the tenant of a landowner who is a member of the Armed Forces of the Union shall also not be entitled to the benefit of this Section." (Emphasis supplied) A perusal of the above provision shows that a tenant is normally entitled to be accommodated on the surplus area. However, the third proviso which was introduced by Act No. 28 of 1962 makes an exception in case of the tenant of a landowner "who is a member of the Armed Forces of the Union.......". Mr. Mehta contends that this provision is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 4. On a perusal of the provisions, we find that an exception has been made in the case of landowners serving the Armed Forces of the Union. Apparently, there is a good rationale for the exception. It is well known that the members of the Armed Forces have to serve at different places in the country. They remain away from their lands. They are, thus, not able to cultivate. In view of the peculiar nature of duties which are performed by the members of the Armed Forces, the Legislature has considered it appropriate to make an exception. We are of the view that this exception is well founded. Persons who shed their blood for this nation are entitled to a differential treatment. In doing so, the Legislature has not violated any constitutional mandate or the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 21. 5. Mr. Mehta submits that there is no distinction between a tenant who is cultivating the land belonging to a villager and another who is tilling the land owned by a member of the Armed Forces. The provision treats the two equals in an unequal manner. 6. We are unable to accept this contention. There is an apparent distinction between the person who stays in a village and yet enjoys the luxury of having the land cultivated by a tenant as against a person who is serving on the Siachin Glacier and living in difficult conditions. The two persons are not equally placed so as to be treated alike. The Legislature which is aware of the needs of the people has made a conscious distinction between the persons who is an ordinary landowner and another who is serving in the Armed Forces. This distinction is well founded and cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. It is well known that in case of persons who have been serving in the Armed Forces, special provisions have been made. This distinction is well founded and cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. It is well known that in case of persons who have been serving in the Armed Forces, special provisions have been made. To illustrate - The members of the Armed Forces are given certain benefits in the matter of grant of promotion when they join a civil service. Posts have been reserved in the All India and States services for the members of the Armed Forces. These reservations have been considered and upheld by Courts. Reference in this behalf may be made to a Full Bench decision of this court in Jagdish Rai and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1977(1) SLR 77. Honble Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy (as his Lordship then was) was pleased to observe as under :- "While the best and the most meritorious of those seeking appointment under the State should be selected, it is also equally fair and equitable that a just proportion of the posts should be given to those who, because of a peculiar handicap, may not stand a chance against those not so handicapped. It would be an extension of the principle of Article 16(4) to those that do not fall under Article 16(4). Defence personnel who on account of their service with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force over the years have lost opportunities for entering Government service and have also lost contact with ordinary civilian life, may find it extremely difficult, on demobilisation, to compete with civilians for civilian jobs, despite the qualities of discipline, sacrifice, sense of public duty, initiative, loyalty and leadership which they would have undoubtedly acquired as members of Defence Forces. The State has an undoubted obligation to provide employment to Ex-Servicemen who have faithfully served the interests of the countrys security, ready to risk their lives. The State has an obligation to protect them from the competition of civilian applicants against whom they may not stand a chance for reasons already mentioned. The State is, therefore, justified in classifying them separately as a source of recruitment and reserving posts for them. Nor, can it be said that efficiency of service will suffer. The State has an obligation to protect them from the competition of civilian applicants against whom they may not stand a chance for reasons already mentioned. The State is, therefore, justified in classifying them separately as a source of recruitment and reserving posts for them. Nor, can it be said that efficiency of service will suffer. Ex-servicemen personnel are required to possess the same minimum qualifications as others and they came endowed with qualities of discipline, sacrifice, initiative, loyalty, sense of public duty etc., qualities not to be scoffed at in public service. And, what does efficiency mean ? As Krishna Iyer, J. points out "Efficiency means, in terms of good Government, not marks in examination only, but responsible and responsive service to the people." 8. Another aspect which deserves mention is that the impugned provision had been introduced in the year 1962. It has been on the statute book for the last more than 38 years. It has stood the test of time. It cannot be struck down unless good reasons are shown. None have been shown. 9. Still further, Mr. Mehta has not even indicated as to how the provision militates against the right to life. Thus, we find no reason to uphold the contention that the impugned provision violates Article 21. No other point has been raised. In view of the above, we find no merit in these petitions. These are, consequently, dismissed in limine. Petitions dismissed.