ORDER The respondent-accused was tried for an offence under section 302/201, IPC on the allegations that on 6-2-1988 at about 11.30 p.m., he caused the death of his wife Malanbi by strangulation and thereafter with a view to destroy evidence, set her body on fire. After investigation was complete, which commenced on the recording of an FIR at the instance of Sadashiv Jagtap, PW-5, challan was filed and the respondent after being charged, was put on trial. The trial court after examining the evidence of the prosecution witnesses notice that the case against the respondent-accused was based on circumstantial evidence and the four circumstances relied upon by the prosecution in support of its case were, (i) motive; (ii) conduct of accused; (iii) medical evidence; and (iv) state of body of the deceased. 2. The trial court found that the motive, i.e. that there were strained relations between the husband and the wife on account of illicit marital relations of the respondent-accused, was not established because the three witnesses whom the prosecution examined in support of the allegations to prove motive, Muktabai Jadhav PW-7, Chitra PW-8 and Sahirabi Sayyed, PW-9 did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile. The trial Court, however, relied upon medical evidence of Dr. Prabha Kesaralimath, PW-10 and did not accept the testimony of DW-1 Dr. L. Amaikant Bade to hold the appellant guilty. The trial court also found that the conduct of the respondent in not taking any step to extinguish fire when his wife was burning, coupled with the naked body of the deceased showed that it was only husband and wife who were in the kitchen when the husband could have strangulated her and thereafter to screen himself, burnt her body. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court convicted the respondent for an offence under section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo RI for 6 months. The respondent was also convicted of the offence under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo 3 years RI and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo RI for 3 months. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The respondent challenged his conviction and sentence in the High Court. The respondent was also convicted of the offence under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo 3 years RI and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo RI for 3 months. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The respondent challenged his conviction and sentence in the High Court. A division bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated 12.4.1991 accepted the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the respondent-accused. By special leave, the state is in appeal before us. 3. Indeed, this case is based only on circumstantial evidence. There is no eyewitness. We shall deal with each of the circumstances hereafter. 4. We agree with the trial court as well as the High Court that the prosecution has failed to prove the motive for commission of the crime. 5. So far as the conduct of respondent-accused is concerned, we find from evidence of PW-9, mother of the deceased that she had been told by Ashanbi, daughter of deceased, that the accused had tried to extinguish the fire when his wife was burning. Ashanbi had been cited as a witness but was not examined. She is the daughter of the deceased and was aged 14 years. She was a material witness. Her non-examination creates a doubt about the bona fides of the investigation. This aspect of the evidence appears to have been lost sight of by the trial court. 6. According to the prosecution, at the time when PW-5 rushed to the quarter of the respondent on hearing cries, the respondent, was wearing his full uniform. The case of the respondent was that he was to go for night duty and since his wife did not like his going out at night, out of anger she may have committed suicide. PW-5 admitted in his cross-examination that the respondent was working as an armed constable and that the duty of an armed constable is to guard and take night rounds in the area which starts from 12:00 midnight till 5.00 a.m. Despite this evidence, the prosecution made no attempt to prove that the respondent was not required to be no night duty. The statement of PW-9 to the effect that even she had been told by the children of the deceased that the respondent had left the house for going on night duty when the deceased set herself on fire and received burn injuries and they cried out, the respondent came back rushing to the house and made an attempt to extinguish fire by putting a chadar on her. This conduct certainly cannot be used as a circumstance against the respondent-accused. If at all, it is a circumstance in favour of the respondent. 7. Insofar as circumstance with regard to the state of body of the deceased is concerned, the trial court has overlooked some material evidence. The body was indeed found naked at the time of post-mortem examination. The trial court inferred that the husband and wife alone were in the room and the husband might have strangulated her. But we find it from the testimony of Yedaba Shinde, PW-2, that the room in which the dead body was found was the kitchen and not the bed room and besides other material a chadar was lying on the ground. There was also a nylon saree lying on the ground which was burnt and another saree was half burnt. There were pieces of cloth attached to the body which were peeling of as an ash according to the post-mortem report. The inference which the trial court, therefore, drew from the nakedness of the body of the deceased, against the accused was not fair. Her clothes had apparently got burnt. 8. Insofar as medical evidence is concerned, the death has been caused due to asphyxia. According to PW-10 who performed the postmortem examination, asphyxia was caused because of strangulation. She proved postmortem report exhibit 24. The respondent-caused examined by Dr. L.A. Bade in defence. Dr. Bade was the professor of forensic medicine. He deposed that on the basis of entries made in the post-mortem report and particularly entry against column No. 29, death of the deceased had been caused by asphyxia, though there was no evidence that asphyxia had been caused because of strangulation. Thus, we have evidence of PW-10 which is contradicted by the evidence of DW-1 as to element of strangulation. 9. There is no other circumstance which has been relied upon by the prosecution against the respondent-accused. Thus, we have evidence of PW-10 which is contradicted by the evidence of DW-1 as to element of strangulation. 9. There is no other circumstance which has been relied upon by the prosecution against the respondent-accused. Each one of these circumstances taken individually and all the circumstances taken collectively do not complete the chain of circumstantial evidence. They are not consistent with the hypothesis of guilt of the respondent. The circumstances cannot be said to be incompatible with the innocence of the respondent. Under these circumstances, the High Court committed no error in acquitting the respondent. 10. We do not find any merit in this appeal, which fails and is hereby dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. Appeal dismissed. *************** ARTICLE SUSPENSION OF CONVICTION (APART FROM SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE) WHETHER PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE LAW ? *P.R. Thakur After trial, an accused is either convicted or acquitted. In case he is acquitted, that is the end of the matter unless appeal against acquittal is preferred by State. In case he is convicted, judgment of conviction is followed by an order on sentence and, an accused is accordingly convicted and sentenced. An appeal is provided against conviction and sentence. Under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called "the Code"), an appellate court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, may order that execution of sentence or order appealed against be suspended and if an appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail. Therefore, from the bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that an appellate court is competent and empowered to suspend a sentence of imprisonment or order of fine/compensation against which appeal has been preferred. There is no specific mention of suspension of conviction as such nor there is any specific prohibition against suspension of conviction. The Supreme Court (H.R. Khanna and R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.) in Retti Deenabandhu and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ (1977) 1 SCC 742 ] observed that a convicted person in challenging his conviction in appeal not only seeks to avoid undergoing the punishment imposed upon him as a result of the conviction but he also wants that other evil consequences flowing from the conviction should not visit him and that the stigma which attaches to him because of the conviction should be wiped out. In Purushottam Lal Kaushik v. Vidya Charan Shukla [AIR 1980 Madhya Pradesh 188], the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (J.S. Verma, J. as his Lordship then was) held that under Section 389 of the Code, "it is only the execution which is suspended and nothing more, with the result that the sentence awarded is not to be suffered during the pendency of the appeal even though it subsists and the appellant is released on bail... Suspension of execution of the sentence or order and grant of bail under Section 389 Cr PC, has the only effect of avoiding sufferance of sentence pending appeal.... Suspension of sentence thus does not arrest disqualification incurred under Section 8(2).... Subsequent event of acquittal does not retrospectively wipe out automatic disqualification incurred by virtue of Section 8(2).... Mere filing of appeal does not arrest disqualification under Section 8(2)". Suspension of sentence thus does not arrest disqualification incurred under Section 8(2).... Subsequent event of acquittal does not retrospectively wipe out automatic disqualification incurred by virtue of Section 8(2).... Mere filing of appeal does not arrest disqualification under Section 8(2)". On appeal by Shukla, the Supreme Court (P.N. Bhagwati, R.S. Sarkaria and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.) in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Purshottam Lal Kaushik [ AIR 1981 SC 547 ] reversed the ratio returned by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, and held: "The acquittal of the returned candidate in appeal prior to the pronouncement of the judgment by the High Court in the election petition filed against such candidate had the result of wiping out his disqualification as completely and effectively as if it did not exist at any time...." Reference was made to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court (J.C. Shah, J. as his Lordship then was, and V. Bhargava, J.) in Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal and others ( AIR 1971 SC 330 = (1971) 1 SCR 798 ] wherein it was held: "In a criminal case, acquittal in appeal does not take effect merely from the date of the appellate order setting aside the conviction it has the effect of retrospectively wiping out the conviction and sentence awarded by the lower court." The ratio decidendi logically deducible from the observations made by the Supreme Court in Manni Lal (supra) is that if the successful candidate is disqualified for being chosen, at the date of his election or at any earlier stage of any step in the election process on account of his conviction and sentence exceeding two years imprisonment, but his conviction and sentence are set aside and he is acquitted on appeal before the pronouncement of judgment in the election petition pending against him, his disqualification is annulled and rendered non est with retroactive force from its very inception, and the challenge to his election on the ground that he was so disqualified is no longer sustainable. In Shukla case (supra), the Supreme Court allowed his appeal on the sole and simple ground that the order of acquittal wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes and as effectively as if it had never been passed. In S.M. Malik v. State (1990 Cri. In Shukla case (supra), the Supreme Court allowed his appeal on the sole and simple ground that the order of acquittal wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes and as effectively as if it had never been passed. In S.M. Malik v. State (1990 Cri. L.R. 1919] Delhi High Court (Malik Sharief-Ud-Din, J.) categorically held that order of conviction could be suspended pending appeal under Section 389 of the Code. It was observed that a reference to the provisions of Section 389 of the Code clearly shows that an appellate court for the reasons to be recorded in writing, is fully empowered to order the suspension of the execution of sentence as also the suspension of the order appealed against. Therefore, where the order appealed against is the order of conviction, the Court is entitled to suspend it under Section 389. Further even if the Court were to simply pass an order stating that the order under appeal is suspended without explaining whether it relates to sentence or both, sentence and conviction, the position that would evolve would be that there would be no final judgment either in respect of the conviction or sentence in existence against the accused. In this case, S.M. Malik was one of the persons who had been convicted of an offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for five years and to pay the fine of Rs 5,000/-. The appeal filed by him was admitted by the order of the High Court of Delhi vide which the conviction and sentence were ordered to remain suspended pending appeal, and payment of the fine was also stayed. The State which had initiated the prosecution against the non-applicant S.M. Malik and others had no grievance against the aforesaid order. The grievance was made by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, the employer of the convict, S.M. Malik which filed the miscellaneous application under Section 482 of the Code challenging the validity of the order insofar as it had suspended the conviction as well of the non-applicant S.M. Malik. The contention of the applicant Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited was that a court could suspend only the sentence and not the conviction while entertaining and admitting an appeal by a convict. The contention of the applicant Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited was that a court could suspend only the sentence and not the conviction while entertaining and admitting an appeal by a convict. The contention of the counsel for the applicant was that under Section 389 of the Code, the expression order used in the said provision was only in respect of suspension of order of fine, if any. The High Court of Delhi, while clearly negating the aforesaid contention, held that an appeal against conviction lies under Section 374(2) of the Code, which clearly shows that any person convicted on trial in which a sentence of imprisonment has been passed against him can prefer an appeal. This provision, according to the learned Judge, clearly laid down that the appeal will lie against conviction. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Retti Deenabandhu (supra) wherein the Supreme Court had held that a person who has been convicted and sentenced, while in appeal, also wants the other evil consequences following his conviction not to visit him as also to wipe out the stigma that sticks to him. Reference was also made to the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court (P.B Gajendragadkar, C.J., K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, V. Ramaswami and Raju, JJ.) between Workmen, U.P. State Electricity Board and another v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. and others [1966(12) Factory Law Reporter 231] wherein the Supreme Court went to the extent of observing that after an appeal is admitted and bail is granted, there is no final judgment against the convict. The company/employer had only two courses open to it. Either the employee should have been allowed to continue in his post or his service could have been terminated after proper charge and enquiry. On the basis of the said decision of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in S.M. Malik case held that even if the court were simply to pass an order stating that the order under appeal is suspended without explaining whether it relates to sentence, or both sentence and conviction, the position that would evolve would be that there would no final judgment either in respect of the conviction or sentence in existence against the appellant. In Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Others [JT 1995(1) SC 515], the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court (A.M. Ahmadi, CJI, R.M Sahai & K. Jayachandra Reddy, JJ.) was dealing with the question whether the appellant was liable to be visited with the consequences of Section 267 of the Companies Act (hereinafter referred to "the Act") notwithstanding the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court while admitting the appellant s appeal against his conviction and sentence by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. Section 267 of the Act provides that no company shall, after the commencement of the Act, appoint or employ, or continue the appointment or employment of any person as its managing or whole-time director who is or has at any time been convicted by a court of an offence involving moral turpitude. The Supreme Court held that the above provision, on a plain reading, was intended to be mandatory in character. Indisputably, the appellant was appointed as the Director in 1988 and the Managing Director in 1990 after his conviction on 22nd December, 1986. On the plain language of Section 267 of the Act, the Company had, in making the appointments, committed an infraction of the mandatory prohibition contained in the said provision. According to the Supreme Court, the law considers it unwise to appoint or continue the appointment of a person guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude to be entrusted or continued to be entrusted with the affairs of any company as that would not be in the interests of the share-holders or for that matter even in public interest. As a matter of public policy, the law bars the entry of such a person as Managing Director of a company and insists that if he is already in position, he should forthwith be removed from that position. The next question considered by the Supreme Court was whether at the time of admitting the appeal, the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi staying the operation of the impugned order, had the effect of staying the operation of Section 267 of the Act? On a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 389 of the Code, it was clear that pending an appeal by a convicted person, an appellate Court may order that execution of sentence or order appealed against be suspended. On a plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 389 of the Code, it was clear that pending an appeal by a convicted person, an appellate Court may order that execution of sentence or order appealed against be suspended. The Supreme Court observed that operation of Section 267 of the Act would take effect as soon as conviction is recorded by a competent court, of an offence involving moral turpitude. While interpreting Section 389(1) of the Code, the Supreme Court observed that the said provision empowers the appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or the order appealed against be suspended pending appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order. Does order in Section 389(1) mean order of conviction or an order similar to the one under Sections 357 or 360 of the Code? Obviously, the order referred to in Section 389(1) must be an order capable of execution. An order of conviction by itself is not capable of execution under the Code. It is the order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of execution and which if not suspended, would be required to be executed by the authorities. Since the order of conviction does not, on the mere filing of an appeal, disappear, the Supreme Court observed that it was difficult to accept the proposition that Section 267 of the Act must be read to apply only to a final order of conviction. Such an interpretation may defeat the very object and purpose for which it came to be enacted. The Supreme Court observed that it was fallacious to contend that on the admission of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the order of conviction had ceased to exist. If that be so, why seek a stay or suspension of the order? The Supreme Court observed that in certain situations, the order of conviction can be executable in the sense that it may incur a disqualification as in the Rama Narang s case. In such a case, the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. If that be so, why seek a stay or suspension of the order? The Supreme Court observed that in certain situations, the order of conviction can be executable in the sense that it may incur a disqualification as in the Rama Narang s case. In such a case, the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations, the attention of the appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1), it is under an obligation to support its order for reasons to be recorded by it in writing . If the attention of the Court is not invited to the specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction, how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? No one can be allowed to play hide and seek with the Court, one cannot suppress the precise purpose for which one seeks suspension of the conviction and obtain a general order of stay and then contend that the disqualification has ceased to operate. In Rama Narang s case, the application by which interim stay of the operation of the impugned judgment was secured, did not mention a single word to the effect that if the operation of the conviction was not stayed, the consequence as indicated in Section 267 of the Act will fall on the appellant. How could it then be said that the Delhi High Court had applied its mind to this precise question before granting stay? The Supreme Court observed that in Rama Narang s case, the appellant had indulged in an exercise of hide and seek in obtaining the interim stay without drawing the pointed attention of the High Court that the stay of conviction was essential to avoid the disqualification under Section 267 of the Act. If such a precise request was made to the Court pointing out the consequences likely to fall on the continuance of the conviction order, the Court would have applied its mind to the specific question, and if it thought that case was made out for grant of interim stay of the conviction order, with or without conditions attached thereto, it may have granted an order to that effect. The Supreme Court held that the Bombay High Court while dealing with interim stay order of the Delhi High Court in collateral civil proceedings could not have held that the latter had no power or jurisdiction to suspend the order of conviction. If the Delhi High Court had consciously passed an order even in purported exercise of power under Section 389(1) of the Code granting stay of the order of conviction so as not to result in the disqualification envisaged by Section 267 of the Act, it would not be open to the Bombay High Court in collateral civil proceedings to overlook it on the ground that the scope of Section 389(1) of the Code did not extend to granting of such a stay order. The Supreme Court considered the question whether the scope of Section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power on the appellate Court to stay the operation of the order of conviction. According to the Supreme Court, if the order of conviction is to result in some disqualification of the type mentioned in Section 267 of the Act, there was no reason why a narrow meaning to Section 389(1) of the Code be given to debar the court from granting an order to that effect in a fit case. The appeal under Section 374 is essentially against the order of conviction because the order of sentence is merely consequential thereto; albeit even the order of sentence can be independently challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferred under Section 374 of the Code, the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and, therefore, there was no reason to place a narrow interpretation on Section 389(1) of the Code not to extend it to an order of conviction. The Supreme Court also observed that High Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. The Supreme Court also observed that High Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. In a fit case, if the High Court feels satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be suspended or stayed so that the convicted person does not suffer from a certain disqualification provided for in any other statute, it may exercise the power because otherwise, the damage done cannot be undone; the disqualification incurred by Section 267 of the Act and given effect to cannot be undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is set aside by the appellate Court. The Supreme Court, however, cautioned that while granting a stay of suspension of the order of conviction, the court must examine pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in doing so, it may impose such conditions as may be appropriate to protect the interest of the shareholders and the business of the company. The Supreme Court (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and K.S. Paripoornan, JJ.) in Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.), Madras v. S. Nagoor Meera [ AIR 1995 SC 1364 ] observed that Section 389(1) speaks of suspending "the execution of the sentence or order", and it does not expressly speak of suspension of conviction. Even so, it may be possible to say that in certain situations, the appellate court may also have the power to suspend the conviction, an aspect dealt with in Rama Narang case (supra) wherein it was held that in certain situations, the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense that it may incur a disqualification. In such a case, the power under Section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. The Supreme Court in Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (supra) was concerned with Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution according to which, a person can be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. The Supreme Court observed that there can be no question of suspending the conduct. The Supreme Court in Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (supra) was concerned with Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution according to which, a person can be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. The Supreme Court observed that there can be no question of suspending the conduct. The Supreme Court was, therefore, of the opinion that taking proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a Government servant who has been convicted by a criminal court is not barred merely because the sentence or order is suspended by the appellate court or on the ground that the said Government-servant accused has been released on bail pending the appeal. Very recently, the Supreme Court of India (K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi, JJ.) in Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P. [ II (2001) CCR 41 (SC) ] while granting bail to the lady-appellant convicted of the offence of murder during pendency of her appeal in the High Court, ordered that the order of conviction and sentence passed against her shall be kept in abeyance and she be released on bail during the pendency of the appeal. WRITER S VIEWPOINT The Supreme Court has, in no uncertain terms, held that an appellate Court has the power to suspend the order of conviction provided attention of the Court is drawn specifically to the consequence which may follow or fall upon conviction. Therefore, an appellate Court is not obliged to suspend operation of an order recording conviction unless disqualifications/serious and evil consequences following as a result of conviction are convassed before an appellate Court, and a court thereafter for reasons to be recorded in writing, may suspend conviction as also sentence during pendency of appeal. In the present scenario, it is a notorious fact that whenever an appellant is released on bail after sentence is suspended during pendency of an appeal, it takes years and decades for appeal to be heard on its turn. Appeals of those in custody, who have been declined bail and denied suspension of sentence after filing of an appeal, are heard on priority in comparison to such appeals where appellants are on bail. In some cases, an appellant-convict may be a Government servant or employed in a public undertaking. Appeals of those in custody, who have been declined bail and denied suspension of sentence after filing of an appeal, are heard on priority in comparison to such appeals where appellants are on bail. In some cases, an appellant-convict may be a Government servant or employed in a public undertaking. As soon as such a person comes to be convicted by a trial Court, notwithstanding admission of his appeal, suspension of his sentence and release on bail during pendency of appeal, an employer has a right under the service rules to dismiss or terminate the services of such a convicted employee. The mere fact that he has filed the appeal against his conviction which has been admitted for a regular hearing and during the pendency of the appeal, he has been released on bail after his sentence has been suspended, is of no avail to him in foreclosing his dismissal/removal from service as a result of his conviction. The irony is that though appeal of such a convict, having prima facie merit, has been admitted and he has been released on bail and his appeal will be heard in normal course after years and decades, yet he will be dismissed from service after conviction by a trial court during pendency of the admitted appeal and he will thus be on road without any allowance for years together though finally, his appeal may be allowed; his conviction and sentence set aside: he may be acquitted and entitled for reinstatement with back wages. All this will be insignificant to him because during all those long years of pendency of his appeal, after his dismissal from service as a result of the conviction, he may be suffering untold hardship and misery. In the opinion of the writer, appeal is admittedly continuation of a trial, and till appeal is decided, conviction may not be said to be final for any purpose. As observed by the Supreme Court (G.B. Pattanaik and M.B. Shah, JJ.) in Padam Singh v. State of U.P. [2000 SCC (Cr.) 285], "the presumption of innocence with which the accused starts, continues right through until he is held guilty by the final court of appeal and that presumption is neither strengthened by an acquittal nor weakened by a conviction in the trial court". This being so, there is all the more reason that conviction and sentence both ought to be suspended wherever circumstances justify such composite suspension. Recently, in the Criminal Appeal No. 674/1999 (Smt. Sharbati v. State) argued by the present writer, the appellant had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life on the charge of murder. It was a case of no evidence so far as the appellant Smt. Sharbati was concerned, and the Division Bench of Delhi High Court was pleased to suspend her sentence on filing and admission of the appeal. The appellant was a Class-IV employee in the bank. After she had been convicted by the trial Court, the bank dismissed her from service notwithstanding her admission of appeal, suspension of sentence and enlargement on bail during pendency of the appeal. She applied to the Division Bench of Delhi High Court which had earlier admitted her appeal, for suspension of her conviction, placing reliance upon the judgment of Delhi High Court in S.M. Malik (supra) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rama Narang (supra). The Division Bench (Usha Mehra and M.A. Khan, JJ.) dismissed the said application for suspension of conviction on the ground that merely because the appellant-convict was a bank employee, it was not a sufficient ground to suspend the conviction. It is submitted with respect (and regret) that the application praying for suspension of conviction detailed the various grounds upon which the appellant deserved suspension of conviction particularly in view of the facts that she had been dismissed from service after her conviction by the trial court; that she was the only bread earner in the family and that her family will suffer starvation and destitution during the long years her appeal will remain pending. The attention of the Division Bench had been specifically drawn to these facts which warranted and justified suspension of conviction of the appellant, as per the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Rama Narang s case (supra). It is submitted that the High Court of Delhi, while dismissing vide the order dated April 26, 2001 the prayer of the appellant for suspension of her conviction on the aforesaid grounds, neither appreciated the principles nor the precedents in the proper perspective, resulting in the miscarriage of justice. It is submitted that the High Court of Delhi, while dismissing vide the order dated April 26, 2001 the prayer of the appellant for suspension of her conviction on the aforesaid grounds, neither appreciated the principles nor the precedents in the proper perspective, resulting in the miscarriage of justice. The appellant could have been saved from the undesirable consequence/agony of being dismissed from service as a result of the conviction thrust upon her by the trial court, by suspension of her conviction in addition to the suspension of her sentence during the pendency of her appeal, and she would have thus continued to earn her livelihood and sustained her family comprising of minor children, her husband having already died. The Supreme Court has categorically held that there can be suspension of conviction if evil consequences following conviction are brought to the notice of appellate Court. In the recent case in Akhtari Bi (supra), the Supreme Court while granting bail to the lady-appellant convicted of the offence of murder during pendency of her appeal in the High Court, ordered that the order of conviction and sentence shall remain in abeyance. As held by the Supreme Court in Shukla case (supra), acquittal in appeal operates retrospectively and wipes out conviction and sentence as completely and effectively as if they did not ever exist. It is true that after acquittal in appeal, an appellant may be entitled not only to reinstatement (if not already crossed the age of superannuation) but also arrears of wages. The question is - Can such a relief at a belated stage undo the harm caused to an innocent appellant as a result of dismissal from service consequent to conviction by a trial court and also by denial of suspension of conviction by appellate court? It is, therefore, the opinion of the writer that in every appeal, every appellate court ought to pay specific attention and deal with any such contention not only specifically but also sympathetically in regard to suspension of conviction which might entail evil consequences like dismissal etc. from the mere fact of conviction recorded by a first court. Appellate Courts should, therefore, be vigilant suo moto in protecting the interests, particularly economic interests of an appellant. Justice must not only be done but also seen to be done. Let suspension of conviction not be a rare phenomenon. from the mere fact of conviction recorded by a first court. Appellate Courts should, therefore, be vigilant suo moto in protecting the interests, particularly economic interests of an appellant. Justice must not only be done but also seen to be done. Let suspension of conviction not be a rare phenomenon. Rather, it should be ordered as often as required so as to see that no one suffers and becomes a victim of injustice. It was Joseph Joubert, 18th century French writer who said, "Justice is the right of the weaker." Indian Courts should endeavour to come true to the statement that courts will not deny the equal protection of the law to the unwashed, unshod, unkempt and uninhabited. **************** Parallel Citations of other Journals : State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Hanif Mohiddin Shaikh, 2002(5) Supreme 161 : 2002(10) JT 132 : 2002(1) All.Crl.L.R. 206 : 2002(3) Crimes 15 00069 00070