S. B. SINHA, CJ, J. ( 1 ) WHAT should be the proper interpretation of sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is the question involved in this petition. Facts : ( 2 ) THE petitioner herein was removed from service on 2. 6. 1995. He allegedly came to know of the same on 31. 8. 1998. A revision petition was filed by him before the 2nd respondent on 18. 11. 1998. The same was dismissed by order dated 14. 6. 1999 whereafter he filed the original application. A miscellaneous application was filed for condoning of delay which was dismissed on 2. 3. 2001. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner herein questioning the said order which was marked as Writ Petition No. 7486 of 2001. ( 3 ) AS the subsequent events had not been taken into consideration, this Court set aside the said order and requested the Tribunal to consider the matter afresh. The impugned order has been passed pursuant thereto. The learned Tribunal refused to condone the delay of 8 months holding that the petitioner ought to have filed an application by 14. 6. 1999 but he did so only on 15. 2. 2001. ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioner was that he was absent from his duties because of his serious indisposition during the period 11. 9. 1993 to 20. 10. 1994. In his original application the petitioner stated that after his recovery and after having come to learn about the order of removal he filed representation for revocation thereof. The said representation was said to be a revision petition. He received the information only on 14. 6. 1999 whereby his revision petition was dismissed inter alia on the ground that he had not adduced any convincing evidence in support of his claim. He filed another representation to the 4th respondent seeking copies of the charge-sheet, documents relied upon by the department, day to day inquiry proceedings, Presenting Officer s briefing if any, details of communications if any, inquiry officer s report, the final order passed by the disciplinary authority so as to enable him to make a proper defence on 8. 7. 1999. But he did not receive any reply therefrom. 7. 1999. But he did not receive any reply therefrom. The petitioner contends that he did not know what procedure was adopted for passing the order of removal and thus he approached the Hon ble Minister Sri Ram Vilas Paswan through a Member of Parliament as he belonged to Scheduled Caste community. The said representation, however, was rejected whereafter the original application was filed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that even in the impugned order no sufficient or cogent reason has been shown. The learned Tribunal in its order, pursuant to the direction of this Court, has considered the decision of the Apex Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , the relevant dicta whereof reads thus: rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation ). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kantal Kumari and State of W. B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. ( 5 ) THE learned Tribunal despite having before it the law of the land - the decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that if the explanation does not smack of any mala fides or it is not put forth as a part of dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor, did not receive any consideration at the hands of the learned Tribunal. This Court has directed the Tribunal to consider the subsequent events viz. This Court has directed the Tribunal to consider the subsequent events viz. , that the petitioner having believed that he could get some relief at the hands of the Hon ble Minister keeping in view the fact that his representation for obtaining the requisite informations had not been acceded to proceeded on the basis that if he could convince the authorities concerned that there were genuine grounds for his absence which although may be technically unauthorised but was not deliberate and for a valid reason, the order of removal may be revoked. The person who has lost his job, on a ground of unauthorised absence was allegedly ailing at the relevant time. Human considerations have some role to play. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act confers enough jurisdiction to the Tribunal to condone the delay even in a case where sub-section (2) of Section 21 may not have any role to play. Subsection (3) provides for non-abstante clause. ( 6 ) SATISFACTION to be arrived at by the Tribunal for the purpose of exercising its discretionary jurisdiction must be rested on rational approach. It ought to have, in our considered view, read the decision of the Apex Court in its proper perspective. Physical running out of time may by itself not deprive a person from having his legitimate grievance ventilated before a Court of law, particularly on the ground of limitation if thereby a third party interest is not created. It is true that a person who sleeps over his rights is not entitled to get his claims adjudicated in a Court of law. Even the concept of Article 14 of the Constitution will have no application. But having regard to the decision of the Apex Court, the Courts and Tribunals should consider such matter from a broader perspective. It may not insist on having explanation for day to day delay or month to month delay. Explanation which may be general in nature may suffice. But having regard to the decision of the Apex Court, the Courts and Tribunals should consider such matter from a broader perspective. It may not insist on having explanation for day to day delay or month to month delay. Explanation which may be general in nature may suffice. As in the instant case the learned Tribunal failed to take into consideration the relevant fact and took into consideration irrelevant facts not germane for the purpose of passing the impugned order and that too ignoring the decision of the Apex Court, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case that the impugned order should be set aside and the delay in filing the application should be directed to be condoned. It is so ordered. The Tribunal shall admit the original application and hear the parties on merits. ( 7 ) FOR the aforementioned reasons, the writ petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.