ORDER Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. Heard the parties and with their consent this appeal is disposed of under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In respect of Agreement No. 3-F2 of 1983-84 dated 2.6.1983, contract for construction of concrete-cum- boulder masonery dam on river North Koel at Mandal Palamau, the Contractor- respondent raised claim of Ps. 1,66,75,117.00 and filed application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was registered as Title Suit No. 120 of 1986. The Court appointed sole arbitrator, who entered into reference on 8.12.1995 and both parties appeared and participated in the arbitration proceedings filed their pleadings and adduced evidence and ultimately award of Rs. 1,13,92,300/- was pronounced on 31.10.1997. It was received in Court on 32.11.1997. The appellant-State filed objection dated 15.5.1998 thereto, under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act and by impugned judgment dated 12.5.1999, the said award was made Rule of Court. However, interest granted by Arbitrator @ 14-1/2% per annum from 7.4. 1989 till date of award was reduced to 9% and the period was extended also from date of award till realisation. 2. Mr. S.L. Barnwal, Additional Advocate General on behalf of appellants submitted that time granted by the Court on extension once, for pronouncement of award by 26.8.1997 was never extended under Section 24 of the Act and, therefore, pronouncement of award in question after the said date was without jurisdiction and barred by time. 3. It is not denied that before expiry of the extended period, on 4.8.1997, arbitrator had already sent request to the Court to extend the period, if possible by 6.12.1997 and parties also jointly had filed a petition in Court on 26.8.1997 for extension of time, under Section 24 of the Act. It further appears that on 24.8.1997, arbitration proceeding stood concluded and, therefore, some time was taken for preparation and pronouncement of the award. Extract of Arbitrators order-sheet dated 24.8.1997 (Annexure A to the counter-affidavit), reveals that arbitration proceeding concluded on 24.8.1997 and on the request of respondent-State, liberty was given to submit/file case laws, if any, before the arbitrator by 14.9.1997 with a copy thereof to the claimant. Such liberty was also allowed to the claimant, who may submit case law, if any, by the said date. Such liberty was also allowed to the claimant, who may submit case law, if any, by the said date. Order sheet of the Arbitrator further reveals that on 24.8.1997 it was agreed by both the parties that except filing case laws, if any, both parties had completed their argument and they had nothing further to argue and/or submit. They signed individual declaration to that effect. In Prasun Roy v. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and Anr., AIR 1988 SC 205 , the apex Court held that the principle is that a party shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold simultaneously. Long participation and acquiescence in the proceeding preclude such a party from contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction. Courts do not favour this kind of contention and conduct of an applicant who participates in arbitration proceedings without protest and fully avails of the entire arbitration proceedings and then when he sees that the award has gone against him he comes forward to challenge the whole of the arbitration proceedings as without jurisdiction on the ground of a known disability of a party. By conduct there was acquiescence on the part of appellant even in a case where initial order was not passed by, consent of parties, a party by participation and acquiescence can preclude future challenges. In the grounds of appeal, no prejudice has been indicated by appellant. In the instant case not only the parties without any protest participated in the arbitration proceedings till last, the arbitrator as well as both parties jointly had also duly applied for extension of time for pronouncement of award. I, therefore, find no force in the submission of Additional Advocate General that pronouncement of award in question was without jurisdiction and barred by time The award in question was non-speaking one but it could not have been a ground for either remitting or setting it aside as no reason was given in its support except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission or an order made by the Court such as one under Sections 20 or 21 or 24 or 34 of the Arbitration Act or the statute governing the arbitration requires that arbitrator should give reason for the award, it is not incumbent upon the arbitrator to pronounce reasoned award. In the instant case it has not been shown to have exceeded his jurisdiction or travelled beyond the contract. There is no error apparent on face of the award. Court cannot substitute its own view in place of arbitrators view and this Court after the award in question has been made rule of the Court cannot examine matter as a regular appellate Court. I find no infirmity in the impugned judgment, This appeal is dismissed. 4. Appeal dismissed.