JUDGMENT 1. 1. This is an appeal under section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short 'the Act) read with clause 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, against an order passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 214/2000. 2. When the case came up for admission before us on 5.1.2001, we found that the office had raised an objetion as to the maintainability of the appeal. As according to the office, the impugned order was an interim order against which appeal was not maintainable. On going through the order, we found that the learned Single Judge had, after going through the replies filed on behalf of the respondents in response to the show cause notices issued by him, had come to the conclusion that contempt of court had been committed by the respondents and therefore, invited them to make submissions on punishment to be imposed. Considering the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants, we held that the appeal was maintainable and the objections raised by the office were over-ruled at that stage, keeping the point open for being canvassed at the time of final hearing. 3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties today also, we find that the appeal is maintainable in view of the Supreme Court decisions in (1) Purshottam Dass Goel V. Hon. Mr. Justice B.S. Dhillon and others ( AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1014) and (2) R.N. Dey & others V. Bhagyabati Pramanik & others (2000) 4 SCC 400 . 4. The case against the appellant has been initiated by the judicial order passed on 5.7.2000 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.225/96 by the learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge found that one Tara Singh, who was the respondent in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 225/96, had died on 3.1.1998 during the pendency of the said petition. The appellants were his counsel in the case and had knowledge of his death as they had filed power on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased workman Tara Singh on 14.9.98. An affidavit in support of application under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was filed on 26.11.98 along with the application. The affidavit was sworn by Tara Singh and attested by the Oath Commissioner at Jaipur on 22.11.98. An affidavit in support of application under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was filed on 26.11.98 along with the application. The affidavit was sworn by Tara Singh and attested by the Oath Commissioner at Jaipur on 22.11.98. The deponent of the affidavit was identified by the lawyer and the affidavit was presented in the Registry by the lawyer. Obviously, the affidavit was either sworn after the death of Tara Singh and could not have been his own affidavit or the affidavit bore signatures of Tara Singh but was attested after his death. The ]eared Single Judge, in such a situation, issued show cause notice to the lawyers involved and the Oath Commissioner. After they filed replies, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order was without jurisdiction and illegal. According to him, a learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings in cases other than civil contem is and in any case, action could not have been initiated beyond one year of the commission of contempt which is the limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act. It was pointed out that the alleged contempt was not a civil contempt and therefore, could only be a criminal contempt. In view of section 18 of the Act, every case of criminal contempt had to be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges, and for that reason, it was contended that the learned Single Jude could not have held the appellants guilty and could not have proceeded to hear on the question of punishment. 6. Section 2(a), (b) and (c) of the Act defines 'contempt of court', 'civil contempt' and 'criminal contempt', as under: "(a) "Contempt of Court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt. 6. Section 2(a), (b) and (c) of the Act defines 'contempt of court', 'civil contempt' and 'criminal contempt', as under: "(a) "Contempt of Court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt. (b) "Civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court; (c) "Criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which:- (i) Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; or (ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." 7. Filing of affidavit of a dead person would not be a civil contempt obviously because it is not a wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. It would amount to criminal contempt because it may prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding or it may interfere or tend to interfere or obstruct or tend to obstruct administration of justice. 8. Section 14 of the Act provides for the procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court and Section 15 of the Act provides for cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases. Section 15 reads as under : "15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.-(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by:- (a) The Advocate-General, or (b) Any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, or (c) In relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such law officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in writing of such law officer. (2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. (3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty." 9. Section 17 of the Act provides for the procedure after cognizance is taken and reads as under : "17. Procedure after cognizance.-(1) Notice of every proceeding under Section 15 shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise. (2) The notice shall be accompanied, (a) In the case of proceedings commenced on a motion, by a copy of the motion as also copies of the affidavits, if any, on which such motion is founded; and (b) in the case of proceedings commenced on a reference by a subordinate Court, by a copy of the reference. (3) The Court may, if it is satisfied that a person charged under Section 15 is likely to abscond or keep out of the way to avoid service of the notice, order the attachment of his property of such value or amount as it may deem reasonable. (4) Every attachment under sub-section (3) shall be effected in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the attachment of property in execution of a decree for payment of money, and if, after such attachment, the person charged appears and shows to the satisfaction of the Court that he did not abscond or keep out of the way to avoid service of the notice, the Court, shall order the release of his property from attachment upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit. (5) Any person charged with contempt under Section 15 may file an affidavit in support of his defence, and the Court may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits filed or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary, and pass such order as the justice of the case requires." 10. (5) Any person charged with contempt under Section 15 may file an affidavit in support of his defence, and the Court may determine the matter of the charge either on the affidavits filed or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary, and pass such order as the justice of the case requires." 10. Section 18 of the Act provides for hearing of cases of criminal contempt by a Bench of not less than two Judges and it reads as under : "18. Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches. (1) Every case of criminal contempt under section 15 shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges. (2) Sub-section (1) shall not apply to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner." 11. It is clear after going through the aforesaid provisions that a case of criminal contempt has to be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges. It appears that on the question whether cognizance of the criminal contempt can be taken by a Single Judge or not, there are two views. In (3) Court Versus Kasturi Lal (Full Bench) AIR 1980 Punjab 72 a Full Bench of Punjab High Court has taken the view that hearing is different from initiation of proceedings and a Single Judge of the High Court is not barred from initiating proceedings for criminal contempt. However, a Division Bench of this Court in (4) State of Rajasthan V. M.R. Mitruka (1978 Cr.L.J. 1440) has held in para 4 of the judgment as follows : "4. As we have already observed above, after examining the provisions of R.324 of the Rules of this Court and the provisions of the Act carefully, we have come to the conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for criminal contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt by the High Court on a motion either suo moto or made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent of the Advocate General or on a reference made to it by a subordinate court. Such initiation of proceedings for contempt, in our view, can only take place when a Bench, consisting of at least two Judges of the High Court, applies its judicial mind to the facts of the case and on a consideration thereof, decides to take cognizance of the case and directs the issuance of notice in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. It appears from the record of this case that the matter was never placed before a Division Bench of this Court for initiating proceedings for contempt nor a Bench of this Court applied its mind to the facts of the case, nor a Bench ever made up its mind to take cognizance in the matter. It is only thereafter that a notice under Section 17(1) of the Act could be issued by this Court. When a matter relating to criminal contempt is placed before a Division Bench for taking cognizance, the Court will apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case and would decide, in the exercise of its discretion, as to whether it would be proper to take action and to initiate proceedings for contempt in the matter or it may decline to take cognizance and to initiate the proceedings for contempt. In the present case, as the matter was not placed before a Division Bench for consideration nor a Bench applied its mind and decided to initiate proceedings and no cognizance was ever taken and thus no further action could be justified. We, consequently hold that the notice issued to the respondent was improper and invalid." 12. In (5) Chhaganlal Mittal. V. Mohanlal Mittal (1982 Cr.L.J. 2199) , a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has held as follows: "5. Mr. We, consequently hold that the notice issued to the respondent was improper and invalid." 12. In (5) Chhaganlal Mittal. V. Mohanlal Mittal (1982 Cr.L.J. 2199) , a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has held as follows: "5. Mr. S.B. Mukherji on behalf of the appellant contends that the learned Judge acted wholly without jurisdiction and the order made by him was a nullity inasmuch as (a) From the statements made in the petition it would appear that the contempt alleged is a criminal contempt and in view of the provisions of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain or determine the said petition which was not made in the criminal jurisdiction; (b) In view of the provisions of Section 15(1)(b) of the said Act of 1971 it was imperative on the part of the petitioner for contempt, to obtain the consent of the learned Advocate General before moving the said application. The same not having been obtained the petition was misconceived and the order passed by the learned Judge was without jurisdiction. (c) In view of the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Act of 1971 the learned Judge sitting singly had no jurisdiction to entertain or to determine the said petition inasmuch as he same could only be entertained and determined by a Division Bench of this Court. 6. In our view the points raised by Mr. Mukherji are of substance and cannot be ignored in a petition for contempt of Court specially when the provisions of the Act of 1971 are bound to be strictly complied with. 7. A point was sought to be taken on behalf of the respondent that the appeal did not lie. But we are satisfied that the appellant, the alleged contemner herein, can maintain this appeal as a matter of right in view of the provisions of Section 19 of the Act of 1971." 13. In the present case, however, by the impugned order, the learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that a clear case of contempt was made out and therefore, he took cognizance. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge directed that the respondents should make submissions on the punishment to be imposed. In the present case, however, by the impugned order, the learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that a clear case of contempt was made out and therefore, he took cognizance. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge directed that the respondents should make submissions on the punishment to be imposed. Holding a person guilt and hearing on punishment is clearly a part of hearing and determination of the matter and therefore, clearly covered by Section 18 of the Act which requires that the matter is to be heard and determined by a Bench of not less, than two Judges. We also find that the provisions of Section 15(3) of the Act which requires that every motion or reference made under this Section, shall specify the contempt of which person charged is alleged to be guilty were not complied with. We also find that provisions of Section 17(5) of the Act were not complied and appellant was not given proper opportunity to file affidavit in support of his defence and to lead evidence in his defence. The correct procedure in the cases like this, when the learned Single Judge deems it necessary to initiate action under the Act for criminal contempt, which is not a contempt in the face of the court, is to first decide whether action can be initiated by a learned Single Judge or it as to be referred to a Division Bench. If it is a criminal contempt and the learned Single Judge is prima facie satisfied that a case for initiation of action for criminal contempt is made out, he has to refer the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for the case being dealt with by a Bench of not less than two Judges as required by Section 18 of the Act. While dealing with the question of prima facie case, learned Single Judge has also to deal with the question of limitation which will depend on the point of time at which the contempt could be said to be committed in such a case of filing and pressing into service a false affidavit. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the impugned order is unsustainable. We therefore, set it aside and remit the matter back to the learned Single Judge for proceeding further in accordance with law. SPL. Appeal disposed of-Matter remitted to S.B. *******