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Allahabad High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 1150 (ALL)

SHAKIRA KHATOON KAZMI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

2001-12-07

G.P.MATHUR, V.M.SAHAI

body2001
G. P. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed for quashing of the government order dated 15. 12. 2000, notice dated 11. 1,2001 and the order dated 24. 8. 2001 passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad. Parties have exchanged affidavits and therefore, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. ( 2 ) THE dispute relates to plot No. 59, Civil Station. Allahabad, having an area of 1 acre and 4272 sq. yards (9112 sq. yards or 7618 sq. metres ). A lease of the aforesaid plot was granted in favour of Thomas Crowby for a period of 50 years on 11. 1. 1868 by the Secretary of State for India in council and it was signed by the Commissioner of Allahabad Division. A fresh lease was executed in favour of his successors for a period of 50 years on 12. 4. 1923 which was to operate from 1. 1. 1918. With the permission of the Collector, Allahabad, the successors of the lessee transferred their leasehold rights in favour of Purshottam Das in the year 1945. Thereafter, on 31. 10. 1958, the legal representatives of Purshottam Das transferred the leasehold rights in favour of petitioner No. 1 Smt. Shakira Khatoon Kazmi, respondent No. 3 Smt. Sabira Khatoon Kazmi and their mother Smt. Maimoona Khatoon Kazmi. Petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and respondent Nos. 4 to 6 in the writ petition are heirs of late Smt. Maimoona Khatoon Kazmi. The lease, which had been granted on 12. 4. 1923, expired on 31. 12. 1967 but the same was not renewed for a long period. Subsequently, a fresh lease deed was executed on behalf of Governor of Uttar Pradesh in favour of the petitioners and respondent Nos. 3 to 6 on 19. 3. 1996 for a period of 30 years which was to operate with effect from 1. 1. 1968. This deed contained a clause that the lease deed may be renewed for two successive terms of 30 years each but the total period shall not exceed 90 years including the original term. The period of this deed expired on 31. 12. 1997 and on 17. 7. 1998 it was again renewed for a further period of 30 years with effect from 1. 1. 1998. The state Government passed an order on 15. 12. The period of this deed expired on 31. 12. 1997 and on 17. 7. 1998 it was again renewed for a further period of 30 years with effect from 1. 1. 1998. The state Government passed an order on 15. 12. 2000 for cancelling the lease and resuming the possession of the plot in question. The District Magistrate, Allahabad, thereafter gave a notice dated 11. 1. 2001 to the petitioners and respondent Nos. 3 to 5 (hereinafter referred to as the lesseesl intimating them that the State Government had passed an order on 15. 12. 2000 cancelling the lease and resuming possession of the plot in question as the same was required for a public purpose. The notice further mentioned that the lessees should remove the structure standing on the plot failing which possession will be taken in accordance with the Clause 3 (C) of the lease deed. The lessees filed an objection against the notice before the District Magistrate on 2. 2. 2001. They further claim to have sent an objection to the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh on 31. 1. 2001 praying for revocation of the order of the State Government dated 15. 12. 2000. The District magistrate considered the objection and rejected the same by his order dated 24. 8. 2001. A copy of the aforesaid order along with cheques representing the compensation for the building standing over the plot (cheques for total amount of Rs. 10 lakhs) were served upon the lessees. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 tried to dispossess the lessees on 1. 9. 2001 and their stand is that possession of open land was taken. It was at this stage that the present writ petition was filed and a stay order was passed on 2. 9. 2001 staying the dispossession of the petitioners. ( 3 ) THE first question which requires consideration is whether the order passed by the State government on 15. 12. 2000 for cancellation of the lease and resumption of possession is legally valid. There is a clear recital in the lease deed executed in favour of the lessees by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh on 19. 3. 1996 that the same is being done under the Government Grants Act. 1895. 12. 2000 for cancellation of the lease and resumption of possession is legally valid. There is a clear recital in the lease deed executed in favour of the lessees by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh on 19. 3. 1996 that the same is being done under the Government Grants Act. 1895. Clause 3 (C) of the deed reads as follows : "3 (C) That if the demised premises are at any time required by the lessor for his or for any public purpose, he shall have the right to give one months clear notice in writing to the lessees to remove any building standing at the lime on the demised premises and within two months of the receipt of the notice to take possession thereof on the expiry of that period subject however to the condition that if the lessor is willing to purchase the building on the demised premises, the lessees shall be paid for such building such amount as may be determined by the Secretary to Government of U. P. In the Nagar Awas Department. " ( 4 ) SECTIONS 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act. 1895, have been amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1960 with retrospective effect and the substituted sections read as follows : "2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government Grants.-- (1) Nothing contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein, heretofore made or hereafter to be made, by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of any person whomsoever; and every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed. (2) U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 not to affect certain teases made by or on behalf of the Government.--Nothing contained in the U. P. Tenancy Act. 1939, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, shall affect or be deemed to have ever affected any rights, created, conferred or granted, whether before or after the date of the passing of the Government Grants (U. P. Amendment) Act, 1960, by leases of land by, or on behalf of. 1939, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, shall affect or be deemed to have ever affected any rights, created, conferred or granted, whether before or after the date of the passing of the Government Grants (U. P. Amendment) Act, 1960, by leases of land by, or on behalf of. the Government in favour of any person, and every such creation, conferment or grant shall be construed and take effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 or the Agra tenancy Act, 1926. 3. Certain leases made by or on behalf of the Government to take effect according to their tenor.--All provisions, restrictions, condi-tions and limitations contained in any such creation, conferment or grant referred to in Section 2, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor; any decree or direction of a Court of law or any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature, to the contrary notwithstanding : provided that nothing in this Section shall prevent, or deemed ever to have, prevented the effect of any enactment relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the imposition of ceiling on agricultural lands. " ( 5 ) IN State of U. P. v. Zahoor Ahmad. AIR 1973 SC 2520 , (Paras 15 and 16), it has been held that the effect of Section 2 of the Government Grants Act is that in the construction of an instrument governed by the Act, the Court shall construe such grant irrespective of provisions of transfer of Property Act. It has been further held that Section 3 of the Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of the land be. The Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations or restrictions in its grants and the rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory or common taw. The rights of the parties have, therefore, to be determined with reference only to the terms contained in the deed and the provisions of any other enactment like transfer of Property Act have to be completely ignored and cannot be taken into consideration. The rights of the parties have, therefore, to be determined with reference only to the terms contained in the deed and the provisions of any other enactment like transfer of Property Act have to be completely ignored and cannot be taken into consideration. The State Government cancelled the lease and directed for resumption of possession thereof as the plot in question is required for extension of Allahabad High Court and also for the extension of the office of Advocate-General, U. P. The plot is situate just in front of the gate of the High court on the Kanpur Road across the road and is, therefore, most suitable and ideal place for the aforesaid purpose. Several court rooms and chambers for the judges have been constructed in the past but there has been no addition of office space with the result that there is hardly any place to keep the records. Even pending files are being kept by having a make shift and temporary arrangement of enclosing the verandas. Similarly, there is acute shortage of space in the office of advocate General. There is no place at all where the State counsel may sit and do the drafting work or for keeping the files. The grounds for passing of the order, namely, extension of High court and extension of office of Advocate General is undoubtedly a public purpose and the same has rightly not been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Clause 3 (C) clearly confers power upon the lessor, namely, the Governor of U. P. that if the plot in question is required by the Government for its own purpose or for any public purpose, it shall have the right to give one months notice in writing to the lessees to remove any building standing on the plot and to take possession thereof on the expiry of two months from the date of service of the notice. There is a further condition in the clause that if the lessor is willing to purchase the building standing on the plot, the lessee shall be paid such amount as may be determined by the Secretary to Government of U. P. In the Nagar Awas Department. The deed of renewal executed on 17. 7. 1998 is a very short one and it does not contain any terms or conditions. The deed of renewal executed on 17. 7. 1998 is a very short one and it does not contain any terms or conditions. It recites that the renewal is being done on the same terms and conditions including the clause for re-entry as is contained in the original lease deed dated 19. 3. 1996 and the terms and conditions of the aforesaid deed would be binding upon the parties. Though a plea has been taken by the petitioners that the clause of re-entry was introduced for the first time in the deed executed in 1996 but the same is not factually correct as the lease deed of 12. 4. 1923 also contained a clause to the effect that if the Government shall at any time require to re-enter in the demised plot it can do so, on paying the cost of the building that may be on the site and that the lessee shall have no further claim of any sort against the Government. In fact in the deed executed on 19. 3. 1996, the right of reentry has been fettered by the condition "required by the lessor for his or for any public purpose". As the State Government is resuming the lease for a public purpose, which under the terms of the grant it has absolute power to do, the order passed by it on 15. 12. 2000 is perfectly valid and does not suffer from any illegality. ( 6 ) THE principal submission of Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the lessees is that initially a proposal was made to acquire the disputed plot for the same purpose in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The District Magistrate, Allahabad, then wrote a letter to the state Government on 29. 10. 1998 that looking to the area of the plot, the estimated amount of compensation, including 30 per cent solatium, 12 per cent additional amount and interest, etc. would come to Rs. two crores and sixty-two lakhs, The said proposal was not accepted by the state Government and was rejected by the order dated 17. 7. 2000. The State Government took possession of few other Nazul lands fn Allahabad but the same was done under Land Acquisition act, wherein, a good amount of compensation was paid to the lessees. two crores and sixty-two lakhs, The said proposal was not accepted by the state Government and was rejected by the order dated 17. 7. 2000. The State Government took possession of few other Nazul lands fn Allahabad but the same was done under Land Acquisition act, wherein, a good amount of compensation was paid to the lessees. The contention is that if the State Government had taken recourse to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the plot in question, the lessees would have got compensation of rupees two crores and sixty-two lakhs and by not adopting the said mode, the lessees have been discriminated against and, consequently, the impugned order of the State Government dated 15. 12. 2000, violates Article 14 of the Constitution. In the writ petition as it was originally filed on 2. 9. 2001, there was no averment to the effect that in the past the State Government had taken recourse to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act for acquiring Nazul land in Allahabad. This plea has been taken by means of an amendment application which was filed on 2. 11. 2001 at the time when the case was taken up for hearing and a new para being para 23 has been added, wherein, it is averred that civil Stations No. 24. 35 and Bungalow Nos. 7b and 8b, Muir Road, had been acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The plea of discrimination has been raised by the lessees on the basis of the aforesaid averment. But the lessees have not filed the copies of the lease deeds which had been executed by the State Government with regard to the properties mentioned above. in absence of the lease deeds, it is not possible to know whether they also contained a similar clause of re-entry as is contained in the lease deed in favour of the lessees of the present case. The mere fact that the properties referred to above were Nazul lands leads us nowhere, nor is decisive of the matter. in absence of the lease deeds, it is not possible to know whether they also contained a similar clause of re-entry as is contained in the lease deed in favour of the lessees of the present case. The mere fact that the properties referred to above were Nazul lands leads us nowhere, nor is decisive of the matter. ( 7 ) IN para 7 of the, supplementary counter-affidavit filed in reply to the amendment application, it is averred that the properties, reference of which has been made in para 23 of the writ petition, were in fact acquired at the instance of Allahabad Development Authority for building of residential and commercial complex and for development of the area and the proceedings for acquisition had commenced on the basis of proposals received from Allahabad Development authority. In para 8 of the supplementary counter-affidavit, it is averred that when Nazul plot no. 13, Civil Station, Allahabad, which is situate in Civil Lines area, was resumed by the. State government for the purpose of construction of a bus station, the same was done in exercise of power vested with it in a similar clause of the lease deed and no proceedings under the Land acquisition Act had been initiated. The resumption by the State Government in the said case was challenged by the lessee of the plot by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44517 of 1988. which was dismissed by a Division Bench on 16. 12. 1999 and Special Leave Petition No. 4329 of 2000, preferred against the judgment of the High Court was summarily dismissed by the Supreme court on 7. 9. 2001. The contention of the lessees that it was for the first time in their case that a lease had been cancelled and the plot has been resumed by the State Government under the terms of the deed Is, therefore, not correct as a similar course of action has been taken in the past also. With regard to other properties, reference of which has been made in para 23 of the writ petition, the important distinction is that there the land had been acquired at the instance of Allahabad development Authority for construction of commercial and residential complexes and for development of the area which shows that the land was not taken over by the State Government for its own purpose. In absence of complete details, it is not possible to ascertain the precise purpose for which the land was acquired. ( 8 ) IT may also be pointed out that the consequences which would follow in adopting the two modes, namely, in acquiring the property under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act or in taking action under the terms of the grant whereby the lease deed is cancelled and property is resumed would also be different. If the State Government decides to acquire the property in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, no separate proceedings have to be taken for getting possession of the land. It may even invoke the urgency provisions contained in section 17 of the said Act and the Collector may take possession of the land Immediately after the publication of the notice under Section 9. In such a case, the person in possession of the land acquired would be dispossessed forthwith. However, where the Government proceeds under the terms of the grant as contained in Clause 3 (C) noted above, even after the lease is cancelled and the Government becomes entitled to take possession, it cannot do so forcibly and it will have to take recourse to proceedings before an appropriate authority for dispossessing the lessee to get the possession of the land. Why it is necessary to do so will be considered later. If proceedings are initiated under U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, the final decision of the case will naturally take some time and if the decision goes against the lessees, they will have a statutory right to challenge the same by filing an appeal. The decision of the appellate authority is no doubt final but some times writ petitions are filed. All these proceedings, take time and the lessee will continue to enjoy the possession of the demised premises. Therefore, if the State Government proceeds under the terms of the deed, the lessee cannot be evicted forthwith nor the State Government can get immediate possession of the property. Therefore, such a course of action is not detrimental to the interest of the lessees but is to their advantage. ( 9 ) THE problem can be considered from another angle. Therefore, if the State Government proceeds under the terms of the deed, the lessee cannot be evicted forthwith nor the State Government can get immediate possession of the property. Therefore, such a course of action is not detrimental to the interest of the lessees but is to their advantage. ( 9 ) THE problem can be considered from another angle. If in the past in ignorance of its legal rights, the State Government proceeded in a manner wherein it had to pay some amount of compensation to the lessees, it does not mean that at a later stage, it is estopped or precluded from enforcing its lawful rights in a manner which is more beneficial to it. When the State government proceeds under the Land Acquisition Act to acquire some land, it acquires title over the land which belonged to another person prior to its acquisition. If the State Government Itself is the owner of the land, the proceedings under Land Acquisition Act ought not to be taken as there is no question of acquiring ownership of ones own property. S/sri Sanjay Goswami and anil Mehrotra, learned standing counsel have rightly submitted that if in the past proper legal advice was not given to the State Government, the action taken now, which is in accordance with law, cannot be struck down on the ground that the same is discriminatory. They have also drawn attention of the Court to a circular issued on 11. 2. 1998 by the Director. Land Acquisition, Board of Revenue, U. P. Government, to all the Additional District Magistrates (Land Acquisition) and all Special Land Acquisition Officers of the State specifically laying down that land belonging to state Government, Nazul land, Gram Sabha land and land declared as surplus in ceiling proceedings are outside the purview of Land Acquisition Act and no proposal should be made for acquisition of such types of land. It further provides that in case of violation of the aforesaid directions. strict and serious action shall be taken against the concerned officers. This shows that after the correct import of the rights of the State Government had been understood at the higher level, a general order has been issued for the whole of State not to make any proposal for acquisition of Nazul land. strict and serious action shall be taken against the concerned officers. This shows that after the correct import of the rights of the State Government had been understood at the higher level, a general order has been issued for the whole of State not to make any proposal for acquisition of Nazul land. ( 10 ) THE mode adopted by the State Government can neither be said to be unjust nor there is any special equity in favour of the lessees. The total area of the plot in question is 9112 sq. yards and it is situate Just in front of the gate of the High Court on National Highway No. 2 (commonly called as Kanpur Road in the city of Allahabad, which has been renamed as Purshottam Das tandon Marg ). It is a big property situate in a prime area of Allahabad which has a huge commercial value. It is the own case of the writ petitioners in para 16 of the writ petition that the actual market value of the property in dispute must not in any case be less than rupees five crores. The lease deed dated 19. 3. 1996 shows that for such a valuable property, the lessees paid a premium of rupees one lakh two thousand five hundred ten only and the yearly rent was Rs. 753. 05 which means about Rs. 62. 70 per month. It is also important to note that the earlier lease had expired on 31. 12. 1967 and the renewal ought to have been done on 1. 1. 1968, What they were required to pay on the said date, they paid almost three decades later in March, 1996, when during this period the prices of land in urban areas and big cities have risen by almost hundred times. The deed also provided that it could be renewed for two further terms of 30 years each (total period of 90 years) and while granting renewal, the rent could be enhanced at a rate not exceeding 50 per cent. When a further renewal of 30 years was granted on 17. 7. 1998. for which no premium was paid, the rent alone was enhanced to Rs. 1,130 per year, which comes to about rs. 94 per month. This shows that the lessees are enjoying a huge and very valuable property virtually for a song. When a further renewal of 30 years was granted on 17. 7. 1998. for which no premium was paid, the rent alone was enhanced to Rs. 1,130 per year, which comes to about rs. 94 per month. This shows that the lessees are enjoying a huge and very valuable property virtually for a song. Who would not like to have such a big and valuable property by merely paying a sum of rupees one lakh two thousand and odd and thereafter a monthly rent of less than rs. 100 and enjoy it for a long period of 90 years by which time even the third generation of original lessee may be extinct (assuming that the property is taken near about the age of forty ). For the amount which the lessees paid to the State Government at the time of execution of lease in their favour in March, 1996, it is doubtful whether they could have purchased even 25 square yards of land on a modest estimate of Rs. 4. 000 per sq. yard for the land in a residential area in that locality. It is not possible to visualise its potential value as a commercial property which in fact it has. ( 11 ) THE lease deed dated 19. 3. 1996 and the deed of renewal dated 17. 7,1998 have also been signed by the lessees which is the requirement of law in view of Section 107, Transfer of property Act and they are bound by the terms and conditions contained therein. Clause 3 (C) of the lease deed gives absolute power that if the land is required for Its own purpose or for any public purpose, the State Government shall have right to give one months notice to the lessees to remove any building standing on the demised premises and within two months of the receipt of the notice to take possession thereof on the expiry of that period. The rights, privileges and obligations of the lessees have to be regulated only according to the terms of the grant in view of section 3 of Government Grants Act. It has been held in Express Newspapers Put. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872 . The rights, privileges and obligations of the lessees have to be regulated only according to the terms of the grant in view of section 3 of Government Grants Act. It has been held in Express Newspapers Put. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872 . (head note C) that the overriding effect of Section 3 is that a grant of property by the Government partakes of the nature of law since it overrides even legal provisions which are contrary to the tenor of the document. Land Acquisition Act is a general law providing for acquisition of land. The terms of the lease deed create special provisions governing the rights of the parties. On the legal maxim specialia generalibus derogant. the special provisions prevail over the general provisions. Therefore, it is not open to the lessees to contend that the State government should have taken recourse to a general provision like, the Land Acquisition Act instead of proceeding under Clause 3 (C) of the lease deed. A similar contention that the State government should have taken recourse to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act was considered by a Division Bench in Tek Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1980 pandh 339, but was repelled with the finding that it did not amount to any discrimination. ( 12 ) SRI S. U. Khan has next submitted that public purpose, if any existed prior to 17. 7. 1998 when the lease was renewed and by renewal of the lease, the State Government is estopped from pleading that there is a public purpose. Learned counsel has further submitted that by renewal of the lease, the lessees legitimately expected that they will remain in occupation for 30 years from 1. 1. 1998, the date from which the lease was renewed. In support of this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance upon Punjab Communications v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 1801 . In our opinion, the contention raised has no substance. The existence of a public purpose is not a new development. The petitioners have filed a copy of the letter dated 29. 8. 1998 sent by the district Magistrate to the Special Secretary, State Government, wherein, he had given estimate of the expenses involved in acquiring the property under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The existence of a public purpose is not a new development. The petitioners have filed a copy of the letter dated 29. 8. 1998 sent by the district Magistrate to the Special Secretary, State Government, wherein, he had given estimate of the expenses involved in acquiring the property under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. This letter makes reference to some earlier correspondence which had taken place between the chief Standing Counsel of U. P. Government and the District Magistrate on 2. 12. 1997. This clearly shows that even before the renewal of the lease in favour of the lessees, the taking over of possession of the property for expansion of the High Court and the office of Advocate-General, u. P. , was being seriously considered. It is, therefore, wrong to suggest that the requirement of the land for a public purpose was not in existence when the lease was renewed. We fail to understand as to how the State Government is estopped from resuming the land merely on account of renewal of the lease in favour of the lessees. Since the very inception, when the lease was executed in favour of the successors of Thomas Crowby on 12. 4. 1923 and then again when the lease was executed in favour of the present lessees on 19. 3. 1996, there has always been a clause that the lessor will have a right to resume the lease and take possession of the plot. The lessees took the lease and got its extension subject to such a condition and they were fully aware of the same. That apart, it is not their case that they have altered their position to their detriment after renewal of the lease on account of any representation done by the State Government. The doctrine of legitimate expectation can have no play here in view of the specific clause in the lease deed. Therefore, the contentions raised by Sri Khan have no substance and must be rejected. ( 13 ) NOW we come to another important question involved in the case namely, whether, the State government can take forcible possession of the demised premises or they can take possession only in accordance with and in a mode recognised by law. Therefore, the contentions raised by Sri Khan have no substance and must be rejected. ( 13 ) NOW we come to another important question involved in the case namely, whether, the State government can take forcible possession of the demised premises or they can take possession only in accordance with and in a mode recognised by law. Learned standing counsel has submitted that in view of the specific term in Clause 3 (C) of the lease deed "within 2 months of the receipt of the notice to take possession thereof on the expiry of that period", the State government is entitled to take possession on the expiry of the period of notice. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmi Narain v. State of U. P. , AIR 1964 All 236, wherein, it has been held that the act of resumption implies the right to re-enter even though the actual re-entry may follow the proclamation of resumption. ( 14 ) THE possession of a tenant after expiry of lease is a juridical possession. The expression "juridical possession" is the same thing as the "legal possession" in a more impressive form. It means possession which has been founded on some right and which has been got neither by force nor by fraud. Juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongful possession but can not per se always be equated with lawful possession. A possession cannot be said to be juridical, where it is taken behind the back of the real owner or one who is in law entitled to possession and who does not acquiesce therein but seeks to evict him as soon as he discovers his dispossession. The latter may, if he does not acquiesce, re-enter and reinstate himself, provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such a re-entry will be viewed only as a resistance to an intrusion upon a possession which had never been lost. The owner cannot be sued by the trespasser, who has entered by force and fraud, for ejectment on the strength of his prior temporary possession. Juridical possession, though not equivalent to lawful possession. Is distinguishable from a mere act of trespass. The owner cannot be sued by the trespasser, who has entered by force and fraud, for ejectment on the strength of his prior temporary possession. Juridical possession, though not equivalent to lawful possession. Is distinguishable from a mere act of trespass. Possession of a tenant after expiry of lease is a juridical possession as law protects him from forcible dispossession but at the same time, his possession can not be said to be lawful. ( 15 ) IN Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, it was observed that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession ; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. In K. K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani, AIR 1954 Bom 358 , Chagla, C. J. , held as under : "under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute. Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under Section 9 and claim possession against the true owner. " ( 16 ) IN a Full Bench decision of our Court in Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das, AIR 1959 All 1 , it was observed : "law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dlsposses a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a Judge in his own cause. " ( 17 ) IN Lallu Yashwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and Ors. , AIR 1968 SC 620 (para 15), the above noted three decisions were quoted with approval and it was observed that the law on the point has been correctly stated therein. No person can be allowed to become a Judge in his own cause. " ( 17 ) IN Lallu Yashwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and Ors. , AIR 1968 SC 620 (para 15), the above noted three decisions were quoted with approval and it was observed that the law on the point has been correctly stated therein. This question was again considered in State of U. P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 (para 15), it was held as follows : "a lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression re-entry in the lease-deed does not authorise extra judicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited ; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional Inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and government authorities should have a legal pedigree. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab, (1962) 2 scr 69 : AIR 1961 SC 1570 , this Court said (at pp. 1574 and 1575 of AIR) : "we must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order. Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to Itself an extra Judicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than indue course of law. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than indue course of law. " ( 18 ) IN Anamallai Club v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , AIR 1997 SC 3650 (paras 8 and 9), it was observed that law makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession and rank trespassers and that law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. It was further observed that after determination of the grant, though the lessees have no right to remain in possession, the State cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure provided under the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act. ( 19 ) AFTER the State Government had passed the order on 15. 12. 2000 and the period of notice given by the District Magistrate had expired, the lessees have no legal right to remain in possession. However, they continue to be in Juridical possession. In view of what has been discussed above, the State Government cannot dispossess them forcibly but can take possession in accordance with procedure established by law. ( 20 ) IN view of the discussion made above, we find no illegality in the order passed by the State government on 15. 12. 2000, the notice dated 11. 1. 2001 and the order passed by the District magistrate on 24. 8. 2001. The writ petition accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. It is, however, made clear that the State Government is not entitled to take forcible possession. It may take possession of the demised premises in accordance with the procedure established by law.