Heard Shri Daya Shankar Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Mahendra Pratap, learned AGA for the State and Shri. J. Lal, learned Counsel appearing for the Union of India. 2. Validity of detention order dated 22-12-2000 passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad in exercise of power under sub-section (2) read sub-section (3) of the National Security Act, 1980 and continued detention pursuant thereto is under challenge in this petition under Article 229 of the Constitution of India. The detention is based on solitary incident giving rise case crime No. 229 of 2000 under Sections 307, 284, 223, 504 and 506 I. P. C. police station Cantt. , District Allahabad. 3. According to the prosecution case as set out in the F. I. R. of case crime aforestated, on 27-11-2000 at 11 a. m. the petitioner and his associates, demanded Goonda tax from the contractor, Arjun Kochar and on refusal by the latter, a workman Manjeet was thrown away on the ground from 17th-18th Ft. high roof of the building under construction. The workman Manjeet received injuries. The incident was viewed as one disturbing public order. The sponsoring authority submitted a report for detaining the petitioner under National Security Act. The petitioner was arrested in the above case and the detention order was served on him in Central Jail, Naini on 22-12-2000 and the same was approved by the State Government on 3-12-2000. The representation dated 4-1-2001 received by the District Magistrate on the same day was sent to the State Government on 11-1-2001. It was received by the State Government on 12-1-2001 and 13-1-2001 and 14-1-2001 being holidays the same was considered on 15-1-2001 and rejected by the State Government on 16-1-2001. Copy of the representation was also sent to the Central Government where it was received on 17-1-2001 and rejected on 18-1-2001. 4. The first ground on which Shri Daya Shankar Mishra has challenged the detention order is that there was no cogent material before detaining authority on the basis of which he could reach the requisite satisfaction that the petitioner could repeat the prejudicial activity in future. Learned Counsel submits that the detention order was passed on the basis of a solitary incident and in absence of any cogent material showing that there was a likelihood of the petitioner repeating such incident in future, it stands vitiated by error of law. Learned Counsel submits that the detention order was passed on the basis of a solitary incident and in absence of any cogent material showing that there was a likelihood of the petitioner repeating such incident in future, it stands vitiated by error of law. Shri Mahendra Pratap submits that the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority to the effect that there was likelihood that the petitioner could repeat the prejudicial activity in future was based on cogent material, namely, report submitted by the sponsoring authority. It is submitted by Shri Mahendra Pratap that the nature of incident on which the detention order is based and the manner in which the offence was committed also lead to a reasonable inference that there were every likelihood of the petitioner repeating the prejudicial activity disturbing the public order. The petitioner was in jail and it is not disputed that in case of satisfaction of detaining authority as to likelihood of the petitioner is repeating the prejudicial activity on being released from jail is vitiated, the order of detention will also be vitiated. In Dharmendra Sugan Chandra Chelawat v. Union of India, 1990 (1) SCC 746 : 1990 (1) JIC 396 (SC); the Supreme Court has held that for the validity of the detention order against a person in custody, it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show firstly, that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in detention and secondly, that there were "compelling reasons" justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu was already in detention. The expression `compelling reasons. it was further observed by the Apex Court in the context for a person already in custody, implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which he may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likelihood to be released from custody in near future and (b) taking into account the nature of antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. 5. 5. In Debu Mahto v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974, 816, it has been held that a solitary act attributed to a person can form the basis for reaching the satisfaction that he might repeat such acts in future and in order to prevent him from doing so it is necessary to detain him. It was, however, observed: "such past conduct may consist of one single act or of a series of acts. But whatever it be, it must be of such a nature that an interference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned could be likely to repeat such acts so as to warrant his detention. It may be easier to draw such an inference where there is a series of acts evincing a curse of conduct but even if there is a single act, such inference may justifiably be drawn in a given case. " 6. In a Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 15473 of 1996, Sunil Tyagi v. State of U. P. and others, decided on 10-1-1997 aforestated cases were considered and it was held that an order of detention can be passed on solitary act if the act is of such nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the concerned person can repeat such an act so as to warrant such detention. 7. Upon consideration of the above decisions, we are of the view that it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that a reasonable inference cannot be drawn on the basis of a solitary past incident that a person who is in jail, would not repeat the prejudicial activities after release. In other words, such an inference can reasonably be drawn from a solitary incident that happened in the past. The manner in which the incident giving rise to the impugned detention had happened, can reasonably lead to the satisfaction as to likelihood that after release the petitioner might indulge in such activities as may be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In Surya Pratap Sharma v. State of U. P. , 1994 SCC (Crl.) 1691, Court has no doubt observed that "the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu might indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order, solely on the basis of a solitary murder cannot be said to be proper and justified. In Surya Pratap Sharma v. State of U. P. , 1994 SCC (Crl.) 1691, Court has no doubt observed that "the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu might indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order, solely on the basis of a solitary murder cannot be said to be proper and justified. " But this observation was made in the fact situation of the case and is not intended to lay down the rule that in no circumstances a solitary incident of the past can lead to requisite satisfaction warranting detention. In our considered opinion, therefore, we do not find any merit in the submission that requisite satisfaction in the instant case was vitiated. 8. Shri Daya Shankar Mishra then submitted that the continued detention of the petitioner is vitiated due to the reason that he was not afforded reasonable opportunity of leading evidence before the Advisory Board. Learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roy v. Union of India, 1982 SCC (Crl.) 152, wherein right of the detenu to lead evidence in rebuttal before the Advisory Board was dealt with as under: "we do not see any objection to this right being granted to the detenu. Neither the Constitution nor the National Security Act contains any provision denying to the detenu the right to present his own evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made against him. The detenu may therefore, offer oral and documentary evidence before the Advisory Board in order to rebut the allegations which are made against him. We would only like to add that if the detenu desires to examine any witnesses, he shall have to keep them present at the appointed time and no obligation can be cast on the Advisory Board to summon them. The Advisory Board, like any other Tribunal, is free to regulate its own procedure within the constraints of the Constitution and the statute. It would be open to it, in the exercise of that power, to limit the time within which the detenu must complete his evidence. " 9. The Advisory Board, like any other Tribunal, is free to regulate its own procedure within the constraints of the Constitution and the statute. It would be open to it, in the exercise of that power, to limit the time within which the detenu must complete his evidence. " 9. In his representation the petitioner has no doubt mentioned certain names to be examined in evidence before the Advisory Board but in para 7 of the affidavit filed by Shri Ashok Tandon, District Magistrate, Allahabad it is mentioned that no such request was made by the petitioner before the Advisory Board. It is further stated in para 7 of the said counter affidavit that one person was produced by the petitioner to appear on his behalf as a next friend and he was heard by the Advisory Board. In the writ petition there is no specific averment to the effect that there was any other person actually present before the Advisory Board and that the request made before the Advisory Board was turned down. In such view of the matter we find no substance in the second submission made by Shri Daya Shankar Mishra. 10. The third submission made by Shri Daya Shankar Mishra pertains to delay in transmission of representation. The representation dated 4-1-2001 was received by the District Magistrate, Allahabad on that very date and it was sent to the State Government on 11-1-2001. The delay from 4-1-2001 to 11- 1-2001, it is submitted by Shri Daya Shankar Mishra, has not been explained. In para 6 of the counter affidavit filed by Shri Alok Tandon, it has been stated that on receipt of the representation dated 4-1- 2001 it was found necessary to have a report from the sponsoring authority to ascertain facts and it was after receipt of the police report that the aforestated representation was sent to the State Government on 11-1-2001. On what date was the police report received by the District Magistrate is not disclosed in the counter affidavit. It is thus, evident that; there is no explanation for delay from 4-1-2001 to 11-1- 2001. In Rajmalla v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 (1) SCC (Crl.) 93; 1999 (1) JIC 524 (SC), it has been held that it is not the period or duration that matters but the absence of explanation which vitiates the detention. It is thus, evident that; there is no explanation for delay from 4-1-2001 to 11-1- 2001. In Rajmalla v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 (1) SCC (Crl.) 93; 1999 (1) JIC 524 (SC), it has been held that it is not the period or duration that matters but the absence of explanation which vitiates the detention. Since there is no mention in the counter affidavit sworn by Shri Alok Tandon as to when did he receive the police report, we are of the view that there is no reasonable explanation for the delay in transmitting the representation. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India enjoins a duty on the detaining authority to decide the representation "as soon as possible". The express in "as soon as possible" implies that the representation must be decided promptly. In the instant case we are of the view that the continued detention is vitiated. 11. For the reasons aforestated, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Respondents are directed to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith if he is not wanted in any other case. Petition allowed. .