ORDER: The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 5 to pay compensation and damages to the tune of Rs.7 lakhs to the petitioner. 2. Heard Mrs.S.V. Jayadharini, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, Mr.M.Mahalingam, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 4, Mr.R.Sivakumar Kennedy for the fifth respondent and Mr.Sree Balaji for M.Sathianaryanan, learned counsel appearing for the sixth respondent. 3. According to the petitioner, the 5th respondent is the owner of the plot No.8/106, A.V.P. Layout, Gandhinagar, Tirupur, Coimbatore District. The 5th respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.3,50,000 from the petitioner and to secure the same he had deposited the documents of title relating to the said plot with the intention to create equitable mortgage to secure repayment of the amount borrowed. The petitioner further claims that on 18.1.1994 the 5th respondent entered into an agreement to sell with the petitioner for the sale of the suit property for a sale consideration of Rs.3,50,000. The sale agreement stipulated that the sale shall be completed within a period of nine months and on the petitioner paying the balance of sale consideration on the date specified in the agreement. The petitioner further claims that he had paid Rs.2 lakhs on 1.3.1994 and 24.4.1994 and subsequently the petitioner came to know that the 5th respondent is attempting to execute the sale deed in favour of the 6th respondent and a legal notice was issued on 21.9.1994 to the respondent Nos.5 and 6 for enforcing the sale agreement dated 18.1.1994. 4. The 5th respondent took the petitioner to the office of the third and 4th respondents on 29.9.1995 for verification of records in respect of the alienations or encumbrances. The petitioner applied for encumbrance certificate to the third and 4th respondent. The third respondent issued an encumbrance certificate dated 29.9.1995 for the period 1.9.1992 to 14.9.1994, wherein the mortgage to the tune of Rs.50,000 executed by the 5th respondent alone finds place. The 4th respondent also issued an encumbrance certificate, dated 28.8.1995 covering the period “15.9.1994 to 29.9.1995.” As seen from the encumbrance certificate there are no entries of encumbrance and therefore the petitioner was made to believe that the 5th respondent is the owner and he could purchase the property as per the earlier agreement. The 4th respondent also issued an encumbrance certificate, dated 28.8.1995 covering the period “15.9.1994 to 29.9.1995.” As seen from the encumbrance certificate there are no entries of encumbrance and therefore the petitioner was made to believe that the 5th respondent is the owner and he could purchase the property as per the earlier agreement. The petitioner proceeded with the purchase and registration of the sale deed of the said plot on 29.9.1995. On 29.9.1995, the 5th respondent executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner and presented it for registration. The said sale deed was assigned as document No.P.123/95 by the 4th respondent. On 30th of September, 1995, the 5th respondent handed over possession of the suit property to the petitioner. On 30th September, 1995, the 6th respondent furnished the petitioner and informed him that he has purchased the property under a sale deed from the 5th respondent, dated 5.5.1994 registered as document No.3346 of 1994 and that the writ petitioner has no right. From the copy of the document produced by the 6th respondent, the petitioner came to know that a sale deed has been registered by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent, which sale is not reflected in the encumbrance certificate issued by the third and fourth respondent. It is obviously clear that the 3rd and 4th respondents have without verification and scrutiny had issued a “Nil” encumbrance certificate. The said action of the third and fourth respondents is arbitrary, violative of Art.19(1)(f), (g) of the Constitution and as a result of the negligence on the part of the respondents 3 and 4, the petitioner had sustained damages. The petitioner is aggrieved by the act of the third and fourth respondents in issuing a “Nil” Encumbrance Certificate and the sale deed executed by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent has not been shown in the encumbrance certificate issued and because of the said encumbrance certificate the petitioner had proceeded further and purchased the property. 5. It is contended that the petitioner is entitled for compensation that he had suffered and he had been put to heavy loss or face litigation because of the negligence committed by the respondents 3 and 4 in issuing a Nil encumbrance certificate, when actually the 5th respondent had already conveyed the property to the 6th respondent. 5. It is contended that the petitioner is entitled for compensation that he had suffered and he had been put to heavy loss or face litigation because of the negligence committed by the respondents 3 and 4 in issuing a Nil encumbrance certificate, when actually the 5th respondent had already conveyed the property to the 6th respondent. Hence the writ petitioner prays for a direction to pay compensation of Rs.7 lakhs to the petitioner by the respondent Nos.1 to 5. 6. On behalf of the respondents 1 to 3, the third respondent had filed a counter affidavit. The third respondent admitted that the petitioner had applied for an encumbrance certificate for the property in question for a period of 14 years from 1.1.1982 to 14.9.1994. In the encumbrance certificate issued by the third respondent there were four entries and last of the entry being of the year 1993. It is admitted that the sale entered relating to sale or conveyance by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent P.K. Gurunathan has been omitted and such omission is also due to oversight. The omission is not deliberate and motivated. It is stated that there is no sufficient strength of staff and as a result of which the staff members are burdened with heavy workload and the department has not provided sufficient strength. 7. According to the said respondents, the instructions contained in the encumbrance certificate form is also not out of context because it has been clearly stated at the bottom for the certificate that the department is not responsible for any error or omission found in the encumbrance certificate. It is admitted by the third respondent that the entry relating to the sale by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent has been omitted by the office of the 4th respondent. The omission of one entry in the encumbrance certificate issued by one of the respondents is not an act of negligence or dereliction of duty and it is due to oversight and heavy work. The complaint that the sale deed executed by the 5th respondent in favour of the petitioner is kept pending without registration is being disputed by the respondents and it is contended that there are no merits. 8. The complaint that the sale deed executed by the 5th respondent in favour of the petitioner is kept pending without registration is being disputed by the respondents and it is contended that there are no merits. 8. It is further admitted that the 5th respondent had conveyed the property to the 6th respondent earlier in point of time without disclosing the same to the petitioner and damages if any shall be payable only by the 5th respondent and not by other respondents. 9. The 5th respondent had filed a counter affidavit admitting the borrowal and deposit of title deeds and creating an equitable mortgage in favour of the writ petitioner for repayment of a sum of Rs.3,50,000 advanced. The 5th respondent admitted that he had entered into an agreement to sell on 18.1.1994 with the writ petitioner and as per the agreement the 5th respondent has to sell the property within nine months from the date of the agreement and he had also undertaken to handover vacant possession of the suit property. It is stated by the 5th respondent that as the premises was in the occupation of a tenant he had not handed over vacant possession of the premises within the time to the writ petitioner. It is further alleged that P.K. Gurunathan, the 6th respondent in the writ petition also claimed some money from him which he was disputing and refusing to pay. However, in order to recover the dues the said 6th respondent by use of force, coercion, intimidation and under vitiating circumstances extracted a deed of sale in his favour and the 5th respondent’s signature had been taken forcibly despite objections and despite the 5th respondent appraising the 6th respondent about the sale agreement entered between the petitioner and the 5th respon dent on 18.1.1994. The 5th respondent admitted that on 18.1.1994, he had executed a sale deed in favour of the writ petitioner with the Sub-Registrar, Nallur. The 5th respondent alleges threat, coercion, initmidation threat by the 6th respondent and that he had been compelled to execute the sale deed as he was threatened with serious consequences he had to execute the sale and present it for registration. 10. The 5th respondent alleges threat, coercion, initmidation threat by the 6th respondent and that he had been compelled to execute the sale deed as he was threatened with serious consequences he had to execute the sale and present it for registration. 10. The 5th respondent further admits that he had not disclosed to the purchaser about the sale deed which was executed under coercion in favour of the 6th respondent while he went to the Registrar’s office to execute the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. According to the 5th respondent his act of executing the sale deed in favour of the 6th respondent is useless in the absence of original title deeds, that he did not have any intention of cheating the petitioner. It is further stated by the 5th respondent that the sale deed executed by him in favour of the writ petitioner is the only valid and true sale deed and the documents of title are also with the writ petitioner. So also possession. It is stated that the writ petitioner is not entitled to any relief while pleading that the 5th respondent has no knowledge or any involvement with regard to any other allegation or averment made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. 11. The 6th respondent contested the writ petition, but did not file any counter. 12. The above facts are not in dispute. It is admitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the writ petitioner is in possession of the property and the petitioner had paid substantial sum towards sale consideration to the 5th respondent. It is also admitted that the 5th respondent had suppressed his act of executing a sale in favour of the 6th respondent and the 5th respondent had gone to the extent of admitting that he had executed the sale deed prior in point of time in favour of the 6th respondent out of threat, danger to life coercion and such sale deed is inoperative and invalid. On behalf of the 5th respondent it is contended that the sale in favour of the petitioner is true and valid. 13. As regards the claim of title as against the respondents 5 and 6, it is to be pointed out that the same being a civil dispute, the same cannot be gone into in this writ petition. On behalf of the 5th respondent it is contended that the sale in favour of the petitioner is true and valid. 13. As regards the claim of title as against the respondents 5 and 6, it is to be pointed out that the same being a civil dispute, the same cannot be gone into in this writ petition. It is well open to the petitioner or other respondents to work out remedies by instituting appropriate proceedings before the appropriate Civil Court seeking for declaration of title or for other reliefs and for compensation or damages as the case may be against the respondents 5 and 6. 14. The counsel for the petitioner represented that she is not pressing the relief of compensation or damages as against the respondents 5 and 6 in this writ petition and the petitioner be given the liberty to work out his remedies against them. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner confined the relief in this writ petition against the respondents 1 to 4. The relief against the respondents 5 and 6 cannot be the subject matter in a writ petition and in so far as respondents 5 and 6 are concerned, it is made clear that it is open to the petitioner to institute appropriate proceedings with respect to the claim of title and possession or for other reliefs as well. 16. In this writ petition, it has to be considered as to whether there is negligence on the part of the respondents 1 to 4 in failing to incorporate the sale by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent? Whether it is an act of negligence? and whether the said respondents are liable to pay compensation to the petitioner? If so how much will be the just and fair compensation. 17. Admittedly a sale deed has been executed by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent on 5.5.1994 and presented for registration by the 5th respondent. The 5th respondent admitted the execution of the deed of conveyance dated 5.5.1994. The 4th respondent had registered the same. It is admitted as there is no escape. In the encumbrance certificate issued by the 4th respondent on 29.9.1995, there is no entry relating to the said sale deed executed by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent on 5.5.1994. The 4th respondent had registered the same. It is admitted as there is no escape. In the encumbrance certificate issued by the 4th respondent on 29.9.1995, there is no entry relating to the said sale deed executed by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent on 5.5.1994. It is admitted that the sale deed dated 5.5.1994 had been duly registered by the 4th respondent in his office. Yet, in the encumbrance applied for by the petitioner and furnished by the 4th respondent, the entry relating to the deed of conveyance by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent is absent and do not find a place. A Nil Encumbrance Certificate was furnished. The respondents 3 and 4 admit the said omission on the part of the 4th respondent. The omission admitted by the respondent Nos.3 and 4 is not an ordinary omission, but the omission is of serious consequences. The omission cannot be due to oversight as sought to be suggested by the respondent Nos.3 and 4, but it is an act of shear negligence on the part of the said respondents or their subordinates for which they are liable. Before ever deciding the liability and quantum of compensation it is essential to refer to the provisions relating to the Registration and the Rules framed thereunder. 18. Part VI relates to presenting documents for registration. A document which is not presented by a person or one of the three categories mentioned in Sec.32 cannot be registered by the Registrar. Sec.34 provides for an enquiry being conducted before registration by Registering Officer. Sec.47 in Part X provides that the document registered shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration. Part IX prescribes the duties and powers of the Registering Officers. Sec.51 provides that the Registrar shall keep the Registers as prescribed in the said Section. Sec.52 prescribes the duties of Registering Officers when document is presented which includes the day, hour and place of presentation at the time of presenting the document for registration. Sec.53 prescribes that all entries in each book required to be maintained, shall be numbered in consecutive series, which shall commence and terminate with the year and a fresh series being commenced at the beginning of each year. 19. Sec.53 prescribes that all entries in each book required to be maintained, shall be numbered in consecutive series, which shall commence and terminate with the year and a fresh series being commenced at the beginning of each year. 19. Sec.54 provides for maintenance of current index and entries therein. Such indexes are to be made by the registering officers respectively as Index No.1, Index No.II, Index No.III and Index No.IV. Sub-secs.(2) to (5) of Sec.55 provides the particulars of the said Indexes I to IV to contain and to be filled up. Sec.57 prescribes that the Registering Officer shall allow inspection of certain books and indexes and to give certified copies of entries. All copies given under Sec.57 shall be signed and sealed by the registering officer and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original documents. Sec.60 provides that the document when presented for registration, and formalities been complied with the registering officer shall endorse thereon a certificate containing the word "registered" together with the number and page of the book in which the true copy of the document has been filed. When the registration of a document is completed endorsements and certificate to be registered and document is returned in terms of Sec.61. Sec.81 provides the penalties for incorrectly endorsing, copying, translating or registering documents with intent to injure. 20. A registering authority/ officer is a public servant within the meaning of Indian Penal Code. Sec.86 provides that no registering officer shall be liable to any suit, claim or demand by reasons of anything in good faith done or refused in his official capacity. Sec.91 provides for inspection and copies of such documents. 21. Sec.69 provides for framing of Rules by the Inspector General of Registration. Rule 127 of the Rules provides for an application to be made to a Registering Officer for a search or a copy shall be made in writing to get the certified copy or the encumbrance certificate. Rule 128 provides for an application for a search or for a copy of an entry in Books I to IV may be received and complied with through the medium of post, the postage charges being borne by the applicant. Rule 128 provides for an application for a search or for a copy of an entry in Books I to IV may be received and complied with through the medium of post, the postage charges being borne by the applicant. On collection of the prescribed search fee and a sum of Rs.2 as an advance for copying charges, the Sub-Registrar shall cause a search to be made in the indexes, shall endorse on the application, the numbers and year of the documents, the particulars of the volume and the pages thereof containing the copy of the document and shall forward a copy of the application so endorsed with the stamp and other papers to the Registrar concerned who shall cause copy to be prepared and furnished. On receipt of the copy and the bill the Sub-Registrar shall deliver or transmit the copy to the party. 22. Rule 140 provides for issue of a certificate of encumbrance in respect of any immovable property. When an application is made for a search or encumbrance in respect of any immovable property or for a list of documents executed by or in favour of, particular individual, and the applicant desires that a certificate of encumbrances or a list of documents found in the course of such search should be furnished to him by the registering officer, the request shall be complied with the certificate or list being in the form printed in Appendix VII. 23. Rule 143 provides that certificate of encumbrance shall contain a complete list of all acts of encumbrances affecting the property in question. Rule 145 provides for certificate of encumbrance shall, as a rule, be searched and made by two persons, independently of each other, so that the results obtained may be compared and verified with those obtained by the other. Appendix VII prescribes the form relating to certificate of encumbrance on property. Note (1) and (2) is the standard format. So also in the case of Nil Certificate of encumbrance on property. Very same note has been appended in the format. Appendix VII prescribes the form relating to certificate of encumbrance on property. Note (1) and (2) is the standard format. So also in the case of Nil Certificate of encumbrance on property. Very same note has been appended in the format. Note (2)(a) and (b) which is common to Certificate of Encumbrances on property as well as Nil Certificate of Encumbrance on property reads thus: "(2)(a) But, as in the present case, the applicant has not undertaken the search himself, the requisite search has been made as carefully as possible by the office; But the department will not on any account hold itself responsible for any errors in the result of the search embodied in this certificate. (b) And, as in the present case, the requisite search for entries in Books 3 and 4 has been made by the registering officer as carefully as possible and by the applicant himself in regard to entries relating to Book 1 and as documents so discovered are shown in the certificate after the verification, the department will not on any account hold itself responsible for any errors in the results of the search embodied in this certificate." 24. The above rules are mandatory, Indexing, the maintenance of Registers and Forms are to be done strictly. Search relating to encumbrances and issuance of certificates also requires to be carried out as two staff are required to search independently and compare. However, if a particular property is described in a different manner in the application and if there is a difference between the registration which has already been completed and the application, as set out in the Note (1) such transactions, evidence by such documents will not be included in the certificate. 25. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S.P.Goel v. Collector of Stamps, Delhi, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 839, while examining the provisions of the Registration Act, vis-a-vis, the Consumer Protection Act, held that under Sec.2(1)(d)(ii), the person who presents a document for registration and pays the stamp duty does not become a consumer, nor the officers appointed under Registration Act and Stamp Act render any service within the meaning of Consumer Protection Act and they only perform their statutory duties and some of them are judicial or at least quasi judicial in nature. With reference to Sec.86 of the Act, the Apex Court held thus: "31. With reference to Sec.86 of the Act, the Apex Court held thus: "31. Running through the twin Acts, namely, the Registration Act and the Stamp Act, we could not at any stage, reconcile ourselves to the idea espoused by the appellant’s counsel, that there is an element of commercialism involved in the whole process of registration of instruments or payment of stamp duty and that the executant of an instrument at the time of its presentation for registration, becomes a "consumer" entitled to "service" within the ambit of Consumer Protection Act. The reasons are many. 32. The Registration Act as also the Stamp Act are meant primarily to augment the State Revenue by prescribing the stamp duty on various categories of instruments or documents and the procedure for collection of stamp duty through distress or other means including criminal prosecution as non-payment of stamp duty has been constituted as an offence. Payment of registration fee or registration charges including charges for issuing certified copies of the registered documents or fee for the inspection of various registers or documents kept in the Registrars or Sub-Registrars office etc., constitute another component of State revenue." 26. On the registration of a document being complete, according to Sec.61(2) of the Act and if there is omissions of the document from the index, it will not invalidate the registration as such, but it is a matter of importance for the purpose of notice. The provision of registering document is to give notice to the whole world that such a document has been executed and is in force. The registration of a document is a constructive notice. 27. Under Explanation (1) of Sec.3 of the Transfer of Property Act a person shall be deemed to have notice of an instrument from the date of registration where any transfer relating to immovable property is required to be brought to and been effected by a registered instrument. In terms of Sec.50 of the Registration Act read with Sec.3 of the Transfer of Property Act the very registration of a document required to be registered constitutes a notice. The effect of registration of a sale deed is a notice to the whole world in respect of the property, which is the subject matter of the deed of conveyance or sale or transfer, mortgage etc., as the case may be. 28. The effect of registration of a sale deed is a notice to the whole world in respect of the property, which is the subject matter of the deed of conveyance or sale or transfer, mortgage etc., as the case may be. 28. As a result of the above discussion, it is clear that the registration of a document by the presentation of the sale deed and completion of sale deed by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent itself constitute a notice of transfer of the document to the whole word as any person interested in the property may apply for search or apply for encumbrance certificate which he could secure as a matter of right by paying the prescribed fee and complying with the required formalities in this behalf. 29. Admittedly in this case when the encumbrance certificate has been applied for and furnished to the writ petitioner by the respondent No.4, the sale by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent referred to already, had been omitted to be included as an entry in the encumbrance certificate. It is not as if the said registration of sale deed is an innocuous document or there is any difference in the schedule description. But it is a document which is required to be registered compulsorily and on the completion of the registration, it is a notice to the whole world in respect of the property which has been dealt with. 30. The respondents 3 and 4 have admitted the omission on their part. This omission on their part in not incorporating the entry relating to the transfer by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent and this has definitely prejudiced the interest of the writ petitioner. Had the writ petitioner, who is deemed to be having a notice of the transfer, when he applied and secured the encumbrance certificate and when there is no such entry of encumbrance relating to the conveyance in question, he is justified in taking that there is no encumbrance or transfer and therefore he has proceeded to purchase the property from the 5th respondent securing a deed of conveyance in his favour from the 5th respondent. It might be that the 5th respondent who had executed the deed of conveyance in favour of the 6th respondent concealed it. It might be that the 5th respondent who had executed the deed of conveyance in favour of the 6th respondent concealed it. But we are not concerned with the said aspect of the matter here. Had the entry been found in the encumbrance certificate furnished to the petitioner, he could have either sued for specific performance of the agreement which the petitioner had entered with the 5th respondent long prior to the conveyance by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent by impleading both the 5th and 6th respondents. 31. Now that the sale deed has been executed by the 5th respondent in favour of the petitioner, the question of instituting such a suit for specific performance may not arise. Sec.50 provides that a registered deed takes effect against every unregistered document relating to the same property. In terms of Sec.48 of the Transfer of Property Act, when a person purports to create transfer, latter created right always be subject to the rights created earlier, which means the deed of conveyance in favour of the 6th respondent by the 5th respondent will have priority. This aspect has to be decided ultimately by the competent Civil Court where the plea as to fraud, threat, coercion, intimidation etc., or other vitiating factors have to be gone into by a Civil Court in respect of the transfer between the 5th respondent and the 6th respondent. The failure or omission on the part of the registering authority to index and set out the entry relating to the transfer by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent is not a formal omission or a omission by oversight as documents presented for registration have to be indexed methodologically in terms of the statutory provisions of the Act. 32. Further, in terms of the statutory provisions, at least two persons in the Registrar’s office has to independently check or verify the entries in respect of the property in question. Merely because a note has been appended to the encumbrance certificate, be it a Certificate of Encumbrance or Nil Encumbrance Certificate, the omission to set out the entry of sale in the encumbrance certificate issued in the present case is not immune from the present proceedings as it is a patent negligent act on the part of the registering Authority, namely, respondent 4 herein. It is the statutory duty, which the respondents have failed and it is not an omission simpliciter as claimed by the respondents 3 and 4, but it is a negligence and such negligence had caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. Despite the statutory provisions and the rules which are mandatory it is rather extraordinary to admit that there is a omission by oversight. The suggestion that it is an omission by oversight or that it is due to overwork or under staff also cannot be accepted and such an explanation is too puerile to be entertained. It is clear that the omission is not a omission simpliciter but it is per se and ipso facto patent negligence and there could be no possible explanation. Such omission reflects very much on the procedure followed in registration indexing and maintenance of statutory books. 33. An encumbrance certificate relating to an immovable property issued by the registering authority when applied for, shall contain not only of encumbrance but all acts and encumbrances affecting such property. It is also clear enumeration of a document relating to the specified immovable property which have been registered and entered in Book No.1 and the indexes relating to the said Book No.1 during the period for which the search is sought for or applied for and certificate issued covering the period. 34. An encumbrance certificate is an extract of the entries in the indexes relating to Book-I in respect of the property. All transactions under registered instruments is properly recorded and indexed and for that purpose only the index and Registers are prescribed by the statutory provisions. Sec.21 of the Act stipulates the requirement to furnish full particulars relating to a property which is sought to be dealt with under the document. To ensure that all acts and encumbrances are reflected in the certificate of encumbrance, the applicant has to furnish the full and correct description of the property. In the instant case it is not as if the application submitted for encumbrance certificate had not contained the particulars or description of the property and there is no discrepancy also. 35. To ensure that all acts and encumbrances are reflected in the certificate of encumbrance, the applicant has to furnish the full and correct description of the property. In the instant case it is not as if the application submitted for encumbrance certificate had not contained the particulars or description of the property and there is no discrepancy also. 35. It is well settled that the registering officer has no power or authority to decide upon the title to a property, nor is he entitled to examine the title of the transferor to the property which is the subject matter of the document, nor he is entitled to go into the validity of such transfer. 36. A Division Bench of this Court in Park View Enterprises v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 251 held that the functions of the Sub Registrar or the Registering officer for purpose of a registration is purely administrative and it is not quasi judicial and the registering authority has neither the authority, nor jurisdiction to decide the question of title as it falls within the realm of Civil Courts and not for the registering officer to adjudicate. When the registering authority fails to maintain the register of indexes and also omits to incorporate the encumbrance relating to the immovable property in the encumbrance certificate furnished by it, it is not a mere omission, but it is a patent negligent act on the part of the registering authority who had furnished the encumbrance certificate. 37. The legal position is well settled in that every document affecting an immovable property as provided in Sec.17 has to be registered so that any person who wants to deal or desire to acquire interest with such property could find out encumbrances if any, the legal obligations, rights and ownership or claim over such property and registration acts as constructive notice to a person who subsequently acquires such property or interest or any part thereof or interest or fraction of interest thereof. 38. Registration of a document is when complete in Book I and particulars thereof such as name of the executants, description of the property and the nature of the transaction and the consideration are entered in the statutory Indexes I and II are mandatory duties. 38. Registration of a document is when complete in Book I and particulars thereof such as name of the executants, description of the property and the nature of the transaction and the consideration are entered in the statutory Indexes I and II are mandatory duties. (sic.) To ascertain whether any transaction has taken place in regard to immovable property or the particulars of such transaction any one could apply to the Registrar’s office to make a search or seek permission to personally inspect the indexes. 39. An Encumbrance Certificate or Nil Encumbrance Certificate as the case may be is issued by the Registering Officer showing the result of such search. The Registering Officer has no power or authority either to correct or modify or cancel or delete an entry already made in the Book No.I or in the Indexes relating to Book No.I, nor he could go into the validity of such registration or entries. To put it bluntly the registering authority cannot modify or delete entries already entered, nor he could omit or delete or fail to set out an entry in an encumbrance certificate and such an omission cannot be taken as mere omission or error since the documentation in the registration department has to be carried out methodically document by document and as and when registration is complete, indexing follows and there is no chances for omission. 40. When the encumbrance certificate is perused and when no entry relating to the conveyance by the 5th respondent in favour of the 6th respondent finds a place and when the respondents themselves admit the omission and admit the certificate issued by them, it has to be held that it is not a mere omission or over sight, but it is a sheer negligence on the part of the registering authority namely respondent No.4 and as a result of his negligence, respondents 1 and 2 are also liable for damages. 41. At the earliest, in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 1039, P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for a five Judges Bench of the Apex Court held thus: "21. 41. At the earliest, in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1965, S.C. 1039, P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for a five Judges Bench of the Apex Court held thus: "21. Thus, it is clear that this case recognizes a material distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to public servants, and acts committed by public servants, and acts omitted by public servants which are not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers. If a tortious act is committed by a public servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. On the other hand, if the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any sovereign power, an action for damages would lie. The act of the public servant committed by him during the course of his employment is, in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been employed by a private individual for the same purpose. This distinction which is clear and precise in law, is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the state’s liability arising from tortious acts committed by public servants. That is why the clarity and precision with which this distinction was emphasized by Chief Justice Peacock as early as 1861 has been recognised as a classic statement on this subject. 28. It is not difficult to realise the significance and importance of making such a distinction particularly at the present time when, in pursuit of their welfare ideal, the Government of the States as well as the Government of India naturally and legitimately enter into many commercial and other undertakings and activities which have no relation with the traditional concept of governmental activities in which the exercise of sovereign power is involved. It is necessary to limit the area of these affairs of the state in relation to the exercise of sovereign power, so that if acts are committed by Government employees in relation to other activities which may be conveniently described as non-governmental or non-sovereign, citizens who have a cause of action for damages should not be precluded from making their claim against the state. That is the basis on which the area of the state immunity against such claims must be limited; and this is exactly what has been done by this Court in its decision in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, (1963)1 M.L.J. 70 (S.C.): (1963)1 An. W.R. 70 (S.C.): A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 933: (1962)2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 989." 42. It is being pointed out that this decision had not been followed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and its efficacy had been eroded (See: Common Cause Society v. Union of India, (1999)6 S.C.C. 667 ). 43. Further in N.Nagendra Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 2263, the entire case law had been analysed as held in Common Cause Society v. Union of India, (1999)6 S.C.C. 667 and held that no constitutional system can, either on state necessity or public policy, condone negligent functioning of the state or its officers. 44. In Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K.Gupta, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 787, though the primary question that has been examined being whether the statutory authorities are amenable as private bodies under the Consumer Protection Act, which aspect has already been clarified by the Apex Court in a latter decision in S.P.Goel’s case, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 839, the said pronouncement is a leading authority wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that even the statutory authorities could be held responsible or answerable or fastened with liability to pay compensation for negligence. In this respect the Apex Court held thus: "Today the issue thus is not only of award of compensation but who should bear the brunt. The concept of authority and power exercised by public functionaries has many dimensions. It has undergone tremendous change with passage of time and change in socio-economic outlook. The authority empowered to function under a Statute while exercising power discharges public duty. It has to act to subserve general welfare and common good. In discharging this duty honestly and bona fide loss may accrue to any person. It has undergone tremendous change with passage of time and change in socio-economic outlook. The authority empowered to function under a Statute while exercising power discharges public duty. It has to act to subserve general welfare and common good. In discharging this duty honestly and bona fide loss may accrue to any person. And he may claim compensation which may in circumstances be payable. But where the duty is performed capriciously or the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then the responsibility to pay the loss determined should be whose? In a modern society no authority can arrogate to itself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary. It is unfortunate that matters which require immediate attention linger on and the man in the (street is) made to run from one end to other with no result. The culture of window clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system. Public administration, no doubt involves a vast amount of administrative discretion which shields the action of administrative authority. But where it is found that exercise of discretion was mala fide and the complainant is entitled to compensation for mental and physical harassment then the officer can no more claim to be under protective cover. When a citizen seeks to recover compensation from a public authority in respect of injuries suffered by him for capricious exercise of power and the National Commission finds it duly proved then it has a statutory obligation to award the same? It was never more necessary than today when even social obligations are regulated by grant of statutory powers, the test of permissive form of grant are over. It is now imperative and implicit in the exercise of power that it should be for the sake of society. When the Court directs payment of damages of compensation against the State the ultimate sufferer is the common man." 45. In Rajkot Municipality v. M.J. Nakum, (1997)9 S.C.C. 552, the Apex Court also held that a statutory corporation can be held liable and may be sued even for wrongs in which intention is immaterial. 46. The above enunciation of law squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In Rajkot Municipality v. M.J. Nakum, (1997)9 S.C.C. 552, the Apex Court also held that a statutory corporation can be held liable and may be sued even for wrongs in which intention is immaterial. 46. The above enunciation of law squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Hence, this Court would be justified in awarding compensation against the respondents 1 to 4. This Court is not going into the question as to who is to be held responsible ultimately and it is for the respondents 1 or 2 to find out the person who had acted negligently and it is open to the said authorities to recover the amount from the said negligent person by ordering recovery. 47. The next question is what is the reasonable amount of compensation which could be awarded in favour of the petitioner on the facts of the present case. This Court has to take into consideration of the value of the property which was conveyed, the amounts spent by the petitioner in getting the sale deed executed in his favour, the litigation which the petitioner has to face and if ultimately the petitioner loses the said litigation and loses the property itself for no fault of his and it may be that the petitioner could proceed against the 5th respondent for his failure, suppression or concealment or his failure to convey effective title. The title has to be guaranteed by the transferor and the petitioner has a right to proceed against the transferor for deprivation of the property or if there is a failure of title conveyed in his favour. However, on that score, the negligence on the part of the respondents 1 to 4 and their subordinates cannot be exonerated, nor the provisions of the Registration Act indemnifies the said respondents from such a claim as it is a case of negligence and a patent negligence which causes serious hardship, prejudice and loss to the petitioner. 48. Such negligence are brought to the notice of the Court very often, yet, no action is being taken. The Registering Offices are being treated with undue importance and place of spinning money and the Registrar themselves behave as if they have the authority to decide even the title. 48. Such negligence are brought to the notice of the Court very often, yet, no action is being taken. The Registering Offices are being treated with undue importance and place of spinning money and the Registrar themselves behave as if they have the authority to decide even the title. They levy the stamp duty and while levying stamp duty they act as a quasi judicial authority, but with respect to the act of registration it is not a quasi judicial function and it is only an administrative function as held by a Division Bench of this Court in "Park View Enterprise case", A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 251. 49. It is well settled by now that Court enforces the performance of statutory duty of public bodies/ statutory authorities as an obligation to citizens who have a legal right to demand compliance by such statutory authorities with its duties to observe statutory rights alone. In order to sustain an action for damages for breach of statutory duties the individual has to establish a breach of a statutory obligation. Such statutory obligation should be established that it is intended to be a ground of civil liability to the petitioner. 50. The petitioner also should establish an injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to give protection. In this case, the statute provides for the statutory provisions of the Act and the Rules already referred to confers a right on the petitioner to apply for encumbrance certificate for any period on payment of certain charges prescribed and the registering authority is obliged to furnish the same and in case of any dereliction or omission or error, be it oversight or be it due to over work, there could be no excuse as it is a negligent act per se. Such negligent act on the part of the registering authority had caused damages to the petitioner and sufficient proof has been placed before this Court in this respect to sustain the claim of damages. 51. In Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officers Town Municipal Council, Udipi and another, (1974)2 S.C.C. 506 , the Supreme Court while examining the liability of the local authority in an action for damages in respect of the statutory duty performed by it,laid down thus: "24. 51. In Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officers Town Municipal Council, Udipi and another, (1974)2 S.C.C. 506 , the Supreme Court while examining the liability of the local authority in an action for damages in respect of the statutory duty performed by it,laid down thus: "24. Another contention on behalf of the respondent is that if there is any breach of a statutory duty, the appellant will not be entitled to any relief without an injury. The breach of a statutory duty created for the benefit of an individual or a class is a tortious act. Anyone who suffers special damage therefrom is entitled to recover damages. Counsel for the third respondent relied on Cutler v. Wandswarth Stadium, 1949 A.C. 398. In that case a bookmaker alleged that he suffered damage in that the occupier had failed to make available for bookmakers space on the track where they could conveniently carry on booking in connection with dog races run on the track under the Betting and Lotteries Act, 1935. It was held that the object of the Act was to provide the public and not the bookmakers with its requirements for the purposes of betting. It was no object of the Act to confer on individual bookmakers a privilege in furtherance of their business which they never possessed before. Consequently no action was maintainable. The question whether an individual who is one of a class for whose benefit such an obligation is imposed can or cannot enforce performance by an action must depend on the purview of the Legislature in the particular statute. Injury may be caused either by the fulfillment of the duty cast by the statute or by failure to carry it out or by negligence in its performance. 25. In order to succeed in an action for damages for breach of statutory duty the plaintiff must establish a breach of a statutory obligation which, on the proper construction of the statute was intended to be a ground of civil liability to a class of persons of whom he is one. He must establish an injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to give protection. The present case is not for pecuniary damages for breach of statutory duties.“ 52. The above decision in Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officers Town Municipal Council, Udipi, (1974)2 S.C.C. 506 . He must establish an injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to give protection. The present case is not for pecuniary damages for breach of statutory duties.“ 52. The above decision in Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officers Town Municipal Council, Udipi, (1974)2 S.C.C. 506 . had been subsequently reiterated by the Apex Court in Rajkot Municipality v. M.J. Nakum, (1997)9 S.C.C. 552. In this decision their Lordships of the Supreme Court reviewed the entire case law on the subject, namely to make a repository of power in an action for damages for breach of such power and while holding that common law principles could very well be followed, where an action was taken for damages by the legal heirs of the deceased on whom there was a sudden fall of trees while he was passing on a public street. The Apex Court held thus: ”11. In Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p.1489, “tort” is defined as a violation of duty imposed by general law or otherwise upon all persons occupying the relation to each other involved in a given transaction. There must always be a violation of some duty owed to plaintiff and generally such a duty must arise by operation of and not by mere agreement of the parties. “A legal wrong is committed upon the person or property, independent of contract. It may be either, (i) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual; (2) the infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to the individual; (3) the violation of some private obligation by which like damages accrues to the individual...” Negligence is failure to use such care as a reasonable, prudent and careful person would use, under similar circumstances. It is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances failure to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances. Negligence also is an omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. 12. Negligence and tort have been viewed without elaborately embarking upon the definition of “tort” applicable to varied circumstances and the scope of negligence in its wider perspective. 12. Negligence and tort have been viewed without elaborately embarking upon the definition of “tort” applicable to varied circumstances and the scope of negligence in its wider perspective. Let us proceed to consider the meaning of “negligence” in the context of tort liability arising in this case. In every case giving rise to tortious liability, tort consists of injury and damage due to negligence. Claim for injury and damage may be founded on breach of contract or tort. We are concerned in this case with tort. The liability in tort may be strict liability, absolute liability or special liability. The degree of liability depends on decree of mental element. The elements of tort of negligence consists in- (a) duty of care; (b) duty is owed to the plaintiff; (c) the duty has been carelessly breached. Negligence does not entail liability unless the law exacts a duty in the given circumstances to observe care. Duty is an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct fraught with unreasonable risk of damage to others. The question whether duty exists in a particular situation involves determination of law. Negligence would in such acts and omissions involve an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The breach of duty causes damage and how much is the damage should be comprehended by the defendant. Remoteness is relevant and compensation on proof thereof requires consideration. The element of carelessness in the breach of the duty and those duties towards the plaintiff are important components in the tort of negligence. Negligence would mean careless conduct in the commission or omission of an act connoting duty, breach and the damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the plaintiff owes. Duty of care is, therefore, crucial to understand the nature and scope of the tort of negligence. 13. The question in each case is whether the defendant has been negligent. In determining duty of care, public policy involved in the statute requires detailed examination. Upon examination, they are required to further consider whether its extension elongates the public policy or retards its effectuation or frustrates its object and the inevitable effect thereof on the affected plaintiff as well as general public. No general or abstract principle is desirable to be laid. The careless breach of duty will vary from case to case and it should not be unduly extended or confined or limited to all situations. No general or abstract principle is desirable to be laid. The careless breach of duty will vary from case to case and it should not be unduly extended or confined or limited to all situations. The attending circumstances require evaluation and application to a particular set of facts of a given case. The standard of care also varies in a particular factual situation. Defendant must be under a duty of care not to create latent source of physical danger to the person or property of third party whom he ought to reasonably forces as likely to be affected thereby. Thus the latent defect causing actual physical damage to the person or property gives the cause of action and then only the defendant is liable to pay the damages for tortious liability. It must, therefore, be an essential element to establish that there is a positive act or a duty and the defendant is under duty of care not to create/ direct latent source of physical danger to the person or property of third party whom he ought to reasonably foresee as likely to be affected thereby. 14. Negligence has been viewed in three ways. Firstly, involving a careless state of mind, secondly, a careless conduct; and thirdly, a tort in itself. Every case giving rise to tortious liability, consists of injury and damage done due to negligence. Injury and damage may be found due to breach of contract or tort. We are concerned in this case with the injury and damage in tort. Therefore, it is necessary to dwell in depth, on strict liability, absolute liability or special liability. In the present case, the omission alleged is to take care of periodical check-up of the condition of the trees. The degree of liability depends upon the degree of mental element. The elements of tort of negligence, therefore, consist in (a) duty of care; (b) duty owed to the plaintiff; and (c) it has been carelessly breached. Negligence does not give rise to liability unless the law fastens the duty of care in given circumstances. Duty is an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct brought with unreasonable risk of damage to another. The question whether duty consists in a particular situation involves determination as a question of law.“ 57. Negligence does not give rise to liability unless the law fastens the duty of care in given circumstances. Duty is an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct brought with unreasonable risk of damage to another. The question whether duty consists in a particular situation involves determination as a question of law.“ 57. It would thus be seen that each case requires to be examined in the light of the special circumstances viz., whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is a person or a class of persons to which the defendant owed a duty of care which the defendant was negligent in performing that duty, whether damage must have resulted from that particular duty of care which the defendant owed to the particular plaintiff or class of persons. Public authorities discharge public obligations to the public at large. Therefore, it owes a duty of care at common law to avoid causing present or imminent danger to the safety of the plaintiff or a class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs.” 53. Following the above circumstances referred to, this Court is of the considered view that there is negligence per se on the part of the registering authority, which is the failure of the statutory duty and it is sheer negligence which is admitted by calling it as oversight. Such a plea of the respondents cannot be sustained. In the circumstances this Court would be well founded in granting the relief prayed for against the respondents. 54. A breach of a duty imposed by statute is ordinarily made a punishable offence. The same may also be actionable by the expressed terms of the statute or on the principle that action lies for damage resulting from any indictable offence. In an action for breach of statutory duty it has to be established that statutory provisions impose certain duty and breach of such duty is the legal cause of the damage sustained. It should be established that it is a breach of statutory obligation, which on a proper construction of the statute was intended to be a ground of civil liability to a class of persons of whom he is one. In such cases, the common law remedy of indictment and action for damages are available for damage resulting from breach of the duty, unless the statute indicates the contrary. 55. In such cases, the common law remedy of indictment and action for damages are available for damage resulting from breach of the duty, unless the statute indicates the contrary. 55. As already pointed out the statutory provisions of the Registration Act in no way prohibits or bars or provides that such an action for damages is repugnant to the statute. An action for mandamus is also one of the well accepted remedy for compelling the performance of a public duty and in case of breach of duty apart from compelling performance of the duty an action for damages could very well be maintained. The remedy of damages is not barred by the statutory provisions of the Registration Act or by the Rules made thereunder. 56. This Court has taken the view that the negligence on the part of the contesting respondents is patent or negligence per se. Negligence per se has many manifestations and one of them being reckless negligence or patent negligence. 57. In Poonam Verma v. Aswin Patel, (1996)4 S.C.C. 332 , the Apex Court had occasion to consider the various manifestation of negligence and in that context held thus: “42. Negligence has many manifestations: it may be active negligence, collateral negligence, comparative negligence, concurrent negligence, continued negligence, criminal negligence, gross negligence, hazardous negligence, active and passive negligence, wilful or reckless negligence or negligence per se, which is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as under: ”Negligence per se: Conduct, whether of action or omission, which may be declared and treated as negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding circumstances, either because it is in violation of a statute or valid municipal ordinance, or because it is so palpably opposed to the dictates of common prudence that it can be said without hesitation or doubt that no careful person would have been guilty of it. As a general rule, the violation of a public duty, enjoined by law for the protection of person or property, so constitutes.“ The Apex Court further held that where a person is guilty of negligence per se, no further proof is needed to prove negligence. 58. As a general rule, the violation of a public duty, enjoined by law for the protection of person or property, so constitutes.“ The Apex Court further held that where a person is guilty of negligence per se, no further proof is needed to prove negligence. 58. H.W.R. Wade in his Book on Administrative Law in Chapter, Part VII”Liability of Public Authorities in Tort“summarised the law as hereunder: ”Public authorities, including ministers of the crown, enjoy no dispensation from the ordinary law of tort and contract, except in so far as statute gives it to them. Unless acting within their powers, they are liable like any other person for trespass, nuisance, negligence and so forth. This is an important aspect of the rule of law.“... ”There are some situations where an officer of central or local government has an independent statutory liability by virtue of his office, because the statute imposes duties upon him as a designated officer rather than on the public authority which appoints him. In that case the employees only will be liable.“..... ”But if the duties of the designated officer are in fact carried out by employees of the local authority, that authority may be liable in the same way as for its other employees. This last proposition was applied by the Court of Appeal where a junior employee of a local authority negligently certified that no local land charges were registered against land which was being sold, so that an incumbrancer lost a charge over the land, although the statutory duty of issuing certificates rested specifically upon the local authority’s clerk as registrar. In cases where the designated officer alone is liable, his employer (whether the crown or a local authority) will normally indemnity him; but this is only a matter of grace.“ 59. While referring to the case which is identical to the present situation in Ministry of Housing and Local Government v. Sharp, (1970)2 Q.B. 223, in which case a clerk of the local authority had negligently overlooked a compensation notice entered in the local land charges register, so that it failed to operate against a later purchaser of the land affected, and accordingly, when planning permission was granted and the compensation paid for a previous refusal should have been repayable, the ministry were unable to recover it. The Court of Appeal discussed the possibility that the local register though an employee of the district council, might have been the party liable, as an independent statutory authority rather than the council itself. But in fact the council accepted legal liability for his functions. 60. H.W.R. Wade also further classified and analysed the legal position thus: ”It is not clear whether this last case should be considered an example of the tort of negligent misstatement, for which damages are recoverable where the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the misstatement. That tort is now proving important as a head of government liability, particularly in connection with misleading official advice, the problems of which were explained earlier. It has enabled a firm to recover damages from a Government department which wrongly advised them that they were covered by export credit insurance against default by a foreign company; and purchasers of land to recover damages from local authorities who overlooked proposals for a subway and for road widening in answering planning enquiries. Claims for loss caused by negligent mortgage valuations have also succeeded, as have claims against district auditors by local authorities. The principle has been extended to planning authorities who negligently grant invalid planning permissions under which the developer later suffers loss, or valid permissions where the right to object is negligently denied to a neighbour..." 61. In Ministry of Housing and Local Government v. Sharp, (1970)2 Q.B. 223, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government registered a planning charge with the Local Land Registry. During 1962, a company which intended to purchase the land requisitioned official search on the Local Land Registry. A clear certificate was issued by making a negligent search and the clerk failed to notice the Ministry’s charge or to include it in the official certificate. The Ministry who had lost the benefit of their charge claimed damages for the mistake made by the clerk by suiting the Local Registrar and also the Local Council on the ground that they were responsible for the mistake of the clerk. In the said case, Lord Denning M.R. held thus: "In my opinion the law should be, and is, that the register of the land charges must be kept accurate; and that an official certificate of search must faithfully record every entry. In the said case, Lord Denning M.R. held thus: "In my opinion the law should be, and is, that the register of the land charges must be kept accurate; and that an official certificate of search must faithfully record every entry. If the registrar or his subordinates makes a mistake, and any person suffers loss by it, then that person should be indemnified for his loss. It should not be necessary for him to prove negligence-though there will nearly always be negligence—in making the mistake. Suffice it that a mistake has been made and caused loss. The loss should be borne by the registrar. This is essential for the good working of the land registration system. It is not in the least unfair to the registrar. We were told that the Government always stands behind the Chief Land Registrar and indemnifies him. And that the local authorities always insure the local land registrar. That is the case here. The action is being defended by the insurers. They have no doubt calculated a premium commensurate with the risk of mistake; and should, therefore, be prepared to pay for the loss when it occurs. I agree with the Judge on the liability of the registrar and of the council, but not on the damages. I would allow the appeal and give judgment for the Ministry against the Registrar and the Council." 62. The above conclusion of Lord Denning, M.R. was agreed to by Lord Justice Salmon and Justice Cross insofar as the grant of damages against the council. Though Lord Denning M.R. held that the clerk who made the entry also should be made liable. Salmon and Cross, L.JJ., held that the council alone is liable and not the clerk who made the wrong entry or committed omission. This judgment is squarely and directly on the point. 63. In the said case the entire compensation as claimed by the Ministry claiming damages for breach of statutory duty/or negligence was sustained and ordered as prayed for. The provisions of the Land Charge Act, 1925 and the Rules framed thereunder are identical to the provisions of the Registration act as well as the Rules framed thereunder and the procedure prescribed to furnish certificate of encumbrance or certificate of ‘nil’ encumbrance after a search which would mean a thorough search and accurate search and the omission is negligence. The provisions of the Land Charge Act, 1925 and the Rules framed thereunder are identical to the provisions of the Registration act as well as the Rules framed thereunder and the procedure prescribed to furnish certificate of encumbrance or certificate of ‘nil’ encumbrance after a search which would mean a thorough search and accurate search and the omission is negligence. For the said negligence though the council discharges the statutory function, the Court of Appeal held that it is liable to compensate. This pronouncement is on the point and with the view taken, I respectfully agree. 64. In the present case, it cannot be stated that the omission is a bona fide one. If there had been some attempt to verify the entries by two persons independently as prescribed by the statutory rule referred to above this omission could have been easily avoided as the entries are indexed immediately after registration. It is not as if the certificate has been applied for immediately after the registration of the sale in favour of the 6th respondent. For this negligence, this Court with a view to render substantial and ultimate justice awards a compensation of Rs.60,000 which will be fair and reasonable and the same will result in rendition of justice and also check omissions on the part of the respondents 1 to 4 or their subordinates, identically placed. It is made clear that it is open to the first respondent to recover the said amount from the erring subordinates after fixing the individuals liability. 65. Writ petition is allowed accordingly. Consequently the connected W.M.P. is closed.