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2001 DIGILAW 118 (MAD)

Mohamed Meeran v. G. Deenadayalu

2001-01-31

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM

body2001
Judgment : 1. The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeking for calling for records from the XX Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Chennai in M.F.No.2 of 1998 and quash the complaint filed for the offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. I have heard Mr.Raja Kalifulla, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ramanlaal, the learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The main point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the prosecution is that even though the Analyst Report was received by the complainant on 24.8.1996, the complaint was filed only on 8.5.1998 after a delay of about 22 months. Thereafter, the notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was served on 21.5.1998 and consequently, the petitioner filed an application before the trial court on 22.5.1998 for sending the sample for second analysis under Section 13(5) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the same has not yet been disposed of and as such, serious prejudice had been caused to the petitioner and hence, the proceedings as against the petitioners are liable to be quashed. 4. In order to show that the delay in launching the prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act would be fatal to the prosecution, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite the following authorities. (1)Archan v. State of M.P., 1998 (2) F.A.C 244; (2)SatrughnaBehera v. Puri Municpality, 1968 Crl.L.J. 123; (3) ReetSingh v. State of Haryana, 1990 (2) F.A.C. 413; (4) Municipal Corporation Khandwa v. State ofM.P., 1995 (1) F.A.C. 49; (5) Jagdish v. State ofU.P., 1991 (1)F.A.C.96; (6) M.A.Azeezv. State rep.by Health Inspector, Hyderabad, 1991 (2) F.A.C. 56; (7) Om Prakash Sharma v. State of Assam, 1994 (1) F.A.C. 17; (8) Municpal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram, AIR 1967 S.C. 979 and (9) ShyamLalv. State, 1991 (1) F.A.C. 222. 5. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the mere delay in launching the prosecution would not be a ground for quashing and that unless the second analysis would show that the articles of food got deteriorated, there cannot be any prejudice to the petitioner and as such, the trial is liable to be proceeded and consequently, the present petition has to be dismissed. 6. In support of this plea, he would cite the following authorities. (1) Chaturbhuj v. State, AIR 1967 All. 6. In support of this plea, he would cite the following authorities. (1) Chaturbhuj v. State, AIR 1967 All. 31 ; (2) Babboo v. State, AIR 1970 All. 122 ; (3) Ajitprasad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 1631 ; (4) Ratanlal Agarwala, Jorhat v. State of Assam, 1993 Crl. L.J. 2747 and (5) Govind Prasad v. State of M.P., 1996 Crl. L.J. 1238. 7. Theprivate complaint filed by the respondent for the offences under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is sought to be quashed on the ground that the complaint was filed with a 22 months delay after the receipt of the analyst report. It is pointed out that a sample Chilli powder was taken from the shop of the petitioner on 18.7.96. This was analysed on 25.7.96 and a report was prepared on 14.8.96. Admittedly, this report had been received by the complainant on 24.8.96. However, the complaint was filed only on 8.5.98, that is, after about 22 months. 8. Though it is mentioned in the complaint that sanction was obtained on 3.3.97, there is no detail as to why the complaint was filed after 16 months subsequent to obtaining of sanction. It is seen from the records that the complaint had been filed on 8.5.98 and the analyst report along with Notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was served on the petitioners on 21.5.98. Immediately thereafter, the petitioners filed an application on 22.5.98 before the trial Court for sending the sample for second analysis under Section 13(5) of the Act. It is pointed out that the said application is not yet disposed of. 9. Ongoing through the records and on hearing the counsel for parties, I am of the view that the complaint has to be quashed on the ground of huge delay which has caused prejudice to the parties. 10. On a similar facts, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the above question and held that the complaint is not maintainable when the complaint was filed with a considerable delay so as to deprive the right of the petitioners/accused to seek for the report on second analysis. 11. In my view, the finding given in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court reported in Ahmed Dadabhai Advani v. State of Maharashtra, 1991 (1) FAC 222 is squarely applicable to this case also. 11. In my view, the finding given in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court reported in Ahmed Dadabhai Advani v. State of Maharashtra, 1991 (1) FAC 222 is squarely applicable to this case also. The relevant portion of the observation of the Supreme Court is as follows:- "Rule 9A uses the word 'immediately' replacing the words 'within ten days'. This expression has to be appreciated in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case bearing in mind the purpose for furnishing the report. The report is dated 1st September, 1978. Yet the filing of the complaint was delayed up to 26th April, 1979. But the copy of the report was despatched on 11th July, 1979 and must have been received within a couple of days. Keeping in view the objective of the requirement to furnish a copy of the report to the accused, we think, having regard to the delay which had already taken place, it was incumbent on the part of the Local Health Authority to have promptly sent the copy which it failed to do. We, therefore, find it difficult to agree with the line of reasoning adopted by the High Court. We think that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in the above circumstances. We therefore, set aside the conviction recorded by the High Court and restore the order of the trial Court. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded. Bail bonds will stand cancelled. The appeal is allowed accordingly." 12. The decision cited by the counsel for the respondent would reveal that in the absence of any application by the accused under Section 13(2) of the Act for getting the sample analysed by the Director, Central Food Laboratory, the accused could not complain any prejudice. 13. Insome of the decisions referred to above rendered by various High Courts, it had been held that Rule 9(a) of the Act is only directary. 14. 13. Insome of the decisions referred to above rendered by various High Courts, it had been held that Rule 9(a) of the Act is only directary. 14. But, those decision would not help the respondent in view of the fact that the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case cited supra would support the contention of the counsel for the petitioners, in view of the fact that the complaint was filed after 22 months, (i.e., on 8.5.1998) and immediately on service of notice on 21.5.1988, the petitioners filed an application requesting for second analysis on 22.5.1998 which admittedly has not yet been disposed of. 15. Under those circumstances, as held by the Supreme Court, the petitioners would certainly complain prejudice. 16. Therefore, I am of the view that the proceedings arising out of the private complaint is liable to be quashed and accordingly, it is quashed. 17. In the result, the petition is allowed. Consequently, Crl. M.P.No.8343 of 1999 is closed.