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2001 DIGILAW 1185 (PNJ)

Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Haryana

2001-10-22

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, V.K.BALI

body2001
JUDGMENT V. K. Bali, J. - The findings of learned Single Judge based upon Section 4(2) of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Gram Panchayat village Khera v. State of Haryana and others, 1989 PLJ 683, that the Gram Panchayat, which is juristic person and not a natural one cannot be termed as an inhabitant so as to object under Section 4(2) about alteration of boundaries of the municipal area are sought to be challenged on the basis of decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Union Bank of India v. Khader International Construction and others, JT 2001(5) SC 218. The word person as used in Order 33 Rules 1 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been interpreted to include a juristic person, like a Company. It has been held that :- "the word person referred to in Order 33 includes a juristic person also. The context in which the word person is used in Order 33 would also indicate that a Company also can sue as an indigent person. Any juristic person such as a Company or idol can maintain a suit ... ... ... . . The definition of the term person is given in the General Clauses Act according to which such term shall include any Company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The said definition provides that the word person would include both natural and artificial persons. The word person has to be given its meaning in the context in which it is used. It refers to a person who is capable of filing a suit and this being a benevolent provision, it is to be given an extended meaning." 2. In the present case, however, the word used In section 4(2) is inhabitant and not person. Further, person came to be interpreted as per its definition in the General Clauses Act. Again, the word person was given its meaning in the context in which it was used. Here, the question is with regard to raising of objections to the boundaries of municipal limits which, in the very nature of things, can be done only by individuals being affected and not by a juristic person. 3. Finding no merit in this appeal, we dismiss the same in limine. Appeal dismissed.