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2001 DIGILAW 1192 (RAJ)

Maya Bansal v. State of Rajasthan

2001-08-01

SUNIL KUMAR GARG

body2001
Honble GARG, J.–This Cr. Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the accused petitioners against the order dated 19.1.93 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara by which he accepted the application of respondent No. 2 (complainant) dated 26.2.91 under Sec. 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. (2). It arises in the following circumstances:- i) The facts involved, if true, are alarming and show low one can sink for selfish ends. Briefly recapitulated the relevant facts are that Km. Saubhagya Goel (hereinafter referred to as ``the Complainant (respondent No. 2)) submitted a complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara on April 6, 1983 against the five accused persons viz. Kumari Madhu Mehra, Smt. S.R. Wadhera, Smt. Maya Bansal, Mr. P.R. Parekh and Mr. R.C. Mehra for offence under Sections 120-B, 149, 166, 417 and 468 I.P.C. It was alleged that the complaint is a blind person in her late 20s. After her selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, she was appointed as a permanent lecturer in History in Government College, Rajgarh, District Alwar. She requested the Director of College Education for her transfer from Rajgarh to Bhilwara. Her request was allowed and she was transferred from Rajgarh to Government Girls College, Bhilwara by the order dated 26.2.1983. In pursuance to it, she joined her new posting in Bhilwara on March 5, 1983. One. Smt. Santosh Yadav was transferred in her place from Government Girls College, Bhilwara to Rajgarh. Smt. Santosh Yadav is also a permanent lecturer and she approached the Director of College Education to get her transfer to Rajgarh cancelled. The Director of College Education cancelled the transfer of Smt. Santosh Yadav by his order dated March 4, 1983 and in her place accused Kumari Madhu Mehta, who was a temporary lecturer in the Girls College, Bhilwara was transferred to Rajgarh by the order dated March 9, 1983. On March 12, 1983, the complainant was called by the accused Smt. S.R. Wadhera - the Principal of the Government Girls College, Bhilwara in her office and was told that she had been transferred back from Bhilwara to Rajgarh by the Director of the College Education by his order dated March 11, 1983 and that the transfer was made on her (complainants) own request. This up-set the complaint since she was transferred form Rajgarh to Bhilwara on her own request and thereafter she never made a request for her transfer back from Bhilwara to Rajgarh. She approached the State Government and the Director of the College Education and apprised them of the situation, reiterating that she made no request for her transfer from Bhilwara to Rajgarh. In the Directors Office, she came to learn that the Director of College Education had received the application (Ex.P/6) in writing purported to have been written at the instance of the complaint, expressing a request therein for her transfer form Bhilwara to Rajgarh and to cancel the transfer of accused madhu Mehra. She also learned there that the whole of the said application was in the hand- writing of the accused Miss Madhu Mehra and the thumb impression on it was verified and attested by accused Smt. Maya Bansal, a lecturer in Government Sanskrit College, Bhilwara. She neither knew the contents of that application nor affixed her thumb impression on it. On March 21, 1983, the Director of College Education cancelled his earlier order dated March 11, 1983, retained the complainant as lecturer in Government Girls College, Bhilwara and transferred the accused madhu Mehra back to Rajgarh. It was further alleged that the application Ex.P/6 was a complete forged document. The accused persons had conspired to manage the complainants transfer back to Rajgarh and somehow or other to retain the accused madhu Mehra at Bhilwara. Accused Smt.S.R. Wadhera who is the principal in Government Girls College, Bhilwara played an active role in forwarding Ex.P/6 to the Director of College Education without ascertaining from the complaint whether it was written at her instance and whether it contained her thumb impression. The order of forwarding Ex.P/6 to the Director of the College Education as written on its back by the accused P.R. Parekh - who is a clerk in the Government Girls College, Bhilwara. Accused R.C. Mehra is the father of accused Ms. Madhu Mehra. It was alleged that after inserting a forwarding note on the back of application Ex.P/6, accused Smt. S.R. Wadhera delivered it to accused R.R. Mehra to be taken to the Director of College Education. Thus, each of the five accused played an active role in forging application Ex.P/6. Accused R.C. Mehra is the father of accused Ms. Madhu Mehra. It was alleged that after inserting a forwarding note on the back of application Ex.P/6, accused Smt. S.R. Wadhera delivered it to accused R.R. Mehra to be taken to the Director of College Education. Thus, each of the five accused played an active role in forging application Ex.P/6. The learned Magistrate after recording the complainants statement under Sec. 200 Cr.P.C. and that of her witness Vipil Goel under Sec. 202 Cr.P.C. took cognizance for offence under Sec. 417, 468 and 120B I.P.C. against the petitioners and under Sec. 468, 417, and 120B read with Sec. 166 I.P.C. against others by order dated 1.9.83. Aggrieved against the said order, the accused persons went in revision, which was heard and disposed of by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhilwara. The Additional Sessions Judge maintained the order of the Magistrate as against accused Madhu Mehra and Smt. Maya Bansal (present accused petitioners), but set it aside in respect of remaining three accused viz. Smt. S.R. Wadhera, P.R. Parekh and R.C. Mehra. ii) During proceedings, an application purpoted to be under Sec. 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act came to be filed by the complainant in the lower Court on 26.2.991 stating that since so called forged document Ex.P/6 bears the writing of accused petitioner Madhu Mehra and attestation of accused petitioner Dr. Maya Bansal and to prove this fact, their specimen writings are necessary and, therefore, a request was made to the court through that application that of the purpose of comparison by expert, hand-writing and signatures of accused petitioners betaken by the Court. (3). That this application was contested by the accused petitioners by filing reply on 30.1.92. (4). After hearing both the parties, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara decided the application dated 27.2.91 filed by the complainant through order dated 19.1.93 and he allowed the application and ordered that specimen signatures etc. be taken of both the accused petitioners so that they may be sent to the expert for comparison. (5). Aggrieved form the said order dated 19.1.93, this criminal misc. be taken of both the accused petitioners so that they may be sent to the expert for comparison. (5). Aggrieved form the said order dated 19.1.93, this criminal misc. petition has been filed by the accused petitioners in this Court and in this petition following submissions have been raised by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners: i) That power of taking specimen signatures lies only in the Court and only on the condition where the Court itself is of the view that it is necessary for its own purpose, meaning thereby that it has been submitted by learned counsel for the accused petitioners that on the application of the complainant, power which has been exercised by learned Magistrate on th application of the complainant vide impugned order dated 19.1.93 cannot be exercised and from this point of view, the order passed by the learned Magistrate is without jurisdiction and illegal. That the petitioners who are accused before the learned trial Court cannot be compelled to be witness against themselves and impugned order is clearly violative of fundamental right guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. (6). On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the order of the trial Court is legal and does not call for interference by this Court. (7). I have heard both. (8). It may be stated here that the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on following three authorities: i) State vs. Poonamchand Gupta (1) ii) Hiralal Agarwalla vs. The State (2) iii) Sukhvinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (3). (9). In my considered opinion, though the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners appears to be attractive in nature, and are supported by some of the authorities and views expressed by various High Courts, but both the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners carry no weight because of some pronouncement of Honble Supreme Court in some of the cases. Argument No.1. (10). The learned counsel for the petitioner has laid stress on second part of Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act which reads as under: ``73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved:..... Argument No.1. (10). The learned counsel for the petitioner has laid stress on second part of Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act which reads as under: ``73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved:..... ``The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. .................. (11). The pertinent question that has to be answered is whether a party can get specimen writing for comparison under Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act from Court or not. The earlierview was that this clause limits the power of the Court to directing a person present in the Court to write any words or figures only where the Court itself is of the view that it is necessary for its own purposes to take such writing in order to compare the words or figures or written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. The power does not extend to permitting one or other party before the Court to ask the Court to take such writing for the purpose of its evidence or its own case. (12). The above view was based on two authorities on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners and further one more case Babubhai vs. Ishwar Lal (4), may also be referred to. (13). In my opinion, these cases are no longer good law in the face of decision of Honble Supreme Court State (Delhi Administration) vs. Pali Ram (5). In that case on the application of prosecution, the trial Magistrate directed the accused of that case to give his specimen writing etc. That order of the trial Magistrate was upheld by the Court of Sessions Judge in revision and against the order of Sessions Judge another revision was filed in the High Court which was heard by Division Bench on reference made by the single Judge and Delhi High Court held that order of learned Magistrate dated 20.5.72 was beyond the scope of Sec. 73 of the Evidence aCt and revision filed by that accused was accepted and orders of both the Magistrate and learned Sessions Judge were set aside. Aggrieved from the order of the High Court, Delhi State filed an appeal before the Honble Supreme Court and the Honble Supreme Court after considering so many authorities and law, including the authorities on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the order dated 20.5.72 of the Magistrate. (14). Thus, the argument that power under Sec. 73 of the Indian Evident Act can only be exercised suo moto by the Court and not on the application of the complainant was not found favour by the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court and hence low laid down in the cases of State vs. Poonamchand Gupta and Hiralal Agarwalla (supra) is no longer a good law. (15). The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhvindra Singh (supra) has held that the words ``any person present in the Court in Sec. 73 has a reference only to such person who are parties to a case pending before the Court and in a given case may even include the witnesses in the said cause, but where there is no cause pending before the Court for its determination, the question of obtaining for the purpose of comparison of the handwriting of a person may not arise at all, and, therefore, the provision of Sec. 73 of the Act would have no application. The law laid in the case of Sukhvindra Singh (supra) is in conformity with the law laid down in Delhi Administration vs. Pali Ram (supra). In Sukhvindra Singhs case (supra) the Honble Supreme Court has clearly observed that the Court which is not holding enquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure or conducting trial is not permitted, on the plain language of Sec. 73 of Evidence Act, to issue any direction of the nature contained in the second paragraph of Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act. But in the present case, the position in otherwise as the matter was pending in the Court, an application was moved by the complainant. Hence, facts of the present case and facts of the case of Sukhvindra Singh (supra) are totally different one. Therefore, the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Sukhvindra Singhs case (supra) is not applicable in the present case. Hence, facts of the present case and facts of the case of Sukhvindra Singh (supra) are totally different one. Therefore, the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Sukhvindra Singhs case (supra) is not applicable in the present case. Hence, argument that power under Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act cannot be exercised on the application of the complainant stands rejected as the application has been moved by the complainant before the learned Magistrate during trial and not at the stage of investigation. Argument No. 2. (16). Article 20(3), Constitution of India and Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act.: Article 20, clause (3) of the Constitution of India, runs as follows:- ``No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (17). The question arises whether the direction to write, to give signature or thumb-impression under this section amounts to compelling the accused to be witness against himself and thus, offends to Article 20(3) of the constitution of India. There was a controversy amounts the various High Court on the subject. The Madras High Court in the case of Rajamuthukoil Pillai vs. P. Nadar (6), held that it does amount to compelling him to be a witness and thus, ordering an accused to give his signature of thumb impression is prohibited by Article 20(3). Therefore, Madras High Court was of the view that accused cannot be compelled to give his thumb impression. (18). The Allahabad High Court in the case of Ranjit Ram vs. State (7) and Calcutta High Court in the case of Sailendra Nath vs. State (8) took a different view. (19). The controversy has been set at set at rest by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the cases of State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu (9) and State (Delhi Adm.) vs. Pali Ram (supra), has held that ``giving of finger-impressions or specimen writing or signature by an accused person though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the large sense is not included within the expression ``to be a witness. Thus, accused can be compelled to give his thumb impression, meaning thereby the accused can be asked to give his thumb impression by the Court. Hence argument No. 2 also stands rejected. Thus, accused can be compelled to give his thumb impression, meaning thereby the accused can be asked to give his thumb impression by the Court. Hence argument No. 2 also stands rejected. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 19.1.93 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity and is within the frame work of law. Hence, this misc. petition deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed after confirming the order dated 19.1.93 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhilwara. If there is any stay, the same stands vacated.