S. B. SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) WHETHER a writ petition questioning the original order after an application for review thereof has been dismissed would be maintainable before this Court having regard to the decision of the apex Court in l Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, is the question involved in this petition. FACTS: ( 2 ) THE petitioner herein while working as an apprentice mechanic in the Railways was removed from service by proceedings dated 9-7-1993 allegedly on the ground that he was unauthorisedly absent from 10-1-1985 to 15-4-1985. ( 3 ) THE original application was dismissed on 3-1-1997 and review petition was disposed of on 6-3-1998. ( 4 ) ADMINISTRATIVE Tribunals have been constituted in terms of Article 323-A of the constitution of India. In terms of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals act, 1985 the jurisdiction of all Courts is barred and only an appeal is maintainable before the Supreme Court under Section 28 of the said Act. Section 28 reads thus: exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court under article 136 of the Constitution:- On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post, no Court except- (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters. ( 5 ) THE apex Court held that judicial review being a basic feature of the constitution the same cannot be excluded by a parliamentary or legislative act. As regards exercise of jurisdiction of the Tribunal vis-avis jurisdiction of the High Courts under article 226 of the Constitution it was held: the Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. The directions issued by us in respect of making the decisions of Tribunals amenable to scrutiny before a Division bench of the respective High Courts will, however, come into effect prospectively i. e. , will apply to decisions rendered hereafter. To maintain the sanctity of judicial proceeding, we have invoked the doctrine of prospective over-ruling so as not to disturb the procedure in relation to decisions already rendered. ( 6 ) WHILE upholding the contention that clause 2 (d) of Article 323-A and 323-B as also Section 28 of the Act whereby and whereunder the jurisdiction of the High courts and of the Supreme Court under articles 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution was excluded is unconstitutional, it was observed:. . . . . . . ( 6 ) WHILE upholding the contention that clause 2 (d) of Article 323-A and 323-B as also Section 28 of the Act whereby and whereunder the jurisdiction of the High courts and of the Supreme Court under articles 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution was excluded is unconstitutional, it was observed:. . . . . . . The Tribunals created under article 323-A and Article 323-B of the constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislation (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. . . ( 7 ) THE apex Court decided the aforementioned case on 18-3-1997. In respect of any judgment rendered by the tribunal prior thereto the writ jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked. Many cases, however, had been filed before this Court wherein after a long time review petitions were filed and which having been rejected, writ jurisdiction of this Court is being invoked questioning an order passed by the tribunal which was rendered prior to 18-3-1997. ( 8 ) IN the aforementioned situation, the question has been referred to a larger Bench by an order dated 20-4-2001. A Division bench of this Court in E. Venkata Ramana v. The General Manager, S. C. Rly, secunderabad in Writ Petition No. 8589 of 1999 by a judgment dated 25-1-2000 held: in case, if the Tribunal had acted upon the review application and had revised the order, for an aggrieved party fresh cause of action is always available and such aggrieved party could approach this Court. Such an action is as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in chandra Kumar s case (supra ). The facts are different here. The Tribunal has refused to review its earlier order dated 27-1-1997 which is passed prior to the law laid down by the Supreme court in Chandra Kumar. Such an action is as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in chandra Kumar s case (supra ). The facts are different here. The Tribunal has refused to review its earlier order dated 27-1-1997 which is passed prior to the law laid down by the Supreme court in Chandra Kumar. We are, therefore, of the view, no cause of action arose to the petitioner to knock at the doors of this Court and we dismiss the Writ Petition. ( 9 ) A Bench of this Court observed in the referring order dated 20-4-2001 thus: prima facie, we are of the opinion that the said judgment of the Division bench requires re-consideration, keeping in view the fact that as to whether the Tribunal has exercised its review jurisdiction in accordance with law or not may fall for consideration before this Court in exercise of the power of judicial review. ( 10 ) WITH a view to answer the question let us consider the provisions of review contained in the Act. The power of review is conferred upon the Tribunal by reason of section 22 (3) of the Act which reads thus: a Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this act, the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely,- (f) reviewing its decisions ( 11 ) RULE 17 of the Central Administrative tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 reads thus: application for review- (1) No application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed. (2) A review application shall ordinarily be heard by the same Bench which has passed the order, unless the chairman may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct it to be heard by any other Bench. (3) Unless otherwise ordered by the bench concerned, a review application shall be disposed of by circulation and the Bench may either dismiss the application or direct notice to the opposite party. (4) Where an application for review of any judgment or order has been made and disposed of, no further application for review shall be entertained in the same matter. (4) Where an application for review of any judgment or order has been made and disposed of, no further application for review shall be entertained in the same matter. (5) No application for review shall be entertained unless it is supported by a duly sworn affidavit indicating therein the source of knowledge, personal or otherwise, and also those which are sworn on the basis of the legal advice. The counter-affidavit in review application will also be a duly sworn affidavit wherever any averment of fact is disputed. ( 12 ) THE power of the Administrative tribunal to review its own judgment is, therefore, saved as contained in Code of civil Procedure. Section 114 and Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure read thus: section 114. Review- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved- (A) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (B) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or (C) by a decision on a reference from a court of Small Causes,may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit. Order 47 Rule 1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved - (A) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (B) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (C) by a decision on a reference from a court of Small Causes,and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation - The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. ( 13 ) AS the power of review of the tribunal is referable to the provisions of code of Civil Procedure it goes without saying that the consequences thereof would also be governed by the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code would thus be squarely attracted which is in the following terms: order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application.- (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable; but an order granting the application may be objected to at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. (2) Where the application has been rejected in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear, he may apply for an order to have the rejected application restored to the file, and, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when such application was called on for hearing, the Court shall order it to be restored to the file upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for hearing the same. (3) No order shall be made under sub-rule (2) unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party. ( 14 ) IN terms of the aforementioned provisions, therefore, whereas an appeal would be maintainable against an original order, in the event the review petition is allowed, the said order itself would be appealable. (3) No order shall be made under sub-rule (2) unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party. ( 14 ) IN terms of the aforementioned provisions, therefore, whereas an appeal would be maintainable against an original order, in the event the review petition is allowed, the said order itself would be appealable. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether, if an appeal is not maintainable, under Order 47 Rule 7 against decision passed on such application, a writ petition will lie. ( 15 ) HAVING regard to the provisions of order 47 Rule 7 of the Code, we are of the opinion when a review petition is dismissed, the doctrine of merger will not apply. The right of appeal, therefore, would be referable to the date when it was passed and not on the date on which the Tribunal refused to review its order for one reason or the other. If an appeal is not maintainable against the order passed in review we fail to see any reason as to how an application for judicial review would be maintainable having regard to the decision of the apex Court in L. Chandra kumar (supra ). ( 16 ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that the power of judicial review cannot be exercised by this Court in relation to an order which was passed prior to the date of pronouncing of the decision of the Supreme court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) if the application filed for review of the order is dismissed. ( 17 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that this writ petition is not maintainable. It is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.