ORDER Hari Nath Tilhari, J.—By this petition, Petitioner has sought the following reliefs: (a) To call for the record. (b) To quash the impugned notification dated 21.12.2000, bearing No. TAPAM.GRAPAM.HA.ADHYAKSHARA CHUNAVANE 2000-01, produced at Annexure-D, issued by Respondent No. 3, i.e., the Returning Officer. (c) For issue of writ of mandamus to Respondent Nos. 3 and 6, to reject the nomination paper filed by Respondent No. 4, for the post of Adhyaksha of Malebennur Gram Panchayat as the pos t of Adhyaksha of Malebennur Gram Panchayat is reserved for BCM-A category, as per notification issued by Respondent No. 6 - Annexure-B, and for issue of such other directions, as the Court may deem fit. Petitioner has also prayed for grant of interim relief for staying all the proceedings of election which have to take place in pursuance of impugned notification dated 21.12.2000, referred to above. 2. According to the Petitioner's case, totally 41 members of Panchayat were elected. Thereafter, Respondent No. 3, issued notification and calendar of events for holding the election of Adhyaksha and called the meeting by fixing 27.11.2000. Annexure-D, which is subject-matter of challenge had been issued on 21.12.2000, by the Returning Officer appointed for election of Adhyaksha of Gram Panchayat concerned, this is described as Election Malebennur notification regarding counting of ballot papers, and which reads as under: Writ Petition No. 36630 of 2000 (LB) Srigere Rajanna v. the Assistant Commissioner, Davangere and Others, which was pending for enquiry was heard on 14.12.2000 at Ch. No. 15, in Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka came to be dismissed. Therefore the counting of Ballot papers will be conducted on 3.1.2001 at 11.00 a.m. in Auditorium of Taluka Panchayat by the Returning officer, Malebennur Gram Panchayat, in presence of all the members and the result will be declared. Therefore all the members of Malebennur Gram Panchayat are hereby directed to be present at the place which for counting of Ballot papers in time. The notification says that, an earlier Writ Petition No. 36630 of 2000, having been dismissed on 14.12.2000. Therefore, counting of Ballot papers will be conducted on 3.1.2001, at 11 a.m., in the Auditorium of Taluka Panchayat by Returning Officer in presence of all members and results will be declared and directed all members to be present at the time of counting of the Ballot papers. 3. Therefore, counting of Ballot papers will be conducted on 3.1.2001, at 11 a.m., in the Auditorium of Taluka Panchayat by Returning Officer in presence of all members and results will be declared and directed all members to be present at the time of counting of the Ballot papers. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the notification, the Petitioner has come up before this Court by way of this petition. 4. I have heard Sri Gachchinamath, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri Bharamagowda, learned Government Pleader for the Respondents. 5. Government Pleader raised the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this Writ Petition on the basis of Article 243(O) of the Constitution, I will deal with this objection hereinafter: Perusal of the notification per se reveals that, counting of Ballot papers has to be done and result has to be declared. In view of these facts it appears that, the process of election is going on and is (sic) with declaration of the result. 6. Para-IV of the Constitution of India deals with Panchayats, its constitution, election of members and their Chairman etc. and Article 243(O) bars the interference by the Courts in electoral matters, it will be appropriate at this juncture to quote in extenso Article 243(O) of the Constitution of India which reads as under: 243(O). Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters: Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-(a) .... (b) No election to any panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as it provided, for by or under any law made by the legislature of the State. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that, powers of this Court under Article 226 are yet there and they are not curtailed. He further submitted that this provision will apply only to the case when the result of election is declared, thereafter, it will apply, but it will not apply to challenge to any other process or challenge to notification of election. In my opinion, both the contentions of the Petitioner's Counsel Sri Gachchinamath are without substance. 7. He further submitted that this provision will apply only to the case when the result of election is declared, thereafter, it will apply, but it will not apply to challenge to any other process or challenge to notification of election. In my opinion, both the contentions of the Petitioner's Counsel Sri Gachchinamath are without substance. 7. Article 243(o) begins with the non-obstante clause and expression 'notwithstanding anything in this constitution', clearly overrides provisions and give overriding effect in the sense that, as far as election matters are concerned, even if, Articles 226 or 227 exits, the process of or remedy under Article 226, will not be available, for challenge, in the matter of election. The Article 243 is expressive of latest intention of framers and the purpose of it appears, to be to avoid and get rid of dilatory tactics in the matter of election and complete the same with Scheduled period without intermediate interruptions by way of legal proceedings challenging the steps and stages between its' commencement and conclusion. 7a. In view of non-obstante clause in Article 243, this first contention of Sri Gachinamath appears, to be without substance, and it is the settled position that remedy under Article 226 is not available in election matters and specially when allowing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution will create delay in the completion of election process. Further the contention of Sri Gachchinamath that, this will only apply when the result of election has been declared and expression election only means that the result of election declaring one to be elected. This contention again, is based of misconception. 8. What is the meaning of 'election' as, used in the Constitution has been subject-matter of consideration in very many decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court beginning from 1952, in the context of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, it will be appropriate at this juncture to refer some cases on this point, the first case in which the question 'what is the meaning of election' has been considered in N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, AIR 1952 SC 64 , in Paragraph-7, their Lordships observe as: As we have seen, the most important question for determination is the meaning to be given to the word "election" in Article 329(b). Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, AIR 1952 SC 64 , in Paragraph-7, their Lordships observe as: As we have seen, the most important question for determination is the meaning to be given to the word "election" in Article 329(b). That word has by long-usage in connection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic institutions, acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the narrow sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate which may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll. In the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected. In A.V. Srinivasalu Reddy and Anr. Vs. S. Kuppuswami Goundar, AIR 1928 Mad 253 the learned Judges of the Madras High Court after examining the question, expressed the opinion that the term "election" may be taken to embrace the whole procedure whereby an "elected member" is returned, whether or not it be found necessary to take a poll. With this view, my brother, Mahajan, J., expressed his agreement in Sat Narain Vs. Hanuman Parshad AIR 1946 Lah 85; and I also find myself in agreement with it. It seems to me that the word "election" has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the wide sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the legislature. The use of the expression "conduct of elections" in Article 324 specifically points to the wide meaning, and that meaning can also be read consistently into the other provisions which occur in Part XV including Article 329(b). That the word "election" bears this wide meaning whenever we talk of elections in a democratic country, is borne out by the fact that in most of the books on the subject and in several cases dealing with the matter, one of the questions mooted is, when the election begins. The subject is dealt with quite concisely in Halsbury's Laws of England in the following passage see p. 237 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Edn. The subject is dealt with quite concisely in Halsbury's Laws of England in the following passage see p. 237 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Edn. 2, Volume 12 under the heading "Commencement of the Election: Although the first formal step in every election is the issue of the writ, the election is considered for some purposes to begin at an earlier date. It is a question of fact in each case when an election begins in such a way as to make the parties concerned responsible for breaches of election law, the test being whether the context is 'reasonably imminent'. Neither the issue of the writ nor the publication of the notice of election can be looked to as fixing the date when an election begins from this point of view. Nor, again, does the nomination day afford any criterion. The election will usually begin at least earlier than the issue of the writ. The question when the election begins must be carefully distinguished from that as to when 'the conduct and management of' an election may be said to begin. Again, the question as to when a particular person commences to be a candidate is a question to be considered in each case. The discussion in this passage makes it clear that the word "election" can be and has been appropriately used with reference to the entire process which consists of several stages and embraces many steps, some of which may have an important bearing on the result of the process. 9. In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, AIR 1978 SC 851 , their Lordships quoted observations from their earlier decision in the case of Ponnuswami referred above and in the Judgment delivered by Krishna Iyer, J., in Paragraphs 30 and 31, as under: 30. The plenary bar of Article 329(b) rests on two principles.-(1) The pre-emptory urgency of prompt engineering of the whole election process without intermediate interruptions by way of legal proceedings challenging the steps and stages in between the commencement and the conclusion. (2) The provision of a special jurisdiction which can be invoked by an aggrieved party at the end of the election excludes other form, the right and remedy being creatures of statutes and controlled by the Constitution. Durga Shankar Mehta Vs. (2) The provision of a special jurisdiction which can be invoked by an aggrieved party at the end of the election excludes other form, the right and remedy being creatures of statutes and controlled by the Constitution. Durga Shankar Mehta Vs. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others, AIR 1954 SC 520 has affirmed this position and supplemented it by holding that, once the Election Tribunal has decided, the prohibition is extinguished and the Supreme Court's over all power to interfere under Article 136 springs into action. In Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 this Court upheld the rule in N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, AIR 1952 SC 64 excluding any proceeding, including one under Article 226, during the on-going process of election, understood in the comprehensive sense of notification down to declaration. Beyond the declaration comes the election petition, but beyond the decision of the Tribunal the ban of Article 329(b) does not bind. 31. If 'election' bears the larger connotation, if 'calling in question' possesses a semantic sweep in plain English, if policy and principle are tools for interpretation of statutes, language permitting, the conclusion is irresistible, even though the argument contra may have emotional impact and ingenious appeal, that the catch-all jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot consider the correctness, legality or otherwise of the direction for cancellation integrated with re-poll. For, the prima facie purpose of such a repoll was to restore a detailed poll process and to complete it through the salvationary effort of a re-poll. 10. In Paragraph-121, again, their Lordships observed as under: As already pointed out, it is well-settled that election covers the entire process from the issue of the notification under Section 14, to the declaration of the result under Section 66 of the Act. When a poll that has already taken place has been cancelled and a fresh poll has been ordered, the order therefore, with the amended date, is passed as an integral part of the electoral process. We are not concerned with the question whether the impugned order is right or wrong or invalid on any account. Even if it is a wrong order it does not cease to be an order passed by a competent authority charged with the conduct of elections with the aid and object of completing the elections. We are not concerned with the question whether the impugned order is right or wrong or invalid on any account. Even if it is a wrong order it does not cease to be an order passed by a competent authority charged with the conduct of elections with the aid and object of completing the elections. Although that is not always decisive, the impugned order itself shows that it has been passed in the exercise of power under Article 324(1) and Section 153 of the Act. That is also the correct position. Such an order, relating, as it does, to election within the width of the expression as interpreted by this Court, cannot be questioned except by an election petition under the Act. 11. In the case of Election Commission of India Vs. Shivaji and Others, AIR 1988 SC 61 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: Article 329(b) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution no election to either house of Parliament or to the house or either House of legislature shall be called in question except by election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under the law by appropriate legislature. Their Lordships in Paragraph-6, observed: The word 'election' has by long usage in connection with the process of proper representatives in democratic institutions acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the narrow sense it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate which may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling, or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll. In the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected and it is in this wide sense that the word is used in Part-XV of the Constitution in which Article 329(b) occurs. In view of these decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealing with the meaning of expression, "election" under Article 329(2b) and the law laid down thereunder, defining that, election expression is, used in the Constitution under Articles 329(b) means and includes entire process, beginning from the notification till declaration of result and same expression have been used in Article 243. The expression "election" used in Article 243(O), has to be constituted and is to be taken to bear the same meaning with reference to the elections to Panchayat and offices relating thereto. In view of bar under Article 243(O), which clearly provides that, no election to panchayat or office in Panchayat shall be called in question, except by the process of the petition as, prescribed by law made by the State Legislature can be done. So, the election or any legality, even if, in the process of election can be challenged only by way of filing of election petition as provided by the law made by the State, before proper authority, but, in view of the non-obstante clause, recourse to Articles 226 or 227, cannot be permitted and power and jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised. Thus considered the present writ petition, as such, is misconceived and is hereby dismissed, but making it very clear that, it will be open to the Petitioner to avail the grounds of challenge which have been tried to be raised in this petition when and if occasion arises for him to file the election petition. 12.. Subject to the above observations, this Writ Petition is dismissed. 13.Costs made easy.