JUDGMENT V.K. Bali, J. - By this common judgment, we propose to dispose of Letters Patent Appeals bearing No. 571 to 573, 621, 623 and 1995 of 1989 and 569 of 1990 filed by the claimants as also Civil Appeals bearing Nos. 3257 to 3264 of 1989, which have since been remanded by the Honble Supreme Court to be decided along with pending Letters Patent Appeals filed by the claimants, detailed above, vide order dated October 1, 1996, as all these appeals, whether filed by the claimants or by the State, are against the common judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in eight Regular First Appeals bearing Nos. 668, 712 to 714, 721, 923 to 925 of 1985. 2. Brief facts of the case reveal the State of Haryana, vide Notification dated June 12, 1981, published on June 30, 1981, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (here-in-after referred to as the Act), acquired 19 acres 7 kanals 3 marlas of land in village Khairpur (Sirsa) for public purpose, namely, raising Housing Board Colony. The Land Acquisition Collector divided the acquired land into three blocks and vide his award dated February 12, 1985, determined the market value at rates varying from Rs. 10,400/- to Rs. 17,200/- per acre depending upon the location of a particular part of the land vis-a-vis the Sirsa-Barnala road and other surrounding constructions. The claimants were not satisfied with the adequacy of compensation awarded to them and thus sought references under Section 18 of the Act. Learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, vide his award dated February 12, 1985 reduced number of blocks to two and assessed the market value at the rate of Rs. 605/- per marla for the land on Sirsa-Barnala road upto depth of 60 yards and at the rate of Rs. 208/- per marla for the rest of the land. The claimants, still not satisfied with the adequacy of the compensation, so assessed, filed Regular First Appeals in this Court, wherein learned Single Judge determined the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 25/- per square yard, vide his order dated December 17, 1988. It is against this order that whereas State filed Special Leave Petitions bearing Nos. 3257 of 3264 of 1989, with the result already indicated above the claimants filed Letters Patent Appeals, noted above under Clause X of the Letters Patent. 3. 25/- per square yard, vide his order dated December 17, 1988. It is against this order that whereas State filed Special Leave Petitions bearing Nos. 3257 of 3264 of 1989, with the result already indicated above the claimants filed Letters Patent Appeals, noted above under Clause X of the Letters Patent. 3. Records of the case would bear it out that the claimants had placed on records sale instances, Ex. P93, P94, P87, P70, P6, P67 (P-90), P7, P45, P51 and P68 which pertained to acquired land itself. These sale instances, even though small, were, however, completely rejected by the learned Additional District Judge on the ground that in view of amendment of Section 24 of the Act, wherein it has been provided that any increase to the value of the land on account of same being put to any use which is forbidden by law or opposed to public policy, cannot be taken into consideration and the evidence on record does not show that these plots were sold out of the acquired land after getting necessary permission to the carve out colony in accordance with the provisions of Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975. This finding of the learned Additional District Judge has been set aside the learned Single Judge on the grounds that could not be assailed and indeed have not been assailed by learned State Counsel. 4. Learned counsel, representing the claimant-appellants, however, vehemently contends that some of the sale instances, which too pertained to the land under acquisition itself, have since been ignored and if the same were also taken into consideration, the average of sale instances would have worked for more than what has actually been granted to the claimants by learned Single Judge. It is further the contention of learned counsel that reliance having been placed upon the sale instances forming part of the acquired land itself, there could not be any further cut while determining the market value, as those whose land stood acquired, by virtue of such sale instances could not be given price less than what had actually been paid by them and that being so, the amount less than that paid to other claimants would be a pure and simple case of discrimination. 5. 5. We have carefully examined the records of the case and from the facts, as have been fully detailed above, we do not find any merit in either of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the claimant-appellants. Indeed, learned Single Judge ignored the sale instances Ex. P93, P94, P87 and P70 but while doing so, it was clearly observed that these four instances required to be rules out of consideration for the reason that same were not proximate to the date of notification as these were not proximate to the date of notification as these were more than a year earlier. This reason in itself may not be enough to ignore the said instances but details of these sale instances, which have been given in paragraph 23 of the judgment rendered by learned Additional District Judge would reveal that if these sale instances were also to be taken into consideration and then an average of all the sale instances was to be worked out, claimants would have got far less compensation than that they have got now. Insofar as sale instance Ex. P93 is concerned, same pertains to March 13, 1979 whereby one kanal five marlas of land was sold for Rs. 9500/-, which works out at Rs. 12.56 per sq. yard. Ex. P94 pertains to March 23, 1979 vide which one kanal five marlas of land was sold for Rs. 9500/- and once again the price per sq. yard works out to be Rs. 12.56. Ex.P70 pertains to February 8, 1980, whereby land measuring eighteen kanals two marlas was sold for Rs. 12,000/-, the average price per square yard of which come to Rs. 21.25. Insofar as sale instance Ex. P87 is concerned, it pertains to June 15, 1979 for one kanal 15 marlas of land which was sold for Rs. 15,000/-. The average price per sq. yard of this sale instance comes to Rs. 14.16. As mentioned above, if all these sale instances were also to be clubbed with the sale instances taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge, the average of all the sale instances would have worked less than what the claimants have been granted. 15,000/-. The average price per sq. yard of this sale instance comes to Rs. 14.16. As mentioned above, if all these sale instances were also to be clubbed with the sale instances taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge, the average of all the sale instances would have worked less than what the claimants have been granted. Further, once there is evidence of increase in the price of the land, naturally it is sale instances in closest proximity to the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, which are more relevant and need to be taken into consideration for working out the market value of the land under acquisition. Insofar as contention of learned counsel based upon discrimination is concerned, all that requires to be mentioned is that if the vendee-claimants of these sale instances were not to purchase small pieces of land and instead, it is large piece of land which was sold to them, naturally, the price would have comparatively reduced. Further, even though two sale instances of small pieces of land have been taken into consideration, i.e., Ex. P6 and P7, the land, subject matter of the said sale instances was sold @ Rs. 42.50 per sq. yard. Insofar as sale instances Ex. P51 and P68 are concerned, and which are of later date than that of Ex. P6 and P7, same was sold @ Rs. 33.05 and 23.61 per sq. yard respectively. In these circumstances, a cut of 1/3rd, on the average of relevant and comparable sale instances of small plots was just and fair. 6. In view of the discussion made above, we find no merit in either of the appeals filed by the claimants or the State. That being so, while upholding the market value assessed by learned Single Judge, we dismiss all these appeals, leaving, however, the parties to bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.